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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis compares policies in Australia and Denmark relevant to assisting women 
from workless couples into work, with a focus on policy learning for Britain. The 
research uses case studies comprising of documentary analysis and 52 elite interviews 
with policy actors to create a contextual analysis based on the notion of ‘hard’ policy 
learning (Dolowitz, 2009). It also develops the idea of ‘policy as translation’ (Lendvai 
and Stubbs, 2007) rather than as ‘transfer’. In so doing, it examines the cultural and 
political underpinnings of the policy developments in each of the countries and how 
these impact on the translatability of policies and programmes to Britain. 
 
The concept of ‘welfare recalibration’ (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003) and its four sub-
dimensions (functional, distributive, normative, politico-institutional) is used both as a 
theoretical basis, as well as a framework for the analysis. It is argued that the 
normative aspects underpin policy change in the other sub-dimensions. Policies for 
partnered women in both Australia and Britain have recalibrated their access to social 
assistance, informed by a normative shift in conceptualising them as ‘workers’ rather 
than as ‘wives/partners’ or ‘mothers’ (Sainsbury, 1996). In Denmark policies have been 
restructured in response to perceived challenges resulting from immigration. 
 
The thesis argues that policy change, as well as policy learning, for partnered women 
in all three countries is incremental. It suggests that activation for partnered women as 
a reflection of welfare recalibration wrongly assumes that the labour market and 
families have similarly adjusted and that childcare provision in Britain is a missing 
core foundation for activation for this group, reflective of stalled functional and 
normative recalibration. The analysis also argues for the incorporation of welfare 
recalibration as a framework for assessing the possibility of policy learning, as well as 
in considering whether policy translation has taken place. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1990s active labour market policies and the concept of activation have 
become increasingly significant across many OECD countries. Such policies have 
gradually been extended from unemployed people to other groups outside the labour 
market, such as disabled people and lone parents. Internationally, partnered women 
have rarely been a specific target for such policies, however in 1999 the Labour 
government in Britain introduced the New Deal for Partners of the Unemployed1 
which offers employment assistance on a voluntary basis to partners (mainly women) 
of unemployed people (mainly men). The programme was designed to address the 
policy problem of worklessness and poverty amongst couple households, particularly 
those with children. In 2008 there were 277,000 workless couple households with 
dependent children and 658,000 workless couple households without dependent 
children (National Statistics, 2008) and approximately 350,000 partners receive support 
through the benefits system (Department for Work and Pensions, 2008: 126). However, 
the New Deal for Partners has had little success in engaging partnered women or in 
moving them into work (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2008). 
Taking the perceived policy failure of the programme as its starting point, this 
research compares policy responses to the ‘problem’ of partnered women outside the 
labour market in Australia and Denmark, with a focus on policy learning for Britain. 
The project is a CASE studentship funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) in collaboration with the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP),2  
which in Britain has responsibility for social security and labour market policies. The 
research is both a conceptual and comparative analysis, as well as a project focused on 
practical policy learning, commissioned by policymakers.  
 
                                                 
1
 Subsequently renamed the ‗New Deal for Partners‘. 
2
 In Britain, benefits and employment services are delivered by Jobcentre Plus, an agency of the Department 
for Work and Pensions (DWP) created in 2002 by merging offices of the Benefits Agency and the 
Employment Service. 
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Section 1.1 of this chapter provides a short introduction to the study and sets out the 
research questions, Section 1.2 describes the innovative contribution of the research to 
existing literature, Section 1.3 the limitations of the study and Section 1.4 sets out the 
structure of the thesis to follow. 
 
1.1   The research 
 
The research examines policies and programmes associated with assisting non-
working partnered women into work. Policies are ‚broad statements of intentions 
which represent the direction in which policy makers wish to go‛, whilst programmes 
are ‚the specific means or course of action used to implement policies‛ (Dolowitz et 
al., 2000: 23). The first stage of the research was an evidence review of OECD 
countries, from which Australia and Denmark were selected as comparators for in-
depth case study research. The case study method comprised documentary analysis 
and 52 elite interviews with policy actors (31 in Australia and 21 in Denmark) 
conducted both face-to-face and by telephone. Governmental policy actors were 
interviewed to gain an understanding of the drivers behind the policies and 
programmes and policy critiques were obtained by interviewing non-governmental 
policy actors such as academics and campaigning organisations. Documents were 
used to inform the case studies in relation to partnered women’s constraints on 
working in each of the countries, as well as the construction of the policy problem 
‘representations’ (Bacchi, 1999), responses and goals. The documents acted as 
triangulation for the interviews and vice versa. The research questions posed at the 
start of the research were: 
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1. What are the most relevant benefit (and service) policies and labour market 
interventions within a range of OECD countries that relate to the situation of 
partnered women in non-working households of working age?3 
 
2. How and for which groups of partnered women have these policies been 
effective at facilitating labour market participation, and to what extent are 
elements of these policies likely to be transferable to Britain? 
 
3. What have been the driving factors and social and economic contexts behind 
the introduction of such policies and what lessons follow regarding 
transferability to Britain? 
 
These questions were addressed at different stages of the research process: the first by 
the initial evidence review of relevant policies in OECD countries and the second and 
third questions during the case study construction and analysis stages. These key 
research questions were supplemented by further, detailed questions devised during 
the fieldwork planning stage (see Appendix 1).  
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the starting point of this comparative 
research was the New Deal for Partners programme in Britain (since 1999), but also 
took into account Joint Claims for Jobseeker’s Allowance (since 2001) and the Partners 
Outreach for Ethnic Minorities (POEM) pilots (2007-2009). In Australia the research 
examined reforms specifically relating to couples claiming income support (beginning 
in 1994 with Working Nation) and subsequent reforms targeted at parents receiving 
income support: Australians Working Together (2003) and Welfare to Work (2006). The 
approaches to assisting partnered women into work in Britain and Australia were 
                                                 
3
 This is the age when individuals are expected to be in paid work, before statutory retirement age. The OECD 
defines working age as 15-64 for both men and women, however not all countries use this definition. In 
Britain, working age is currently defined as 16-64 for men and 16-59 for women, although Britain intends to 
adopt the OECD‘s definition by 2020. 
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conceptualised as targeted approaches specifically focused on partnered women, or 
sub-groups such as parents. Denmark’s approach was considered to be encompassing 
in relation to the activation paradigm of ‘all must be active’ (Rosdahl and Weise, 2001) 
since 1994, but this was viewed through the lens of the 300 timers reglen/300 hours rule 
(since 2006) targeted at (immigrant) married couples.  
 
The research examined the policy ‘stories’ in both Australia and Denmark in terms of 
the specific policy trajectories, focusing predominantly on active labour market 
policies. However, the case studies revealed the importance of other policy areas, 
namely access to benefits and childcare provision. The interviews with policy actors 
focused on their representation of the policy ‘problem’ and the perceived successes 
and failures of the policy responses. The focus of the research was on policy learning 
for Britain, centred on understanding the context of the programmes in each of the 
countries to assess the possibility of policy ‘translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007). 
The research considered policies already implemented or under consideration in 
Australia and Denmark until the cut-off date of September 2009. More recent policy 
developments are considered in Britain, particularly relating to the change of 
government in May 2010. 
 
1.2  Innovative contribution of the research 
 
The contribution of this research is in its specific focus on partnered women in non-
working households. The majority of existing literature concerning women, 
employment and social protection has focused on standard family formations, on 
mothers or lone parents. This research therefore fills a gap in knowledge relating to 
partnered women in non-working households and in particular provides an important 
reference source for information concerning the needs and support for this group in 
relation to access to paid work. The research also contributes a conceptual analysis to 
the policy transfer literature, which has predominantly focused on theoretical 
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approaches to policy transfer, or on studies which assess whether policy transfer has 
occurred. Its wider contribution is to comparative social policy research as well as to 
literature on policy change and policy learning. 
 
The study links the adaptation of contemporary welfare states to global transformation 
on the one hand, with family and household employment behaviour in relation to 
partnered women on the other. In the past four decades there has been considerable 
structural change in all societies and new forms of stratification have arisen in both 
families and the labour market. Changes in family structure include rising divorce 
rates, increasing cohabitation and an increase in the number of children born outside 
marriage (O'Connor et al., 1999): couple families comprise spouses as well as 
cohabiting partners and these family forms may be fluid, rather than static.  
 
Female labour market participation has increased relative to men’s across OECD 
countries. The 1980s saw a collapse in manufacturing industries in countries such as 
Britain and the withdrawal of working class men from the labour market, contributing 
to an increase in the number of families in which no one is in paid work. However, 
another important structural change is that many women have moved from being 
housewives or secondary workers supplementing family income to key dual or sole 
earners. Employment opportunities for women in particular have opened up in the 
increasing number of service industries, facilitated by new technologies (Esping-
Andersen, 1999).  
 
This study is concerned with how the welfare states of Australia, Denmark and Britain 
have responded to these structural challenges in respect of partnered women. As 
different constellations of states, markets and families, the institutions and structures 
of welfare states shape gender relations, but are also shaped by them. Esping-
Andersen (2009: 9) argues that ongoing changes in women’s roles and demographics 
render multiple societal ‘equilibria’ as unstable, or create societal ‘disequilibria’. It is 
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within this context that the overarching analytical framework of ‘welfare recalibration’ 
has salience, highlighting how welfare states respond incrementally to ‘new’ social 
risks such as the reconciliation of work and family, being fine tuned to restore some 
kind of equilibrium. 
 
The data were analysed using Ferrera and Hemerijck’s (2003) framework of ‘welfare 
recalibration’ which is both a descriptive and prescriptive metaphor for incremental 
policy change (p. 89). Although the focus of recalibration is on ‚institutional 
reconfiguration and re-balancing‛ (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 89), this research is 
not concerned with questions of whether and how institutions change. Rather, the 
recalibration framework in the form of its four sub-dimensions (functional, 
distributive, normative and politico-institutional) permits a truly comparative piece of 
research as an alternative to accounts divided into country-by-country chapters. The 
four sub-dimensions are each complemented by related theoretical concepts, which 
are described in Chapter Two and set out in Section 1.4 below. The thesis’ originality is 
two-fold. Firstly, in its use of recalibration to analyse policies relating to a specific 
group of women (partners outside the labour market) in a gender-sensitive way. 
Secondly, by extending Ferrera and Hemerijck’s analysis outside the European context 
by investigating the Australian case in addition to Denmark and Britain. Through the 
four-sub-dimensions, the thesis demonstrates the shift from welfare to workfare states 
in all three countries in relation to this group of women. 
 
Although the research focuses on policy learning, there are key differences between 
the approach taken here and that adopted by policymakers in searching for policy 
lessons. The timescale for this study is longer than the fast policy learning required by 
policymakers and, by examining the context surrounding the programmes, the 
research has engaged in ‘hard’ rather than ‘soft’ policy learning (Dolowitz, 2009). In 
soft learning, ‚nothing new is incorporated into the existing knowledge structure‛ 
(Dolowitz, 2009: 323), whereas harder forms require a deeper understanding of the 
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contexts within which programmes operate. Further, the research contributes to the 
literature on policy learning and is innovative in its focus on the possibility of policy 
learning and policy translation from other countries, rather than on examining 
whether policy transfer has occurred and whether it was successful. The research thus 
moves beyond merely making policy recommendations to consider how such 
recommendations can be employed by policy actors in the British context. As such, the 
research has been grounded in both the theoretical literature, as well as the 
policymaking process. By using elite interviews, the research has examined how the 
policy problem representation has informed the policy responses in Australia and 
Denmark and how these representations differ between the various policy actors. 
Focusing on ‘what works’ in active labour market policies does not take into account 
wider factors relating to what does not work. Policies and programmes are informed by 
ideological constructions such as the problematisation of particular policy issues; such 
constructions inform the policy responses and also frame the conceptualisation of 
policy ‘success’.  
 
The research was conducted during an important stage of welfare reform in Britain4 
and the findings consider policy learning in this context. This thesis suggests that 
Britain can learn three major lessons from the examination of policies relating to 
partnered women in Australia and Denmark. Firstly, many partnered women in 
Britain have not been claiming (means tested) benefits in their own right as 
individuals, but via a derived access5 principle of main claimant and dependent 
partner. Based on the experiences of Australia and Denmark, partially individualising 
access to social assistance benefits is an important precursor to engaging directly with 
partnered women through active labour market policies. Secondly, alternative care 
and in particular both pre- and post-school age childcare is a prerequisite for 
                                                 
4
 The research commenced in October 2006 and the fieldwork took place in 2009 whilst the Welfare Reform 
Act was progressing through Parliament. 
5
 This term has similarities with Jepsen and Meulders‘ concept of ‗derived rights‘ - see Jepsen, M. & 
Meulders, D. (2002) The individualisation of rights in social protection systems, in Sarfati, H. & Bonoli, G. 
(Eds.) Labour market and social protection reforms in international perspective. Aldershot, Ashgate, 97-116. 
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activation policies relating to partnered women. Thirdly, individually responsive 
employment assistance is likely to be the most effective approach to assisting this 
heterogeneous group into work.  
 
1.3 Limitations of the study 
 
The study has a number of limitations. Firstly, it does not include a quantitative 
analysis of factors which impact on the labour market participation of partnered 
women. This is partly a result of the paucity of statistical data relating to this specific 
group in both Australia and Denmark, but it also reflects the focus of the research on 
contextual policy learning and policy translation. Secondly, the research does not 
make specific recommendations concerning which interventions (or the sequence of 
interventions) are the most effective in assisting partnered women into work, although 
some indications are given in Chapter Seven. This reflects the heterogeneity of the 
group and the difficulty of recommending one approach for all, but highlights the 
importance of the policy recommendation of individually tailored employment 
assistance. Thirdly, the research generated less interview data for the Australian case 
study than for the Danish one (discussed in Chapters Three and Eight), however this 
was countered to some extent by the availability of more documents in Australia than 
in Denmark.  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter Two sets out the theoretical framework of recalibration and discusses why 
welfare regime theory has provided a backdrop to the research, but has not been its 
predominant focus. It also considers gendered aspects of regime theory and in 
particular the salience to the analysis of Sainsbury’s (1996) concepts of eligibility and 
entitlement to benefits. Recalibration has been used as a tool to analyse aspects of the 
policies relevant to partnered women outside the labour market in the three countries 
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in Chapters Five, Six and Seven and to underline the importance of incremental policy 
change (and policy translation) in relation to this group. This framework has also been 
used as a way of examining the possibility of policy ‘translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 
2007), drawing on the work of Dolowitz (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, Dolowitz, 2009, 
Dolowitz et al., 2000).  
 
Chapter Three discusses the methodology for the research. Linking to the theoretical 
framework, it sets out how the limitations of regime theory have shaped the research 
design in not selecting countries according to regime typologies. Instead, countries 
were selected to provide a comparison of ‘targeted’ and ‘encompassing’ (Korpi and 
Palme, 1998) approaches to assisting partnered women into work. The chapter 
considers the different stages of the research: the evidence review, selection of cases 
and the case studies themselves. The methodology is considered in more depth 
through discussion of the case study method, the use of documents, access to 
respondents and ethical considerations, and elite interviewing as the core method for 
the research, but one which is under-utilised in social policy.   
 
Chapter Four analyses the evaluation evidence for the programmes examined in 
Britain, Australia and Denmark. This begins with the constraints on paid work in 
structural and normative terms (McRae, 2003). The policy ‘story’ for each of the three 
countries is set out and the chapter concludes by considering evidence relating to the 
‘effectiveness’ of the programmes examined, assessed against the success criteria 
defined within each of the countries and linked to the problem representation as set 
out in the documents analysed. It is argued that although the governments in both 
Australia and Denmark have suggested that the programmes are successful on the 
basis of decreasing welfare caseloads, these claims can be challenged by both lack of 
evidence of more qualitative considerations and of resultant increased poverty. 
 
 10 
 
Chapter Five begins the analysis of findings using the recalibration framework by 
focusing on the functional and distributive sub-dimensions. The functional sub-
dimension is constituted here as the function of the three welfare states in providing 
social security, employment, employment assistance and alternative care, including 
childcare. The thesis argues for the importance of looking beyond activation policies in 
isolation to include these other functions. Drawing on Sainsbury (1996) the chapter 
argues that partnered women’s entitlement to benefits in Australia and Britain has 
changed from the bases of dependent wives/partners and mothers to that of worker, 
which is predominantly the basis of entitlement in Denmark. The chapter highlights 
the similarities in the social contracts of activation across the three countries, drawing 
on Serrano Pascual’s (2007) concept of quid pro quo and the changing balance of the 
rights and duties of the state and the individual. Distributive recalibration relates to 
social groups and in this chapter this is discussed in relation to targeted activation 
programmes for partnered women in Australia and Britain as an extension of policies 
for lone parents, arising from benefits based on categories of incapacity for work. The 
targeted approaches in these two countries are compared with the Danish 
encompassing approach, whilst also accounting for the anomalous targeting of 
immigrant women by the 300 hours rule. The chapter considers the advantages and 
limitations of the implementation of individually tailored assistance in both Australia 
and Denmark as a component of policy learning for Britain. 
 
Chapter Six focuses on normative recalibration: values, norms and discourses. There is 
interdependence between the four sub-dimensions of recalibration, but this thesis 
argues that the normative sub-dimension underpins policy change in the other three. 
In particular this chapter argues that policies relating to partnered women outside the 
labour market are a reflection of the complex dynamics of ‘work’, ‘family’ and ‘nation’ 
(Williams, 1995, Williams, 1989). The Danish case highlighted the importance of 
‘culture’ to the policy problem representation; although this was critiqued by non-
governmental policy actors, it is argued that this aspect has salience to the case of 
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partnered women outside the labour market in both Britain and Australia. Activation 
for partnered women assumes that caring responsibilities are transferred elsewhere 
and the Australian and British policies assumed that partners had the capacity to swap 
roles. This was undermined in the latter case in particular by inadequate alternative 
care and in both countries by gendered roles within couples and by individual 
preferences for work and caring as reflections of ‘gendered moral rationalities’ 
(Duncan and Edwards, 1999). In Denmark an increasingly diverse population 
resulting from migration is a challenge to universalist policies contributing to the 
attainment of the universal breadwinner model (Fraser, 1989), including day-care. In 
all three countries the normalisation of ‘work’ is important and it is argued that this 
aspect cannot be considered without also accounting for the dimensions of ‘family’ 
and ‘nation,’ the latter being of particular importance to the Danish case.  
 
Chapter Seven incorporates the final sub-dimension of recalibration (politico-
institutional) as a facet of policy translation (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007), using the 
work of Dolowitz (Dolowitz et al., 2000, Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) and Rose (1993, 
see also Rose, 1991). It argues for a hybridization, or synthesis of policies from 
Australia and Denmark to Britain in relation to partnered women outside the labour 
market. It suggests that institutional and ideational differences between Britain and 
Denmark do not preclude policy learning from the latter and that the contextual 
approach of policy translation highlights the differences as well as the often-stated 
similarities between Britain and Australia. However, ideological as well as 
institutional ‘stickiness’ is a constraint on the translation of policy learning from both 
countries. The chapter considers in detail the possibility of, and constraints on, policy 
translation of the three policy recommendations from this research: partial 
individualisation of benefits, alternative care and in particular childcare and 
individually responsive employment assistance. 
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Chapter Eight draws together the findings from the research and brings the thesis to a 
conclusion. It highlights that consideration should be given to the longer term 
implications of policies and programmes, beyond the immediate impact on decreasing 
income support caseloads. It also highlights that partnered women’s own cultural 
norms or preferences to care for their children (or for other adults) is a persistent 
concern for policymakers in both Britain and Australia (and to a lesser extent 
Denmark), particularly in the context of precarious and low-paid employment. As well 
as the three policy recommendations arising from this research, the chapter argues 
that attention should be paid to other complementary policies, such as parental leave 
and skills development. In the final conclusion, the thesis argues that activation for 
partnered women as a reflection of welfare recalibration wrongly assumes that the 
labour market and families have similarly recalibrated. Further, it argues that 
childcare provision in Britain is a missing core foundation for activation for this group, 
reflective of stalled functional and normative recalibration. 
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Chapter Two – Theoretical framework 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework for this comparative study. Section 2.2 
begins by considering how recalibration (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003) with its four 
sub-dimensions is utilised as a frame for this analysis. Section 2.3 discusses regime 
theory and its gendered variants and explains why it was used as a broad basis for the 
research, but not the overarching framework. This section also considers Sainsbury’s 
(1996) bases of entitlement to benefits and Williams’ (1995) interrelated concepts of 
‘work’, ‘family’ and ‘nation’. Section 2.4 examines Serrano Pascual’s activation regimes 
(2007) and Section 2.5 provides an account of how the policy transfer literature will be 
used to assess the possibility of policy learning for Britain from the policy responses to 
partnered women outside the labour market in Australia and Denmark. Section 2.6 
summarises the chapter and the theoretical framework to be used. 
 
2.2 Recalibration 
 
Institutions are meso-level entities devised by individuals, but which also constrain 
and structure the actions of individuals (Hudson and Lowe, 2004: 148). Path 
dependence (see Pierson, 2000) suggests that institutions are stable and persistent. 
Each step along a policy path produces consequences which make that path 
progressively more attractive and raises the costs of shifting to an alternate path. 
Sticking with established paths produces increasing returns, but exits are subject to 
increased costs, or decreasing returns (Pierson, 2001b: 312). Radical departure from a 
policy path may entail prohibitive costs, particularly if it involves institutional change, 
such as changes to legislative systems or welfare delivery systems (for example benefit 
administration systems). Although path dependency does not preclude particular 
types of policy reform, it may suggest that radical reform to policies relating to 
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partnered women outside the labour market is less likely if such reform constitutes 
marked divergence from a well-worn policy path.  
 
The premise of Hall and Soskice’s (2001) varieties of capitalism thesis is that ‚many of 
the most important institutional structures – such as systems of labour market 
regulation, education and training and corporate governance – depend on the 
presence of regulatory regimes that are the preserve of the nation-state‛ (p.4). Firstly, 
this is because a nation’s political economy is ‚inextricably bound up with its history‛ 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 13). Secondly, because institutions should not be considered as 
single entities, but reinforce one another: there is ‘institutional complementarity’ 
(Estévez-Abe et al., 2001: 146). Pierson (2001b: 9) warns that it is a mistake to treat 
institutions as independent variables which have similar effects in different settings. 
Instead, institutions are linked to an individual country’s history: they are ‘cultural 
products’ (Freeman, 1999: 91), which both constitute cultures and are constituted by 
them. OECD countries are currently faced with managing similar social risks, such as 
ageing populations and increasing numbers of sick and disabled people outside the 
labour market. ‘Divergent convergence’ (Leibfried and Obinger, 2001: 5), or 
‘contingent convergence’ (Hemerijck, 2006: 38) highlights that, whilst there may be 
converging policy trajectories, there is also diversity amongst welfare systems. 
Although some degree of convergence resulting from globalising forces can be 
observed across countries, divergence is also seen at the level of the nation-state. For 
Pierson, a key aspect of path dependency is that the effects of globalisation are 
mediated by domestic institutional arrangements within nation states.  
 
In this context, most welfare state commentators agree that welfare is being 
‘recalibrated’, ‘recast’, is ‘adapting’ or ‘restructuring’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2001: 2-3). Ferrera 
and Hemerijck suggest (2003) that ‚a completely new welfare architecture‛ is out of 
the question, but ‚recalibration is very much on the agenda‛ (p.121). The notion of 
welfare recalibration is derived from Pierson’s (2001a: 455) concept of welfare state 
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‘adjustment’. For Pierson, this represents restructuring in an era of ‘permanent 
austerity’, rather than dismantling, as suggested by those who argue that there is 
welfare state ‘retrenchment’, or a ‘race to the bottom’ in response to global economic 
pressures (see Castles, 2004). Pierson sets out ‘three worlds of welfare reform’ linked 
to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) regime types which together constitute a ‘new politics of 
the welfare state’. In liberal welfare states adjustment is in the form of re-
commodification, or cost containment; in conservative states, reforms involve cost 
containment, or recalibration in terms of rationalisation; and in social democratic 
states reform involves cost containment, or recalibration in the form of updating 
(Pierson, 2001a: 455). Cost containment is primarily motivated by the urgency of 
reducing debts and deficits; rationalisation refers to modifications of existing 
programmes in line with new ideas about how to achieve established goals; and 
updating constitutes specific initiatives in response to newly recognised social needs 
(Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 89). Whereas de-commodification involved services and 
income maintenance as a matter of right, re-commodification effectively reverses this 
process, restricting ‚alternatives to participation in the labour market, either by 
tightening eligibility or cutting benefits‛ (Pierson, 2001a: 422).  
 
As Esping-Andersen (1999: 72) has acknowledged, welfare regime typologies are 
‘inherently static’ but regime theory (discussed in Section 2.3) treats regimes as if they 
are ‘unified or coherently structured’ (Clarke, 1999: 83). By contrast, Clarke (2004) 
suggests that the political-cultural underpinnings of welfare systems are ‘settlements’ 
which are only ever temporary, ‚however deeply embedded, institutionalised and 
naturalised they might appear‛ (p.29). Clarke highlights the importance of examining 
how these settlements become unsettled, which leads to conceptualisation of welfare 
states as constructed, contested, contradictory and constitutive (pp. 29, 147). They are 
constructed, rather than natural or inevitable; contested because they are sites of 
conflict; contradictory in that they manage contradictory pressures; and constitutive in 
that they not only reflect social divisions, differences, identities, inequalities, 
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relationships and resources, but also create them (p.147). Clarke’s notion of policy 
change as ‘unfinished’ (p.29) and the metaphor of recalibration suggest that policy 
change is incremental and constrained by path dependency. The concept of 
‘recalibration’ suggests that incremental policy changes are made in response to new 
social risks: fine tuning to restore equilibrium, or something approaching equilibrium. 
This theory also indicates that policy change is slow and gradual, as opposed to a 
stagnant/punctuated equilibrium based on exogenous shocks, such as economic 
instability or war. Recalibration is characterised by three elements:  
 
1. The presence of a set of constraints conditioning policy choices and developments, 
stemming from the interaction between new external pressures and domestic 
challenges 
 
2. The interdependence between additions (or upgradings) and subtractions in the 
social policy menu, as a consequence of such constraints 
 
3. A deliberate shift of weight and emphasis among the various instruments and 
objectives of social policy, in the wake of complex dynamics of social and institutional 
learning (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 89-90). 
 
Constraints conditioning policy choices and developments reflect globalising 
processes. Although such processes are not the immediate concern of this analysis, 
changes in the instruments (means) and objectives (ends) of social policy (Titmuss, 
1974: 16) can be seen as products of them. This study examines how policy choices and 
developments are products of historical policy decisions (path dependence) by tracing 
back the ‘policy genealogies’ (Bacchi, 1999: 40-1) from the most recent programmes 
examined. The interdependence between additions and subtractions in the social 
policy menu are visible between policy areas (such as active labour market policies 
and childcare), as well as in the interaction between the welfare state, the market, the 
 17 
 
family and civil society. The further value of the four sub-dimensions of recalibration 
is that they are interlinking, but allow for highlighting of contradictions across policy 
areas. Shifts in weight and emphasis of policy instruments and objectives include 
changes in the role of welfare, such as increased targeting and marketisation, as well 
as re-commodification. 
 
The recalibration framework has four sub-dimensions (functional, distributive, 
normative and politico-institutional) and is used in this study to describe and attempt 
to explain variance across the three countries in the policy responses to partnered 
women outside the labour market. The framework is further complemented by the 
work of Sainsbury (1996) in relation to access to benefits, of Serrano Pascual (2007) in 
relation to aspects of activation regimes and of Williams (1995) in relation to the 
dynamics of work, family and nation reflected in social policies. The analysis utilises 
the framework in a practical, as well as a theoretical way by using politico-institutional 
recalibration to complement the policy learning literature and to assess the possibility 
of ‘translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007) of policies relevant to partnered women. In 
particular use of the framework facilitates exploration of the context of policies in 
order to engage in ‘hard’, rather than ‘soft’ policy learning (Dolowitz, 2009) (see 
Section 2.5).6 Softer forms do not involve redefinition of normative aspects governing 
policy paradigms, or redefinition of policy goals. By contrast, harder forms of learning 
require in-depth understanding of the contexts within which programmes and policies 
operate in both originating as well as borrowing countries. We now turn to consider 
the four sub-dimensions of recalibration, how they relate to this research and how 
they will be used in the analysis. 
 
                                                 
6
 This journal article was published after the fieldwork for this research had taken place, but the precursor to 
this article was Dolowitz‘s paper of the same name at the Policy and Politics conference ‗Policy transfer in a 
globalising world‘ held at the University of Bristol, 3-4 July 2008.  
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2.2.1 The four sub-dimensions of recalibration 
Women’s revolutionary role-change in the labour market is key to the dynamic of 
functional recalibration: ‚The financial viability of the welfare state in the twenty-first 
century depends critically on the revenues generated by high...levels of women’s 
labour force participation‛ (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 90). For Ferrera et al (2000) 
functional recalibration reflects the historical ‘congruence’ of welfare states ‚with the 
population, family and labour market structures,‛ such as high fertility, shorter life 
expectancy, Fordist employment, low rates of female employment, a male 
breadwinner model and traditional gender relations (p.72). However, as Esping-
Andersen highlights, the ‘revolution’ of women in the labour market is incomplete 
and does not extend to women in all strata of society (Esping-Andersen, 2009). As this 
thesis will demonstrate, the policy goal of encouraging the labour market participation 
of partnered women (specifically mothers) links with normative recalibration as it 
involves the re-conceptualisation of women’s roles in relation to labour market 
participation, which are also reflected in functional changes in terms of access to 
benefits (Sainsbury, 1996) and the provision of childcare.  
 
Functional recalibration concerns how welfare states respond to social risks7 in the 
provision of welfare by taking on new functions, or recalibrating existing ones: in this 
analysis such functions include the provision of social security, employment and 
childcare. ‘Old’ social risks in the 20th Century included poverty, unemployment and 
illness; ‘newer’ social risks result from labour market and family change and include 
the reconciliation of work and family and skills deficits in a knowledge economy. 
However, as is argued in Chapter Six, the reconciliation of work and family is not a 
new social risk, but one which has become more visible in policymaking. Ferrera and 
                                                 
7
 See Bonoli, G. (2005) The politics of the new social policies: providing coverage against new social risks in 
mature welfare states. Policy and Politics, 33(3):431-50, Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004) New risks, new welfare: the 
transformation of the European welfare state, Oxford, Oxford University Press. The concept of ‗social risks‘ 
has been critiqued – see for example Schmid, G. (2006) Social risk management through transitional labour 
markets. Socio-economic review, 4:1-33. 
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Hemerijck (2003) suggest further examples of new social risks as being social 
exclusion, family break-up, chronic illness and disability (p.72). Family break-up is 
important in relation to the ‘fluidity’ of transitions between partnered parent and lone 
parent statuses (see Chapter Five) and to the capacity of benefits systems and labour 
market policies to respond to this. This also relates to the distributive sub-dimension 
in focusing on specific groups viewed by policymakers as ‘distant’ from the labour 
market, discussed in more detail below. As we will see in Chapter Four, their own or 
their partner’s sickness or disability constitute constraints on partnered women’s 
capacity to undertake paid work. A further functional change is in precarious 
employment subsidised by benefits which transforms the role of social protection from 
straightforward income replacement, as well as the ‘revolving door’ of short-term 
work and unemployment.  
 
Activation is an illustration of functional recalibration, understood in this thesis as 
referring to the conversion of labour market policies from ‘passive’ to ‘active,’ making 
receipt of benefits conditional on demonstration of active job search and willingness to 
improve employability (Daguerre and Etherington, 2009: 5) and the increasing role for 
sanctions for non-compliance. Active labour market policies are generally defined by 
their goal of helping people of working age into work by increasing the employability 
of individuals, but not the number of jobs available (Daguerre and Etherington, 2009: 
5). A further example of functional recalibration in this analysis is the shift from 
‘welfare states’ to ‘workfare states’, ‘workfarism’ being defined as ‚the imposition of a 
range of compulsory programmes and mandatory requirements for welfare recipients 
with a view to enforcing work while residualising welfare‛ (Peck, 2001: 10 emphasis in 
original). This policy change also relates to politico-institutional changes, such as the 
merging of government departments and the creation of new agencies conjoining 
benefit payment and employment service functions, which also reflects ideological 
unification of work and welfare within policy. This example illustrates how this 
welfare state change pervades each of the sub-dimensions of recalibration. 
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Distributive recalibration relates to social groups, to labour market segmentation and 
emerging skill-based cleavages (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 91) which impact on the 
capacity of individuals to enter the labour market, remain within it and to progress. In 
this analysis it concerns the ways in which the distribution of benefits within welfare 
states may change in response to the social risks articulated in the functional sub-
dimension. Ferrera et al (2000: 73) highlight the growing gap between ‘insiders’ such 
as dual-earner families without children and ‘outsiders’ such as one-earner or no 
earner families with children, the latter including workless couple households. In 
addition to workless households, Ferrera et al (2000: 73) suggest that lone parents and 
ethnic minorities are particularly affected by skill-based cleavages and outsider status. 
In this study, distributive recalibration also considers the focus on partnered women 
in activation policies, both as an extension of policies for lone parents, as well as in 
ideological distinction from them. Activation policies in Britain and Australia are 
targeted at particular groups, reflecting conceptions of incapacity for work constructed 
through the benefit system. Such targeting is contrasted with the Danish 
(encompassing) approach of ‘all must be active’ (Rosdahl and Weise, 2001) and within 
this the anomalous 300 hours rule. These facets of the distributive sub-dimension also 
reflect aspects of normative recalibration. 
 
Normative recalibration pertains to symbols, norms, values and discourses (Ferrera et 
al., 2000: 74). This sub-dimension links with the functional and distributive by 
responding to ‚dilemmas of the status quo and the future directions of policy‛ 
articulated within them (Schmidt, 2000 cited in Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003). 
Normative recalibration is a key underpinning of policy change in the other sub-
dimensions, such as in the functional recalibration of access to benefits for partnered 
women. Pfau-Effinger (2005) suggests that social security and labour market policies 
are reflective of the ‘welfare culture’ (p.4) of a given society, defining this not in the 
sense of a ‘dependency culture’ but ‚the relevant ideas in a given society surrounding 
the welfare state and the way it is embedded in a society‛ (p.4). These ideas may be 
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seen as reflections of the dynamics of ‘work’, ‘family’ and ‘nation’ (Williams, 1995, see 
also Williams, 1989) (see Section 2.5). In this thesis it will be demonstrated that these 
three interrelated dynamics demonstrate changes in the conceptualisation of partnered 
women’s roles in societal institutions in all three countries. For example, Ferrera and 
Hemerijck (2003) argue that current normative debate ‚is no longer exclusively 
concentrated on issues of distributive justice and income maintenance, but 
increasingly...on work-related values and aspirations...the division of labour between 
men and women in and outside the family‛ (p.92). In particular they point to ‚the 
greater salience of economic independence, and the spreading conviction that labour 
market participation is a demonstration of gender equality‛ (p.92). In Denmark the 
universal breadwinner model (Fraser, 1997) has been achieved, facilitated by the 
model of day-care, reflective of both the functional and normative sub-dimensions. 
However, legacy breadwinner models in both Australia and Britain are a challenge to 
the extension of paid work to all women. Further, women’s own preferences and 
cultural models may constitute ‘normative constraints’ on undertaking paid work 
(McRae, 2003), but may also reflect labour market opportunity. In Chapter Six analysis 
of the normative sub-dimension is complemented by Serrano Pascual’s (2007) concept 
of hegemonic regulatory assumptions (see Section 2.4) in order to examine the 
normative drivers behind the policy responses, which intersect with policy change in 
the functional sub-dimension.  
 
Politico-institutional recalibration concerns ‚the levels and actors that are or should be 
involved in the governance of social protection‛ (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 93). 
This sub-dimension has two aspects. Firstly, ‚reforms that re-configure the division of 
labour between levels of government in the provision of welfare and the promotion of 
employment‛ (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 93). For example, in Denmark trade 
unions have to an extent balanced these two welfare state goals within the flexicurity 
model. The second aspect concerns the multi-level and multi-actor nature of 
governance, which is seen in the degree of decentralisation (as in Denmark) or 
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centralisation (as in Britain and to an extent Australia). The politico-institutional sub-
dimension also considers the actors delivering policy at the frontline, as well as how 
machinery of government changes to policy responsibility constitute administrative as 
well as symbolic (normative) change. Welfare pluralism can be seen in the 
marketisation of employment services in all three countries and in the most extreme 
case of the privatised employment service in Australia. Politico-institutional 
recalibration also relates to who provides the alternative care in the functional sub-
dimension which can facilitate partnered women’s labour market participation. In this 
analysis, it also informs consideration of the possibility of policy learning from 
Australia and Denmark for Britain. It will be argued that the demonstrated similarities 
and differences in each of the countries reflected in this sub-dimension may facilitate 
or block policy translation. 
 
The recalibration framework has some similarities with Trickey’s (2001) framework for 
comparing workfare programmes, which includes aims and ideology, target groups, 
universal versus selective provision and the administrative framework. However, 
recalibration provides a more useful framework for this study in highlighting the 
dynamic and incremental nature of interdependent policy change across more than 
one policy area and how this relates to the possibility of policy translation. The basic 
character of welfare recalibration is ‚as a form of institutionally-bounded policy 
innovation‛ (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 121). In identifying policies in Australia and 
Denmark which encourage non-working partnered women’s labour market 
participation, this research considers the context of the economic, historical, social, 
political and cultural factors which led to the creation of current policies and 
programmes affecting this group. Assessing the translatability of policies first requires 
explanation of reasons for similarities and variance in the conceptualisation of 
partnered women’s worklessness in the three countries and the four sub-dimensions 
of recalibration are used to explain the similarities and differences in the policy 
response. In particular, it can be hypothesised that cultural factors impact on the 
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decisions of non-working partnered women to enter paid work. Culture may be 
defined as a ‚field or domain of social life in which meanings are produced and 
reproduced<*and+ in the process, some sets of meaning may<*become+ the ‘way of 
life’ of a social group‛ (Clarke, 1999: 73). Pfau-Effinger (2008) suggests that culture 
consists of ‚constructions of sense to which people orient their behaviour,‛ which 
includes values, models and stocks of knowledge. Consideration of cultural aspects 
raises a key question as to whether the welfare state, by means of its structures, can be 
an agent of cultural change, or whether the welfare state predominantly responds to 
cultural changes. Functional recalibration may reflect the historical congruence of 
welfare states with societal change, or it may highlight welfare states’ attempts to 
promote such change; both of these aspects, it could be argued, are illustrated by the 
example of the policy goal of encouraging the participation of partnered women in 
paid work. Such a goal is underpinned by normative recalibration and also reflected in 
the distributive and politico-institutional sub-dimensions. 
 
2.3 Welfare regime theory  
 
Daly and Rake (2003: 24-31) provide a useful summary of different approaches to 
comparative studies of the welfare state. These approaches are: explanations of welfare 
state development; regime theory; evaluative studies; and feminist comparative work. 
Each of these is briefly considered below. Regime theory has superseded studies such 
as Wilensky (1975) which sought to provide explanations for the origins and 
development of welfare states by focusing on expenditure. The focus is now on 
explaining responses to new developments, rather than their origins (Hill, 2006: 38). 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes (liberal, conservative-corporatist and social 
democratic) broadly correspond to Titmuss’ (1974: 30-1) models of social policy: the 
residual welfare model, the industrial achievement-performance model and the 
institutional redistributive model. In the residual welfare model the ‘natural’ or 
‘socially given’ channels through which individuals’ needs are met are through the 
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private market or the family and only when these break down do other institutions 
such as the state come into play. In the industrial achievement-performance model 
social needs are met on the basis of merit, work performance and productivity; and in 
the institutional redistributive model social welfare is a key integrated institution, 
providing universalist services outside the market on the principle of need.  
 
Regime theory uses typologies to explain similarity and difference between countries, 
with regimes being defined as the welfare systems resulting from the different 
constitution and interaction of welfare agents: the state, the market, the family, or the 
voluntary/third sector (civil society) (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 129). Regime theory 
helps to answer the question posed by Esping-Andersen: ‚Why is it that nations 
respond differently to a set of social risks that, all told, are pretty similar, whether you 
are an American, a Spaniard, or a Swede?‛ (1999: 170). Social problems are not unique 
to particular countries but welfare systems have developed from different historical 
paths so both the construction of policy ‘problems’ as well as the responses to them 
will vary across countries. One aim of this research was to illuminate the policy 
‘problem’ of partnered women outside the labour market in the familiar British 
context by viewing it in the unfamiliar settings of Australia and Denmark. The 
comparison of ‘targeted’ (Britain and Australia) versus ‘encompassing’ (Denmark) 
approaches to assisting partnered women in this analysis borrows from Korpi and 
Palme’s (1998)8 evaluative study of the effects of different institutional welfare state 
types on poverty and inequality in 18 countries, although the Danish case study is also 
a comparison of a targeted labour market programme (300 hours rule) within the 
context of encompassing activation policy. The research aimed to explore how policies 
change and how easy they are to change, in relation to the possibility of policy 
                                                 
8
 Although Korpi and Palme label Britain and Denmark and Denmark as ‗basic security‘ models in terms of 
old age pension and sickness insurance, for this research Britain may be considered as a ‗targeted‘ model in 
terms of labour market policies aimed at non-working partnered women. Australia is labelled as ‗targeted‘ by 
Korpi and Palme. 
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learning. The relevance of regime theory in the context of this analysis is discussed 
further below. 
 
Feminist comparative studies developed to an extent in response to the shortcomings 
of Esping-Andersen’s regime typology and in particular its omission of gender9 and 
family in relation to the concept of de-commodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Similarly, Williams (1995: 129) critiques Esping-Andersen’s omission of race and 
ethnicity. Within this genre are derivatives of regime theory, such as Lewis’ typology 
of male breadwinner regimes (Lewis, 1992). Sainsbury’s (1996, see also Sainsbury, 
1999) work is most relevant to this study in relation to access to benefits. However, 
before discussing such aspects, a number of points will be made about regime theory 
in relation to this research. The first stage of the research (the evidence review) aimed 
to identify the most relevant policies and programmes relating to partnered women 
outside the labour market and to select two countries for case study analysis; one way 
of identifying cases was to utilise regime theory. The shortcomings of regime theory 
are well-documented and will not be rehearsed in full here.10 However, the first point 
to be made is that categorisation of countries is contested and, secondly, that 
typologies over-emphasise differences between regime types, but that variations within 
types may be more important (Daly and Rake, 2003), particularly to a gender-sensitive 
analysis.  
 
In relation to the first point, categorisation of all three countries studied here is 
contested. Gough (2004: 242) rightly argues that the welfare regime paradigm cannot 
take into account dynamic changes and shifts within a regime. Ellison (2006) suggests 
that there is a global trend towards liberalisation, although this drift is slow and 
gradual, or incremental. To some extent, Castles’ (1993) ‘families of nations’ concept 
                                                 
9
 In this thesis, gender is defined as a socially constructed differentiation between women and men. See 
ACKER, J. (1989) The problem with patriarchy. Sociology, 23, 235-40.   
10
 See Arts, W. A. & Gelissen, J. (2002) Three worlds of welfare capitalism or more? A state-of-the-art report. 
Journal of European Social Policy, 12(2):137-158. 
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overcomes regime theory’s classificatory problems, as it acknowledges the inter-
connectedness of commonalities between nations.11 Such commonalities can be 
geographical, linguistic, cultural or historical (Castles, 1993, Castles, 1998) and they 
may facilitate policy translation, such as between Australia and Britain which share 
histories and language. However, as Chapter Seven argues, even such similarities may 
be insufficient for successful policy learning, if the context in both the borrowing and 
lending countries is not taken into account. The notion of ‘mongrel’ and 
‘thoroughbred’ regimes (Bolderson and Mabbett, 1995) and the ‘hybridisation’ of 
regime types (Hemerijck, 2007: 26 see also Driver and Martell, 2006: 106) highlight that 
current policy trajectories are themselves the products of previous policy learning 
between countries.  
 
Secondly, Daly and Rake (2003: 27) argue that regime classifications over-emphasise 
the differences between types at the same time as over-emphasising similarities 
amongst countries within types. Regime typologisation is based on ideal-typing and 
there are no pure cases. In fact, the ‘analytical parsimony’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 72) 
which typologies permit may in fact result in policy analysis which is too simplistic. 
The other extreme is that every country, or even every region or locale is unique, with 
its own unique context. In relation to political or cultural formations, Clarke (1999) 
argues that expecting, or trying to impose, coherence ‚detracts attention from more 
difficult, but possibly more important, questions about the internal and external 
contradictions‛ (p.83). In the context of policy learning, it is crucial to pay attention to 
such contradictions. Similarly, Daly and Rake (2003: 167) argue that context and 
complexity are necessary for a gender-focused analysis and this may render 
typologisation unsuitable. There is also a danger that welfare regime theory becomes 
deterministic, promoting assumptions that countries within a particular welfare 
                                                 
11
 Castles suggests four ‗families of nations‘ (English-speaking, Continental, Scandinavian and Southern) and 
this has particular salience to this analysis in Castles‘ focus on explaining the distinctiveness of the Australian 
‗wage-earners‘ welfare state‘. See Castles, F. G. (1985) The working class and welfare: reflections on the 
political development of the welfare state in Australia and New Zealand, 1890-1980, London, Allen & 
Unwin. 
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regime type will have similar policy responses. Regime theory provides the terms of 
reference within which to approach this comparative study; a hypothetical guide as to 
the kinds of policies which might be expected from a particular regime type at the 
outset of the research. However, ‚The classification of a country as belonging to a 
particular type of welfare regime is of limited use in predicting the nature of particular 
policies, especially those related to gender equity‛ (Brennan, 2002: 108).  
 
A number of typologies have been put forward as gender-focused alternatives to 
regime theory. Lewis and Ostner (1991, see also Lewis and Ostner, 1994) focus on the 
strength of the breadwinner model across welfare states, based on two bases of 
entitlement: breadwinner or earner and breadwinner dependents. Sainsbury (1994: 
168) argues that Lewis and Ostner see the extent to which women are recognised as 
workers as the essential variation between welfare states, but that this downplays the 
principle of care for children or adults. In her study of Britain, Ireland, France and 
Sweden, Lewis (1992) suggests that the male breadwinner model was the basis for all 
modern welfare states, but that this has been modified in divergent ways. She 
highlights the conceptualisation of women as wives and mothers in these four welfare 
states in relation to benefits, services (particularly childcare) and married women’s 
labour market status. Lewis’ model has been critiqued by Sainsbury (1996: 43), who 
argues that it does not allow for sufficient variation. In particular she argues that the 
concept of a ‘weak’ male breadwinner state (which Lewis and Ostner suggest applies 
to post-1970 Denmark) is problematic and that too many diverse countries may be 
classified as ‘strong’ male breadwinner states (Sainsbury, 1996: 43). Millar (1996) also 
suggests that more attention should be paid to how male breadwinner earnings are 
replaced, whether by social insurance or social assistance and whether women’s 
claims to welfare are on the basis of wives, mothers or workers, an aspect central to 
Sainsbury’s (1996) analysis. 
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Sainsbury (1996: 3) focuses on welfare state variation, rather than similarities and 
critiques existing approaches in two respects. Firstly, she criticises the focus of welfare 
state comparison on country-by-country descriptions; secondly, she highlights the 
skewed focus on models or typical recipients. Sainsbury (1996) examined social 
security and gender equality reforms in Britain, the US, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
focusing on the bases of entitlement to benefits, the stratifying effects of benefits and 
benefit inequalities, and gender equality reforms. Sainsbury’s bases of entitlement to 
benefit are important for this research in highlighting that women and men have 
different relationships with the welfare state (see Daly, 1994: 114-5). The welfare state 
genders access to benefits, creating gendered dualism in entitlements (Sainsbury, 1996: 
223), whereby men are more likely to receive contribution-based benefits and women 
are more likely to receive benefits as a result of their caring roles. Orloff (1993: 308) 
suggests that men make claims as worker-citizens but that women make claims both 
as workers and as members of families. Sainsbury’s bases of entitlement consider 
women as wives, mothers (or caregivers), or workers. In this thesis, gendered dualism 
is part of functional recalibration, but also reflects normative dimensions. The thesis 
argues that the conceptualisation of partnered women as workers rather than as 
dependent wives, mothers or carers is an important axis for comparison across all 
three countries, but in Australia the principle of care is particularly important in 
relation to access to benefits, activation and childcare. Using welfare recalibration as a 
framework for analysis for this research offers a truly comparative analysis based on 
thematic aspects and echoes Sainsbury’s (1996) departure from the approach of 
country-by-country comparisons. 
 
In addition to Sainsbury’s work, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) concept of de-
commodification and its gendered equivalent ‘de-familisation’, or ‘de-familialisation’ 
(Lister, 1994: 31, McLaughlin and Glendinning, 1994: 65) are useful in illustrating how 
the three countries conceptualise partnered women outside the labour market within 
policymaking. De-commodification refers to ‚the degree to which individuals, or 
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families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market 
participation‛ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37). In highly de-commodifying welfare states 
(such as Sweden) Esping-Andersen (1989) argues that ‚citizens can freely, and without 
potential losses of job, income or general welfare, opt out of work under conditions 
when they, themselves, consider it necessary for reasons of health, family, age or even 
educational self-improvement‛ (p.22). In its purest form, de-commodification 
constitutes citizen’s income, a policy path pursued in Denmark until the early 1990s 
(Goul Andersen, 1996, Goul Andersen, 2002: 66).12 De-familialisation refers to ‚the 
terms and conditions under which people engage in families, and the extent to which 
they can uphold an acceptable standard of living independently of ‘family’‛ 
(McLaughlin and Glendinning, 1994: 65). Family dependency is the functional 
equivalent of market dependency (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 44-5). Orloff’s (1993: 311-
318) conceptualisation of de-commodification includes the addition of access to paid 
work and the capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household. Of particular 
relevance to this research is Orloff’s (1993) suggestion that the interest of feminists in 
welfare state comparison is predominantly to ask the question: ‚Can the welfare state 
alter gender relations?‛ (p.307).  
 
One drawback to the concepts of both de-commodification and de-familialisation is, as 
Esping-Andersen (1999: 45) has argued, that in reality it is more a matter of degree 
than ‘either-or’. He also acknowledges that the concept of de-commodification 
presupposes that individuals are already commodified in the labour market (1999: 45). 
O’Connor (1993) notes that a precondition of de-commodification is access to the 
labour market and that ‚limitation of access<may be the result of systemic 
discrimination or inequality of condition, such as that associated with caring 
responsibilities‛ (p.513). In Britain and Australia, women have a higher propensity 
towards part-time work and endure more interruptions to employment (McRae, 2003) 
                                                 
12
 A further example is the Danish leave schemes, now curtailed. See Etherington, D. & Jones, M. (2004a) 
Welfare-through-work and the re-regulation of labour markets in Denmark. Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, 22:129-148. 
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as a result of undertaking caring roles within the household. This challenges Hakim’s 
(2000) static typology of work-centred, home-centred and adaptive women. Thus, 
women who care for dependants instead of engaging in paid work, or who work for 
fewer hours in order to care, are not de-commodified, but familialised, with their 
dependence tied to the family. For some women their preference may be to care for 
their family, although such a preference may be constrained, such as by labour market 
opportunities. Duncan et al (2003) suggest that ‚people do not view care simply as a 
constraint on paid work. Rather they feel morally obligated to care, and often wish to 
do so‛ (p.310). ‘Gendered moral rationalities’13 inform decisions about work and care 
for both lone and partnered mothers in terms of ‘good motherhood’ and ‘the right 
thing to do’ (Duncan et al., 2003, Duncan and Edwards, 1999). Such rationalities are 
influenced by class, ethnicity, networks and cultural values.  
 
Williams (1995: 129) highlights Esping-Andersen’s omission of race and ethnicity from 
his regime typology; furthermore, Sainsbury (2006) suggests that comparative welfare 
state studies have largely ignored immigrants. Williams argues that ‘a new politics of 
the welfare state’ has emerged which attempts to reconcile ‚the old concepts of 
universalism, equality, and citizenship with new understandings of difference and 
diversity‛ (1995: 129). Building on her seminal work incorporating the interaction of 
race, gender and class in social policy (1989) she suggests a framework for 
understanding the dynamics underpinning the development of welfare states: family, 
nation/race and work (Williams, 1995: 149). ‘Nation’ relates to national identity around 
race; ‘family’ refers to familial divisions of labour around gender; and ‘work’ relates to 
class. These three terms reflect socially constructed meanings ‚constituted through 
various conditions, institutions, and forms of organisation, as well as through social 
relations of power, processes of inclusion and exclusion (which also involve forms of 
mobilisation of interests), identities, and political actors‛ (Williams, 1995: 148). 
                                                 
13
 In their study, Duncan et al constructed types of ‗primarily mother‘, ‗primarily worker‘ and 
‗mother/worker‘. See Duncan, S., Edwards, R., Reynolds, T. & Alldred, P. (2003) Motherhood, paid work 
and partnering: values and theories. Work, Employment and Society, 17(2):309-330. 
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Although this analysis does not specifically consider class, in the normative sub-
dimension ethnicity is considered in relation to how family is conceptualised as a 
constraint on working, particularly in Denmark but also in Britain. Work and family 
are also considered to be important aspects of activation in relation to the normalising 
of paid work as a policy goal for partnered women and how unpaid care work is 
devalued within this. Williams argues that the state’s relationship to these three 
interrelated dynamics, evidenced through social policy, are illustrative of ‚the diverse 
configurations of multilayered welfare settlements in different countries‛ (p.148). 
 
Daly and Rake’s (2003) framework for comparative analysis14 relates to the interaction 
of the welfare state and gender relations, with the latter understood as access to 
resources, social roles and power relations. In their analysis, the welfare state has two 
key activities. Firstly, resource distribution in terms of both time as well as material 
resources; secondly, the welfare state has agency: it ‚is not a neutral or passive 
participant, but is active in both shaping and negotiating power relations‛ (p.46). 
Welfare systems are not gender-neutral and the welfare state is a site of stratification 
in terms of gender. ‚The basis of entitlement constructs the framework in which 
individuals and/or collective units are granted access to income support‛ (Daly, 1994: 
114) and there is variation in this across different welfare states, demonstrated in this 
analysis by examining a range of policy areas relating to partnered women. 
 
Daly and Rake’s suggestion (2003) that they were not ‚especially interested in 
identifying regimes<it is too constricting<Complexity and configuration interest us‛ 
(p.30) is also true of this analysis. By using the framework of recalibration in 
conjunction with Sainsbury and others, the aim of the analytical framework is to 
capture and reflect the complexity and configuration of policies relating to partnered 
women outside the labour market in the three countries.  
 
                                                 
14
 Based on a study of France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Britain and the US. 
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2.4 Serrano Pascual’s activation regimes 
 
Having considered the critiques of both mainstream and gendered regime theory, 
similar shortcomings may be attributed to Serrano Pascual’s (2007) typology of 
activation regimes. Although this analysis does not focus on assigning the three 
countries studied to Serrano Pascual’s typology, the value of her typology to this 
analysis is two-fold. Firstly, it specifically focuses on activation policies; secondly, her 
concept of hegemonic regulatory assumptions is useful in not merely describing what 
activation policies do in terms of the recalibration of functional and distributive 
dimensions, but also in highlighting the normative bases for the policy responses: 
 
‚Activation regimes are the outcome of the fragile balance of power between 
the different actors involved in the design and implementation of these 
activation policies and of all the hegemonic regulatory and cognitive 
benchmarks that shape a community’s understanding of the social exclusion 
problem‛ (Serrano Pascual, 2007: 276) 
 
Serrano Pascual defines activation regimes as ‚different ways of organising the 
policies and actors that deal with the problems of social exclusion and economic 
activity‛ (2007: 294). Her typology moves on from Barbier’s (2001) binary of activation 
regimes, which characterises Britain as liberal and Denmark as universalistic. The 
universalistic type provides ‚complex and extended services to all citizens and 
simultaneously guarantees relatively high standards of living‛ (Barbier, 2001: 9); the 
liberal type focuses on individual relationships with the labour market to produce 
social equity and efficiency. In this context, active labour market policies (ALMPs)15 
are restricted to inciting individuals to seek work, providing quick information and 
                                                 
15
 Bonoli argues that ALMPs is too broad to be used analytically and suggests four dimensions: incentive 
reinforcement, employment assistance, occupation, and human capital development. See Bonoli, G. (2010) 
The political economy of active labour market policy. Working papers on the reconciliation of work and 
welfare in Europe, Edinburgh, Reconciling work and welfare in Europe (RECWOWE). 
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matching services, as well as investing in short term vocational training‛ (Barbier, 
2001: 9). The value of both Barbier’s and Serrano Pascual’s approaches is in linking the 
activation policies with the broader welfare state: ‚The semantic field of the activation 
concept<goes beyond the strict meaning associated with employment policies, as it 
also includes the Welfare State’s intervention and reproduction logic and principles‛ 
(Serrano Pascual, 2007: 276).  
 
Serrano Pascual’s activation regimes are distinguished by two key factors: (i) 
governance structures and institutional setting and (ii) hegemonic regulatory 
assumptions. The former is not utilised in this analysis, but is instead considered by 
employing politico-institutional recalibration. The concept of hegemonic regulatory 
assumptions is used to analyse functional and normative aspects of the policies in the 
three countries and this has four aspects: (i) the meaning of work, (ii) the meaning of 
citizenship, (iii) who or what is considered to be responsible for the jobless situation of 
the individual and (iv) the duties of jobseekers and the duties of the state in terms of a 
social contract (quid pro quo). These all ‚act as cultural frames that not only influence 
policy design, but also serve as a regulatory justification/foundation for these policies‛ 
(Serrano Pascual, 2007: 278). This includes the prevailing understanding of the 
individual as competent and responsible, or as dependent and passive (Serrano 
Pascual, 2007: 278); the latter, it could be argued, is how policies in Britain and 
Australia have historically viewed partnered women outside the labour market. 
Serrano Pascual argues that community values relating to work and worklessness 
influence the social representation of policies. Although is not made clear how such 
community values are articulated and mediated through policymaking elites, she cites 
examples of such representations (2007: 278-9). A moralistic concept of unemployment 
favours activation in order to discourage dependency and promote responsibility. A 
political understanding of unemployment linked to national identity and the viability 
of the welfare state may lead to activation focusing on national citizenship. An 
economic concept of unemployment may lead to a focus on adaptation to new 
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economic challenges through investment in human capital or through more coercive 
strategies to ensure a reserve army of workers.  
 
Serrano Pascual identifies five types of activation regimes (economic springboard 
regime, civic contractualism regime, autonomous citizens regime, minimalist 
disciplinary regime and fragmented provision regime) (p.294). Denmark reflects both 
the civic contractualism regime and the autonomous citizens regime and Britain 
reflects the economic springboard regime. This typology is based on two aspects. The 
first is the modes of managing individuals and within this the two extremes of: (i) the 
moral-therapeutic management of behaviour and (ii) adaptive skills management.16 
The second aspect is a ‘new social contract’ and within this the two elements of: (i) the 
quid pro quo17 between unemployed people and the State and (ii) the balance, or 
imbalance between the two. In considering the first aspect of modes of managing 
individuals, Serrano Pascual suggests that both the moral-therapeutic management of 
behaviour and adaptive skills management draw on the concept of ‘autonomy,’ but 
with different underlying interpretations. The moral-therapeutic intervention is 
‘paternalistic,’ assuming that individuals are passive by nature and that it is necessary 
to force them to fulfill their moral duty to take responsibility for their lives. There are 
two main variants of this assumption. The first variant views individual behaviour as 
a consequence of a rational decision - that individuals do not wish to work or believe it 
is not worthwhile to work; in this analysis this is labelled homo economicus. Examples of 
activation interventions which exemplify this include legally binding requirements to 
seek work, constant assessment and economic incentives. The second variant assumes 
                                                 
16
 Indicators for managing individuals are: (i) regulation of behaviour by: benefit sanctions, limiting income 
replacement, reducing entitlement period, conditionality, less generous unemployment benefit and a stricter 
benefit regime, (ii) tax-benefit reforms, (iii) definition of a ‗suitable job‘, (iv) extension of measures to all 
economically inactive people, (v) attitude towards clients, including the role of the individual and a top-down 
approach, (vi) client supervision, (vii) marketisation and (viii) degree of discretion/formalisation. Although 
these indicators have not formed the basis for the analytical framework of this research, these aspects are 
accounted for in the analysis. 
17
 Latin meaning ‗something for something‘ but as Goodin argues, there can be asymmetries within this 
supposed reciprocity. See Goodin, R. (2002) Structures of mutual obligation. Journal of Social Policy, 
31(4):579-596. 
 35 
 
that individual behaviour is a result of personality failings rather than rationality and 
interventions aim to improve self-esteem, or provide career guidance and job 
application skills. These hegemonic regulatory assumptions concerning the reason/s 
for worklessness are reflected in the policy responses. The second aspect of Serrano 
Pascual’s modes of managing individuals (adaptive skills management) views 
individuals as autonomous and requiring certain resources to make use of their 
autonomy, such as education and training.  
 
The two approaches to managing individuals form the first aspect of Serrano Pascual’s 
activation regime typology. The second aspect is the social contract between the State 
and the unemployed individual and the balance or imbalance this quid pro quo relating 
to the rights and duties of individuals and of the State (p.299).18 The moral-therapeutic 
approach focuses more on the duties rather than the rights, whereas adaptive skills 
management is a more balanced form of social contract between the individual and the 
community (p.299). Serrano Pascual suggests that the moral-therapeutic approach is 
found in Britain but that Denmark incorporates both approaches. The drawback of 
Serrano Pascual’s approach is not only its complexity, but also its singular focus on 
activation in isolation from other policy areas. Dingeldey’s (2007) three country study 
identifies two mutually constitutive paths to welfare state transformation (workfare 
and enablement) and her concept of enabling policies includes childcare, which this 
thesis argues is an important underpinning for activation policies, visible in both the 
functional and normative sub-dimensions, as well as in terms of policy translatability 
in the politico-institutional sub-dimension. Despite the shortcomings of Serrano 
Pascual’s approach, her concept of hegemonic regulatory assumptions is employed as a 
tool for analysing data from the case studies in the normative recalibration sub-
                                                 
18
 Indicators for this second aspect include: (i) the extent of entitlement (coverage of income replacement, 
comprehensiveness, generosity), (ii) the amount of government spending, (iii) the degree of individualisation, 
(iv) the participation of the rcipient in the activation process, (v) the range, type and quality of options for 
participation, (vi) labour market segmentation. Although these indicators have not formed the basis for the 
analytical framework of this research, these aspects are accounted for in the analysis. 
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dimension and this is complemented by Williams’ (1995) work, family and nation (see 
Section 2.3).  
 
2.5 Policy as transfer and policy as translation 
 
Policy transfer can be defined as ‚the process by which actors borrow policies 
developed in one setting to develop programmes and policies within another‛ 
(Dolowitz, 1996: 357). Stone (1999) highlights that ‘policy transfer’ as utilised by 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) encompasses a range of related concepts. Firstly, lesson-
drawing (Rose, 1993) in the sense of being voluntaristic rather than coercive. Secondly, 
‘policy convergence’ and ‘policy diffusion’ suggest that policy transfer arises as a 
consequence of structural forces (Stone, 1999: 52). Thirdly, ‘social learning’ or ‘policy 
learning’ where ‚the emphasis is on cognition and the redefinition of interests on the 
basis of new knowledge which affects the fundamental beliefs and ideas behind policy 
approaches‛ (Stone, 1999: 52). May (1992) suggests that ‚Learning implies improved 
understanding, as reflected by an ability to draw lessons about policy problems, 
objectives, or interventions‛ (p.333). For Hall (1993) there are three types of social 
learning, based on three orders of paradigmatic policy change. First order change 
involves changes in the instrument settings, but the policy goals and instruments 
remain the same. In second order change policy instruments as well as settings are 
changed, but the normative legitimacy of the central policy goals remains 
unquestioned. Third order changes are more radical, involving a change in the 
hierarchy of goals, or a paradigm shift. First and second order change do not 
automatically lead to third order change (Hall, 1993: 279), but Hall cites the shift in 
British macroeconomic policy from Keynesianism to monetarism as an example of a 
change of all three orders. First order change is likely to be incremental, but second 
order change may move one step beyond in a strategic direction. Third order change is 
likely to be more sociological than scientific, involving changing views of experts; for 
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example, there may be a shift in the locus of authority and policy experimentation and 
policy failure are likely to play a key role (Hall, 1993: 280).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Hall’s three orders of policy change have some similarity with Dolowitz’s (2009) 
distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policy learning. In soft learning ‚nothing new is 
incorporated into the existing knowledge structure‛ (p.323). Harder forms require 
individuals to recognise the importance of context within countries from which policy 
lessons originate and, further, require that they actively pursue information, analyse it 
and ‚actively develop a deeper understanding of how and why the object under 
consideration operates in the observed system‛ (Dolowitz, 2009: 323). This has 
similarities with May’s (1992: 336) distinction between instrumental policy learning, 
involving a focus on policy instruments and designs, and social learning, which 
incorporates an improved understanding of policy problems, goals and dominant 
causal beliefs. Dolowitz (2009) argues that: 
 
‚It is likely that most instances of policy transfer actually involve much softer 
processes. In fact, more than a few instances of learning appear to involve little 
more than policy makers going on vacation, seeing something they like, and 
then coming back and attempting to mimic it within their own system, with 
little or no analysis being undertaken of either the foreign model or the 
specifics of the context in which it is to be transferred‛ (p.323) 
 
This research differs from such ‘touristic’ policy learning by engaging in an 
understanding of the wider policy contexts in both Australia and Denmark in order to 
draw policy lessons for Britain as well as to anticipate, avoid, or attempt to mitigate 
the possibility of policy transfer failure. In this analysis this process begins with both 
the perceived policy failure of the New Deal for Partners. For Rose (1991) 
dissatisfaction with policy (whoever articulates such dissatisfaction) is the impetus for 
policy learning. This analysis also considers the policy problematisation of partnered 
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women outside the labour market. Different countries problematise the worklessness 
of non-working partnered women in a variety of ways, or may not problematise this at 
all. Drawing on Foucauldian discourse theory, Bacchi (1999) argues that ‘problem 
definition’ considers policies to be ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered and solved by 
the policy community, whereas her ‘What’s the problem’, or ‘problem representation’ 
approach acknowledges that policy problems are constructed. Taking account of such 
representations contributes to hard learning and may overcome potential constraints 
on transfer by examining the normative foundations of policies and programmes. By 
utilising the recalibration framework, this research will consider whether and how the 
policy responses to partnered women outside the labour market are consistent with 
existing policy trajectories in Australia and Denmark.  
 
Dolowitz et al (2000: 23) specify different aspects19 of policies which may be 
transferred: policy goals, content and instruments, programmes, institutions, ideas 
and attitudes, and negative lessons. Rose (1991: 21-2) identifies a number of ways in 
which programmes may be utilised during policy transfer.20 A programme may be (i) 
copied, (ii) emulated, (iii) hybridised, (iv) synthesised, or (v) serve as inspiration. 
Copying ‚occurs when a country adopts a programme in use elsewhere without any 
changes‛ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 351); this may be done within the same country, 
for example from a local or federal level to national level. Emulation requires 
adaptation to national circumstances (Rose, 1991: 21). Hybridisation may combine 
elements from programmes in two different places (Rose, 1991: 22) and synthesis 
combines elements in several different programmes into a distinctive whole. Rose 
treats hybridisation and synthesis as two separate methods, however others (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 1996, Dolowitz et al., 2000) combine these two processes. Inspiration views 
a familiar problem in an unfamiliar setting, but it constitutes speculation rather than 
lesson-drawing as it does not demonstrate how a particular programme actually 
                                                 
19
 Or ‗objects of transfer‘. See Evans, M. & Davies, J. (1999) Understanding policy transfer: a multi-level, 
multi-disciplinary perspective. Public Administration, 77(2):361-385. 
20
 This may be referred to as the ‗degree of transfer‘. See Evans and Davies (1999). 
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works (Rose, 1991: 22). This research views the policy ‘problem’ of partnered women 
outside the labour market in Britain in the two different settings of Australia and 
Denmark. This to an extent de-familiarises the familiar. However, in engaging in hard 
policy learning it goes beyond simply looking for inspiration, but provides analysis of 
the policy responses in the two countries, with reference to the British case. 
 
Path dependency highlights that policy is not made on a blank sheet, but is often a 
product of what has gone before. ‚Policy makers are inheritors before they are 
choosers<new programmes cannot be constructed on green field sites<they must be 
introduced into a policy environment dense with past commitments‛ (Rose, 1993: 73). 
In terms of policy transference, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) suggest that past policies 
‚constrain agents as to both what can be transferred and what agents look for when 
engaging in policy transfer‛ (p.353). Thus, past policies, or history, set limits on the 
parameters of search for policies in other settings. Path dependency should not be 
construed as presenting an insurmountable barrier to innovative welfare policies, but 
it must be considered as one of the constraints on successful policy transfer, as policy 
responses are circumscribed by institutional ‘stickiness’. Dolowitz et al (2000: 35) 
highlight that borrowed policies develop over time; notably, many policy paths are 
themselves a result of policy transference. For example, Australian welfare reforms 
were borrowed from the US and the concept of Danish ‘one-stop shops’ combining 
benefit and employment services was borrowed from the Netherlands. 
 
Clearly, policy transfer is not straightforward. Dolowitz and Marsh argue that 
geographic propinquity does not necessarily equate to effective policy transfer, but 
that similarity of ideology and resources are necessary preconditions (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996: 353). Ideology provides a link between more abstract ‘philosophical’ 
judgements and analyses of welfare and the institutional politics of welfare in terms of 
the design and implementation of policies and programmes (Clarke et al., 1987: 15 my 
emphasis). Looking to countries with similar political ideologies can make sense as a 
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facilitator of policy transfer, but confining the search for policies in this way can be 
argued to reinforce the existing order. This is problematic in the context of policy 
failure, if the current and dominant paradigm is in part responsible for that failure. 
The existing order can thus be perpetuated by looking to countries with a history of 
policy lending and this can also occur by confining policy lessons to countries within 
similar regime types. However, it must be acknowledged that policy transfer may be 
facilitated by policy learning within countries with similar institutional systems. In 
assessing the possibility of transfer, this analysis aims to negotiate a path between the 
two extremes of ‘technical feasibility’ (in which all programmes are theoretically 
capable of being replaced) and ‘total blockage’ (where specific histories, institutions 
and cultures block transfers between countries) (Rose, 1991: 25). For Rose (1991: 24), 
there are two key standards against which programmes and policies should be judged 
with a view to transfer: (i) technical feasibility (‘Is the programme practical?’) and (ii) 
political feasibility (‘Is it desirable?’). Rose suggests that the ideal programme needs to 
meet both criteria, however this transfer is mediated by the political environment and 
the policy process, as well as by path dependency.  
 
Rose (1991: 23-4) argues that a key part of the policy transfer process is ‘prospective 
evaluation’. This differs from conventional evaluation in focusing on the potential 
future success of a programme, rather than solely being retrospective. However, 
prospective evaluation also contains retrospective elements, such as examination of 
the historical path leading to the introduction of a policy or programme. Such an 
approach is taken in this research by making a judgement concerning the success of 
current or historical programmes affecting partnered women in Australia and 
Denmark, together with a prediction about the suitability of these programmes to 
Britain at a future date. To this end, it involves informed speculation based on existing 
evidence in another context. Policymakers prefer to rely on what has been seen to 
work. Reviewing ‘what works’ to inform policy and the agenda of ‘evidence-based 
policy’ began in Britain with Thatcher’s introduction of a ‘measurement culture’ under 
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the ‘New Public Management’ (Hudson and Lowe, 2004: 233). However, this has also 
been a defining aspect of New Labour governance in Britain.21 Instead of evidence-
based policy,’ Irving and Hodgson (2007: 9, 12) highlight that the reality of policy-
making is that it is often ‘evidence-inspired,’ ‘evidence-informed,’ or even ‘evidence-
base-aware’. In particular, the success criteria constructed for policies or programmes 
are important factors in forming a judgement as to whether it may be viewed as 
‘successful’ and this will be addressed in this analysis. 
 
Policy transfer ‘success’ may be defined as (i) the extent to which a transferred policy 
achieves the aims stated by the transferring government and (ii) whether the policy, 
programme or institution was viewed as a success by the key actors involved 
(Dolowitz et al., 2000: 33). In the second case, this is dependent upon which actors are 
making the judgement; an aspect which also applies to perceptions of policy 
dissatisfaction and policy failure. However, success in one policy context does not 
guarantee success in another. Dolowitz et al (2000: 33-4) suggest that policy transfer 
failure can occur in three ways. Firstly, as a result of ‘unknowledgeable transfer,’ 
where a borrowing system has insufficient information about the programme in the 
originating system. Secondly, ‘incomplete transfer’ in which crucial elements which 
contributed to policy success in the originating country are not transferred. Finally, 
‘inappropriate transfer’ where insufficient attention is paid to differences in economic, 
social, political and ideological contexts in both the transferring and originating 
systems. Accounts of failed transatlantic policy transfer (Dolowitz, 1998, Dolowitz et 
al., 1999, Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004, Deacon, 2000) suggest that policy transfer 
failure is due to some degree of incomplete transfer. However, each of these types of 
policy transfer failure is the result of insufficient attention being paid to the context of 
either the originating or transferee countries, or both.  
 
                                                 
21
 As early as 1991, Henkel suggested that there was an ‗evaluative state‘. See Henkel, M. (1991) The new 
evaluative state. Public Administration, 69:121-36. 
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That programmes are circumscribed by policies and the wider welfare state system 
means that lifting a programme from one country and re-inserting it into the context of 
another country can be problematic. This study thus utilises Lendvai and Stubbs’ 
(2007) concept of ‘policy as translation’ rather than ‘policy as transfer’, which 
emphasises two key aspects. Firstly, policies or programmes are not available to be 
looked at and learned from in the sense of merely viewing a problem in an unfamiliar 
setting (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007: 180), as in Rose’s concept of inspiration. This 
conceptualisation alters the role of the actors transferring policy from one of mere 
‘conduits’ of policy transfer to ‘translators’ of policy (p.179). Policy failure may occur 
as a result of the process of transference, rather than as a result of the borrowed policy 
or programme itself (Dolowitz et al., 2000: 35). For example, a programme may be 
used in a transferring country in a way which was not intended by the originating 
country. The implication of this is not necessarily that a programme cannot be used in 
a different way, however to do so may require construction of different success criteria 
from that of the lending country. In the conceptualisation of policy translation as a 
process, policy is produced ‘in the act of looking’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007: 180) and is 
fluid, dynamic and actor-orientated. The policy transfer/translation process is akin to a 
research process and is thus subject to similar epistemological and ontological 
considerations. Furthermore, the process of policy change should be viewed in the 
context of a fluid policy environment, where ‚everything is changing, yet, at the same 
time, resistance to change prevails and the possibilities are limited‛ (Lendvai and 
Stubbs, 2007: 185). This recognises that there may be constraints on the perceived 
political acceptability of learning lessons from particular countries at specific points in 
time. Evidence-based policy can in practice mean ‚policy based not so much on 
evidence as on consensus<politics is the art of the possible, rather than what is 
rational or what might work best‛ (Leicester, 1999: 6). A programme that was 
politically unfeasible at one point may become feasible at another (Rose, 1991: 28). This 
relates to both technical feasibility in terms of path dependency and to political 
feasibility in relation to normative aspects and to the overarching welfare paradigm.  
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Secondly, policy as translation recognises that policies or programmes are de-
territorialised and then re-territorialised; translating policies from one country to 
another requires reconstitution, or re-siting. This becomes problematic in the context 
of mainstream policy transfer literature, whose ‚realist ontology sees ‘policy’ both in 
the source and in the recipient context as a stable, pre-existing and uncontested 
‘reality’‛ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007: 179). Rather, policy can be seen as being unstable, 
as with Clarke’s notion of welfare settlements (Clarke, 2004). Lendvai and Stubbs see 
the policy process as continually re-constituting, rather than linear. Similarly, Crozier 
(2007, see also Crozier, 2008) refers to the governance process as being ‘recursive’ and 
iterative, involving ‚repeated application of a procedure or rule to successive results of 
a process‛ (p.2).22 In this way policy learning, like policy change, may be viewed as 
incrementally and cumulatively transformative (see Streeck and Thelen, 2005). The 
problematisation of partnered women outside the labour market reflects changing 
conceptualisations of women’s roles, however as will be demonstrated in this thesis 
this shift in thinking does not necessarily constitute a paradigm shift of the third order 
in any of the countries studied, but more a recalibration.  
 
2.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has set out the theoretical framework for this research. It has discussed 
regime theory as a broad theoretical starting point and outlined that the key analytical 
concept used is welfare recalibration with its four sub-dimensions (functional, 
distributive, normative, politico-institutional). The framework is complemented by a 
number of other relevant concepts from the literature. Sainsbury’s bases of entitlement 
to benefits is utilised in the functional sub-dimension, along with Serrano Pascual’s 
activation regimes and her concept of the social contract (quid pro quo). The normative 
sub-dimension is complemented by Serrano Pascual’s concept of hegemonic 
                                                 
22
 See also Dwyer, P. & Ellison, N. (2009) ‗We nicked stuff from all over the place‘: policy transfer or 
muddling through? Policy and Politics, 37(3):389-407. 
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regulatory assumptions as a way of conceptualising the perceived problem 
representations of partnered women outside the labour market which inform the 
policy responses. Williams’ concept of work, family and nation is also used to analyse 
the ideology behind the policy goals within this sub-dimension. Finally, both 
Dolowitz’s concept of ‘hard’ policy learning and Lendvai and Stubbs’ concept of 
‘policy as translation’ have driven the consideration of policy learning from Australia 
and Denmark to Britain, complementing the work of Dolowitz and others which 
suggest criteria for successful policy transfer. This aspect also completes the analysis 
using the final sub-dimension of recalibration (politico-institutional). The next chapter 
sets out the methodology for the research, including how it has been informed by this 
theoretical framework. This is followed by a review of documentary evidence relating 
to partnered women outside the labour market in the three countries. Subsequent data 
analysis chapters are structured according to the four sub-dimensions of recalibration.  
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Chapter Three - Methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides discussion of the methods employed in the study, which began 
with an evidence review of eight OECD countries, from which Australia and Denmark 
were selected for further in-depth case study research and contrasted with Britain in 
relation to policy learning. The case studies incorporated documentary analysis and 52 
elite interviews with policy actors (31 in Australia and 21 in Denmark), mostly 
conducted face-to-face, but some by telephone. The key research questions posed at 
the outset of the study were: 
 
1. What are the most relevant benefit (and service) policies and labour market 
interventions within a range of OECD countries that relate to the situation of 
partnered women in non-working households of working age? 
 
2. How and for which groups of partnered women have these policies been 
effective in facilitating labour market participation, and to what extent are 
elements of these policies likely to be transferable to Britain? 
 
3. What have been the driving factors and social and economic contexts behind 
the introduction of such policies and what lessons follow regarding 
transferability to Britain? 
 
These questions were addressed at different stages of the research. The first by the 
initial evidence review (see Section 3.2) and the second and third by the in-depth case 
studies of Australia and Denmark (see Section 3.3) and during the analysis stage. 
These key research questions were supplemented by further detailed questions 
 46 
 
constructed for the evidence review framework during the first stage and for the 
interview topic guides during the fieldwork planning stage (see Appendix 1). 
  
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this chapter consider, respectively, the evidence review and 
selection of the case study countries. Subsequent sections cover methodological 
aspects relating to the case studies: Section 3.4 discusses the case study method, 
Section 3.5 considers documentary analysis, Section 3.6 discusses the construction of 
the interview sample, Section 3.7 considers ethical issues affecting the research and 
Section 3.8 discusses the elite interview method. Section 3.9 focuses on methodological 
issues relating to policy learning, Section 3.10 provides some reflective comments and 
Section 3.11 concludes the chapter with a brief summary. 
 
3.2 Evidence review of OECD countries 
 
The project was an ESRC CASE studentship collaboration between the University of 
Sheffield and DWP and was commissioned by DWP which requested an international 
review of policies relating to partners, with a focus on policy learning. Prior to my 
recruitment to the studentship a project initiation document had been produced by the 
University and DWP. This set out the working title, the research questions and a 
detailed workplan for the three year duration of the project, comprising: (1) in Year 
One an evidence review of OECD countries based on documentary analysis, (2) in 
Year Two historical documentary analysis of policies in selected countries and 
interviews with key actors, and (3) in Year Three consultation meetings and policy 
option dissemination with DWP and other actors. This framework was largely 
adhered to, however this presented some difficulties for the project, as this chapter 
considers. 
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In overall terms this study followed the recommendations of a project focused on 
international comparison23 run for policymakers by the British Government’s former 
Centre for Management and Policy Studies.24 In particular the study utilised a 
Workbook (structured assessment tool) produced for examining policies and 
programmes in other countries, with a view to policy learning.25 The main elements of 
the tool reflect the stages of this research: scanning, selecting, understanding, assessing 
and recommending. The aim of the evidence review was to undertake ‘mixed scanning’ 
(Etzioni, 1967) by reviewing policies relevant to assisting partnered women into work 
in a number of OECD countries; this informed the selection of Australia and Denmark 
for case study research. Understanding of the programmes relating to partnered 
women in the context of the wider welfare states of these countries was achieved 
through the interview and documentary data and during the analysis stage. Similarly, 
assessment of the policies began during the fieldwork stages, but predominantly took 
place during the analysis. The final stage comprised the writing up process where, 
following assessment and analysis, aspects of the policies and programmes examined 
were recommended for the British context.  
 
Prior to my recruitment to the project, a project initiation document had been 
produced, which suggested that the first year would comprise the evidence review 
based on documentary analysis of policies in a wide range of OECD countries, chosen 
to reflect regime types. In the event, regime types were not utilised for reasons set out 
in Section 3.3, as well as in Chapter Two. During the first year the DWP-commissioned 
evaluations of the New Deal for Partners (NDP) were analysed using a similar 
methodology for meta-analysis as that employed by Hasluck and Green (2007) in their 
review of ‘what works for whom’ in British welfare to work programmes. This 
                                                 
23
 ‗Beyond the Horizon‘ 
24
 Renamed the National School of Government. 
25
 See National School of Government Policyhub http://www.nationalschool.gov.uk/policyhub/ [Last 
accessed 27 February 2010]. 
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involved mapping and assessing the evidence and drawing out the key lessons.26 
Analysis of this evaluation evidence was accompanied by a mapping of social security, 
social assistance and employment assistance pertaining to non-working partnered 
women in Britain. During this time, a visit was made to a Jobcentre Plus office to 
examine how NDP was implemented at the frontline by observing an NDP Personal 
Adviser conducting mandatory Work-Focused Interviews for Partners (WFIPs) and 
voluntary NDP interviews. One aim of this visit was to consolidate knowledge of 
current policy and practice before assessing policies in other countries for 
transferability. This visit also acted as a pilot for the interviews with policy actors and 
similar visits to frontline offices in Australia and Denmark. Due to time constraints 
interviews with policy actors in Britain were not as extensive as for the other two 
countries, however engagement with current policy was ensured through regular 
contact with the DWP supervisor Dr Alison Herrington, as well as by my own desk 
research. Meetings also took place periodically with other policy officials in DWP, as 
well as with statisticians and I also spoke to a number of academics based in Britain. 
The British case was treated as both the starting point and end point for the research in 
that the perceived ‘policy failure’ of the New Deal for Partners provided the ‘impetus’ 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) for policy learning and the British case was returned to in 
considering policy translatability from the comparator countries. 
 
The evidence review involved scanning of predominantly labour market policies 
relevant to partnered women in OECD countries. It was not practical within time and 
resource constraints to examine all OECD countries.27 DWP requested that the US be 
excluded due to the amount of existing data relating to US policies. Given the 
documented failures of transatlantic policy transfer (Dolowitz, 1998, Dolowitz et al., 
                                                 
26
 This meta-analysis and the interviews which follow are broadly based on the idea of drawing policy lessons 
based on a cumulative picture, espoused by Pawson in his realist methodology for evidence-based policy. 
Pawson also provides a critique of systematic reviews based on hierarchies of evidence. See Pawson, R. 
(2006) Evidence-based policy: a realist perspective, London, Sage. 
27
 There were 29 OECD countries in addition to Britain. 
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1999, Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004, Deacon, 2000)28 I supported this exclusion 
and it provided an opportunity to explore the possibilities of policy learning from 
another European country.29 The initial focus was on countries with higher female 
employment rates than Britain and OECD employment rates (OECD, 2008)30 for all 
women were used as a proxy measure to ensure data comparability. Based on this, the 
eight countries with a higher employment rate than that of Britain are set out in Table 
3.1 below.  
 
Table 3.1: Employment rates for women of working age, 2006 
Britain 66.8 
Finland 67.3 
New Zealand 68.4 
Canada 69 
Switzerland 71.1 
Sweden  72.1 
Norway 72.3 
Denmark 73.2 
Iceland 81.6 
 Source: OECD Factbook 2008 
 
Evidence reviews of each country were conducted, except Iceland, which was due to 
be begun when the evidence review was drawn to a close (see below). In the course of 
reviewing New Zealand, information was acquired regarding Australian policies, as 
the former had served as policy inspiration for the latter and Australia was later added 
to the analysis for reasons set out in Section 3.3 below. The evidence review revealed 
                                                 
28
 However, drawing on elite interviews with DWP officials, Dwyer and Ellison cast doubt on the US as the 
primary influence on British activation policy and point to hybridisation within policy learning. See Dwyer, P. 
& Ellison, N. (2009) ‗We nicked stuff from all over the place‘: policy transfer or muddling through? Policy 
and Politics, 37(3):389-407.  
29
 However, it transpired that the Australian reforms examined were partially inspired by the US, reflecting 
existing policy learning. See Gray, M. & Stanton, D. (2002) Lessons of United States welfare reforms for 
Australian social policy, Melbourne, VIC, Australian Institute for Family Studies. 
30 Employment rates are the ratio of the employed to the working age population, calculated by dividing the 
working age population into two groups: those who are employed and those who are not. All OECD countries 
use the ILO Guidelines for measuring employment: unemployed people are defined as those who are without 
a job, want a job, have actively sought work in the last four weeks and are available to start work in the next 
two weeks; or those who are out of work, have found a job and are waiting to start it in the next two weeks. 
The ILO definition of employment is more accurate than the claimant count, which merely counts people 
registered as unemployed and not those who are on benefits other than unemployment benefits or those who 
are not registered as unemployed but are nevertheless looking for paid work. 
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that total employment rates were an inadequate measure of partnered women’s labour 
market participation and that more in-depth research was required to identify relevant 
policies.  
 
The review was an iterative process. Searches of citation indexes accorded with 
Hasluck and Green (2005: 97) that using ‘partners’ as a search term generated a large 
number of unrelated items (such as ‘social’ and ‘business’ partners) and that ‘partners 
of benefit claimants’ did not produce many items. Key words used in database and 
index searching were: ‘partnered women’, ‘unemployed women’, ‘unemployed 
partners’, ‘partners of unemployed’, ‘workless partners’, ‘unemployed partnered 
women’, ‘jobless partners’, ‘workless couples’, ‘jobless couples’. Databases searched 
included the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), Web of 
Knowledge, Web of Science, Applied Social Science Index and Abstracts (ASSIA) and 
the International Social Security Association database.31 Search engines used were 
Google and Google Scholar. Extensive searches were conducted of European Union 
and OECD websites, of other sources set out in the British Government’s National 
School of Government’s Policy Hub website32 and of the websites of relevant 
government departments in each country.33 The focus of the review was on 
programmes currently operating. As Macdonald (2001: 201) has highlighted, use of the 
‘Find’ function was helpful in searching large quantities of often lengthy documents. 
Burnham et al (2004) suggest that ‚even if the web-like character of the Internet allows 
us to think in new and different ways, the basic organising concepts that are deployed 
in social science research still have to be applied‛ (p.190). I logged the searches by 
using bookmarks in Google, as well as by keeping a journal. It was acknowledged at 
                                                 
31
 ISSA comprises institutions and bodies administering social security in most countries. It was founded in 
1927 and is part of the International Labor Office.  
32
 http://www.nationalschool.gov.uk/policyhub/ [Last accessed 27 February 2010] 
33
 Although a large quantity of documentary evidence is publicly accessible via the Internet, the success of 
Internet searching is circumscribed by the efficacy of search engines, citation indexes and search phrases 
used. One major disadvantage of the Internet is the authenticity of the vast amount of documents, however 
there are also constraints on Internet searching: many governments place a large amount of information onto 
the web, but this is not true of all OECD countries. 
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an early stage that Internet search alone was unlikely to yield information about 
specific policies and programmes relevant to non-working partners, therefore e-mail 
contact was made with relevant policymakers, analysts and academics in each 
country.34 Contacts were established via a snowballing technique, including through 
DWP’s Joint International Unit, EU committees, networking at conferences and 
Internet searching.  
 
The evidence review of the eight countries revealed that partnered women as a target 
group did not specifically feature in policies, apart from in Australia, New Zealand 
and Denmark.35 The intention was that the scope of the review would be widened if 
insufficient data were collected by focusing merely on the eight countries. In the event, 
the University upgrade panel which approved my progression from MPhil to PhD 
requested that the evidence review be drawn to a close and that I select my 
comparator countries and commence the case study research. This echoed my own 
concerns concerning the amount of time the review was taking.36  
 
3.3 Selection of case study countries 
 
At the start of the research, the intention was to select up to three countries for case 
study analysis in the second year of the project. Following the evidence review stage 
and based on advice from academics in the field about what could be accomplished in 
the time period, I selected two cases in addition to Britain. Given the task of analysing 
the wealth of contextual data acquired from two countries during this research, three 
cases would have been potentially problematic.  
                                                 
34
 I am grateful to Dr Patricia Kennett for advice regarding this. 
35 At a later stage in the research, I discovered that active labour market policies had been extended to 
partners of benefit claimants in Germany as part of the Hartz reforms (2003 - 2005) but that these reforms 
were not strictly enforced. I am grateful to Dr Irene Dingeldey for this information. Although my German 
language skills were reasonably advanced, they were not sufficient to conduct in-depth interviews requiring 
knowledge of specialist terms. 
36
 The review began in Spring 2008 and ended in Autumn 2008. Although the evidence review had originally 
been intended to form part of the first year‘s research preparation, much of the first year was also consumed 
with reviewing the theoretical literature. 
 52 
 
Based on the theoretical literature (see Chapter Two), three options were considered 
for the selection of case study countries. The first was to select two countries which, 
together with Britain (if conceptualised as a liberal welfare regime37), each represented 
one of Esping-Andersen’s original three regime types.38 The second option was to 
confine the cases to those within the same regime type as Britain on the basis that 
borrowing policies would be more likely to result in successful policy transfer.39 The 
third option was to select countries purely on the basis of being the most successful in 
increasing the employment rates of partnered women, perhaps grouped according to 
particular policy approaches and which may also reflect regime approaches. Selecting 
two countries using regime typologies40 was rejected on the basis of regime theory’s 
shortcomings, particularly in the context of such a gender-focused analysis (see 
Chapter Two). The third option was selected, but given that Australia did not have a 
higher employment rate for partnered women (65.6 compared with 66.8) than Britain, 
in the event this was also informed by other aspects relating to the construction of the 
case studies, such as access to data. 
 
The intention of selecting Australia and Denmark was to compare policy responses 
specifically targeted at partnered women outside the labour market with 
encompassing approaches not directly focused on partnered women, but which 
affected their employment rate. The selection was reflective of Korpi and Palme’s 
(1998) five types of institutional models41, modified for this study. Australia’s 
approach to partnered women outside the labour market was conceptualised as 
‘targeted’. Australia was also selected on the basis that the direction of British welfare 
                                                 
37
 Classification of Britain is contested, as is the typologization of the two comparator countries. 
38
 Or four regime types - although there are differing opinions as to which countries constitute a ‗fourth world 
of welfare capitalism‘. 
39
 Selection of countries could also be confined to EU countries, based on the rationale that EU member 
countries are subject to EU policies, within the framework of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). 
Notably, Britain also differs from most other EU countries (apart from Denmark and Sweden) in not having 
adopted the Euro. 
40
 This would have meant selecting one conservative-corporatist and one social democratic welfare state. 
41
 Korpi and Palme‘s typology compares five types of institutional models of welfare, based on old age 
pension and sickness insurance; their typology includes encompassing and targeted/basic security regimes. 
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reforms for partners and lone parents42 had some similarities with Australia and the 
project provided an opportunity to investigate further the context of the Australian 
reforms, particularly in terms of possible negative policy lessons. Given that the two 
countries have been considered to be members of the same regime cluster43, this 
rationale partially reflects the second option above, however one further reason for the 
selection of Australia was to examine any variations between Australia and Britain, 
which are important in considering the possibility of policy translation. Denmark was 
selected as a country with an encompassing approach to encouraging the labour 
market participation of partnered women within its overarching framework of 
activation for all; the anomalous targeted approach to married immigrant women was 
a lens through which to view Danish encompassing activation. Since the mid-1990s 
Denmark has led the rest of the Nordic countries in employment policy innovation in 
terms of activation44 in the context of its flexicurity model, comprising a flexible labour 
market45 and activation, but importantly, balanced by generous and comprehensive 
social protection. Denmark has also been cited as a source of policy inspiration for 
British welfare reforms (Purnell, 2008) and its flexicurity policies are promoted across 
the EU and OECD (see Roche, 2010: 211-5).  
 
Selecting Denmark also offered the opportunity to examine the acknowledged 
variations (such as the established system of day-care) but also any similarities 
between Denmark and Britain, which, as with Australia, are important in considering 
policy translation. These cases provided a most-similar-systems design (Australia) and 
most-different-systems design (Denmark) (Manheim et al., 2006: 211-2). Such a close-
up comparison of a small number of cases aimed to overcome Galton’s problem 
(Manheim et al., 2006: 213), whereby the influence of one country or a supra-national 
                                                 
42
 In particular the Welfare Reform Act 2009. 
43
 By Esping-Andersen (1990) - for a critique of this typologisation see Castles, F. G. (1993) Families of 
nations: patterns of public policy in western democracies, Aldershot, Dartmouth. 
44 In fact activation is an example of Danish policy learning from Sweden. 
45
 Where employees have the right to leave their job within a relatively short notice period and employers also 
have the right to ‗hire and fire‘ workers. 
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actor such as the OECD ostensibly results in policy convergence in a large sample. The 
case selection was also based on a judgment formed during the evidence review 
concerning the availability of data in the two countries. This was the primary reason 
for selecting Australia rather than New Zealand but was interesting in the context of 
problems with access to data in the Australian case (see Section 3.8). 
 
Two hypotheses were posited relating to the selected cases. Firstly, that the higher 
labour market participation of partnered women in Denmark, compared with Britain, 
is a result of its ‘encompassing’ welfare state, rather than policies specifically targeted 
at this group of women. The second hypothesis was that there would be policies in 
Australia which, as in Britain, are specifically targeted at non-working partnered 
women but which have a differential impact on their labour market participation, for 
example in relation to different sub-groups of partners. Two further hypotheses were 
posited regarding policy learning. Firstly, that Danish policies are the most difficult to 
translate to Britain because of the different institutional, historical, political and 
economic contexts and cultural specificities. Secondly, that Australia’s policies may be 
easier to translate to Britain, given some similarities between their welfare states, as 
well as their shared history.46 In practice the research was also limited to countries 
which appeared to have sufficient data available in English.  
 
3.4  The case study method 
 
The approach taken in the research is that suggested by Hammersley (2004: 254) 
whereby a case study is driven by an interest in a problem and concerns diagnosis of 
the problem, identification of its sources and outlines possible solutions. From the 
beginning, it was anticipated that the research was likely to produce a complex picture 
which might be difficult to reduce to a number of statistical measures. The case study 
approach was considered to be the most appropriate method, given that it can 
                                                 
46
 Australia was a British colony and still has the British Monarch as its Head of State. 
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incorporate a range of methods, both qualitative and quantitative (Mangen, 2004: 309). 
Case studies also have a strong theoretical dimension (Burnham et al., 2004: 54) and 
the methodology was informed by the theoretical framework. Given the focus on 
policy learning, a contextual and conceptual comparative analysis was required in 
order to engage in ‘hard’ policy learning (Dolowitz, 2009) to assess the possibility of 
policy ‘translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007). Such a contextual analysis is also 
important for a such gender-focused analysis (Daly and Rake, 2003: 167). The case 
study approach permits the retention of a wide range of factors (Mangen, 2004: 309) 
and allows the research to tell a ‘country-specific’ story. Such a ‘close-up comparison’ 
(Hantrais, 2004: 270) was considered more likely to reveal differences which may not 
be apparent from aggregated national-level data, the short-comings of which had 
already been identified in the evidence review.  
 
One constraint on the research was that it was never considered possible to state with 
certainty that a particular programme resulted in higher job entries for partnered 
women. Hill (2006: 16) suggests that for governments it is outcomes that really matter, 
but the key problem with such data is that variations may have little to do with policy 
factors but are the result of other, wider social and environmental factors, which are 
not easy to bring under policy control. Multiple regression was unsuitable for such a 
small number of cases and although Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)47 was 
considered, two cases were insufficient for this. Armer’s tests (1973 cited in Burnham 
et al., 2004) suggest that ‚a major methodological task in comparative research is to 
devise and select theoretical problems, conceptual schemes, samples and measurement 
and analysis strategies that are comparable or equivalent across the societies involved‛ 
(p.56). Comparability was sought, firstly, by examining policies relating to a sub-
group of partners in each of the countries (in each these groups were comparatively 
                                                 
47
 This quantitative technique is informed by in-depth qualitative data, and facilitates comparison of cases 
rather than variables. See Rihoux, B. & Ragin, C. (2004) Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): State of the 
art and prospects. Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Chicago, 2-5 September 2004. 
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small in number). Secondly, by acquiring detailed information about the documented 
reasons for partnered women being outside the labour market in Australia, Denmark 
and Britain (see Chapter Four) and to demonstrate a common starting point for 
problematisation.  
 
3.5 Documents 
 
Burnham et al (2004: 206) suggest that no project should be entirely based on elite 
interviewing. In this research documents have been used as triangulation for interview 
data and vice versa, however documents are also important primary data which 
highlight how the policy ‘problem’ of partnered women outside the labour market is 
identified, represented and constructed. Atkinson and Coffey (2004: 58) argue that 
documents should be regarded as data in their own right and not merely to cross-
check oral accounts. Government documents examined included records of 
parliamentary and committee debates, Green and White Papers, discussion papers, 
annual reports, parliamentary-commissioned reviews and programme evaluations. 
Other documentary evidence reviewed included academic journal articles and books 
and other research commissioned by non-governmental policy actors. These were 
acquired via the websites of government departments, research institutes and 
universities, as well as from citation index searches.  
 
At the beginning of the research I identified the risk that some documents might not 
be publicly available, or might be withheld from me due to political or commercial 
sensitivities. In Australia there is no government commitment to publish evaluation or 
statistical data48 in comparison with the wealth of data published by the British 
government, particularly DWP. For example, a research organisation contracted by the 
Australian government had produced a number of relevant evaluation reports. 
                                                 
48
 There are concerns about media manipulation of published data and also concerns regarding the Privacy 
Act 1988. During the later stages of write-up of this research (in March 2010) an evaluation report was 
published, although it had been produced for the Australian government in May 2008. 
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Although the organisation agreed to provide the documents if permission was sought 
from the relevant government department, this permission was not granted. My 
difficulty in accessing data was not confined to me as a researcher from outside the 
country, but also applied to many academics working in the field. The impression I 
gained from the interviews was that the role of non-governmental policy actors may 
be less significant to the Australian policymaking process than to the British or Danish 
ones.  
 
Burnham et al (2004: 197) suggest that public agencies often lag behind private ones in 
maintaining their websites. One issue faced in relation to this was that materials were 
not always transferred between websites following machinery of government changes, 
so more intricate searches had to be conducted. Further, following such changes some 
documents were not available electronically; this was particularly visible in the 
Australian case where relatively more published data were available in English than 
for Denmark. However, this aspect underscored the importance of the interviews, 
where signposting was given to published originals of such documents which I may 
not otherwise have located. Some documents were provided to me in person, or e-
mailed or posted to me later; some were accessed via the research institutes where I 
was based during the fieldwork. Due to budget constraints, documents in Danish were 
translated by a University student for a small fee. Reliance on others to read 
documents and search websites reduced my control over the process and required me 
to adequately explain the purposes of my research and the data I was looking for. 
Inevitably, through no fault of the people helping me, information which may have 
been useful may not have been accessed. Some documents were translated word for 
word, but due to cost constraints, summaries of relevant sections of documents were 
produced. Although these aspects constrained the research, this was offset by the 
availability of other data available in English (predominantly academic documents) 
and by the interviews.  
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Atkinson and Coffey (2004) argue that ‚We have to treat documents for what they are 
and what they are used to accomplish‛ (p.58). They argue that analysis of 
‘documentary realities’ should not be confined to content, but ‚must also incorporate a 
clear understanding of how documents are produced, circulated, read, stored and 
used for a variety of purposes‛ (p.57). Documents are ‘social facts,’ not transparent 
representations and however ‘official’ they appear, they cannot be viewed as firm 
evidence of what they report (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 58). Manheim et al (2006: 53) 
suggest a number of criteria to consider when reviewing documents: authority, 
objectivity, accuracy, currency and coverage. Burnham et al (2004: 185) add to this 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. It is important to consider 
that documents are not only produced, but are productive (Prior, 2004: 84) of a reality; 
Atkinson and Coffey (2004: 73) highlight the importance of authorship (production) as 
well as readership (consumption). For example, government (and sometimes non-
government) documents often do not have named authors, but are anonymous 
products of organisations. Such anonymity contributes to the construction of such 
accounts as authoritative or factual (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 71). Government 
documents such as Green and White papers reflect political and policy ideology, 
employing rhetorical devices. Further, such documents are often not produced for a 
wider audience, but are largely aimed at (and read by) policy elites and other policy 
actors. Although such documents may be written in accessible language, in reality 
only a ‘restricted readership’ with specific competencies are able to fully decode them 
(Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 72).  
 
Mossberger and Wolman (2003: 430) suggest that when searching for policies to 
transfer formal programme evaluations are preferable to anecdotal information or 
newspapers. For Robson (2004: 123) evaluations have a number of purposes, including 
examining how a policy is operating, why it does or does not work, how it might be 
improved and how the costs compare with the benefits, with a particular concern with 
outcomes. Such programme evaluations are conducted by research organisations 
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commissioned by government departments, but the publication of such documents is 
managed and approved by government officials. Other research commissioned by 
campaigning organisations or funded by research councils are constructed in the 
context of lobbying campaigns or of certain funding criteria, which set parameters on 
what is produced. Taskforces and policy reviews operate within constructed terms of 
reference informed by policy ideology and the resulting reports do not reflect all 
evidence reviewed, but are representations (although minority reports are often 
published which highlight dissenting views). In this way, parliamentary committee 
minutes are useful as they record all proceedings. This is not to denigrate the 
documents used in this research in any way - on the contrary, they must be (and have 
been) viewed as important, but also as constructed ‘documentary realities’ (Atkinson 
and Coffey, 2004). Further, they are not separate entities, but embody intertextuality in 
that they make sense with reference to other documents (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 
66-7) which together constitute constructions of reality. They are cultural artifacts 
which constitute reality constructed on the basis of shared understandings and 
expectations, shared meanings and cultural assumptions (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 
65) and are used by policy elites to construct and maintain policy paradigms, such as 
‘activation’.  
 
One of the most important features of the bureaucratic mode of social organisation 
within which policy elites are situated is that people and courses of action are 
reconstructed in terms of the categories and rules of the organisation itself; such 
categories do not merely classify, but also create and shape classes and systems 
(Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 61). This can be seen in the categorisation of, and focus on 
particular groups of people, such as lone parents and partners.49 Such categories are an 
important component of outcome measures and, in turn, these measures construct the 
indicators of success for policies and programmes which appear in documents such as 
                                                 
49
 Taxonomic structures are a feature of social science research. See Prior, L. (2004) Doing things with 
documents, in Silverman, D. (Ed.) Qualitative research: theory, method and practice. London, Sage, 76-94. 
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annual reports and evaluation reports. They inform decisions concerning the 
management information collected, which raises questions about which data are not 
publicly available and why.  
 
For both countries access to relevant statistical data was restricted to people with links 
to institutions within those countries, such as universities. A number of Australian 
interviewees suggested that one possible source of data was the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, but it would have taken 
considerable time to familiarise myself with the database, which was not feasible 
within the fieldwork schedule. The possibility of issuing a survey to Australian 
employment service providers was explored, but in the context of the transition to the 
new employment services contract in July 2009 they were too busy to take part.  
 
3.6 Construction of the interview sample 
 
The interviewees were recruited to achieve a purposive sample, comprised of those 
considered relevant to the research questions and topics. Seldon (1996: 353) defines 
elite interviews as those conducted with individuals because of who they are or what 
they did, although there is overlap in terms of methodology with interviews 
conducted with ‘ordinary’ people. Manheim et al (2006: 355) highlight that elite status 
depends on the information to which people have access and not on their role. Policy 
elites’ access to information was important: however their role was also important in 
terms of their construction of authoritative truths. The domain of knowledge to be 
accessed related to their professional domains and associated identities (Baker, 2004: 
164), but these views may also be informed by the individual’s beliefs and opinions. 
The research differed from my previous research50 in that it was not solely based on 
                                                 
50
 This refers to research I conducted, rather than my professional role managing evaluations of employment 
programmes. My own research included interviews with participants in a youth training scheme, interviews 
with graduates in relation to aspirations around parenthood, research with young people in relation to sexual 
health and with senior civil servants concerning leadership and management.  
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interviews with direct beneficiaries of a programme. I found this aspect challenging in 
seemingly giving a voice to those who, to a greater or lesser extent, already had a voice 
as part of an elite. However, the importance of the interviews with policy actors was 
two-fold: firstly, in understanding the context of the programmes and secondly, in 
highlighting the construction and representation of policy problems by elites and how 
these inform the policy responses. Given that the final aim of this research was policy 
learning, the elite viewpoints of policy actors were important in telling a country-
specific story. The sample was not representative as such, but was intended to reflect 
the range of key policy actors in Australia and Denmark, based on background 
research. It took some time for me to understand the structure and responsibilities of 
the government departments, particularly for Denmark. It was easier to identify 
researchers and academics to approach for interviews, as their research interests and 
contact details were in the public domain on University and research organisations’ 
websites.51 In most cases it was difficult to directly identify the most relevant people in 
government departments in the first instance, so I contacted such organisations via e-
mail addresses given on their websites, which in some cases were for named officials. 
Recipients were happy to pass my e-mail onto relevant colleagues, or suggest other 
people I could speak to.  
 
In my e-mails I introduced myself, set out my research goals and highlighted my links 
with both my University and with DWP. I carefully proofread my e-mails to ensure 
that I had clearly explained the purpose of my research whilst being as brief as 
possible. I was aware that the potential respondents were busy professionals with 
overloaded Inboxes and that many did not have English as a first language, so I 
needed to be clear and avoid jargon. E-mail communication is usually less formal than 
other forms of communication (Markham, 2004: 117); I aimed to strike a balance 
between too much formality and too little informality, at least at the beginning. 
                                                 
51
 Professor Dan Finn at the University of Portsmouth and Dr David Etherington at the University of 
Middlesex provided a number of useful contacts and guidance. 
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Notably, some respondents were more formal in e-mails than others. E-mail 
transcends temporal and geographical boundaries - an important asset for cross-
national research. E-mail also gave recipients the advantage of reading messages at 
times convenient to them and the opportunity to examine and reflect upon my request 
before responding (Markham, 2004: 104). It had the further advantage of being the 
primary medium for professional communication for the policy actors interviewed.  
 
A number of policy actors asked who I had already arranged to speak to and gave me 
guidance as to who else I should contact. This snowball approach acted as a checking 
mechanism to ensure that I had recruited a range of policy actors within the two 
countries which were representative of each case, given that the case studies were 
constructed by a British researcher. In other forms of interviewing, discussion of other 
interviewees would have been a breach of confidentiality, however in elite interviews 
in policy analysis this is an important aspect of constructing the policy story. For 
example, I did not initially understand why a Danish respondent had strongly 
suggested I should interview social workers. In fact, this was an important aspect of 
the Danish case and my initial difficulty in appreciating the importance of these policy 
actors related to the British context, where social workers have never had such a role. 
Manheim et al (2006: 358) propose that suggestions of other potential interviewees 
may reveal alliances or shared perceptions and in some cases this was apparent. 
However, on this occasion the opposite appeared to be the case, as the respondent 
making the suggestion had diverging views on the policy to those voiced by the social 
workers.  
 
A possible risk identified at the start of the research was that policy actors may have 
been uninterested either in taking part in the research, or in engaging fully in the 
research process. However, some officials had stated their interest in hearing about the 
British context, so our meetings had some benefit for them. One of the chief rewards 
for elite respondents is the chance to impart learning to someone knowledgeable about 
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and genuinely interested in a subject of importance to them (Manheim et al., 2006: 
360). Officials arguably had a vested interest in facilitating policy learning, however 
they could equally have had reservations about how such learning would be 
implemented. The success of the research depended on contacts in other countries 
being willing and able to communicate programme information to me. This, in turn, 
depended on my abilities as a researcher to build up relationships with them. My own 
professional experience as a government researcher and civil servant was helpful in 
approaching potential interviewees and in conducting interviews with senior officials 
in both governmental and non-governmental organisations.  
 
Seldon (1996: 361) highlights the importance of mentioning a supervisor or other 
mentor in first communication with potential elite respondents. When contacting 
government departments I highlighted the links with DWP and my background as a 
civil servant. The purpose of this was to establish some common ground and to 
position myself as an ‘insider’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004). Miller and Glassner (2004: 
128) suggest that how interviewees respond to us depends upon the social categories 
to which we belong and upon whether interviewers are considered to be members of 
the groups they are studying. This may impact on the level of trust between 
interviewer and interviewee, whether they understand our questions, or whether they 
purposely mislead us (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 128). There was a risk of here of 
‘going native,’ however I considered that the success of the research depended on how 
far interviewees considered me to have legitimacy. It was not possible to ascertain 
how far this affected the responses conveyed to me. In the Australian case access to 
officials may not have been possible at all without my government links. However, 
this reflects that interviews are constructed and that my presentation of myself as an 
interviewer was reflective of my positionality as both a researcher and former 
government official. Holstein and Gubrium (2004) argue that in the case of interviews 
assessments of reliability and validity must be based on criteria which account for 
their construction as ‚dynamic, meaning-making occasions<One cannot expect 
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answers on one occasion to replicate those on another because they emerge from 
different circumstances of production‛ (p.145). This includes ‚institutionalised ways of 
understanding and talking about things,‛ reflective of the elite interviewee as an 
‘active’ rather than a ‘passive subject’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004: 150, 147). In 
advance of the interviews I offered to send respondents document outlining the broad 
questions and topics I wished to cover, but few respondents asked for this.  
 
Burnham et al (2004: 209) suggest that one risk when dealing with large organisations 
(such as government departments) is being ‘fobbed off’. In the Australian case the fact 
that my meetings with officials had been organised by a governmental International 
Unit allowed me access that I may not otherwise have had, as well as saving me time. 
However, there was a gatekeeper effect, which was not the case with my relatively 
open access to Danish government officials. Given my own experience as a 
government official, I should have anticipated that government departments would 
have routines for processing visitors (Burnham et al., 2004: 261). Further, although my 
meetings with Australian government officials had been organised according to my 
list of policy areas, most meetings were in the form of roundtable discussions. 
Manheim et al suggest that one-to-one interviews are preferable to group interviews 
(2006: 360) but this may not always be possible when trying to access respondents with 
busy schedules. Although an advantage of the roundtable meetings was the 
‘synergistic effect’ created by respondents reacting and building upon the responses of 
others (Wilkinson, 2004: 180), I did not treat them as focus groups by observing the 
dynamics of group behaviour. I also felt that I had less control over the interactions 
and that the data generated were not as in-depth compared with the one-to-one 
interviews. In such a setting, individuals were less likely to present anything other 
than official viewpoints and this may have contributed to the reduced openness of 
these interviews compared with the Danish ones.  
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On visits to frontline staff in Australia I was accompanied by a departmental 
representative - ostensibly to take notes, although the notes had to be cleared with the 
relevant Section Heads.52 Although this was understandable, it made it difficult to 
probe sufficiently, particularly in comparison with the one-to-one Danish interviews. I 
tried for around three months to organise a visit to a Danish Jobcenter and was 
dependent on AMS (National Labour Market Authority) to arrange this. Once I knew 
which Jobcenter I was visiting, I did some background research about the locality and 
discovered that there were few residents of an ethnic minority, few immigrants and 
therefore few partnered women subject to the 300 hours rule residing there. During 
the second phase of Danish interviews, I arranged another Jobcenter visit via a contact 
I had made during the first phase. One disadvantage of the limited time in each 
country was the lack of flexibility, however in the event this did not cause problems. 
Only one interview was cancelled in advance due to an interviewee’s ill health but we 
both agreed that the interview need not be re-arranged as I would be speaking to 
colleagues with similar knowledge. One interviewee was replaced on the day with a 
colleague, but this transpired to be fortuitous as their replacement actually had more 
relevant knowledge. 
 
3.7 Ethical issues 
 
The research specification was reviewed by the University Ethics Committee, which 
required changes to be made to the participant information sheets to include 
information about anonymity, data storage53 and for consent forms to be given to 
interviewees. A number of interviewees expressed surprise that they had to complete 
consent forms, however this is in line with social research.54 Each interview 
                                                 
52
 Unfortunately I was unable to utilise the notes taken by officials. 
53
 Although the fieldwork was taking place in two different countries, the research was required to adhere to 
the British Data Protection Act 1998. 
54
 See for example the Social Research Association (http://www.the-sra.org.uk/ [Last accessed 2 March 2010] 
and the Social Policy Association http://www.social-policy.com/documents/SPA_code_ethics_jan09.pdf  
[Last accessed 2 March 2010].  
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respondent was given an information sheet and asked to sign a consent form before 
the interview. All respondents received copies of the completed form, which offered a 
choice of options regarding anonymity: for individuals and/or organisations to be 
named in the thesis or to remain anonymous. Similar research with elite respondents 
(for example Branosky and Morrell, 2005, Kremer, 2005) name respondents in the final 
publications, but do not quote from them directly. Although most interviewees said 
they would be happy to be named and quoted in the thesis, in retrospect giving 
interviewees options for anonymity proved to be problematic. This accords with 
Robinson’s (2008) research with elite and non-elite climbers, in which all responses 
were anonymised because whilst ‚some interviewees had stressed that they did not 
mind the possibility of being identified, others had asked for anonymity‛ (p.7). 
 
Marsh (1967, cited in Kennett, 2001: 44) distinguishes between formal equivalence and 
functional equivalence: using identical procedures to compare data across countries 
(formal equivalence) does not necessarily produce functional equivalence. In the 
event, formal equivalence was not achieved across the two countries as consent was 
not given to record the interviews with Australian government officials. Although 
months earlier I had secured the support of officials, the week before the fieldwork 
began I was informed that senior officials would not agree to me recording the 
interviews if the data were to appear in a published document. This resulted in more 
reliance on interviews with non-governmental actors and on documentary evidence in 
the Australian case. Although data were gained from other sources, functional 
equivalence was challenged compared with the more extensive interview data in 
Denmark. This imbalance was addressed through an iterative process of data 
collection and the triangulation permitted by use of mixed methods in the form of 
documents and interviews for each case. However, one drawback to the imbalance in 
functional equivalence between cases is that the interview data in Denmark were 
triangulated by documents and vice versa, but this was not entirely possible with the 
Australian data. A further drawback is that the relative paucity of the Australian 
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interview data is all too apparent to the reader, in comparison with the richer Danish 
data, which owes a debt to the candour of the Danish respondents. 
 
For some Australian respondents, direct quotes were not used (even in anonymised 
form) as permission was only given to use information in a paraphrased form. This 
meant that careful use had to be made of such data, so as not to compromise its 
robustness, or change the meaning. A further issue was that a small number of 
respondents who agreed to be named also specified that direct quotes be checked with 
them before they were used and attributed in the final thesis. There was a risk that 
respondents might withdraw consent based on quotes presented out of context, 
however in the event only one respondent wished to see their quotes and cleared them 
without problems. These issues underline the difficulty of conducting elite interviews 
with policy actors. Such a methodology produces interesting and rich data, but this 
may be one reason why this method is underused in social policy. Issues relating to 
anonymity may be related to the cultures of anonymity within government 
departments (highlighted in relation to documents in Section 3.5), but this may also 
reflect the cultures in different countries. Anonymity is important to the British civil 
service and this also seems to be the case in Australia, but appeared to be less of an 
issue for Danish civil servants, who were all happy to be quoted and named. In 
particular in Australia there had been a change of government in 2007 and in serving 
the current government, officials wished to distance themselves from the policies of 
the previous one, including the most recent programme I examined. In the Danish case 
the focus was on policy changes brought about by the current government, although 
the basis of consensual political decision-making perhaps frames these aspects 
differently. 
 
In the final thesis, to protect the identity and data of all interviewees, all quotes are 
anonymised, but as is customary (see for example Burnham et al., 2004: 218) attributed 
to the type of professional or organisation - the list of interviewees is at Appendix 1. 
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Such anonymisation is in line with University ethics requirements, social research 
guidelines and with DWP’s own ethical guidelines (Bacon and Olsen, 2003). However, 
consideration was given regarding how to typologise interviewees so as not to 
compromise anonymity.  
 
3.8 The elite interviews 
 
The aim of constructing in-depth and contextual case studies was one of the reasons 
for the selection of elite interviews, complemented by documents, for the 
methodology. Although commonly used by political scientists, elite interviewing is 
not well-used in social policy. The classic political science text by Heclo and 
Wildavsky (1974)55 used elite interviewing and this is also commonly used in 
programme evaluations in relation to policy implementation. Dwyer and Ellison 
(2009) used elite interviews with senior DWP officials involved in formulating New 
Deal policies to illuminate the complexities of policymaking in relation to policy 
transfer. In this research the use of elite interviews did not aim to provide a policy 
network analysis in relation to the policies identified, but were primary data sources 
for ‘hard’ policy learning (Dolowitz, 2009). 
 
Burnham et al (2004: 208) highlight that one problem with qualitative research is 
undertaking too many interviews, suggesting that 20-30 interviews is a reasonable 
target where interviewing is the principal method. In total, 52 elite interviews were 
conducted but for two cases; these were predominantly face-to-face but six Australian 
interviews took place by telephone either within Australia or from Britain where 
respondents could not be interviewed face-to-face (predominantly due to the 
availability of respondents during the limited time periods in the three interview 
locations in Australia). The actual number of policy actors interviewed exceeded the 
                                                 
55
 This text was a pioneer of the elite interview method, analysing the influence of, and constraints on, 
government actors in relation to budgeting processes in British government. 
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number of interviews conducted, as some interviews took the form of roundtable 
meetings (see Section 3.6). There were 31 interviews in Australia and 21 in Denmark. 
This imbalance between the numbers of interviews in the two cases is countered by 
the smaller number of recorded interviews and increased signposting to documents in 
the Australian case. In some cases it appeared that Australian interviewees felt that the 
availability of documents in our shared language to an extent superseded the 
interview data. It is also perhaps reflective of elite interviews as an uncommon 
methodology in social policy. In Denmark it may have been assumed that I would 
have more reliance on the interviews due to the limited availability of data in English.  
 
During the fieldwork I conducted desk research at two research institutions in 
Australia and one in Denmark. The majority of the Australian interviews were 
conducted during April 2009. The first phase of Danish interviews took place in 
January 2009 and the second phase in June 2009. Pre-visit telephone conversations 
were conducted with government officials in both countries; these acted as pilots for 
the interviews, provided useful background data and facilitated access to respondents. 
The Australian interviews ranged in length from 15 minutes to one hour forty 
minutes, averaging 40 minutes. The Danish interviews were between 20 minutes and 
almost two hours, averaging one hour. Due to time constraints, on some days three or 
four interviews were conducted in a day, which was not ideal; Burnham et al (2004: 
208) suggest that two interviews per day is a reasonable target. That some of the 
interviews were short reflects one problem with elite interviews: that respondents are 
very busy people. In both countries major reforms were taking place at the time of the 
interviews - in Australia the new employment services contract and in Denmark the 
municipal reforms.  
 
Manheim et al (2006: 358) suggest that it is often best to interview the most central 
figures late in the study but in Denmark I took the approach of gaining the official 
views first in order to understand the policy and then listened to the critical voices, 
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particularly during the second phase. Due to geographical and time constraints 
Australian government officials were not interviewed first, although these interviews 
still took place early in the fieldwork stage. Mossberger and Wolman (2003) argue that 
because evaluations are not always available, sources should be queried concerning 
implementation problems and criticism, which includes speaking to ‚knowledgeable 
observers and experts, including social scientists, and not solely to programme 
operators and advocates‛ (p.436). Being unable to record the interviews with 
Australian government officials (see Section 3.7) meant that the Australian case study 
relied less upon interviews with government policy actors and more on interviews 
with researchers, academics and on documentary evidence. For example, less data 
relating to policy goals were obtained from Australian government officials compared 
with the Danish case, but was gained from other policy actors and from documents. 
This also meant that there were methodological similarities with the British case, 
where the majority of the data were obtained from documents. 
 
Topic guides were devised for the interviews with policy actors; these were semi-
structured (see Appendix 1) and were broadly based on the prompts in the CMPS 
Workbook (see Section 3.2), reflecting key stages of the policy process: agenda-setting, 
objective-setting, choosing policy instruments, implementation and evaluation. Semi-
structured interviews steer a course between strict scheduling (where information is 
restricted to that already decided upon) and unscheduled interviews (which may 
allow imprecise comparisons) (Manheim et al., 2006: 356). A feature of elite 
interviewing is that each respondent is given individualised treatment (Manheim et 
al., 2006: 355). I wished to allow respondents to speak relatively openly about the topic 
and to allow for aspects that I had not previously considered, particularly at the start 
of the fieldwork when I was building up my own knowledge. As Burnham et al (2004: 
216) suggest, the focus of the interviews changed as the research process progressed. 
During the early stages themes were defined, refined and explored; in the central part 
I became more selective; and during the final interviews I checked emerging 
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interpretations with respondents. Although the Internet has reduced the transaction 
costs of comparative research (Burnham et al., 2004: 189), interviews aided the 
interpretation of documents and added to them (Seldon, 1996: 358). Later interviews 
acted as a checking mechanism to ensure that I had captured the relevant elements 
and reached what I considered to be ‘saturation point’. Some interviews were 
complimented by e-mail correspondence to clarify particular aspects of policies, or to 
pursue documentary evidence. An advantage of the Danish case study was the 
possibility to make two trips to Denmark, with time in the intervening period to assess 
data gaps, but due to resource constraints this was not possible for the Australian case.  
 
As Leech suggests (2002a: 666), I began each interview with a brief recap of the aims of 
my research. At the end of the interviews I gave respondents the opportunity to say 
anything that we had not already covered. I sent ‘thank you’ e-mails to all 
interviewees on my return to Britain, as Seldon suggests is good practice (1996: 363). 
Although two of the Australian interviews took place in cafes, the majority of the 
interviews took place at respondents’ workplaces. This should have encouraged 
openness (Seldon, 1996: 357), but in the Australian case did not appear to do so, 
although perhaps this was for reasons unrelated to the research methodology (see 
Section 3.7). It was harder to establish a rapport with respondents over the telephone, 
particularly when they were in a different time zone, with a time delay between 
speaking and being heard, but this was overcome because such interviews took place 
later in the research, when I had already built up considerable knowledge. 
 
In elite interviews the balance is usually in favour of the respondent (Burnham et al., 
2004: 205). This is because elite respondents are treated as experts about the topic in 
hand (Leech, 2002b: 663). There was a tension here in that one of the purposes of the 
research was for me to become the expert. However, Burnham et al (2004: 211) also 
suggest that the cardinal rule for conducting elite interviews is to be prepared, as 
respondents respect the researcher more if they can demonstrate familiarity with the 
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subject matter. I achieved such familiarity through preparation of pre-visit briefing 
reports for my own use and a number of actors in both countries (particularly 
Denmark) said that they were impressed by my knowledge. During one of the Danish 
interviews, the interviewee had prepared a generic presentation about their 
organisation, which he soon abandoned once he realised my interview questions were 
more specific and well-informed. However, the interviews with academics and 
researchers often revealed their own theories regarding the context, goals and 
outcomes of the programmes and this presented a challenge to my own analysis. One 
way in which I addressed the ‘expert’ status of the elite viewpoints was to 
acknowledge that, although the status and position of these elites was important to the 
construction of the case studies, their representations were themselves constructed and 
required analysis across the range of data I had collected. 
 
Interviews are becoming more and more commonplace, making them increasingly 
naturally occurring occasions (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004: 156). They are 
collaborative accomplishments - two-way conversations which are ‚unavoidably 
interactional and constructive‛ or ‘active’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004: 141-2). 
However, one problem with the interview process is that it fractures the stories being 
told (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 127). Respondents’ interview accounts were de-
constructed (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004: 156) and re-constructed in the case study 
accounts. Triangulation was achieved by interviewing a range of actors in each 
country and by utilising a range of sources, both qualitative and quantitative and both 
interview and documentary. Such methodological triangulation was beneficial in 
instances where interviewees talked about the impetus for past policies in which there 
was a potential risk of recall problems or viewing the past anachronistically. This can 
also help to address problems such as unintentional inaccuracy or oversimplification 
(Seldon, 1996: 356). Triangulation also helped to overcome problems of validity 
associated with anecdotalism (Silverman, 2007: 211), which is a potential risk in 
relying only on elite interviews. However, the interviews in turn provided rich 
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contextual data, which Millar suggests is important in addition to evaluations, where 
evidence may be less than robust, or the wrong conclusions drawn (Millar and Austin, 
2006: 5). 
 
At the start of the study I considered that one possible problem with the research 
methodology was that important information relevant to the transfer of policies might 
intentionally or unintentionally be omitted by policy actors. For example, the role of 
subsidised jobs was not explicitly mentioned by any interviewees in Denmark, but this 
is an important facet of the Danish approach.56 Some aspects are so embedded within 
the contexts of the countries that they may have been unintentionally omitted unless I 
had known in advance to probe further. To a large extent the preparatory research was 
able to address this issue, although the limitations of the Australian interviews meant 
that some insights relating to policy translation were not captured by the interviews, 
but gleaned from documents. 
 
A further issue which was considered at the planning stage of the research was that of 
conceptual equivalence – ensuring that terms in English and used in Britain (for 
example concepts such as ‘gender’, ‘partnered women’) were understood in the 
comparator countries. In the event this was not such an issue, although it was a 
relevant consideration. For example, ‘pensioners’ in Australia was not equivalent to 
the meaning of pensioners in Britain. Iyengar (1993 cited in Kennett, 2001: 44-5) 
suggests that it may not be possible to achieve ‘linguistic equivalence’ through precise 
translation, but that ‘measurement equivalence’ is more practicable, whereby concepts 
measure what they set out to within a specific context. ‘Culture’ is a contested concept, 
but through probing during interviews, I ascertained that its use by different Danish 
policy actors was equivalent within the Danish context of the 300 hours rule. A 
number of Danish words have been used in this thesis, as understanding of such terms 
was an essential component of attempting to understand and represent the ideological 
                                                 
56
 I am grateful to Dr David Etherington for highlighting this. 
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discourses and value systems within which they are situated. Although language was 
a constraint regarding use of documents (see Section 3.5), that the Danish policy actors 
spoke excellent English aided the acquisition of interview data.  
 
The majority of interviews were digitally recorded, if interviewees gave consent (see 
Section 3.7) and this allowed me to focus on the conversation and topic guide, rather 
than on note-taking. However, I took some notes as an insurance against recording 
equipment failure. I took handwritten notes during the interviews with Australian 
government officials and during telephone interviews. The resulting data were coded 
manually. Although I had initially intended to use Nvivo to code, computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) did not seem appropriate for re-
constructing the policy ‘stories’. I firstly coded using multiple codes where these 
applied and subsequently refined them. I then analysed the data further using the four 
sub-dimensions of the recalibration framework (see Chapter Two), employing mind-
mapping (Buzan and Buzan, 1993) in the process.  
 
3.9 Policy translation 
 
Data from the case studies were key in informing the possibilities for translation of 
policies to Britain. This included the acquisition of information about the intentions 
behind policies and programmes and whether the policy goals constructed were 
considered to have been met in implementing them. As well as gaining knowledge 
about current policies, it was also important to the construction of the case studies to 
develop understanding of the historical and ideological paths which led to the creation 
of the relevant programmes, within the wider welfare state contexts. This required 
analysis of documents and interview data, contributing to what Rose (1991: 23-4) 
refers to as ‘prospective evaluation’, in which empirical evidence about how and why 
a programme works in one country is combined with hypotheses about its likely 
success or failure in another country. Lendvai and Stubbs’ (2007) notion of policy as 
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‘translation,’ rather than policy as ‘transfer,’ reflects that policy learning is akin to a 
research process and subject to similar epistemological and ontological considerations. 
The concept recognises that policy is produced in the ‘act of looking’ (Lendvai and 
Stubbs, 2007: 180). This study has been constructed according to the countries selected 
and selecting alternative cases would have produced a different research project. 
 
At the outset of the project, it was intended that the third year would include 
consultation meetings and policy option dissemination with DWP. At an early stage of 
the research, it was decided with both supervisors that due to time constraints this 
would be postponed until the writing-up stage had been completed. Preliminary 
discussions regarding policy learning have already taken place with the DWP 
supervisor and a senior DWP policy official and the research project as a whole reflects 
the co-production of knowledge. Following the end of the project, further 
dissemination will take the form of a policy brief, presentations and discussion to 
provide DWP (and other relevant government departments) with sufficient 
information to pursue policy translation.  
 
The value of comparative analysis is the opportunity to view a policy problem in one 
country through the lens of one or more countries, facilitating a better understanding. 
An important aspect of this comparative study was that the case studies produced 
findings which were an impetus to return to the Britain case study and ask slightly 
different questions, or to pursue other previously unexplored aspects. For example, 
the Australian case highlighted that transitions between lone and partnered parent 
status were important, as was the extent of activity already being undertaken by 
parents before reforms were implemented. One aspect which was not considered at 
the start of the research was migration. I felt uncomfortable once I discovered that the 
300 hours rule concerned married immigrant women as I felt the ethnicity aspect was 
politically sensitive and was overrepresented in the Danish case compared with the 
other two. Furthermore, I was concerned as to how to represent the notion of ‘culture’ 
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which the majority of Danish interviewees discussed. However, I came to realise that 
both ‘nation’ and ‘culture’ as reflections of ideology were important to the 
conceptualisation of partnered women outside the labour market in Britain. 
 
3.10 Reflections 
 
As highlighted in Section 3.2 the project initiation document agreed before my 
recruitment to the project set out in detail the intended activities in all three years of 
the research. That this was so precisely set out at the start in some respects constrained 
my ability to make the project my own and in retrospect it may have been helpful to 
have challenged and re-negotiated some aspects. For example, I retained the research 
questions set out (see Section 3.1) although for purposes of clarity it would have been 
helpful to split the second research question into two. That this question linked the 
effectiveness of policies with the possibility of policy transfer made clear the emphasis 
of the research on transferability from the start, however the policy transfer aspect was 
also covered in its own right by the third research question.  
 
I also found it a challenge that the methodological focus of the research was not on 
partnered women themselves, although the elite interview method was one of the 
reasons I was attracted to the project. To have undertaken interviews with partnered 
women would either have resulted in a very different research project which was less 
focused on policy translation, or could have appeared tokenistic if added to the elite 
interviews. I did make changes to the proposed methodology in that I diverged from 
the original proposal to select comparators reflecting the ‘three worlds’ typology (see 
Section 3.3) and I adapted the proposed workplan (see Section 3.9) in relation to 
dissemination. The CASE-related constraints on the research did not prevent me from 
using and adapting the recalibration and policy translation frameworks in an 
innovative way as both a theoretical and analytical underpinning for the research.  
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The inception document did not set out Britain as a comparator country but it was 
used as the starting point and end point for the study. It is usual for DWP 
international reviews to follow this format and it was particularly important in this 
research given the emphasis on policy transferability. As discussed in Section 3.3, the 
original intention had been to examine three comparator countries with Britain as the 
starting and end point, but I reduced the number of comparators to two. There were 
insufficient resources to undertake elite interviews in Britain as a comparator country. 
As highlighted in the previous Section (3.9) regarding policy transfer, meetings were 
regularly held with the DWP supervisor throughout the project and in addition with 
other DWP officials, particularly at the beginning and end of the project. Documents 
were used as the main data for the British case and the purpose of this was to review 
the evaluation evidence regarding the policy ‘problem,’ which was returned to in 
consideration of policy translatability. The documents also formed the basis for the 
analysis of the problematisation of partnered women not in work in Australia and 
Denmark. As it transpired, the reliance on documentary data for Britain also had 
parity with the Australian case, where open access to respondents was more limited 
than in Denmark (see Section 3.7).  
 
The methodology used was problematic in that the data constructed were not 
sufficiently bounded. Firstly, because the research examined more than one policy 
area and, secondly, because the data were from both interviews and documents. 
Although more than 50 interviews were conducted, these did not form the sole basis 
for the findings and were not the end-point of data collection, or ‘data generation’ 
(Baker, 2004: 163). Burnham et al (2004: 207-8) highlight that one problem with elite 
interviewing is when to stop and that there comes a point after which each additional 
interview yields diminishing returns. At a particular stage of the research I considered 
that a synthesis had taken place, or that I had reached saturation point with the data 
collection. Given the short time periods for interviewing in each country this 
predominantly applied to the potentially less bounded nature of the documentary 
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analysis. However, it also applied to the telephone interviews conducted on return 
from both countries. I set an end point for the research beyond which no new data 
would be collected, or new policies incorporated.57 Nevertheless, in-depth case studies 
were achieved for each country, which highlighted aspects of consensus as well as 
divergent viewpoints.  
 
The methodology and aims of the research were multi-level: the study was policy-
focused by virtue of the involvement of DWP and that one of its aims was to provide 
policy learning for Britain. Clearly, it was also an academic project and as such 
straddled the boundaries of research and policy, theory and practice. The range of 
policy actors interviewed allowed for consideration of the policy ‘problem’ at both 
academic and policy levels. At times, however, managing these two aims did become 
challenging. Nevertheless, although Burnham et al (2004) argue that sponsors may 
‚push research in directions that are ethically undesirable‛ (p.259), at no point did I 
consider that the differing aims of the research directly conflicted. This was facilitated 
by the fact that the DWP supervisor was herself a researcher and aware of ethical 
considerations. However, the aim of obtaining a rich contextual analysis for policy 
learning also posed problems. Selecting the case study countries, as well as bringing 
the project to completion, involved a considerable narrowing of focus and at times it 
was difficult to achieve a balance between these two aspects.  
 
My fieldwork planning would have benefited from prior knowledge concerning 
problems of access to data, however in many ways this was unavoidable and was not 
a result of the methodology. I could also have built time into the fieldwork to learn 
about and gain access to HILDA data. In retrospect it would also have been useful to 
have gained more signposting from actors in both countries towards quantitative 
studies which may have suggested the reasons for partnered women being in work in 
                                                 
57
 The one exception to this was the evaluation report for Welfare to Work in Australia mentioned earlier, 
which was considered key to the research, given that it was important data which had not been available at the 
time of the fieldwork. I am grateful to Professor Dan Finn for alerting me to its publication. 
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Australia and Denmark. Both case studies would have benefited from a less time-
intensive fieldwork period, allowing for more reflection time. Although the Danish 
fieldwork involved two visits, each comprised concentrated time periods during 
which the interviews were conducted. It would have also benefited both case studies if 
there had been time to analyse some interviews during the fieldwork period to 
highlight any further gaps, rather than doing this at the end.  
 
3.11 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the methods of data generation employed in this research. 
It has described the evidence review and the selection of case study countries and 
considered how both documents and elite interviews were used to construct case 
studies of Australia and Denmark which were compared with Britain for the purposes 
of policy learning. It has also discussed the construction of the interview sample. This 
chapter has built on Chapter Two, which set out the theoretical framework of 
recalibration used to analyse the findings. Chapters Five to Eight present the findings 
from the interview and documentary data according to this framework. However, 
before this Chapter Four sets out a review of documentary evidence relating to the 
policy ‘problem’ of partnered women outside the labour market in Australia, 
Denmark and Britain and considers the policy responses and effects. 
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Chapter Four - Policy problems, responses and effects: a review of 
the evidence about partners outside the labour market in Britain, 
Australia and Denmark 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to set the scene for the empirical research by drawing on evidence 
from government-commissioned evaluations in the three countries. Section 4.2 
considers the policy ‘problem’ representation and the evidence relating to why 
partnered women are outside the labour market. Section 4.3 considers the policy 
responses. In Britain, this predominantly includes the New Deal for Partners from 
1999, but also Joint Claims for Jobseeker’s Allowance for couples without children and 
the Partners Outreach for Ethnic Minorities pilot, along with some consideration of the 
Welfare Reform Act 2009. In Australia the story begins with the 1994 Working Nation 
reforms to income support for partners and subsequent reforms to Parenting Payment 
for partnered and lone parents. Australians Working Together (from 2002) introduced 
activity requirements for recipients of this payment with teenaged children and 
Welfare to Work (from 2006) increased the obligations to take up paid work for 
parents with children aged over six. In Denmark since 2006 the 300 hours rule 
(subsequently 450 hours rule) has required married couples claiming social assistance 
to test their eligibility for payment by requiring them to have accrued 300 hours of 
paid work in a two-year period. This programme is considered in the context of 
Danish activation since 1994. Section 4.4 highlights relevant evaluation evidence 
concerning the effects of the programmes which, it is argued, are too narrowly focused 
on short-term measures of employability and decreased welfare caseloads. Section 4.5 
concludes the chapter with a summary. 
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4.2  The policy ‘problem’ 
 
The focus on non-working partners in all three countries has been peripheral to 
activation policies. To some extent in Britain the labour market participation of non-
working partnered women is only just starting to be recognised in terms of its 
potential impact on reducing child poverty (Campbell, 2008: 467). In Australia, 
McInnes (2002) has argued that ‚The research evidence indicates that the most 
effective policies supporting single mothers’ labour market participation are those 
which support married mothers’ labour market participation, because workforce 
attachments which are in place before separation, tend to endure after separation‛ 
(p.2). There is no explicit focus on lone parents in the Danish encompassing model and 
partnered women do not feature in Danish activation, except in the 300 hours rule. 
 
Kennett (2004) argues that ‚It is vital to analyse the processes through which a 
phenomenon becomes defined as a problem‛ (p.292). As stated in Chapter Three, the 
backdrop to this study is the total employment rates for women compared with men 
and the number of workless households in each of the countries (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
below). Australia’s family worklessness is the second highest of all OECD countries 
after Britain and Denmark is the lowest of the three.  
 
Table 4.1: Employment rates for women and men of working age, 2006 
 Men Women Difference 
Australia 78.8 65.5 13.3 
Denmark 80.6 73.2 7.4 
UK 78.4 66.8 11.6 
Source: OECD, 2008 
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Table 4.2: Share of working age population living in jobless households58, 2005  
 UK Australia Denmark 
Jobless households 16.3 14.2 9.2 
Jobless households with children 14.9 11.9 4.7 
Source: Whiteford, 2009: 23 
 
In Britain of a total of 17.1 million families, couple families constitute 71 per cent 
(National Statistics, 2007: 3).59 There are 277,000 workless couple households with 
dependent children and 658,000 workless couple households without dependent 
children (National Statistics, 2008), with approximately 350,000 partners receiving 
support through the benefits system (Department for Work and Pensions, 2008: 126). 
The majority (69 per cent) of non-working partners are women living with a male 
partner (Department for Work and Pensions, 2004).60 Appendix 2 contains tables 
showing the different types of income support received by couples by the number and 
age of dependent children.  
 
In Britain since New Labour’s first welfare reform Green Paper (Department for Social 
Security, 1998) there has been a focus on reducing long-term and youth 
unemployment. The policy objective of assisting partners into work was to reduce the 
number of workless households by helping one person into work, as well as to address 
the polarisation between ‘work-rich’ and ‘work-poor households’ (Department for 
Social Security, 1998: 27). One of the purposes of the New Deal for Partners of the 
Unemployed was to bring into the remit of the public employment service a group 
with whom it had had little previous contact. New Labour ideology emphasised that 
the primary site for the reduction of a range of social ills and for social inclusion61 was 
                                                 
58
 Jobless (or workless) households are where no adult of working age is in paid work. Households can refer 
to one or more tax/benefit family units. For a discussion of family units and households see Millar, J. (2006b) 
How low-paid employees avoid poverty: an analysis by family type and household structure. Journal of 
Social Policy, 35(3):351-369. 
59
 The British benefit system treats cohabiting couples in the same way as married couples. With the 
introduction of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, partners may be of the opposite or same sex. 
60
 It should be noted that over 100,000 female claimants with partners also receive support through the 
benefits system (DWP data May 2008). 
61 For example, in a speech delivered at the Aylesbury Estate, Southwark, London on 2 June 1997 Tony Blair 
famously stated that ‗work is the best form of welfare‘. See Millar, J. (2006a) Better off in work? Work, 
security and welfare for lone mothers, in Glendinning, C. & Kemp, P. A. (Eds.) Cash and care: policy 
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participation in paid activities within the labour market and the goal of child poverty 
reduction has been an axis on which to place a number of benefit and tax-related 
policies. Britain has around one in five children living in relative poverty62 and 19 per 
cent of them are in workless couples (Harker, 2006: 7, 15). The Labour Government set 
a target of halving the number of children in poverty by 2010-11, as a step on the way 
to eradicating child poverty by 2020.63  
 
As Serrano Pascual (2007) argues, ‚The UK shares a belief with the Nordic countries in 
the key role of work as a means of achieving economic and social welfare‛ (p.288). 
However, a key difference between Britain and Denmark is the extent of Britain’s in-
work poverty and this primarily affects couple families (Harker 2006: 47); 40 per cent 
of children in poverty are living in couple households where someone is actually 
working (Harker, 2006: 15, 17).64 Policy goals which elevate labour market 
participation as the route out of (or to avoid) social exclusion are undermined by the 
existence of in-work poverty and hardship in households with one adult in paid work 
(Lyon et al., 2008). Partnered women’s income from paid work is important in 
preventing low-income families from moving into poverty (Millar and Glendinning, 
1992, Gardiner and Millar, 2006), but it is not usually sufficient if she is the sole, low-
paid worker, even when this is supplemented by in-work benefits (Lyon et al., 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                    
challenges in the welfare state. Bristol, Policy Press, 171-185. The ideology informing New Labour‘s 
approach to welfare reform was informed by the Commission on Social Justice conducted whilst they were in 
opposition. Commission on Social Justice (1994) Social justice: strategies for national renewal, London, 
Vintage. See Bennett, F. & Millar, J. (2009) Social security: reforms and challenges, in Millar, J. (Ed.) 
Understanding social security. Issues for policy and practice  (Second Edition). Bristol, Policy Press, 11-29. 
62
 Defined as living in a household with below 60 per cent median income before housing costs HARKER, L. 
(2006) Delivering on child poverty: what would it take? , The Stationery Office. 
63
 This was pledged by Tony Blair in his Beveridge Speech in 1999 BLAIR, T. (1999) Beveridge revisited: a 
welfare state for the 21st century. IN WALKER, R. (Ed.) Ending child poverty. Bristol, Policy Press. These 
goals were enshrined in legislation in the Child Poverty Bill 2009, which came into force in 2010. The Labour 
government missed its interim target of reducing child poverty by a quarter between 1998-99 and 2004-05 
(Harker, 2006: 7) and Harker suggests that achieving the 2010 child poverty target for couple households 
would involve increasing the percentage of dual-earner couple households from 57 to 65 per cent and 
decreasing the couple unemployment rate from five to four per cent (p.13). 
64 The OECD states that in order to stay above the level of poverty (defined as 60 per cent of the median 
standard of living) in Europe, a couple requires one partner to work full-time at the national minimum wage 
and one to work part-time, whilst a single parent requires one full-time job and allowances OECD (2006b) 
Starting Strong II: early childhood education and care, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
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Despite around 70 per cent of poor children living in jobless families (Whiteford, 2009: 
4) child poverty has not overtly been on the political agenda in Australia. In opening 
Labor's election campaign in 1987, Prime Minister Bob Hawke famously stated that 
‚By 1990 no Australian child will be living in poverty‛ (Bessant et al., 2006: 106). This 
pledge was not met and was held over him; subsequent governments have attempted 
to distance themselves from the child poverty agenda. Australians Working Together 
(AWT) which increased the obligations for partnered and lone parents receiving 
Parenting Payment (see Section 4.3.2) was put forward as a poverty reduction 
measure, but this aspect was notably absent from Welfare to Work (Blaxland, 2008: 94, 
212). In introducing Welfare to Work, the Howard government emphasised the 
financial benefits of working (similar to ‘making work pay’ in Britain), but did not 
mention ‘poverty’ (Blaxland, 2008: 211-2). One reason for the relative absence of the 
poverty agenda in Australia compared to Britain is ongoing debate about the 
measurement of poverty (interview with academic).65 The discourse of joblessness is 
linked to concern about inter-generational poverty transmission (Whiteford, 2009). 
However, Whiteford (2009) argues that in Australia in couples where one or both 
parents are in paid work, poverty rates are among the lowest in the OECD, thus ‚paid 
work provides effective protection against income poverty‛ (p.4). Tables A2.20 and 
A2.21 in Appendix 2 respectively show poverty rates for couple households with 
children and the distribution of child poverty in all three countries. For Australia and 
Britain there is a significant decrease in poverty for households where one or more 
adults are in work and the difference is greater in Australia. In Denmark there is less 
incidence of poverty across the board than in the other two countries and the 
distribution of child poverty is more equal. 
 
In Australia there are 2.3 million couple families with children and 1.9 million couple 
families without children (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008). In 2005 there were 
                                                 
65
 There is no official poverty line, but the measure used in Australia is the Henderson line created in 1973 
Bessant, J., Watts, R., Dalton, T. & Smyth, S. (2006) Talking policy: how social policy is made, Crows Nest, 
NSW, Allen and Unwin.. 
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163,800 couple families with non-working working age males, comprising eight per 
cent of the total (Baxter, 2005: 2). Partnered women were employed in 39 per cent of 
these couples, compared with 74 per cent of couples with an employed male (Baxter, 
2005: 2). Appendix 2 contains tables showing Parenting Payment Partnered (PPp) 
recipients by sex, payment category of their partner, age, country of birth and 
payment duration. The majority (90 per cent) of PPp recipients are female and the 
majority of their partners (56,087 of a total of 167,272 PPp claims) are on Newstart 
Allowance (equivalent to Jobseeker’s Allowance), or employed and on a low income. 
Over 35 per cent have been recipients for three or more years and over 21 per cent 
have claims of under six months. Most (43 per cent) are aged between 30 and 39, but 
23 per cent are aged between 20 and 29. The majority (63 per cent) are Australian-born. 
 
The first reform Working Nation (1994) followed an inquiry by the Committee on 
Employment Opportunities66 and, in the context of deep recession, its overarching aim 
was to reduce unemployment (particularly long-term) through economic growth. At 
this time there was a focus on bringing dependent partners into the income support 
system in their own right, based on analysis that such a small number of wives of 
unemployed men were in work because the institutional structure did not recognise 
them as labour force participants; further, the joint benefit entitlement and income 
tests disincentivised second earners (interview with former government official). 
Subsequent pilots targeted at disadvantaged groups, as well as the next reform 
Australians Working Together (2002) were a response to the recommendations of the 
McClure Report (2000a) in relation to reducing the number of jobless families and 
assisting single and partnered parents into work.67 The objectives of Welfare to Work 
were to increase workforce participation and reduce welfare dependence amongst 
                                                 
66
 Committee on Employment Opportunities (1993) Restoring full employment. A discussion paper, Canberra, 
ACT, Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Government (1994) Working Nation: policies and programs, 
Canberra, ACT, Commonwealth of Australia. 
67
 The other two targets were: (i) a significant reduction in the proportion of the working age population who 
need to rely heavily on income support and (ii) stronger communities that generate more opportunities for 
social and economic participation.  
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working age income support recipients (particularly groups outside the labour market, 
including parents),68 whilst maintaining a strong safety net for those who needed it 
(Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010: 3). This has 
some similarities with New Labour’s welfare reforms, emphasising ‘work for those 
who can, security for those who cannot’ (Department for Social Security, 1998: iii). 
Over the three years following Welfare to Work, 109,000 people were expected to enter 
employment, 56,000 of these being parents69 (Senate, 2005b).  
 
In Denmark there are 1,332,382 couples (Statistics Denmark 2009)70 and Table A2.15 in 
Appendix 2 shows the total number of married couples claiming social assistance: in 
2008 there were 35,831 married couples with children and 12,633 without children 
receiving cash-benefits. It was estimated that around 6,000 couples would be affected 
by the 300 hours rule and that around 1,200 people would lose their cash-benefits.71 
The focus of the 300 hours rule was immigrant married couples and in particular 
immigrant women in these couples, based on their comparatively lower employment 
rates. Table A2.16 in Appendix 2 shows the economic activity and employment rates 
for both Danish and immigrant women; notably, the employment rate for immigrant 
women has steadily increased from 27 per cent to 47 per cent between 1997 and 2007. 
 
In Denmark policy goals for activation include assisting young people and long-term 
unemployed people into work. The policy goal of the 1994 labour market reforms was 
to reduce long-term unemployment and to reduce the duration for which 
unemployment benefit could be claimed, as well as to reduce the possibility of the 
                                                 
68
 Other target groups were mature aged, long-term unemployed people and people with disability; 
membership of these groups may overlap. 
69
 The rest were 20,000 people with disabilities, 15,000 very long-term unemployed, 11,000 mature age, plus 
7,000 additional recipients due to the income support taper rate changes Senate (2005b) Inquiry into the 
Employment and Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work and other Measures) Bill 
2005 and the Family and Community Services Legislation Amendment (Welfare to Work) Bill 2005, 23 
November 2005. Department of Employment and Workplace Relations Questions on Notice, Canberra, 
Commonwealth of Australia. 
70
 Incorporating married couples, registered partnerships, couples living in consensual union and cohabiting 
couples. 
71
 Interview with government official. 
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‘carousel’ of benefits and work.72 Initiatives in the 2000s such as the 300 hours rule 
have been driven by the policy goal of increasing the workforce through the social 
integration of immigrants. Danish employment policy is underpinned by the 
requirement to promote labour market flexibility in relation to the ‘golden triangle’ of 
‘flexicurity,’ comprising flexible employment protection,73 encompassing social 
protection and activation. The Danish Government’s aim is that 25,000 more 
immigrants and descendants should be employed by 2010 (www.nyidanmark.dk). 
 
The policy responses to partnered women outside the labour market in all three 
countries share similar policy goals: of increasing the labour market participation of 
this group, or a particular sub-group of partners and also to reduce the numbers 
receiving benefits. However, in Britain and Australia the policy goal was initially to 
target partnered women not engaged with the benefits system or employment 
assistance. In Denmark partnered women, whether parents or carers of adults, had 
been subject to the same activation rules as other benefit recipients. As we will see in 
this thesis, this is a crucial variation between Denmark and the other two countries. 
Each country has a flexible labour market but although each experienced recession in 
the 1980s, only Denmark has had a labour shortage. All countries share the policy 
goals of reducing long-term unemployment by targeting particular groups, such as 
young people, ethnic minorities (and in Australia Indigenous people) and of assisting 
sick and disabled people into work. However, in Denmark such targeting is in the 
context of encompassing activation. The next section examines evidence relating to 
                                                 
72
 The scope of leave programmes was also curtailed, along with job rotation. See Goul Andersen, J. & 
Pedersen, J. J. (2007) Continuity and change in Danish active labour market policy: 1990-2007. The 
battlefield between activation and workfare. CCWS Working Paper No. 2007-54, Aalborg, Centre for 
Comparative Welfare Studies, Aalborg University, Etherington, D. & Jones, M. (2004a) Welfare-through-
work and the re-regulation of labour markets in Denmark. Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy, 22:129-148. 
73
 There is no Dismissal Protection Act, but the right to give notice is a central concern of union collective 
agreements Kvist, J., Pedersen, L. & Köhler, P. A. (2008) Making all persons work: modern Danish labour 
market policies, in Eichhorst, W., Kaufmann, O. & Konle-Seidl, R. (Eds.) Bringing the jobless into work? 
Experiences with activation schemes in Europe and the US. Berlin, Springer, 221-256. 
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why partnered women are not in the labour market in each country, to highlight the 
similarities and differences amongst the groups. 
 
4.2.1 Why are partnered women outside the labour market? 
 
Examining the range of possible reasons for couple worklessness is important for two 
reasons. Firstly, to compare the Australian and Danish cases with that of Britain and, 
secondly, because suggested reasons for a policy ‘problem’ should in theory inform 
the policy response. If we do not fully understand the reasons why someone is not in 
work, the policy response may be rendered ineffective. So, the policy response should 
be informed by what we know about ‘what is not working,’ rather than merely 
focusing on ‘what works’ in active labour market policies.  
 
Drawing on Hakim’s Preference Theory74 (Hakim, 2000), McRae (2003: 329) argues that 
constraints affecting women’s decisions regarding work and family are in two 
categories: structural and normative. Structural constraints include (i) job availability, 
(ii) cost and availability of childcare and (iii) outcomes of different social origins, 
manifested in poor educational qualifications, early pregnancy, poor health, or culture. 
To this can be added disincentives to work created by the interaction of the tax and 
benefits systems. Normative constraints include (i) women’s own identities (their 
‘inner voices’), (ii) gender relations in the family and (iii) their partner’s attitudes 
towards work and care (McRae, 2003: 329). The following two sections consider 
evidence relating to partnered women’s constraints on working as reflections of 
McRae’s concepts. 
 
                                                 
74 Hakim argues that women in Britain and the US can be divided into three groups according to their 
preferences for work-life patterns: home-centred women, adaptive and work-centred women. 
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4.2.2 Structural constraints 
 
Table 4.3 shows the barriers to work for partnered women in Britain.75 The majority of 
New Deal for Partners (NDP) participants have worked at some point (Hasluck and 
Green, 2007: 93), however the majority (46 per cent) had not worked for five or more 
years (and 47 per cent of main claimant partners had also not worked during this 
period) (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 17). Those who have never worked tend to have 
learning difficulties or basic skill requirements, or are young parents with young 
children (Thomas and Griffiths, 2005: 19). For those who have worked, it is important 
to note the reasons for labour market exit. In Coleman et al’s (2006: 24) sample, 42 per 
cent of partners said they had spent a great deal of their adult life looking after the 
family or home. Long periods of absence from the labour market are associated with 
weak work histories and lack of up-to-date skills, which make it difficult to enter the 
labour market without lengthy preparation (Thomas and Griffiths, 2006: 50). Many 
partnered women lack skills, qualifications or recent work experience and this is 
further compounded by a lack of confidence (Aston et al., 2009a, Thomas and Griffiths, 
2006). In Britain, some Muslim partnered women were culturally or religiously 
constrained in the work they could do (Aston et al., 2009a: 51).76 
 
Table 4.3: Barriers to working for partnered women in Britain 
 per cent 
Health problems or disabilities 39 
Childcare responsibilities  15 
Caring responsibilities other than childcare 51 
Literacy/language problems  23 
No experience of paid work 16 
Source: Coleman et al 2006: 2 
 
                                                 
75
 The term ‗barriers‘ to work is often used in DWP programme evaluations. In this thesis, ‗constraints‘ is 
used in preference to barriers, except where ‗barriers‘ is a direct quote. 
76
 For example, not working with pork or alcohol, not ‗free mixing‘ in environments where men work, or 
working in jobs viewed as ‗degrading,‘ such as cleaning. 
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Similarly to British partners, there are also sub-groups of Australian partners, such as 
partners of prisoners, Indigenous partners and culturally and linguistically diverse 
(CALD) women, although these did not tally directly with the British partners. The 
CALD and Indigenous partners have additional, but differing, requirements for 
assistance into work and the scope of this study does not allow these two groups to be 
considered in detail. However, Baxter (2005) highlights that a small percentage of 
women in Australia have significant language barriers and are disproportionately 
represented in couples where the man is unemployed or has an illness or disability. 
The CALD group in particular did not overtly feature in the interviews with 
Australian policy actors and this aspect is of interest. Similarly, interview respondents 
were reluctant to engage in discussion of issues relating to the employment of 
Indigenous Peoples.77  
 
Table 4.4 shows partnered women’s reasons for not looking for work in Australia as 
evidenced by Baxter (2005). Her analysis of data from the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia survey demonstrates that the relationship between a 
number of barriers to work and female employment is very strong and partially 
explains the lower employment rates for women partnered with workless men (p.13). 
These barriers are: incomplete secondary education, ill health or a disability, caring for 
a sick spouse or other family member, having children aged under five and poor 
language skills. Baxter’s (2005: 9) analysis highlights the prevalence of low levels of 
education amongst partnered women in workless couples.  
                                                 
77 Documents relating to Indigenous employment were sourced but these did not discuss women, or partnered 
women. 
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Table 4.4: Partnered women’s reasons for not looking for work in Australia (per cent) 
 Partner 
unemployed 
 
Partner sick/ 
disabled 
 
Partner not in 
labour force 
for other 
reasons 
Prefers to look after children, 
other childcare reasons 
71.4 43.2 45 
Ill health of someone other than 
self/other family reason 
7.1 29.7 5 
No jobs available 3.6 18.9 5 
Language difficulties/ethnic 
background 
10.7 2.7 0 
Lacks training or qualifications 3.6 10.8 10 
Too young/too old 3.6 5.4 0 
Own illness or disability 10.7 13.5 10 
Welfare payment may be 
affected 
0 8.1 0 
Studying 3.6 10.8 25 
Does not need to work 3.6 5.4 15 
Moved house/holidays 3.6 2.7 15 
Have a job to go to 3.6 0 5 
Other reasons 10.7 0 10 
Source: Baxter, 2005: 17 
 
In Australia interviews with a number of organisations working with partnered 
women suggested that, based on anecdotal data, they could be split into two groups: 
those with existing skills, and those with few or no qualifications. The former group 
generally require only coaching, confidence-building and IT skills, whereas the latter 
group tend to need more support. Most parents do not enter employment assistance as 
a significantly disadvantaged individual, but as the equivalent of a jobseeker who has 
been unemployed for three to four months (interview with employment service 
professional). Providers’ experiences of placing parents into work suggest that they 
are easier to place than other groups. Anecdotal evidence from providers also suggests 
that employers are more likely to employ parents than the very long-term 
unemployed, partly because being out of the labour force in order to care for children 
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is seen as a ‘legitimate activity’ (interview with employment service professional).78 
However, two other interviewees from welfare organisations suggested that, although 
some parents are more job-ready, some are significantly disadvantaged and not ready 
to move into work. This is supported by other data which suggest that 72 per cent of 
jobless Parenting Payment recipients have qualifications of Year 1079 or less, compared 
with only 25 per cent of the overall workforce (Australian Council of Social Services, 
2007: 4, Baxter, 2005: 9). Mothers claiming Parenting Payment are more likely than 
other mothers to have no employment experience at all, but lone parents tend to be 
more highly educated than partnered (Social Research Centre, 2005a: iv). Six per cent 
of mothers claiming PPp had never been in paid employment (Butterworth, 2003: 26).  
 
In Denmark around two-thirds of spouses who lost their benefit under the 300 hours 
rule had not been employed before arriving in Denmark, although 20 per cent had 
worked for at least five years (Bach and Larsen, 2008: 33-4). Those affected by the rule 
either had ‘poor’ Danish language skills80 (22 per cent of both those who lost their 
benefit and those who retained it), or spoke no Danish at all (19 per cent of those who 
lost their benefit and 12 per cent of those who retained it) (Bach and Larsen, 2008: 40). 
Structural constraints on labour market participation for immigrant women in 
Denmark include the availability of work, but this may relate to discriminatory 
practices, or further to concerns about how they will be treated in the labour market 
(interview with social workers).  
 
One of the most important constraints on work for partnered women in Britain is 
having caring responsibilities, whether for children (including disabled children), a 
sick or disabled partner, or other dependent relatives. This is a structural constraint in 
                                                 
78
 This is supported by a qualitative employer survey conducted by the Department for Education 
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR), which found predominantly positive attitudes amongst 
employers towards parents returning to work Department for Education Employment and Workplace 
Relations (2010) Welfare to Work Evaluation Report, Canberra, Department for Education Employment and 
Workplace Relations. 
79
 Equivalent to GCSE. 
80
 Proficiency in Danish was estimated by the interviewers and is subjective. 
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relation to the availability of alternative care provision. It may also be structural if it 
relates to job availability, or to poor educational qualifications. The majority of 
partners caring for people other than dependent children had given up work to care, 
although a small number became carers because they were not employed (Thomas 
and Griffiths, 2006: 34). Caring is also a normative constraint in the context of women’s 
own identities, gender relations in the family and their partner’s attitudes towards 
work and care (discussed in Section 4.2.4). For most partners their main activity was 
looking after children or the home (39 per cent), or caring for someone who was sick or 
disabled (25 per cent) (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 16). The existence and number of 
dependent children is a characteristic of the benefit claimed (see Tables A2.1 and A2.2, 
Appendix 2). As a number of authors have pointed out, caring for a child or another 
adult can be passive as well as active (Finch and Groves, 1983, Giullari and Lewis, 
2005). For some partners, the person they cared for had ‘intermittent and 
unpredictable care demands’ which severely restricted work or precluded work 
altogether (Thomas and Griffiths, 2006: 34). Non-working partnered women who care 
for their partner may also be responsible for the care of children, and/or for another 
dependent relative. For these women, entry into paid work may mean that the double 
bind of care and work becomes a triple bind. Furthermore, responsibilities for different 
dependents may change over the life course and women in particular may be caught 
in a cycle of caring. Pakistani and Bangladeshi partnered women of all ages and 
educational backgrounds believed that they would be at least partly responsible for an 
elderly or ill family member at some point (Aston et al., 2007: 66). Such responsibilities 
‚often had a substantial impact on women’s lives, including their educational 
achievements and subsequent employment options‛ (Aston et al., 2007: 66). 
 
There is a possibility that the extent of partners caring for another adult has been 
overstated in DWP evaluations compared with other surveys of the general 
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population (Perry, 2005).81 However, there are dependencies between the sickness or 
disability of a main claimant and the caring role (as well as workless status) of their 
partner, also seen in Australia. Baxter (2005: 16) found that partnered women whose 
husbands were not working because of ill health or a disability were unlikely to move 
into employment and this group was also likely to state that they did not wish to 
work. There has been relatively little Australian research into the impact of caring 
responsibilities on the labour force status of carers (see Edwards et al., 2008: 100). The 
distribution of carers is towards those older than working age, but significant numbers 
of female carers live in households in which no adult is employed (Edwards et al., 
2008: 106). Carers who worked tended to do so part-time and stated barriers to work 
were: ‘difficult to arrange working hours’, ‘no alternative disability care arrangements’ 
and ‘would be too disruptive to person with disability’ (Edwards et al., 2008: 103, 106). 
Although in Denmark some women care for sick or disabled husbands (interview with 
employment service professional), this is less usual than in Britain or Australia. 
 
For partners with children, lack of affordable childcare may be a significant 
disincentive to working, if the costs cannot be offset against the salary earned. In 
Britain couple families pay the highest costs on entry into paid work as a percentage of 
net family income: 33 per cent, compared with 10 per cent in Australia and eight per 
cent in Denmark (OECD, 2007c). Further, the decision to enter paid work is affected by 
the availability of work which is flexible enough to accommodate family 
commitments, or reduced capacity for work. This depends to some extent on anti-
discrimination and flexible working policies and how these are implemented in 
practice. In Australia evidence from the Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot (which 
preceded Australians Working Together - see Section 4.3.2) suggested that childcare 
costs had a major impact for non-working partnered parents (25 per cent) (Pearse, 
2000: 99). Brennan (Brennan, 2007a, Brennan, 2007b) argues that despite the more 
                                                 
81
 Whether individuals admit to caring responsibilities may depend to some extent on who is asking the 
question. 
 95 
 
established and comprehensive foundation of care in Australia compared with Britain 
(discussed further in Chapter Five), childcare is still prohibitively expensive for many 
families. Doiron and Kalb (2002) suggest that, on average, childcare costs are low for 
partnered mothers, but that the labour supply of those with pre-school children is the 
most sensitive to childcare costs. In Denmark a significant number of both those who 
lost their benefit (50 per cent) under the 300 hours rule and those who retained it (42 
per cent) were looking after the home (Bach and Larsen, 2008: 89). However, it is not 
possible to tell whether they were doing this because they were not in, or could not 
find, paid work. Furthermore, 45 per cent of those who lost their benefit and 43 per 
cent of those who kept their benefit were taking care of children (Bach and Larsen, 
2008: 89).  
 
In Britain being a carer is also linked with partners’ propensity to be sick or disabled 
themselves (Thomas and Griffiths, 2005: 22). Almost two fifths of partners (39 per cent) 
described themselves as having a longstanding illness, health condition or disability 
and 29 per cent said that their condition affected the type or amount of work they 
could do (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 22). Poor health is also a constraint for Australian 
partners. Almost one third of women with a sick or disabled partner have a long-term 
health condition and ill health is also prevalent amongst women with an unemployed 
partner (Baxter, 2005: 11). Butterworth (2003: 27)82 was the first to document the 
prevalence of mental disorders amongst income support recipients, although this was 
lowest amongst partners (34.8 per cent had a moderate or severe disability and 35.1 
per cent had none). However, carers in general and female primary carers in particular 
experience lower levels of health and well-being than any other group in society 
(Cummins et al., 2007).  
 
                                                 
82
 Butterworth states that this group differed most from departmental administrative data and may have been 
skewed by the inclusion of Family Allowance recipients Butterworth, P. (2003) Estimating the prevalence of 
mental disorders among income support recipients: approach, validity and findings, Canberra, Department of 
Family and Community Services. Page 24. 
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In Denmark health is a major constraint on working for spouses subject to the 300 
hours rule, affecting 69 per cent of those who lost their benefit and 60 per cent of those 
who kept their benefit (Bach and Larsen, 2008: 115). Tables A2.17 and A2.18 in 
Appendix 2 set out the self-estimated health and self-estimated reduced work ability 
of spouses affected by the rule. The majority of illnesses were mental or psychological 
(76 per cent for those who lost their benefit and 84 per cent for those who kept it) (Bach 
and Larsen, 2008: 45). However, this sub-group of married cash-benefits recipients do 
not have a higher proportion of persistent or chronic illnesses compared to a larger 
group of social assistance recipients (Bach and Pedersen, 2007 cited in Bach and 
Larsen, 2008: 44), suggesting that ill health is a problem for that wider population. 
 
For non-working partnered women their reasons for being, and remaining, workless 
are related to the complex dynamics of intra-household decision-making about labour 
supply. Moylan et al (1984, see also Millar, 1994) were amongst the first to raise the 
issue of joint labour supply amongst unemployed married couples. Developing Pahl’s 
(1984) notion of a ‘household work strategy,’ Millar and Ridge (2008) have highlighted 
that entering and sustaining employment is a ‘family-work project’. Labour supply 
decisions for one member of a partnered couple may be based on the work (or 
workless) status of the other. The additional worker effect holds that the family 
operates as an ‘insurance unit’ for labour market changes, with the employment of one 
party being offset by that of the other (Gregory, 1999: 7). Male unemployment may 
lead to female partners entering work, or increasing their amount of paid work to 
maintain living standards (Gardiner and Millar, 2006: 358). However, women in 
couples with children are unlikely to avoid poverty based on their own income from 
paid work (Gardiner and Millar, 2006: 363), particularly compared with the loss of 
benefits and associated poverty traps (Irwin and Morris, 1993). Additional female 
unemployment may ensue because the female partner becomes discouraged (Cooke, 
1987), related to the perception, or the reality, of the availability of suitable work 
(Beatty et al., 2010). Such effects may be exacerbated by the partnering of individuals 
 97 
 
with similar levels of skills, education and labour market prospects (Davies et al., 1992, 
Brynin and Ermisch, 2008), meaning that both partners may be likely to enter 
relatively insecure, low-paid work. The state of the labour market and the insecure 
nature of the entry-level jobs available are major contributing factors towards the lack 
of sustainability of successful job outcomes from NDP (Thomas and Griffiths, 2005: 
98).  
 
Discouraged worker effects may also reflect perceived or actual disincentives to work 
associated with earnings disregards for benefit receipt, or to benefit withdrawal 
combined with taxation of low-paid work (Irwin and Morris, 1993, Dilnot and Kell, 
1987, Davies et al., 1992, Hasluck and Green, 2005: 37, Centre for Social Justice, 2009).83 
McGinnity (2002) and Dex et al (1995) have attributed this to means testing.84 Some 
low-waged couples perceive that both partners would need to be in paid work to be 
better off than on benefits (Thomas and Griffiths, 2006: 36). This is supported by 
OECD evidence which suggests that couple households are only likely to be lifted out 
of poverty when there is one full-time and one part-time worker (OECD, 2006b: 34). 
In-work benefits are one method of addressing disincentives to work.85 Additionally, 
Better Off Calculations (BOCs)86 allow Jobcentre Plus Personal Advisers to calculate 
whether or not households are likely to be better off in work compared with being on 
benefit. These tend to be most positive for partners with children, although they 
                                                 
83
 This relates to means-tested benefits, but there are also disincentives to work for those on contribution-
based (individualised) Incapacity Benefit, as well as in relation to Housing Benefit. See Beatty, C., Fothergill, 
S., Houston, D., Powell, R. & Sissons, P. (2010) Women on Incapacity Benefits, Sheffield, Centre for 
Regional Economic and Social Research.  
84
 Doris contests this - despite clear disincentives, Doris‘ fixed effect model suggests that the comparatively 
lower employment rate of wives of unemployed men may be due to dynamic considerations relating to the 
expected length of the husband‘s unemployment spell. Doris, A. (1999) Means testing disincentives and the 
labour supply of the wives of unemployed men: results from a fixed effects model, Dublin, Maynooth 
University. 
85
 Francesconi et al‘s study of the effects of in-work benefits suggested that Working Families Tax Credit 
(introduced in October 1999, became Working Tax Credit in 2003) increased the likelihood of women from 
couples entering or remaining in work. They further suggest that WFTC may have increased the bargaining 
power of married women in poorer households. See Francesconi, M., Rainer, H. & van Klaauw, W. (2009) 
The effects of in-work benefit reform in Britain on couples: theory and evidence. Economic Journal, 
119(February):F66-F100. 
86
 BOCs (previously known as In-Work Benefit Calculations) calculate potential household income based on 
salary and any in-work benefits, the aim being to demonstrate the financial gains to entering paid 
employment. 
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would only be marginally better off in work (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 27). For some 
partners (mostly carers) BOCs reinforced existing beliefs that there would be little or 
no financial gain from working.87  
 
In Australia Baxter (2005) found that the likelihood of partnered women working 
depended to some extent on the reason why their partner was not working, for 
example whether they were unemployed, sick or disabled, or outside the labour 
market for other reasons. Women with sick or disabled partners were likely to be 
discouraged workers, for a number of reasons, including perceptions of the labour 
market as well as lack of recent work experience (Baxter, 2005: 18). King et al (1995) 
concluded that the income test prior to Working Nation acted as a disincentive to 
work, also supported by Donnelly and McClelland (1989). However, Bradbury  (1995) 
contests this, arguing that ‚heterogeneity is more important than state dependence‛ 
(p.68) in relation to benefit receipt for couples.88 Gregory (1999) suggested that the 
design of the welfare system could be an explanatory factor for increasingly high 
effective marginal tax rates [EMTRs] for couples with dependent children who face 
low labour market incomes (p.9).89 High EMTRs were mentioned by a number of 
policy actors interviewed in Australia and Apps (2006: 100, see also Millar, 2009: 240 in 
relation to the UK) suggests that EMTRs offers an explanation for the very low 
working hours of married mothers. No evidence was found relating to disincentives to 
                                                 
87
 Conducting BOCs for partners is complex compared to other customer groups, particularly when 
attempting to cover all likely permutations across the household. Due to the Data Protection Act (1998) BOCs 
can only be carried out in full if the main benefit claimant is present, or has given their consent for the adviser 
to access their benefit records for this purpose. Otherwise, calculations are indicative only. For a discussion 
concerning the risks of leaving benefit to enter paid work in respect of married couples, see Millar, J., Cooke, 
K. & McLaughlin, E. (1989) The employment lottery: risk and social security benefits. Policy and Politics, 
17(1):75-81. 
88
 This is in contrast to the British case, where state-dependence appears to account for around one-third of the 
difference between wives with employed husbands and those with unemployed husbands. See Davies, R. B., 
Elias, P. & Penn, R. (1992) The relationship between a husband's employment and his wife's participation in 
the labour force. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 54(2):145-171. 
89
 Effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) show how much of an additional dollar of income is retained by 
individuals and families, after payment of income tax and the withdrawal of any means-tested cash payments. 
See Harding, A., Vu, Q. N., Tanton, R. & Vidyattama, Y. (2008) Improving work incentives for mothers: the 
national and geographic impact of liberalising the Family Tax Benefit income test. 37th Australian 
Conference of Economists. Gold Coast, QLD. 
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work in the tax and benefits systems in Denmark, but this perhaps reflects that there is 
not the same overlap between work and benefits seen in Britain and Australia. 
Furthermore, low-paid work is not such a significant issue in Denmark as it is in the 
other two countries (see Chapter Six, Section 6.3).  
 
There are also other constraints which may impact on partners’ ability to take up work 
and for which employment services may act as brokers for other support. These are 
outside the scope of this research but include being in temporary or substandard 
housing, which can adversely impact on health and take priority over job search 
(Thomas and Griffiths, 2006: 50) and lack of transport infrastructure, which limits the 
travel to work area.  
 
4.2.3 Normative constraints 
 
As discussed in the previous section, caring responsibilities can be a structural 
constraint on paid work in relation to the availability of alternative care, but this is also 
a normative constraint, based on gender relations and the attitudes to work and care 
within couples. Evaluation evidence from NDP suggests that the traditional gender 
roles of the male breadwinner and the female home-maker are still the reality for 
many couples (Thomas and Griffiths, 2005: 24) and ‚perceptions of caring 
responsibilities and ‘breadwinning’ responsibilities were strongly affected by gender 
role expectations‛ particularly for carers of spouses (Thomas and Griffiths, 2006: 46). 
Thomas and Griffiths (2005: 24) highlight the importance of the attitude of the main 
claimant towards their partner being in work, which they argue is linked with the 
balance of influence and power within relationships. They suggest that in couples 
which reflect the male breadwinner/female home-maker model, partnered women 
taking up paid work would ‚disrupt the perceived desirable balance of roles within 
the couple‛ (Thomas and Griffiths, 2005: 27). In some cases carer-partners said that 
they felt guilty for contemplating employment, especially in cases where they cared 
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for the main claimant; this could be compounded by the notion that they might be 
emphasising the ‘failure’ of the main claimant to fulfil their breadwinning role by 
being unable to work (Thomas and Griffiths, 2005: 28). Discouraged female worker 
effects may occur when the male wage earner becomes unemployed because women 
do not wish to ‘reverse roles’ (Millar, 1994). When Joint Claims for JSA was introduced 
for couples without dependent children, it was perceived by some partners to be 
‚counter to cultural beliefs about gender roles‛ (Bewley et al., 2005: 2) because it 
required both partners to be available for work. Further, there was resistance from a 
cultural perspective to Joint Claims from some Bangladeshi men who did not want 
their wives to work, or to learn English and be independent (Aston et al., 2009b: 22). 
Notably, McRae considers women’s own identities, gender relations in the family and 
their partner’s attitudes towards work and care to be normative constraints, but 
categorises ‘culture’ as a structural constraint. 
 
A significant proportion of workless couple families in Britain are reluctant to use 
formal childcare (Harker, 2006: 31, Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 2) and take-up of the 
Childcare Assist and Childcare Subsidy (childcare subsidies offered by Jobcentre Plus) 
has been low (Harker, 2006: 32). This reluctance can relate to affordability and 
suitability (for example for couples with disabled children) but also to attitudes. 
Parents have expectations of alternative care, which may relate to the perception of 
their own identity as carers for their children. However, women may also not wish to 
use formal childcare if this is not a ‘social norm’, particularly in their own 
communities. In a quantitative survey of partners, just three per cent used formal 
childcare rather than family or friends; in half the couples the main benefit claimant 
looked after the children whilst the partner worked (Coleman et al., 2006: 75). For the 
remainder, there appeared to be strongly-held perceptions about caring roles. Table 
4.5 below shows the childcare-related barriers for partners, highlighting that the most 
important barrier was the age of the child. 
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Table 4.5: Childcare-related barriers to work for partners in Britain 
 per cent (multiple 
response) 
Age of children 44 
Someone else having to look after 
my children 
23 
Cost of childcare 15 
Availability of childcare in the area 10 
None of these 39 
Don’t know 2 
Source: Coleman et al., 2006: 90 
 
Many Bangladeshi and Pakistani partners do not wish to use formal childcare as 
informal childcare by extended family is the norm (Aston et al., 2009b: 110). Of 
Pakistani non-working mothers, 96 per cent said that their primary activity was 
looking after the home and family (Aston et al., 2007: 12), although many women felt 
that husbands were now taking an active part in looking after their children (Aston et 
al., 2007: 61). Some younger women also recognised the socialisation and 
developmental benefits of formal childcare (Aston et al., 2007: 110).  
 
In Baxter’s (2005: 17) analysis in Australia, over 70 per cent of women with an 
unemployed partner cited preferring to care for children (or other childcare-related 
reasons, which may include availability of alternative care) as a reason for not looking 
for work. A survey of Parenting Payment recipients suggested that recipients were 
making an ‘active choice’ not to work (unpublished FaCS data cited in Ganley, 2003: 
189). Family responsibilities were cited as the main reason for not working by both 
those who stated that they preferred not to work as well as by those who said that they 
would prefer to work. Saunders et al (2003) found that for Parenting Payment 
recipients (both single and partnered) childcare was the most important activity for 
them (p.66). Around half of Parenting Payment recipients mentioned one or more of 
the following as a disadvantage of being in work: being away from, and having less 
time for, family and children; worrying about both children and family’s wellbeing; 
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inability to fulfill carer responsibilities while at work; concern about children’s 
development; and extra workload at home and less time for housework (unpublished 
FaCs data cited in Ganley, 2003: 189). Caring for children and looking after the home 
have been cited as key constraints on labour market participation for women in 
workless couples (Donnelly and McClelland, 1989, King and McHugh, 1995). An 
evaluation of the Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot (PPIP) found that 30 per cent90 
of those with unemployed partners felt that they and their partner could swap 
carer/earner roles (Pearse, 2000: 99).  
 
In Denmark the cost and availability of childcare is not a structural constraint on 
working as it is in Britain and to some extent in Australia. This is emphasised by the 
interview data in subsequent chapters. As argued in Chapters Five and Six, in 
Denmark universal day-care is both an institutional and social norm; there is a day-
care offer for every child from the age of six months and supply now meets demand. 
However, some women may be reluctant to use day-care because they are unfamiliar 
with its set-up and purpose, or it may be their preference not to. They may also have a 
different cultural understanding of the importance of their role as a homemaker and 
carer, rather than as a worker. As highlighted in Chapters Five and Six, there is some 
commonality in this regard between all three countries. However, in all of the 
countries labour market demand is important and labour market discrimination is an 
issue for ethnic minority partnered women, an aspect highlighted by non-
governmental Danish interviewees as a counter to the official claims that such women 
simply did not wish to work. 
 
 
This section has reviewed the evidence relating to constraints on working for 
partnered women in the three countries. In each country for partnered women not in 
paid work their main activity tends to be caring for the family or home, however it is 
                                                 
90
 Just less than the British partners. 
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difficult to tell whether this is their primary role partly because they are discouraged 
workers. In both Australia and Britain there is evidence to suggest that partnered 
mothers prefer to care for their children; in Britain partners women may be reluctant 
to use alternative care, but this may be due to lack of availability of suitable, affordable 
care. If their partner was to assume the caring role, this could potentially restrict both 
partners from moving into work, which is a policy goal in each of the countries. In 
Britain caring for an adult appears to be a constraint on paid work less clearly 
evidenced in Australia and not at all in Denmark. In Britain gendered roles are 
important constraints on paid work for partnered women in some couple households. 
This also appears to be the case in Australia and possibly for some sub-groups of 
ethnic minority women in Denmark. Partnered women across all three countries share 
a lack of work experience, qualifications and in particular in Denmark lack of language 
proficiency. In all three countries health conditions are a constraint, particularly in the 
Danish case. In Britain and Australia there is evidence of disincentives to work in 
relation to ‘discouraged worker’ effects, but this is not evidenced in Denmark. 
Although the groups are heterogeneous, this section has demonstrated that there are 
shared constraints on working between partnered women across the three countries. 
 
4.3 What are the policy responses in each of the countries? 
 
This section sets out the ‘policy stories’ relating to employment programmes for 
partnered women outside the labour market in Britain, Australia and Denmark. The 
focus is predominantly on the most recent policies, but also acknowledges historical 
policy trajectories. As background context, the historical origins of each of the three 
welfare states are set out in the relevant annexes for each country (Britain in Appendix 
3, Australia in Appendix 4 and Denmark in Appendix 5). 
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4.3.1 Britain 
 
4.3.1.1 The New Deal for Partners (NDP) and the Partners Outreach for Ethnic 
Minorities (POEM) pilot 
 
The New Deal for Partners of the Unemployed (NDPU) was introduced in 1999, 
targeted at dependent partners of benefit claimants, rather than those claiming 
benefits in their own right. As with the other New Deals,91 it was funded by £60 
million of Windfall Tax and aimed to help thousands of people (mainly women) into 
work (Department for Social Security, 1998: 27) by providing a range of support 
accessed through a Jobcentre Plus Personal Adviser. NDPU was originally a voluntary 
programme for dependent partners of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) claimants, but in 
2001 it was renamed the New Deal for Partners (NDP) and eligibility was extended to 
partners of non-JSA recipients of Income Support, Incapacity Benefit and Severe 
Disablement Allowance. Eligibility for participation in NDP is dependent upon an 
individual’s relationship with the main benefit claimant – whether they are a spouse, 
or an unmarried and co-habiting partner or a civil partner.92 From April 2004 under 
the Enhanced NDP partners were required to attend one Work Focused Interview for 
Partners (WFIP) with a Personal Adviser; this became the gateway to NDP, although 
NDP participation remained voluntary. Since 2004 partners have had access to the 
same range of Jobcentre Plus services as other customer groups, in particular to a 
similar suite of assistance as lone parents. The range of benefits relating to partners 
and the assistance offered by NDP are at Appendix 3 and Table 4.6 below highlights 
NDP eligibility for partners of different benefit recipients.  
 
                                                 
91
 The first New Deal programme was the New Deal for Young People, followed by the New Deal for the 
Long-Term Unemployed/New Deal 25 Plus, the New Deal for Lone Parents, the New Deal for Disabled 
People, the New Deal 50 Plus and then the New Deal for Partners of the Unemployed. 
92
 Although couples can be same sex, this research predominantly considers heterosexual couples. 
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Table 4.6: Enhanced New Deal for Partners eligibility by working age benefit from 2004 
Type of benefit Eligibility for 
NDP 
Actions 
Couples without 
children claiming 
Jobseeker’s 
Allowance 
Not eligible for 
NDP  
Both partners claim JSA in their own 
right and are under the JSA signing 
regime 
Couples with 
children claiming 
Jobseeker’s 
Allowance 
Eligible for NDP 
as only one 
partner is under 
JSA regime 
 
One mandatory WFIP at six month 
point 
Failure to attend or participate in a 
WFIP can result in benefit sanctions to 
either or both partner’s benefits 
Any action related to NDP following 
WFIP is voluntary 
Partners of Income 
Support claimants 
Eligible for NDP 
 
One mandatory WFIP at six month 
point 
Failure to attend or participate in a 
WFIP can result in benefit sanctions to 
either or both partner’s benefits 
Any action following WFIP is voluntary 
Partners of 
Incapacity Benefit 
(IB)/ 
Employment and 
Support Allowance 
(ESA) claimants93 
Eligible for NDP One mandatory WFIP at six month 
point 
Failure to attend or participate in WFIP 
can result in benefit sanctions to either 
or both partner’s benefits 
Any action following WFIP is voluntary 
Partners of Severe 
Disablement 
Allowance (SDA) 
claimants94 
Eligible for NDP One mandatory WFIP at six month 
point 
Failure to attend or participate in WFIP 
can result in benefit sanctions to either 
or both partner’s benefits 
Any action following WFIP is voluntary 
Partners of Carer’s 
Allowance (CA) 
claimants 
WFIPs are not 
currently 
mandatory 
 
Can voluntarily undertake a WFIP and 
join NDP 
 
The Partners Outreach for Ethnic Minorities (POEM) pilot ran from 2007 to 2009. It 
aimed to assist partners of an ethnic minority into work but, based on the recognition 
                                                 
93
 From October 2008 all new claimants have claimed ESA.  
94
 Closed to new claims in 2001. 
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that some partners were significantly disadvantaged, the pilot also aimed to achieve 
softer outcomes such as movement closer to the labour market (Aston et al., 2009a: 12). 
Although it targeted all ethnic minority groups, it was predominantly focused on 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Somali women, who have some of the lowest employment 
rates (Aston et al., 2009a: 12). The pilot targeted partners of main benefit claimants, as 
well as couples not receiving benefit.95 The programme was contracted out to 
providers, who based their approach on developing partnerships with relevant 
organisations and providing outreach in venues relevant to the target groups.96 
Support was individually tailored and included job search assistance, training and 
group activities, signposting to other providers and culturally sensitive childcare. 
 
4.3.1.2 Joint Claims for Jobseeker’s Allowance 
 
Joint Claims for Jobseeker’s Allowance was introduced in 2001 and changed the rules 
for young couples without dependent children where both were aged 18 or over, and 
at least one partner was born on or after 18 March 1976. From this date, eligible 
couples could only receive means tested JSA it if they made a claim jointly and both 
partners complied with JSA conditionality in being available for work. In March 2002, 
eligibility for Joint Claims was extended to couples where one or both partners was 
born on or before 28 October 1957. As partners in Joint Claims are claimants in their 
own right, they are not eligible for NDP.97  
 
4.3.1.3 The Welfare Reform Act 2009 
 
The Welfare Reform Act 2009 legislated for increased conditionality for both lone and 
partnered parents. Tables 4.18 and 4.19 respectively outline the proposed 
                                                 
95
 Some were partners of potential main benefit claimants who had chosen not to claim benefit. 
96
 The ethnicity of partners has historically not been well known from DWP data, at least until the partner is in 
direct contact with Jobcentre Plus. 
97
 Section 4.4 of this chapter does not include evaluation evidence relating to Joint Claims, as this is outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
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conditionality for partners and conditionality under the Progression to Work model 
following the Act. 
 
Table 4.7: Proposed conditionality for partners of benefit recipients following the British 
Welfare Reform Act 2009 
 Capable 
of work 
Children 
aged 7+ 
Current 
conditionality 
Proposed 
conditionality 
Jobseeker’s 
Allowance 
(JSA) 
Yes Yes Worked Focused 
Interview every six 
months and access 
to New Deal for 
Partners 
JSA joint claim, full 
JSA conditionality 
for both members of 
a couple 
 
Income 
Support (IS) 
Employment 
and Support 
Allowance 
(ESA) 
Yes No Worked Focused 
Interview at six 
month point and 
access to New Deal 
for Partners 
 
Partner becomes 
main claimant in 
JSA claim with full 
JSA  conditionality 
ESA main claimant 
can still claim ESA 
Income 
Support (IS) 
Employment 
and Support 
Allowance 
(ESA) 
Yes Yes Worked Focused 
Interview at six 
month point and 
access to New Deal 
for Partners 
 
Partner becomes 
main claimant in a 
JSA claim with full 
JSA conditionality  
ESA main claimant 
can still claim ESA 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, 2008: 129 
 
Table 4.8: The British Progression to Work model for parents with younger children  
Age of 
youngest 
child 
Conditionality 
grouping 
Requirements 
Under 1 No Conditionality Not subject to any conditionality requirements 
1-2 Progression to Work Required to attend periodic WFIs and agree an 
action plan. Not mandated to undertake any 
activities recorded on the action plan or any 
other activities, although they will be 
encouraged to do so voluntarily 
3-6 Progression to Work Required to follow the full Progression to Work 
regime based around WFIs, action plans, work 
related activity and adviser direction 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b 
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Increases in lone parent obligations began in October 2008, with lone parents with a 
youngest child aged 12 or over being moved from Income Support to JSA, with 
accompanying requirements.98 The Welfare Reform Act is another step in the lengthy 
process of simplifying the benefits system, explicitly begun by the Labour government 
in 1998. The Act extends Joint Claims to couples with children aged seven and over 
and legislated to introduce Progression to Work pathfinders99 for parents (both lone 
and partnered) with children aged below seven. In effect, most workless couples not in 
work will be engaged in benefit regimes linked to JSA and/or Employment and 
Support Allowance as the key working age benefits. Although eligibility and 
conditionality will be individualised, for partners claims are effectively linked, as are 
any sanctions.  
 
4.3.2 Australia 
 
4.3.2.1 Working Nation  
 
For partnered women, the key change as a result of Working Nation under the Keating 
Labor government was that women who had previously been considered dependent 
spouses in the benefits system were required to claim benefit in their own right. The 
significance of this reform for partnered women is two-fold. Firstly, the reform began 
a process of changes to payments claimed by partnered women which resulted in the 
introduction of Parenting Payment (see Table 4.1, Appendix 4). Parenting Payment 
(PP) is paid to the person designated as the Principal Carer Parent (deemed to have 
this role if they care for a dependent child aged less than 16 years)100 and is intended to 
assist with the costs of caring for children for families not in work or on a low income. 
                                                 
98
 From April 2009, lone parents with a youngest child aged ten or over have been moved from IS to JSA and 
from April 2010 most lone parents with a youngest child aged seven or over will be moved from IS to JSA. 
The Coalition government has proposed increasing conditionality to lone parents with a youngest child aged 
over five. 
99
 These draw - in a modified form - on the Gregg Review. See Gregg, P. (2008) Realising potential. A vision 
for personalised conditionality and support, Norwich, The Stationery Office. 
100
 Only one person at a time can be the principal carer of a particular child, which can be problematic for 
separated or divorced parents. 
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Secondly, Working Nation resulted in partial individualisation of benefits. Payment 
entitlement was divided into two and the income test101 was restructured into a ‘free 
area’ of earnings disregard, followed by an individual and then a joint income test. 
The taper rate for those in work was changed from 100 per cent to a maximum of 70 
per cent.102 
 
4.3.2.2 The Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot (PPIP) and the Workless Families Pilot 
(WFP) 
 
Both of these pilots were randomly assigned trials involving PP recipients. The 
Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot (PPIP) informed the policy development of 
Australians Working Together (Department of Family and Community Services, 2001: 
138, 149). In particular the Workless Families Pilot aimed to test the effectiveness of 
joint and individual interviews, an aspect considered in the British NDP evaluations 
(see Section 4.4.1 of this chapter). More detail concerning these pilots and the 
evaluation evidence is at Appendix 4. 
 
4.3.2.3 Australians Working Together (AWT)  
 
The next stage of welfare reforms impacting on partners under the Howard Coalition 
government was Australians Working Together (AWT): participation for a more equitable 
society (Australian Government, 2003) 103 introduced gradually from September 2002 
                                                 
101
 In Australia all benefits are income- and assets-tested. 
102
 This means that for every additional dollar of earnings, only 30 cents is retained. See Vu, Q. N. & Harding, 
A. (2008) Winners and losers from tax-transfer system and other changes during the Howard years. 
Presentation to the conference A future for the Australian welfare state? Continuity and change from Howard 
to Rudd. Macquarie University. Page 14. 
103
 Family and Community Services Legislation Amendment (Australians Working Together and Other 2001 
Budget Measures) Act 2003 No. 35. This was preceded in May 2004 by a Parenting Payment trial which 
aimed to increase the voluntary participation of PPS and PPp recipients in Job Network. See Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations (2004) Annual Report 2003-04, Canberra, DEWR. 
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(Social Research Centre, 2005c: 2).104 AWT targeted four main groups105 and bracketed 
PP claimants into three sub-groups in terms of activity testing (conditionality): (i) 
those with a youngest child of pre-school age, (ii) those with a youngest children child 
in primary school and (iii) those with a youngest child in secondary school (Blaxland, 
2008: 30). Table 4.9 sets out the changes to conditionality. 
 
Table 4.9: Australians Working Together changes for sole and partnered parents 
Age of 
youngest 
child 
Payment type Requirements  
< 6 Parenting Payment 
Single and Partnered 
No new requirements 
6 – 12 Parenting Payment 
Single and Partnered 
Compulsory annual participation planning 
interview, further participation voluntary 
13 – 15 Parenting Payment 
Single and Partnered 
Attend annual interview and develop 
Participation Agreement comprising 
participation in activities for up to 150 hours in 
each consecutive 26 week period 
Source: Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, 2005b 
 
From September 2003 parents whose youngest child was aged between 13 and 15 
years were required to develop a Participation Agreement with a Jobs, Education and 
Training (JET) Adviser,106 detailing approved activities to be undertaken, lasting up to 
150 hours every 26 consecutive weeks (six months) (Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations, 2005: 5).107 Such activities could include paid work, job search, 
participation in Job Network (JN)108 programmes, education or training, volunteering 
                                                 
104 The first stages of implementation did not require legislative reform. See Blaxland, M. (2008) Everyday 
negotiations for care and autonomy in the world of welfare-to-work: the policy experience of Australian 
mothers, 2003-2006 (PhD thesis). Sydney, University of Sydney. Page 80. 
105
 Parents, mature age jobseekers, indigenous jobseekers and people with disabilities. 
106
 The JET program began in 1989 following the Cass Social Security Review and was a voluntary program 
for parents, during which JET advisers provided information and referrals to education, vocational training 
and employment as well as childcare. Parents receiving JET make a co-payment of 10 cents per child per hour 
towards the cost of childcare. Duration of JET has been increased from one to two years.  
107
 The 150 hours could be undertaken over the full six months, averaging just over six hours per week, or 
could be concentrated into a shorter period. See Blaxland, M. (2008) Everyday negotiations for care and 
autonomy in the world of welfare-to-work: the policy experience of Australian mothers, 2003-2006 (PhD 
thesis). Sydney, University of Sydney. Page 31. 
108
 Australian employment services have been privatised since 1998, when the first incarnation Job Network 
(JN) was created by the Howard Government, replacing the former Commonwealth Employment Service 
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or other activities to overcome constraints on workforce participation. Although 
parents with a youngest child aged between six and 12 were required to attend a 
participation planning interview, further participation was voluntary. AWT also 
introduced a number of other measures including 850 additional Personal Advisers for 
disadvantaged jobseekers109 (see Table 4.4, Appendix 4), more out-of-school hours 
childcare places being made available, together with improved financial assistance 
with childcare fees. 
  
4.2.3.4 Welfare to Work  
 
The Welfare to Work Budget 2005-06 measures under the Howard government further 
increased the activity requirements for sole and partnered parents110 from 1 July 2006. 
Table 4.10 sets out the changes to the existing requirements. Both partnered and sole 
parents on PP are required to undertake, or search for, paid work of at least 15 hours 
per week when their youngest child is aged six. New partnered claimants with a 
youngest child aged six are required to claim NSA, but sole parents are not required to 
do so until their youngest child is aged eight. For political reasons, there was a 
transitional (‘grandfathering’) arrangement for existing PP recipients on 30 June 2006, 
who remained on the benefit until 1 July 2007, or until their youngest child turned 
seven (whichever was later):111 this applied to around 79 per cent of the PP population 
(Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010: 14).  
                                                                                                                                                    
(CES). Centrelink (the trading name of the Commonwealth Service Delivery Agency) was created in 1997 as 
a cross-departmental agency providing benefit payments and became the gateway to Job Network, a national 
network of private and community sector organisations providing services under contract to what was then the 
DEWR. Finn highlights three distinct periods in JN‘s history, distinguished by different employment service 
contracts: the first employment services contract (ESC1 1998–2000), ESC2 2000-2003 which incorporated 
the ‗Active Participation Model‘ (APM) and ESC3 2003-2009. See Finn, D. (2008) The British 'welfare 
market'. Lessons from contracting out welfare to work programmes in Australia and the Netherlands, York, 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation. The new contract ‗Job Services Australia‘ (JSA) began on 1 July 2009, 
replacing Job Network. 
109
 The legislation also closed access to Partner Allowance, created as part of Working Nation.  
110
 The other target groups were people with disability, mature aged and long-term unemployed. 
111 This ‗grandfathering‘ arrangement potentially acted as a disincentive to work because parents who left PP 
and returned more than 12 weeks later would have been required to make a new claim under the new rules 
(interview with former government official). 
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Table 4.10: Conditionality before and following Welfare to Work in Australia 
Previous arrangements Arrangements from 1 July 2006 
PPs and PPp Existing PPS 
& PPp at 
30/6/06 
New PPp 
recipients 
from 1/7/06 
New PPs 
recipients 
from 1/7/06 
Age of youngest child Age of youngest child 
0-5 6-12 13-15 0-6 
no 
requirements 
0-5 
no requirements 
No 
activity  
Attend 
annual 
Personal 
Adviser 
interview 
150 hours of 
approved 
activities in 
each 26-week 
period 
7-15 
Participate in 
services from 
1 July 2007 or 
when 
youngest 
child is 7 
 
6-15 
When 
youngest 
child is 6 
apply for 
NSA and 
undertake, 
or seek, 
paid work 
of at least 
15 hours 
per week 
6-15 
When 
youngest child 
is 6 undertake, 
or seek, paid 
work of at least 
15 hours per 
week 
When 
youngest child 
is 8, claim NSA  
No MO 
activity 
No MO 
activity 
No MO 
activity 
Youngest child aged 6+  
MO requirement of 150 hours over 6 month 
period every 12 months 
Source: Australian Government, 2005c Para. 3.4 
 
Welfare to Work involved commitment of $389 million over four years from July 2005,  
with $283 million allocated for employment-related assistance (Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations, 2005a: 175). The increased activity testing was 
accompanied by a new compliance framework.112 Welfare to Work reforms included 
changes to the income test thresholds and taper rates to encourage work (Australian 
Government, 2005a: 12)113  and other measures (see Table 4.4, Appendix 4). The 
reforms also included $50 million over four years for an Employer Demand and 
                                                 
112
 Replacing the previous breaching system and comprised participation failures and serious failures (such as 
refusing a job offer) for non-compliance. This compliance regime was reviewed by the Rudd Labor 
government (elected in 2007) and a new system of ‗no show, no pay‘ was introduced at the same time as the 
Job Services Australia contract. This involves losing one day of payment for every day that individuals do not 
participate; they may lose payment for up to eight weeks. 
113
 As a result, recipients could earn up to $250 per fortnight before this withdrawal commences (increased 
from $245 to $250 a fortnight, compared to $142 for NSA recipients). 
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Workplace Flexibility Strategy to encourage employers to recruit people from the four 
target groups, predominantly comprising coordinated communication, consultation 
and engagement (Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 
2010). The JET programme was superseded by Welfare to Work, although the 
childcare subsidy element was retained as JET Childcare Fee Assistance (see Chapter 
Five, Section 5.5).114 From July 2009 Employment Preparation was subsumed into the 
support streams based on estimated job readiness (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4.2) 
under the new Job Services Australia contract. Prior to July 2009 JN providers could 
access a Jobseeker Account (JSKA)115 to enable them to purchase items not available 
through other funds to help jobseekers enter employment.116 Under Job Services 
Australia from July 2009 the JSKA has been replaced by a more flexible Employment 
Pathway Fund. Following the Participation Review commissioned by the Rudd Labor 
government, flexibilities have also been introduced to the Welfare to Work 
requirements for parents from 2010.117  
 
4.3.3 Denmark 
 
4.3.3.1 Activation 
 
To provide context for the 300 hours rule, this section examines Danish encompassing 
activation (aktivering). Activation in its current form began with the 1978 Work Offer 
scheme,118 however the watershed for Danish labour market policy was the 
                                                 
114
 $266 million was also allocated for childcare, including an extra 84,300 Outside School Hours Child Care 
places, 2,500 extra Family Day-care places and 1,000 extra In-Home Care places to assist working parents 
Australian Government (2005a) 2005-06 Budget Overview, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia.. 
115
 Administered by DEEWR 
116
 This has some similarities with the Adviser Discretion Fund (ADF) in Britain. 
117
 The Participation Review Taskforce recommended continuation of the current participation approach to 
helping parents into work, but stated that within such a punitive approach there was insufficient attention 
being paid to skills development and that voluntary work should be considered as an alternative pathway to 
work and a move away from the work first model. Australian Government (2008) Participation Review 
Taskforce Report, Barton, ACT. Commonwealth of Australia. See also Attorney-General's Department (2009) 
Budget Measures. Budget Paper No. 2 2009-10, Barton, ACT, Commonwealth of Australia. 
118
 Targeting young people and following five years of rising unemployment Kvist, J. & Pedersen, L. (2007) 
Danish labour market activation policies. National Institute Economic Review, 202(1):99-112.. 
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introduction of ‘the active line’ by the 1993 Labour Market Reform I,119 comprising 
reform of unemployment insurance and active labour market policy.  
 
Denmark has two types of unemployment benefit: one based on insurance, and social 
assistance.120 The Danish social protection system is based on the ‘Ghent model’ of 
voluntary unemployment insurance schemes administered by trade union-linked 
funds (Clasen and Viebrock, 2008: 433).121 People in paid work can voluntarily join an 
Arbejdsløshedskasse (unemployment insurance fund, or AK).122 AKs are operated by 
private companies123 and supervised by Arbejdsdirektorate (ADIR, the Directorate of 
Labour, Ministry of Employment), a regulatory body of the Beskæeftigelsesministeriet 
(Ministry of Employment). The requirement for receipt of unemployment benefit 
(dagpenge) is membership of an AK for 52 weeks in the last three years. Unemployed 
people who are not members of an AK can apply for kontanthjælp (cash-benefits, or 
social assistance). Prior to the 1993 reform unemployment benefit duration was 
unlimited, but since then it has been progressively limited to four years in total.124 If 
work in the ordinary labour market is not secured within this time, unemployed 
insured people must then apply for cash-benefits. The 1998 Law on Active Social Policy 
                                                 
119
 Implemented from 1994 and following a Social Commission report. 
120 Permanently disabled people who are unable to work may claim Disability Pension. Other benefits in 
Denmark include family allowances and special benefits. Special benefits include a special benefit for those 
caring for a terminally ill relative (not just paid to spouses), benefits paid to people incurring particularly high 
rent costs and benefits for people with a large number of children (or children with special needs). 
121
 The Unemployment Insurance Act of 1907 enshrined the involvement of the trade unions in the 
administration of benefits, building on the 1899 Constitution of the Danish Labour Market, an agreement 
between employers and employees. 
122
 AKs are enshrined in law as ‗an association of persons who have joined together for the sole purpose of 
providing economic assistance to each other in the event of unemployment and for carrying out additional 
administrative duties conferred upon the fund by the legislature‘. See Kvist, J., Pedersen, L. & Köhler, P. A. 
(2008) Making all persons work: modern Danish labour market policies, in Eichhorst, W., Kaufmann, O. & 
Konle-Seidl, R. (Eds.) Bringing the jobless into work? Experiences with activation schemes in Europe and the 
US. Berlin, Springer, 221-256. 
123
 Workers do not have to be trade union members to join an unemployment insurance fund. The state 
refunds expenditure on unemployment insurance to recognised AKs. Requirements for recognition include 
membership of at least 10,000 people and fulfilment of state requirements regarding benefits. See Kvist, J. & 
Pedersen, L. (2007) Danish labour market activation policies. National Institute Economic Review, 202(1):99-
112. 
124
 Extension of this period may be permitted for reasons such as sickness, parental leave and care of 
dependants. It is still possible to be on benefit for longer periods, such as insured people who are sick or 
disabled and cash-benefits recipients in match categories 4 and 5. 
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extended activation to cash-benefits claimants and also extended to municipalities125 
the responsibility for activating this group (see Table 5.1, Appendix 5 for a 
chronology). Social assistance receipt has not been curtailed, except for couples and 
immigrants.  
 
There are three main types of activation: (i) guidance and qualification/skills 
upgrading, (ii) job placements126 and (iii) subsidised jobs (up to one year).127 In practice 
most activation offers are combined. All unemployed people have the right and duty 
to activation during the ‘activation period’ which is every six months128 following the 
‘benefit period’. Table 4.11 below sets out the Danish activation offers by target group 
and Table 4.12 highlights the types of activation and their take-up amongst both 
insured and uninsured unemployed. 
 
                                                 
125
 In Denmark policy delivery is decentralised to local government Kommuner (municipalities). Since 2007 
benefits and employment services for insured and uninsured unemployed people have been brought together 
in joint Jobcenters. Since 2009 municipalities have had responsibility for the provision of services to both 
groups, subject to the legislation of the Ministry of Employment. 
126 4 weeks for insured unemployed and 13 weeks for uninsured unemployed. 
127 In addition there are other programmes for people with disadvantages, such as (i) rehabilitation for people 
with reduced work capacity; (ii) flex jobs (permanent employment for people with permanently reduced work 
capacity; (iii) sheltered employment for people receiving a Disability Pension. See Kvist, J., Pedersen, L. & 
Köhler, P. A. (2008) Making all persons work: modern Danish labour market policies, in Eichhorst, W., 
Kaufmann, O. & Konle-Seidl, R. (Eds.) Bringing the jobless into work? Experiences with activation schemes 
in Europe and the US. Berlin, Springer, 221-256.. 
128
 It is possible to apply for a one-month vacation in-between. 
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Table 4.11: Danish activation by target group 
Target group Activation offer 
Young people under 
25 both insured and 
cash benefit 
recipients 
Right and duty to be trained if they are capable of doing so 
During the training period they receive the same students 
grants as other students 
Insured 
unemployed under 
30 
Right and duty to activation after 13 months of 
unemployment. The offer must be for at least 6 months. 
Repeated activation every 6 months 
Insured 
unemployed aged 
30 to 59 
Right and duty to activation after 9 months of 
unemployment  
Repeated activation every 6 months 
Insured 
unemployed aged 
over 60 
Right and duty to activation after 6 months of 
unemployment 
Repeated activation every 6 months 
Cash-benefit 
recipients under 30 
 
Right and duty to activation before 13 weeks of 
unemployment  
Activation period is 18 months129 
Repeated activation every 6 months  
Cash-benefit 
recipients over 30 
 
Right and duty to activation after 9 months of 
unemployment (as insured unemployed)130 
Repeated activation every 6 months 
Source: AMS131 
 
                                                 
129
 The number of hours per week is decided by the municipality. For example, Aalborg Kommune activates 
for at least 25 hours per week. 
130 If activation is longer than 11 months, an activation-free period (or vacation) must be included. Activation 
offers are received every six months if they are still unemployed. 
131
 Provided by AMS, December 2009 
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Table 4.12: Principle types of activation in Denmark by type of benefit, 2006 
Types of activation Comprising 
 
Insured 
unemployed 
per cent 
Social 
assistance 
per cent 
Guidance and 
upgrading of skills 
and qualifications  
Short advisory and introductory 
courses, labour market training 
courses, short vocational 
training, special labour market 
courses, day classes at high 
schools, university study 
56 71 
Jobs with wage 
subsidies (1/3 
private, 2/3 
public)132  
Individual receives minimum 
wage 
Employer receives wage 
subsidy 
Minimum period 6 months 
41 9 
Practical job 
training in 
enterprises 
(ansættelse med 
løntislkud) 
 
Employment projects with 
private and  public sector 
employers, voluntary 
organisations, private 
households, associations 
3 20 
Total activated 
persons 
 26,300 28,100 
Source: AMS133 
 
4.3.3.2 300 timers reglen/300 hours rule 
 
The 2002 labour market reform More People into Work134 under the Venstre (Liberals)135 
minority coalition changed the rules for married couples where both spouses were 
claiming cash-benefits, but where one spouse (usually the woman) was deemed by the 
municipality to be unavailable for work because they were working in the home. In 
such cases couples were entitled to claim only one amount of cash-benefits for the 
                                                 
132 They can last for up to one year. 
133 Document provided during interview, January 2009. 
134
 Implemented from July 2003. 
135
 For the first time since 1920 the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) were no longer the party with the 
largest representation and Venstre formed a minority coalition with the Danish People‘s Party (Det 
Konservative Folkeparti). 
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person available for work, plus a ‘spouse supplement’ for their dependent.136 More 
People into Work also introduced lower cash-benefits after six months for families 
where one or both spouses receive cash-benefits, which decreased the amount of cash-
benefits by around DKK1000 for approximately 21,000 people (Goul Andersen and 
Pedersen, 2007: 18). This was offset by ‘Partner Assistance’ (Ægtefælle tillæg) in which 
the tax allowance (Personfradrag) of a non-working spouse is transferred to the 
working spouse.  
 
The 2005 labour market reform A New Chance for All (En ny chance til alle)137 was a 
package of measures focused on the integration of immigrants. Introduced on 1 April 
2006, it abolished the spouse supplement and introduced 300 timers reglen (300 hours 
rule).138 This rule states139 that where both members of a married couple are claiming 
cash-benefits, the spouse with less than 300 hours of employment within the last two 
years loses their entitlement.140 Only one spouse may lose their entitlement and they 
are considered to be working at home and not available for the labour market 
(Finansministeriet, 2005: 38). The requirement is on a continuing basis; once an 
individual has proved their availability for work by obtaining 300 hours of 
employment, they may re-claim cash-benefits until the two-year period is again 
reached. Based on the ‘success’ of the 300 hours rule (see Section 4.4.3) and as a result 
of a political agreement in 2008 the 300 hours requirement has been increased to 450 
                                                 
136
 In practice, this rule was used for only around 200 people (government official). 
137
 July 2005 - this legislation also denied cash-benefits to young people who refused education, denied child 
benefit to parents of 15-17 year olds not in education or employment and required cash-benefits recipients 
with problems other than unemployment to receive repeated activation offers. See Goul Andersen, J. & 
Pedersen, J. J. (2007) Continuity and change in Danish active labour market policy: 1990-2007. The 
battlefield between activation and workfare. CCWS Working Paper No. 2007-54, Aalborg, Centre for 
Comparative Welfare Studies, Aalborg University. Page 20. 
138
 However, as with the Australian Parenting Payment reforms, there was a transition period - in this case, 
recipients did not lose their entitlement until 1 April 2008. 
139
 The aim of the social assistance law is: ―to prevent people that have difficulty keeping their job to get help 
from the Government and to create an economic security net for anybody who cannot provide for themselves. 
The target is to help people to provide for themselves. Every man and woman has the responsibility to look 
after themselves and their married spouse and their children under 18 years and that responsibility only stops 
when you are separated or divorced‖ (translated by government official during interview). 
140
 During initial implementation it had not been clear whether both individuals had to be receiving cash-
benefits; this point was clarified later by the National Board of Appeal (Ankestyrelsen) and led to some cases 
in which cash-benefits were withdrawn being reviewed. See Jensen, K. B. & Lauritzen, H. B. (2008) Local 
authority implementation of the 300 hour rule, Copenhagen, Anvendt Kommunal Forskning. Page 2. 
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(450 timers reglen/450 hours rule), with effect from 1 July 2011. A new chance for all also 
outlined improvements to work incentives for people claiming cash-benefits,141 along 
with increased funding for activation.  
 
A further policy initiative relating to non-working partners was set out in the Law for 
an active employment effort (Ministry of Refugees Immigration and Integration Affairs, 
2008). This allows Jobcenters to provide training or other appropriate measures to 
unemployed people not receiving benefits (similarly to POEM in Britain). This is 
relevant to those who have lost their entitlement through the 300 hours rule, for 
women ineligible for cash-benefits because their spouse is working, or for unemployed 
insured women who have reached the end of their entitlement. This provision has 
only been used for a small number of people and as a result, little data are available.142  
 
 
This section has introduced the programmes relating to partnered women examined in 
this study. In Britain and Australia partnered women, particularly parents, have been 
subject to increasing conditionality, although as will be argued in subsequent chapters, 
in Britain until the Welfare Reform Act 2009 this has been in the absence of 
independent access to benefits as in Australia and Denmark. In Denmark partnered 
women have not been explicitly targeted by Danish encompassing activation policies 
since 1994, until the focus on integration of reforms in the 2000s.  
 
4.4 What are the effects of the policy responses? 
 
This section considers evaluation evidence relating to the programmes in the three 
countries. Martin (2000: 90, citing Grubb, 2005) highlights the tendency in the US to 
                                                 
141
 DKK 500m has been set aside for this initiative. 
142
 The Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs has produced a pamphlet describing how 
the initiative has been used Ministry of Refugees Immigration and Integration Affairs (2008) Indsats for 
ledige selvforsørgede betaler sig! [An effort worthwhile], translated for the purposes of this research by S.S. 
Nielsen, Copenhagen, Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. 
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have a proliferation of overlapping programmes which limits the ability to disentangle 
‘what works’ (European Commission, 2000: 46-7). Such political ‘hyperactivism’ - 
whereby there is an overproduction of policy initiatives in order to be seen to be 
‘doing something’ (Dunleavy, 1995) - is also true of Britain. In Australia one major 
difficulty resulting from their privatised employment services model is the loss of 
insight into why and how interventions work (Finn, 2008: 42). Denmark’s 
decentralised policy delivery model in some respects makes assessing the effect of 
activation difficult (European Commission, 2000: 45) because of the diversity of 
approaches in different localities.   
 
In terms of assessing the ‘success’ of policies, it is necessary to define - and to critique - 
what is meant by this term. ‚While evaluation can be understood as part of the 
rational side of policy analysis it also has a deeply political aspect‛ (McClelland, 2006: 
67). Furthermore, ‚Analysts do not stand outside of the normative disagreements 
which figure in problem definition‛ (Bacchi, 1999: 20). Discussion of policy success in 
this study takes into account its differing definitions in the three countries and this is 
linked with how differently the policy problem of partnered women outside the 
labour market is constructed in each country. Although moving off benefit and into 
work is a policy goal for Australian labour market policies, a further policy goal is also 
increased earnings whilst on part income support payments (Senate, 2005a: 143). In 
Denmark moving off benefits is seen as a positive consequence of being in work143 and 
in Britain the policy goal for partners is moving into work and off benefits. DWP 
considers jobs to be sustained if they are of 16 hours or more per week144 and last for at 
least 13 weeks. However, there is growing policy interest in longer-term sustainability 
and progression.145  
                                                 
143
 In Denmark, Ministry of Employment targets for Jobcenters for 2009-10 were: (i) to reduce the number of 
unemployed with more than three months‘ unemployment, (ii) to reduce the number and duration of sick 
leave claims and (iii) to reduce the numbers of young people under 30 receiving benefits. 
144
 For main benefit claimants. For dependent partners this is 24 hours per week. 
145
 ―The system must do more to help people stay in work and move up the ladder through better in-work 
support – through advice, financial incentives and training‖ Department for Work and Pensions (2007) In 
work, better off: next steps to full employment (Cm 7130), The Stationery Office. Page 9. This has been 
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The success of programmes in each country is defined both as numbers moving into 
work and in decreasing numbers of benefit recipients. In Australia and Denmark the 
programmes studied had the effect of decreasing the numbers claiming benefit and in 
both countries this constituted policy ‘success’. However, when examining the 
quantitative outcomes of labour market programmes, there are also qualitative 
considerations, or ‘soft’ outcomes, such as sustainability and quality, pay and the 
potential for progression.  
 
4.4.1 Employment outcomes 
 
Although around 200 people join NDP each month there are high attrition rates 
between identification of eligibility and participation (National Audit Office, 2007: 21). 
In 2005-06, 300,000 partners were identified as eligible to join NDP, but only three per 
cent did so (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2008). Between 1999 
and 2004, 7,820 partners participated in NDP and 1,860 moved into work.146 Tables 
A2.3 and A2.4 in Appendix 2 show that between April 2004 and August 2009 of the 
9,120 partnered women starting the caseload, 4,380 left NDP for paid work. The job 
entry rate for NDP was 48 per cent but, based on estimated calculations of 
deadweight, it helped only 61 people into work who would not otherwise have 
secured jobs without the assistance of the programme and ‚shows the largest net cost 
to the Exchequer‛ of all the New Deals (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2008: 10).147 A minority (eight per cent) of partners were in work at the time 
                                                                                                                                                    
attempted via the Employment, Retention and Advancement pilots. Further, the Coalition government has 
stated that 12 months should be the measure of a sustained job entry. Duncan Smith, I. (2010) Welfare for the 
21st Century. Speech at the Department for Work and Pensions, 27 May 2010. London, Department for Work 
and Pensions. 
146
 Historical DWP data. 
147 Job entries have been estimated at a cost of £34 million in total - £2,300 per job. However, the Public 
Accounts Committee states that data concerning NDP is ―based on relatively weak evidence on additional 
jobs and includes a relatively high proportion of administrative costs because of the low number of 
participants‖ - House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2008) Helping people from workless 
households into work: Ninth report of session 2007-8, London, The Stationery Office. Page 10. The cost of 
NDP for 2006-07 was £613,000 Jobcentre Plpus (2007) Jobcentre Plus Annual Report and Accounts 2006-
2007 Norwich, The Stationery Office. 
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of their WFIP and for most this was less than 16 hours per week (Coleman and Seeds, 
2007: 16). 
 
In total 54.7 per cent of POEM participants were women (Aston et al., 2009a: 44). Over 
the lifetime of the pilot, 32 per cent of all clients recruited were Black African, with 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani partners each comprising 14 per cent of the total; ten per 
cent were non-UK white (Aston et al., 2009a: 42). The majority of clients were aged 25 
to 34 (Aston et al., 2009a: 46). The key finding from POEM was that both clients and 
providers felt that the one-to-one individual, intensive and tailored support was its 
strength (Aston et al., 2009a: 58). Of 9,614 clients recruited, POEM helped 2,835 into 
work (Aston et al., 2009a: 78). POEM participants were typically employed in low-
skilled, entry-level work such as retail, cleaning, office and administration, hospitality 
and catering, social care, security, driving and in factories and warehouses (Aston et 
al., 2009a: 83). Part-time work such as school lunch-time supervisors and child-
minding were commonly requested by partnered women, along with cleaning 
agencies where work could be done flexibly to accommodate school drop-off and pick-
up (Aston et al., 2009a: 84). DWP did not collect data on sustainable outcomes and by 
the end of the pilot these were harder to achieve as the recession began to impact 
(Aston et al., 2009a: 84).  
 
Due to space constraints Working Nation, the effects of the Parenting Payment 
Intervention Pilot and the Workless Families Pilot in Australia are considered only 
briefly here - further details are at Appendix 4. Partial individualisation and changes 
to the income test following Working Nation predominantly benefited older women 
without dependent children (Burke and Redmond, 2002). The key finding from PPIP 
was that its impact was least for jobless couples (PPp recipients with a NSA-claiming 
partner) (Barrett and Cobb-Clark, 2000: 201). Evidence from WFP highlighted the 
importance of a longer-term perspective on encouraging the workforce participation of 
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those in workless families who are likely to be entrenched in disadvantage and require 
significant resources (Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 442).  
 
DEWR data showed that following Australians Working Together the number of PPp 
recipients remained stable, but in-flows declined by eight percentage points between 
2002 and 2004, although the strong labour market was likely to have been a factor in 
this reduction (Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, 2005b: 6). Most 
exits from PPp were a result of commencing paid work, or due to a partner’s earnings 
(Social Research Centre, 2005b: 43), such as a partner commencing work or declaring 
their earnings. PPp recipients were more likely to exit income support than PPs 
recipients (13 per cent compared with eight per cent) (Social Research Centre, 2005b: 
43), perhaps due to a partners’ earnings. For partnered parents, the rate of 
participation in paid employment increased from 24 per cent to 27 per cent and there 
was an increase in the percentage of partnered parents reporting average fortnightly 
earnings over $400 from 37 per cent in 2001/02 to 49 per cent in 2003/04 (Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations, 2005b: 10, Social Research Centre, 2005a: 36).148 
However, the largest increase was for sole parents (Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations, 2005b: 10).  Overall, there was little change in levels of ‘self-
reliance’ and employment participation for parents following AWT, which may reflect 
the voluntary nature of the programme (Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations, 2005b: 13).149 However, as the results of PPIP and WFP suggest, compulsory 
participation does not always encourage participation or result in job outcomes (see 
Appendix 4). 
 
Welfare to Work was only partially successful in achieving its objectives during 2006-7 
and it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the reforms from the strong labour 
market context (Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 
                                                 
148
 There was a general increase in wages over the period, given the improved economic conditions. 
149
 The short time period between policy implementation and evaluation was also noted in the report. 
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2010: 95).150 Only a small proportion of parents (five per cent) in the target group were 
directly affected by the reforms.151 There was a 32 per cent decrease in PPp claims 
(from 83,558 to 56,863) for parents with children aged 0-5 and 6-15 (Department for 
Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010: 20-1). Figure 4.13 shows the 
steady decrease in the number of recipients of PPp between June 1999 and June 2008, 
particularly following Welfare to Work.  
 
Figure 4.13: Numbers of Parenting Payment Partnered recipients in Australia, June 1999 - 
June 2008 
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Source: DEWR and DEEWR annual reports 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 
 
The number of NSA claims for partners with school-age children also decreased by 55 
per cent (from 24,476 to 11,398).152 However, there was an indirect effect of higher rates 
of transfer from PP to other payments, such as Disability Support Pension and Carer 
                                                 
150
 The evaluation comprised data from the following sources: Centrelink administrative data, Longitudinal 
Pathways Survey, Survey, Evaluation and Analysis Dataset, administrative data from the Corporate 
Management Information System, Post-Program Monitoring Surveys, an Employer Survey and departmental 
focus groups with jobseekers.  
151
 The evaluation covers the year 2006-07. The grandfathered group (79 per cent) were excluded, as were 
those (16 per cent) whose children were not six until after 1 July 2007 and were therefore not subject to the 
participation requirements during 2006-07. 
152
 These parents would previously have claimed PPp. 
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Payment, neither of which are activity tested.153 Compared with similar groups in 
previous years, both single and partnered parents left income support sooner and 
were at least as likely to be in paid work than if they had remained on income support 
(Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010: 40). The rate 
at which partnered parents left NSA after six months was faster than for comparable 
groups: 45 per cent compared with 32 per cent in 2005-06. The proportion on income 
support with earnings was slightly higher for partnered parents than sole parents, 
although for partnered parents the reason may have been the income of their partner 
rather than entering work themselves. The overall employment rate for partnered 
parents was higher (51 per cent) for those on NSA, compared with 40 per cent for 
those on PPp (Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010: 
40). Of partners with a youngest child age six to 15, 29 per cent were in paid 
employment after six months, compared with 20 per cent in 2005-06. For those who 
were employed, the median number of hours worked per week was 22 hours and the 
median hourly wage was around $18, above the minimum wage of $13.75 
(Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010). The 
quantitative effects of Welfare to Work were small and this must be balanced by 
qualitative evidence of the difficulties the reform caused for individual parents and 
families (see Chapter Five).  
 
Activation is considered by policy actors to have played a key part in contributing to 
the ‘Danish miracle’ of moving from very high unemployment in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s to a pattern of considerably low unemployment. This is also the key reason 
for its export as policy learning to other countries. However, activation has failed to 
permanently reduce benefit claims and is not as successful for harder to reach groups 
with multiple barriers to work (Rosdahl and Weise, 2001: 160, Kvist et al., 2008: 225). 
The success of activation is generally accepted, despite the difficulty of effectively 
                                                 
153
 Older women also applied for DSP if they did not receive the Age Pension. 
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measuring its impact,154 the lack of systematic review evidence regarding its effect on 
various target groups and insufficient data concerning exact individual employment 
(Kvist et al., 2008: 222). Micro-based evaluations of activation show that effects vary 
depending on the type of intervention and on those participating; macro-based studies 
suggest that the context is important (Kvist et al., 2008: 222), for example Albrekt 
Larsen (2002) argues that economics, rather than activation, is the cause of decreased 
unemployment in Denmark. In general, studies which measure the impact of Danish 
activation do not adequately take into account the differences for men and women, 
although a small number do. Jespersen et al (2008) found that women gain most from 
private job training. Similarly, Laužadytė (2008)155 found that only private sector 
employment programmes reduced the duration of unemployment (by 0.85 weeks) for 
women, compared with 0.21 weeks for men. Other evidence suggests that job 
placements in the private, rather than public, sector are the most successful for both 
short-term and long-term unemployed (European Commission, 2000: 43). Table 4.14 
highlights the effects of different activation interventions. 
 
Bolvig et al (2003) demonstrate that the timing of activation is significant and suggest 
that it should be implemented earlier in the benefit spell for men, but later for women. 
Graversen (2004) also concludes that the sequencing of activation is significant and 
that where more than one activation offer is received, education should precede job 
training. The majority of activation participants are positive about the interventions, 
stating that they benefit from increased confidence and improving their job prospects; 
however, a significant minority (24 per cent) feel negatively about it 
(Arbejdsministeriet, 2001, Bach, 2002).  
                                                 
154 Larsen summarises the following different methods of measuring the effects of activation: flow effect 
measures, subjective effect measures, fixed effect measures and duration measures. See Albrekt Larsen, C. 
(2002) Policy paradigms and cross-national (mis)learning from the Danish employment miracle. Journal of 
European Social Policy, 9(5):715-735. 
155
 Using county-level data from AMS to estimate the impact of ALMPs on unemployment exit for men and 
women. 
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Table 4.14: The effects of Danish activation interventions 
Type of 
interventions 
Effects 
Search activity Probability of leaving benefit increased during first 8 
months 
Probability decreases after one year 
Private job training Largest direct employment effect but large variations for 
different people 
On average reduces dependence on benefits by 16 
percentage points (two months) 
Municipal 
employment 
projects 
On average reduces dependence on benefits by 6 
percentage points (three weeks) 
 
Education Difficulties in measurement as effects may be in the 
longer-term 
Wage subsidy jobs Number of ordinary employees falls by 0.4 every time 
someone is employed on a wage subsidy 
Source: Kvist et al., 2008 
 
One acknowledged drawback of activation is a lock-in effect, whereby people search 
less intensively for work during participation, or because they prefer to complete their 
activation before applying for work (see for example Madsen et al., 2007). The most 
pronounced lock-in effects are for education activation (Bolvig et al., 2003); this 
increases unemployment duration by about two weeks for both men and women and 
has both locking-in and negative post-programme effects (Laužadytė, 2008: 22-3).156 
However, the deficit from classroom training may in fact be smallest for women 
(Jespersen et al., 2008) and it may have ‘qualification effects’ which result in improved 
qualifications and increased job matching. Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure 
whether people secure work as a result of gaining qualifications or as a result of 
increased job search and it has different effects for different groups of people, some of 
which are apparent only in the longer term (Kvist et al., 2008: 107, 250). Activation can 
also have a motivation (or threat) effect, causing unemployed people to intensify their 
job search and increase their probability of securing work without intervention 
                                                 
156
 The post-programme effect of public job training for women was found to be slightly positive (0.5 per 
cent), but Laužadytė argues that this did not compensate for the dramatic locking-in effect. 
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(Geerdsen, 2002, Geerdsen, 2006, Ministry of Labour, 2000). This is particularly 
relevant to the 300 hours rule, where there is a threat of loss of benefit.   
 
Bach and Larsen (2008) report six findings from their evaluation of the 300 hours rule, 
based on statistical modeling. Firstly, wives were less likely than husbands to be 
employed. Secondly, younger and middle-aged spouses were more likely to be 
employed. Thirdly, education does not appear to influence the probability of being 
employed. Fourthly, those born in Denmark were less likely to be employed than all 
other ethnic groups. This aspect is important, given the rhetoric concerning the 
perceived problem of immigrants’ unemployment (discussed in Chapter Six). Fifthly, 
those who do not speak Danish at all are less likely to be employed. This is also 
important, as both the AKF (Jensen and Lauritzen, 2008) and SFI (Bach and Larsen, 
2008) evaluations found that recipients often did not understand the letter from the 
municipality concerning the 300 hour requirement and the threat of loss of benefit 
(Jensen and Lauritzen, 2008: 4-5, Bach and Larsen, 2008). Finally, self-estimated illness 
has a large influence on the probability of employment (Bach and Larsen, 2008: 69-70). 
It is not possible to establish whether people had left the cash-benefits system as a 
direct result of the rule157 and Bach and Larsen (2008: 61-3, 68) also highlight the rule’s 
deadweight effect. However, the SFI evaluation has been used by the Danish 
government to justify the increase in the requirement of paid work from 300 to 450 
hours (Folketinget, 2009).158  
 
Table 4.15 shows that the majority of those affected by the 300 hours rule were women 
and immigrants.159 Table 4.27 shows the main occupation of individuals at risk of 
                                                 
157
 Interview with government official. 
158 Findings from the SFI evaluation should be viewed with two caveats: first, the sample was selected prior 
to clarification of the rule, resulting in a significant number not in receipt of cash-benefits; second, those who 
lose their benefit are considered to be closest to the labour market. See Bach, H. B. & Larsen, B. (2008) 300-
timers-reglen. Betydningen af 300-timers-reglen for gifte kontanthjælps-modtagere [The significance of the 
300 hours rule for married social assistance recipients] (translated for the purposes of this research by S.S. 
Nielsen), Copenhagen, Det Nationale Forskningscenter for Velfærd (SFI). 
159
 The ethnic origins of those affected by the 300 hours rule are predominantly the Middle East and the 
Balkans. 
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losing their benefit at the time of the survey. Around a third of those who lost their 
benefit and 25 per cent of those who retained their benefit were employed. 
Employment was predominantly full-time, entry-grade and low-paid, such as cleaning 
and other service industry work (Bach and Larsen, 2008: 83). That a majority of those 
affected by the rule were married women but that the work they entered was mainly 
full-time highlights the difference in part-time working between Denmark and Britain: 
most workers in Denmark (including women) are employed on a full-time basis (see 
Table A2.22 in Appendix 2).  
 
Table 4.15: Characteristics of those affected by the 300 hours rule (per cent) 
 Lost their benefit 
 
Who kept their 
benefit cash-benefits 
Women 70 52 
Born in Denmark 5 10 
Danish citizenship 25 35 
Placed in match-group 4160 52 46 
Work ability highly reduced 24 38 
Poor or very poor health 38 52 
Chronic disease or similar 38 46 
Mental illness 23 32 
Basis for calculation 321 681 
Source: Bach and Larsen, 2008: 16 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
160
 In Denmark activation participants are assigned to one of five match-groups which constitute measures of 
employability. Match-groups 4 and 5 comprise those furthest from the labour market and requiring the most 
support to enter work. See Chapter Five, Section 5.4.2 for more discussion of this aspect. 
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Table 4.16: Main occupation of married social assistance recipients in Denmark (per cent) 
Main occupation 
at the time of the 
interview 
Lost their social assistance Retained their social 
assistance 
 Spouse 
also 
receiving  
Spouse 
not 
receiving  
Total Spouse 
also 
receiving  
Spouse 
not 
receiving  
Total 
Employed 31 34 33 0 34 25 
Cash-benefits 18 13 15 78 31 43 
Cash-benefits, in 
activation or pre-
rehabilitation 
12 8 10 22 12 14 
Sickness benefits 2 2 2 0 7 5 
Course/education 2 5 4 0 2 2 
Rehabilitation 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unemployment 
benefit/maternity  
0 3 2 0 4 2 
Early retirement 0 1 1 0 2 2 
Working at 
home/ 
no occupation 
35 33 34 0 8 6 
Source: Bach and Larsen, 2008: 71 
 
One in five of those who lost their benefits stated that they were searching for a job; for 
those working in the home, this was one in four (Bach and Larsen, 2008: 89). 
Recipients who lost their cash-benefits appeared to be more interested in paid work 
than those who kept their benefit (62 per cent compared with 42 per cent) (Bach and 
Larsen, 2008: 63).161 Bach and Larsen (2008: 93) argue that this suggests that those who 
kept their benefit were not as motivated to find work but that perceived work ability 
has an effect on the desire to work. Perceptions of employability are important in 
evaluating work potential. The question is which comes first: the preference for work 
or the risk of losing benefit. Self-estimated work ability is also important in relation to 
whether recipients report illness, which leads to exemption from the rule (Bach and 
                                                 
161 30 per cent of those who lost their benefit said they would prefer part-time work and 36 per cent full-time 
work. Of those who kept their benefit, 26 per cent said they would prefer part-time work and 28 per cent full-
time. Men were more likely to prefer full-time work Bach, H. B. & Larsen, B. (2008) 300-timers-reglen. 
Betydningen af 300-timers-reglen for gifte kontanthjælps-modtagere [The significance of the 300 hours rule 
for married social assistance recipients] (translated for the purposes of this research by S.S. Nielsen), 
Copenhagen, Det Nationale Forskningscenter for Velfærd (SFI).Page 92. 
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Larsen, 2008: 65). There is evidence of significant health problems amongst the couples 
affected by the rule, which if of concern given that those who were considered to be 
closest to the labour market lost their benefit - such aspects have been underplayed by 
the Danish government in espousing the success of the rule.  
 
A further aspect of concern regarding the effects of the rule is that the destinations of 
many who lost their cash-benefits is not known, although 60 per cent of municipalities 
in the AKF study (Jensen and Lauritzen, 2008) stated that they had conducted follow-
up programmes.162 The Danish government has argued that as an economic incentive 
the policy has been successful, which was one reason cited for increasing the number 
of hours of paid work required from 300 to 450 (Folketinget, 2009). However, the other 
side of a stick rather than a carrot approach of economic incitement to enter work by 
reducing (or removing) benefit is the risk of poverty, particularly for children. This 
was an aspect which particularly concerned social workers (see subsequent 
chapters).163 The extent of hardship is demonstrated by the finding that 20 per cent of 
those who lost their benefit had been unable to pay their rent in the previous three 
months and 57 per cent had borrowed money from family and friends (Bach and 
Larsen, 2008). A number of those who lost their benefit described themselves as ‘very 
poor’ (23 per cent), even those who were working (16 per cent) (Bach and Larsen, 2008: 
129).  
 
4.4.2 ‘Soft’ outcomes 
 
The relative lack of outcome data for NDP can be countered by the rich qualitative 
data. Reasons for exit from NDP without entering work included: BOCs indicating 
                                                 
162
 One way of funding these was via the Act on Active Measures 2007 (see Section 4.2.3). 
163
 There was considerable opposition voiced by the Danish Union of Social Workers and many other 
agencies (such as by the Council for Socially Marginalised People, the trade union confederation LO and 
Amnesty International amongst others) in response to both the proposals for the 300 hours rule and the 450 
extension. See Ardejdsdirecktoratet (2009) Høringssvar til forslag til lov om ændring af lov om aktiv 
socialpolitik (Ændring af 300 timers reglen for ægtepar) [Proposed amendment to the 300 hours rule for 
married couples], 28 January 2009, Copenhagen, Ardejdsdirecktoratet (ADIR). 
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that the household would not be better off in paid work than on benefits; the 
insurmountability of barriers to work; and difficulty in coping with the demands of 
training (Thomas and Griffiths, 2005). Nevertheless, there were instances where carers 
in particular described positive change had occurred during their time on NDP 
(Thomas and Griffiths, 2006). These resulted from: firstly, adjustment to the demands 
of caring, coupled with support arrangements; secondly, improvement in health 
conditions; and, thirdly, other family members taking over caring roles. Notably, these 
improvements were not a direct result of NDP. Thomas and Griffiths (2006: 25) 
suggest that it is the WFIP process which is problematic, rather than NDP itself, as 
they are a single event in circumstances which for many partners are subject to change. 
Similarly, in Australia an evaluation of AWT suggested that economic and social 
participation appeared to be strongly influenced by customers’ underlying attitudes to 
participation, which were difficult to change in a one-off interview (Social Research 
Centre, 2005c: 25). Crucially, for partners in Britain barriers to work are not necessarily 
overcome on taking up paid work (Hasluck and Green, 2005: 71) and for many work 
was not sustained due to difficulties combining paid and caring work (Thomas and 
Griffiths, 2006: 42, 46). The reality for many partnered women who do move into paid 
work may be a ‘revolving door’ of low-paid, short-term work, followed by a return to 
benefits.  
 
Some of the successful job outcomes164 from NDP were not the result of programme 
design, but of implementation; sometimes these could be attributed to the variety of 
skills, experience and working styles of individual Personal Advisers (Thomas and 
Griffiths, 2005). The extent to which the range of issues faced by partners in taking up 
employment was understood by Advisers, along with their ability to address these 
issues, had an important bearing on the take-up of employment (Hasluck and Green, 
                                                 
164 One problem with outcome data for NDP is that neither the ending of periods on NDP, nor the reason for 
exit, are always clear from the management information. See Thomas, A. & Griffiths, R. (2005) Work 
Focused Interviews for Partners and Enhanced New Deal for Partners: qualitative evaluation phase one. 
Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No. 283, Leeds, Department for Work and Pensions. 
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2007: 95). However, Jobcentre Plus Job Outcome Targets discourage advisers from 
spending time assisting partners, as the number of points which they receive for 
partners’ job entries is lower (eight points), compared to the number of points received 
for helping lone parents or IB/ESA recipients into work (12 points)165 and is not 
commensurate with the input required (Thomas and Griffiths, 2006). Qualitative 
interviews with clients and providers suggested that POEM achieved soft outcomes, 
such as increasing clients’ confidence and motivation, increased their awareness of 
suitable work, improved their job search, application and interview skills and 
improved their English language skills (Aston et al., 2009a: 92). Outreach workers of 
the same ethnic backgrounds to the target groups were vital in accessing partners, 
however subsequent support did not need to be provided by advisers from similar 
ethnic groups and could be advantageous in allowing clients to become more 
confident, particularly with language skills (Aston et al., 2009a: 108).  
 
There is mixed evidence as to whether WFIPs and NDP interviews are more effective 
when conducted with both partners; to some extent, this is dependent upon the 
specific situation of the couple. In the WFP in Australia there was no evidence to 
suggest that joint interviews were more effective than individual interviews in 
increasing economic activity (Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 435). However, in Britain many 
advisers166 considered that joint interviews gave them the opportunity ‚to engage with 
the complexities of the ‘couple dynamic’‛ (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 34). Many joint 
WFIPs occur for ‘contingent reasons,’ such as the main claimant giving their partner a 
lift to the Jobcentre Plus office, or providing ‘moral support’ because they were more 
familiar with Jobcentre Plus, and were more likely to occur in couples where the main 
claimant was looking for work, where the partner was too ill to work again, or for 
partners whose first language was not English (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 33). 
                                                 
165
 However, Jobcentre Plus customers with children now attract a Child Premium of two points, following 
the Harker report on child poverty - Harker, L. (2006) Delivering on child poverty: what would it take?, 
Norwich, The Stationery Office. 
166
 Most advisers prefer to conduct interviews individually, predominantly because this is the default 
Jobcentre Plus model and is also less time-consuming. 
 134 
 
However, the majority of couples viewed the appointment letter from Jobcentre Plus 
as being for the addressee only, despite the invitation to bring along the main 
claimant. This underlines the confusion inherent in this policy, which treats partners 
both as dependents and as individuals, a point which will be returned to in 
subsequent chapters. The potential effectiveness of interviews also depended on 
whether the main claimant’s attitude towards their partner working was positive and 
supportive, or negative and obstructive (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 35). This will also 
be returned to in later chapters in relation to gendered roles within couples. 
 
Evaluation evidence suggests that some partners view NDP as a positive opportunity 
for support, whilst others resent the obligations placed upon them (Hasluck and 
Green, 2007: 95). Take-up has predominantly been confined to partners who are 
already highly motivated to work and are most work-ready (Thomas and Saunders, 
2002), as well as those already looking for work, where NDP could provide job search 
or training (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 4). This may be because often the most 
motivated or job-ready tend to volunteer for such programmes. The most successful 
outcomes have been for partners who wished to become self-employed and joined 
NDP to take utilise the test-trading option, but this sub-group were atypical in tending 
to possess higher-level qualifications (Hasluck and Green, 2007: 93, Thomas and 
Griffiths, 2005: 79).167  
 
In Australia AWT appeared to increase the number of partnered parents participating 
in study from five to 16 percentage points, which can be seen as a first step towards 
employment (Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, 2005b: 12, Social 
Research Centre, 2005a: 36). Similarly to the evaluation of the WFP (see Appendix 4), 
                                                 
167
 One of the benefits of self-employment is the flexible working arrangements it often facilitates, such as 
working flexible hours and working from home. Some partners also reported involving the main claimant in 
their self-employment initiatives. See Thomas, A. & Griffiths, R. (2005) Work Focused Interviews for 
Partners and Enhanced New Deal for Partners: qualitative evaluation phase one. Department for Work and 
Pensions Research Report No. 283, Leeds, Department for Work and Pensions. 
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evaluations of the Personal Adviser (PA) intervention168 highlighted that PPp 
recipients were already participating to some extent in study or training (Social 
Research Centre, 2005a: 13). Importantly, Participation Agreements ratified activities 
already being undertaken (Social Research Centre, 2005a: iv); just over half of activity-
tested parents were undertaking new activities and the rest were undertaking new 
activities in addition to existing ones (Alexander et al., 2005: 16).169 Such existing 
economic activity may be a reason why employment rates did not dramatically 
improve as a result of AWT (Blaxland, 2008: 204-5).170  
 
Alexander et al (2005) examined the effects of AWT on parents and their children and 
reported overwhelmingly positive responses to the participation requirements. In 
most cases the stress and time pressures reported by participants at the beginning 
dissipated over time and were outweighed by positive impacts on confidence, self-
esteem, social connectedness and anticipated or actual financial benefits (p.62). There 
were no significant increases in behavioural or relationship problems amongst 
children, predominantly because most parents ensured adequate supervision whilst 
they were participating in activities, and positive effects on parent-child relationships 
outweighed the negatives (p.60). These positive effects were reinforced by the 
children, who took on increased responsibility within the household and respected 
their parent’s working role. In most cases parents were more involved in homework, 
facilitated by the new skills they had acquired through their activities and a link was 
made between parents acting as positive role models and children’s performance at 
school (p.59). The evaluation also highlighted the benefits for both parents and 
children where activities allowed parents to be more involved in their children’s lives, 
                                                 
168
 The evaluations utilised the Trans-theoretical Model of Behavioural Change to examine change in attitudes 
and intentions. See Social Research Centre (2005a) Personal Adviser evaluation research customer survey 
wave 1. Research report final. Canberra, DEWR. Page 47-8. 
169
 For some participants, participation was also for considerably longer than the requirements stipulated. 
Alexander, M., Baxter, J., Hughes, J. & Renda, J. (2005) Evaluation of the impact of activity requirements for 
Parenting Payment customers on their children aged 13-15 years, Melbourne, Australian Institute for Family 
Studies. Page 16. 
170
 See Table A4.7 in Appendix 4 for the list of activities being undertaken at the time of the PA interview. 
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such as through paid or voluntary work at their children’s school (p.59). However, 
lack of involvement with children’s lives was a particular issue for parents with health 
problems of their own or with other caring responsibilities (p. 59).  
 
Table 4.17 highlights the types of employment assistance in which partnered parents 
under Welfare to Work in Australia participated, along with the corresponding job 
outcomes.  
 
Table 4.17: Participation in Australian Job Network and outcomes for partnered parents with 
youngest child aged 6-15 
Job Network services % of parents 
participating 
% employed full- or part-
time three months after 
existing employment 
assistance 
Job search support 71.1 45.5 
Intensive support job search 
training 
15.6 39.1 
Intensive support customised 
assistance 
First round 
Second round 
 
 
8.3 
0.3 
 
 
37.9 
n/a 
Employment Preparation 4.7 46.8 
Source: Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010: 45-6 
 
Although parents found the assistance helpful, many suggested that they required 
more individualised services and consideration of their caring responsibilities, 
particularly in relation to suitable jobs available in the local labour market 
(Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010: 46). That the 
reforms did not adequately take into account the circumstances of parents is examined 
further in subsequent chapters. Take-up of Employment Preparation by parents was in 
the following forms: training (63 per cent), clothing and equipment (17 per cent) and 
other assistance such as transport costs and employer incentives (Department for 
Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010: 47). The Jobseeker Training 
Account was used for courses in IT (24 per cent), hospitality (17 per cent), first aid (14 
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per cent) and office administration (11 per cent) (Department for Education 
Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010: 47-8). 
 
 
This section has reviewed evaluation evidence relating to the programmes examined 
in each of the countries. In Britain NDP has had low participation rates and has 
predominantly assisted partnered women closest to the labour market. Australians 
Working Together appeared to be effective in increasing partnered women’s 
engagement with the labour market, by building on activities already being 
undertaken as well as by offering further assistance. There were recognised benefits 
for mothers and their children through this level of engagement. Welfare to Work 
resulted in decreased claims for benefit, increased earnings with part income support 
payment, as well as exits from income support. However, it is not possible to ascertain 
whether exit from income support was due to a partner’s own earnings, or whether 
the effects were partly due to the threat effect of the policy. The 300 hours rule is 
considered a success by the Danish government, presented in terms of a link between 
the loss of benefit, or threat of it, and movement into work. Further, that many 
recipients looking after the home lost their benefit is seen as a policy success resulting 
from testing their availability for work.  
 
4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has examined the policy problem, responses and effects of partnered 
women outside the labour market in Britain, Australia and Denmark. Section 4.2 
demonstrated that there is a shared ideology as a basis for policy learning in terms of 
the policy goal of increasing the employment rates and decreasing benefit receipt of 
target groups as they are variously constituted in the three countries. Section 4.2.2 
highlighted the structural and normative constraints on working common to 
partnered women across the three countries, such as lack of educational qualifications 
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and recent work experience, ill health and in the British and Australian cases on 
particular in relation to both structural and normative constraints in relation to 
childcare. Section 4.3 set out the policy responses, which have increased conditionality 
for partnered women in each of the countries. Section 4.4 examined the perceived 
success of the policies, which has predominantly been in reducing the number of 
income support recipients and with some success in moving partnered women into 
work. The following three chapters examine the similarities and differences of the 
policy contexts of the three countries in more detail, using the four sub-dimensions of 
recalibration: Chapter Five discusses functional and distributive, Chapter Six considers 
normative and in Chapter Seven politico-institutional recalibration informs consideration 
of policy translation to Britain. 
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Chapter Five - The function of the welfare state in relation to 
partnered women as a social group 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter begins the interview analysis by examining aspects relating to functional 
and distributive recalibration. Functional recalibration concerns changes in the 
function of the welfare state in relation to social risks - in relation to partnered women 
outside the labour market these functions are social security, employment assistance 
and childcare. Distributive recalibration involves changes in the distribution of 
benefits (and also activation) for partnered women as a social group within the three 
welfare states in response to the changing social risks articulated in the functional sub-
dimension. Drawing on Sainsbury (1996), Section 5.2 considers partnered women’s 
access to benefits as an important precondition for activation. It is argued that access 
to benefits for partnered women demonstrates policy change in relation to their 
conceptualisation as workers, rather than as dependent wives/partners or mothers. 
This re-conceptualisation operates on a number of levels and, importantly, is 
underpinned by normative recalibration, considered in Chapter Six. Section 5.3 
compares the social contracts in the three countries as a reflection of the functional 
recalibration of welfare states from social security to workfare states and in relation to 
Serrano Pascual’s (2007) notion of quid pro quo. Section 5.4 compares the targeted and 
encompassing policy responses in the three countries. It discusses how categorisation 
as a form of selectivity in income support systems in Australia and Britain translates 
into targeted labour market policies for sub-groups of partnered women. In Denmark 
encompassing activation is supported by employment assistance tailored to the 
individual, but the 300 hours rule introduces targeted withdrawal of support for a 
specific group. Individualised employment assistance is also a feature of Australian 
labour market policy but the section considers how treating partnered women as 
standard jobseekers has underplayed their difficulties in accessing paid work arising 
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from their status as carers. For both Australia and Denmark the section discusses how 
far policy actors perceived such individualisation had been achieved in practice. 
Finally, returning to functional recalibration, Section 5.5 discusses the provision of 
childcare in each country as a reflection of the function of the welfare state (functional 
recalibration). It is argued that childcare is a crucial foundation for activation policies 
in all three countries and an important aspect of policy learning for Britain. Section 5.6 
concludes the chapter with a summary. 
   
5.2 Access to benefits for partnered women 
 
This section considers access to benefits in relation to the changing function of the 
welfare state in response to perceived social risks. As described in Chapter Two, ‘old’ 
social risks in the 20th Century included poverty, unemployment and illness and in 
Australia and Britain such risks were linked with the response of the welfare state to 
the male breadwinner’s incapacity to earn a family wage. By contrast, in Denmark the 
male breadwinner model was dominant for only a short period in the 1950s (Borchost, 
2006); since the 1970s women have been viewed predominantly as paid workers rather 
than mothers (Stoltz, 1997). In Britain and Australia partnered women outside the 
labour market have thus been increasingly viewed as a ‘newer’ social risk. This is 
partly linked with the decrease in male employment in the industrial sectors and the 
increase in jobs in the service sectors. The latter has mostly benefited women, some of 
whom have taken up such work as part-time workers to supplement a full-time male 
wage (one-and-a-half earner model), or to replace it. However, as Chapter Four 
showed, in the context of male unemployment, it is sometimes the case that partnered 
women become discouraged, rather than encouraged workers.   
 
The interviews with policy actors highlighted that, in order to understand the policy 
contexts in Australia and Denmark, it was necessary to examine the bases of 
entitlement and eligibility to benefit (Sainsbury, 1996), as these link to the activation 
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policies. Sainsbury argues that women’s entitlements to benefits are on the basis of 
their status as ‘wives’ (and partners), ‘mothers’ (or ‘caregivers’) and ‘workers’ and on 
their eligibility in terms of need, labour market status and citizenship (p.130). As 
Chapter Four demonstrated, for partnered women their statuses as ‘caregivers’ and 
‘mothers’ are important constraints on paid work. The status of ‘disabled’ has also 
been added to Sainsbury’s typology to reflect the increasing number of partnered 
women who are recipients of sickness or disability benefit (Beatty et al., 2010). The 
welfare state is a site of stratification in terms of gender; men and women have 
different relationships to the welfare state and, indeed, the welfare state may treat 
them differently. However, as will be argued, all three countries in this research 
increasingly treat partnered women as having a degree of parity with men as workers, 
rather than as mothers and this change has been particularly significant in Britain and 
Australia. The re-conceptualisation of partnered women’s roles as workers, rather than 
as dependent wives/partners or mothers in society (the labour market, family, nation) 
suggested by the policies is underpinned by normative considerations (discussed 
further in Chapter Six).  
 
Britain and Australia share a male breadwinner foundation for their respective social 
security systems. In Britain partnered women not entitled to contributory benefits 
have historically received ‘passive compensation’ through derived access as 
dependent wives/partners of a main claimant. This was also the case in Australia, 
although as there are no contributory benefits this applied to all partnered women 
linked into the income support system through the unemployment status of their 
partner. In Australia Working Nation changed the basis of entitlement to benefits for 
partnered women from wives/partners to mothers/workers. It will be argued that this 
was a significant shift in recognising them in the benefits system in their own right, as 
well as on the basis of the ‘principle of care’ (Sainsbury, 1996) for children. This change 
in the basis of entitlements is also a feature of continuing British welfare recalibration 
in relation to partnered women. This recalibration of the function of social security is 
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closely linked with activation policies. In Australia it was a precursor to the extension 
of activation to partnered women who had no existing connection with the public 
employment service, but in Britain this has worked the other way around. The legacy 
of the male breadwinner foundation of benefits has persisted throughout attempts 
since the introduction of the New Deal for Partners in 1999 to encourage partnered 
women into work through the extension of voluntary activation policies and 
increasing conditionality in the form of Work-Focused Interviews. In Denmark 
partnered women already had access to benefits as well as activation in their own 
right and have been conceptualised in policymaking as workers. The 300 hours rule in 
effect withdrew support in the form of benefits and activation for a sub-group of 
married women by testing their availability for work and thus their eligibility for 
benefit.  
 
5.2. 1 Britain 
 
In the post-war British welfare state Beveridge did not envisage a key role for means 
testing, but this element has gradually become a more important feature. This was 
predominantly a result of Conservative reforms in the 1980s which were continued by 
New Labour and have led to an erosion of the importance of the basis of national 
insurance and ‘the contributory principle’ (Williams, 2009). However, given women’s 
greater likelihood of interrupted working lives following childbirth, means tested 
benefits have the potential to be more gender-equalising than contributory benefits. 
Benefits may be paid to partnered women on the ‘principle of care’ of adults or 
children, but this may lead to a ‘gendered dualism’ (Sainsbury, 1996: 223) in benefit 
receipt, whereby men receive contributory benefits and women receive means tested 
benefits. In Sainsbury’s analysis, entitlement on the basis of the principle of care is not 
necessarily negative, but it does have the potential for a locking-out effect in relation to 
access to paid work, which labour market policies attempt to overcome. Table 5.1 sets 
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out the bases of entitlement and eligibility for benefits for partnered women in the 
three countries and these are described further below. 
 
Table 5.1: Bases of entitlement and eligibility for benefits for partnered women in Britain, 
Australia and Denmark 
Country Entitlement 
wife/partner, mother, 
caregiver, worker, 
disabled 
Eligibility 
need, labour 
market status 
(LMS), citizenship 
Denmark 
Unemployment benefit  
Cash-benefits 
 
Worker 
Worker 
 
LMS 
LMS/Need 
Australia 
Parenting Payment Partnered 
Newstart Allowance (Principal 
Carer) 
Carer Payment 
Carer Allowance 
 
Mother 
 
Worker/Mother 
Caregiver 
Caregiver 
 
Need 
 
LMS/Need 
Need 
Citizenship 
UK  
pre-Welfare Reform Act 2009 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
JSA (Joint Claim) 
Income Support  
Incapacity Benefit/Employment 
and Support Allowance 
Carers Allowance 
 
post-Welfare Reform Act  
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
Income Support171 
Employment and Support 
Allowance 
Carers Allowance 
 
 
Wife/Partner 
Worker 
Wife/Partner 
 
Wife/Partner/Disabled 
Caregiver 
 
 
Worker 
Wife/Partner 
 
Worker/Disabled 
Caregiver 
 
 
LMS/Need 
LMS/Need 
Need 
 
LMS/Need 
Need 
 
 
LMS/Need 
Need 
 
LMS/Need 
Need 
Based on Sainsbury, 1996 
 
 
In Britain in relation to partnered women there are both individualised contribution-
based and non-means tested benefits, and means tested benefits based on a derived 
                                                 
171
 For those with children aged under five. 
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access model of a main benefit claimant with supplements for dependent partners. A 
summary of the range of benefits is at Appendix 3. In 2001 the New Deal for Partners 
was extended from partners of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) recipients to partners of 
main claimants of: Income Support, Incapacity Benefit, Invalid Care Allowance (now 
Carers Allowance) or Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA). All of these benefits 
except SDA are represented in Table 5.1172  
 
JSA is split into two types: contribution-based and income-based. Both contribution-
based JSA173 and Incapacity Benefit (IB) (which in 2008 was replaced by Employment 
and Support Allowance - ESA)174 are non-means tested benefits based on individual 
National Insurance (NI) contributions. Contribution-based JSA175 is limited to six 
months, after which income-based JSA may be claimed if the person is still 
unemployed. As discussed in Chapter Four, unemployed partners without children 
have formerly claimed JSA as a Joint Claim and have not been eligible for the New 
Deal for Partners. ESA is split into contribution-based and income-based elements. In 
Britain, unlike in Denmark or Australia, means testing is on the basis of household 
income and savings, but not assets (such as houses). ESA recipients are assessed as 
being in either the Support or Work-Related Activity Groups,176 therefore in terms of 
the bases of entitlement, these two strands are considered in this analysis to have 
either ‘worker’ or ‘disabled’ as the bases of entitlement and labour market status or 
need as the bases of eligibility.177  
 
                                                 
172 SDA was closed to new claims in 2001. 
173
 This is not affected by savings, as with income-based JSA, but the amount received may be affected by 
any part-time earnings or occupational or personal pensions. 
174
 Except for a small number of post-2001 recipients with significant pension income. Those who have 
insufficient NI credits to qualify for IB may receive means-tested Income Support with a disability premium. 
Beatty, C., Fothergill, S., Houston, D., Powell, R. & Sissons, P. (2010) Women on Incapacity Benefits, 
Sheffield, Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research. Page 13. 
175
 The Welfare Reform Act 2009 changed the rules relating to contribution-based JSA and ESA, requiring NI 
contributions of 26 weeks in the past two tax years.  
176
 The Coalition government intends that Pathways to Work will be replaced by the Work Programme but so 
far plans appear to reflect these two groupings established by the Labour government. 
177 Those in the Work-related Group are required to undertake activities to move them closer to the labour 
market, but for those in the Support Group such activities are voluntary.  
 145 
 
The British social security system in relation to partnered women has its origins in the 
Beveridgean National Insurance scheme which allowed married women to opt out of 
paying full national insurance contributions and instead rely on their husband’s 
contributions, forfeiting the claim to benefits in their own right (Sainsbury, 1996: 55). 
This option was widely used (Land, 1985: 56-7) until its abolition following the Social 
Security Pensions Act 1975.178 Although since 1990 income tax has been individualised, 
the unit of assessment for both means-tested benefits and tax credits is the family.179 
Bennett (2005) argues that ‚There is a tension between the focus on the individual in 
labour market strategies and the focus on the family in benefits reforms‛ (p.xi). Until 
1983 only husbands could apply for means tested assistance; now, either partner may 
apply for the benefit, but in most couples the main claimant is male (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2004).  It may appear logical in cases where the man has been the 
principal wage-earner and the woman the home-carer for the male partner to become 
the main benefit claimant although this depends to some extent on the reason for 
claiming and the benefit claimed. However, a benefit system which has some benefits 
based on derived access (as the British one has historically) implicitly assumes, 
perhaps wrongly, that all adults in the family have equal access to household income. 
Furthermore, such a model of derived access may reinforce any family breadwinner 
models which already exist. As a result, individualised benefit systems are seen as 
being more gender equalising in terms of women’s access to income (Michel et al., 
2001, Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
 
Following implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2009 (HM Government, 2009b) 
partners will be required to claim benefit in their own right and participate in the 
relevant benefit regime (JSA or ESA), with accompanying sanctions such as loss of 
benefit for those who do not meet the requirements. The function of benefits in this 
                                                 
178
 Women already using the option could continue to do so. 
179
 This contradiction was noted by Martin Taylor, who authored a report on incentives which preceded the 
introduction of NDPU and Joint Claims. Taylor, M. (1998) Review of the tax and benefit System: the 
modernisation of Britain's tax and benefit system, Number 2, London, HM Treasury. 
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respect represents a shift from ‘passive compensation’ for dependent partners to a 
reciprocal aspect of the social contract of activation, discussed further in Section 5.3. 
The basis of entitlement for partnered women will be as ‘workers’ for both JSA 
recipients and for those ESA recipients deemed capable of paid work. This removal of 
the concept of a dependent partner and increased conditionality has similarities with 
the partial individualisation changes following Working Nation in Australia.  
 
5.2.2 Australia 
 
Australia does not have any contributory benefits apart from superannuation and this 
is the principal reason for the predominance of means-testing.180 Since 1910 the 
Australian welfare state has been funded from general taxation and can be 
conceptualised as having a distinctive ‘targeted safety net approach’ (Bessant et al., 
2006: 89) based on means testing. In Australia the principal relevant benefits for 
partnered women are: the unemployment benefit Newstart Allowance (NSA), 
Parenting Payment (Partnered and Single), Carer’s Allowance (CA)181 and Carer 
Payment (CP).182 A summary of the range of benefits is at Appendix 4. Prior to the 
Working Nation (WN) (Australian Government, 1994) changes there were three types of 
dependency-based payments: Job Search Allowance, Newstart Allowance (NSA) and 
Sickness Allowance. As described in Chapter Four, the key change following WN for 
partnered women not in paid work was that they were required to claim benefit in 
their own right, rather than as a dependent. A report at the time stated that ‚marital 
status is no longer a significant limiting factor in women’s labour force participation. 
                                                 
180
 Australia‘s welfare state was not based on the universal social insurance principles that were a feature of 
either the British or Danish welfare states. Attempts to introduce such systems in the 1920s and 1930s failed, 
predominantly as a result of trade union opposition. 
181
 Carer Allowance is a supplementary payment paid to people who provide daily care at home to someone 
with a disability, a severe medical condition or who is frail aged. It is not taxed or income and assets tested. 
182
 Carer Payment is an asset and income tested income support payment for those unable to participate in the 
workforce full-time because of their caring responsibilities. In the 2009-210 Budget the Australian 
Government announced that it will provide $1.8 billion over five years (including $384.8 million in 2008-09) 
to improve assistance to carers through the introduction of a new carer supplement, in recognition of the 
contribution carers make in caring for people with disabilities and the frail aged. 
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Rather, it is the presence and more particularly the age of dependent children‛ 
(Douglas et al., 1993: i). This latter aspect formed the basis for the introduction of 
Parenting Payment (PP) for partnered or single parents who were not in work or were 
on a low income, a benefit based on the principle of care for a child. Changes to 
eligibility and entitlement for this payment have been the focus of activation to move 
parents, both single and partnered, into paid work. In Australia although benefits are 
partially individualised and individuals claim benefits in their own right, one 
disadvantage of PP is that only one member of a couple is designated as the ‘principal 
carer’, which does not allow for the possibility of shared care and reinforces the 
gendered role of one person (usually the woman) as a carer.183  
 
The next significant change for partnered women was Australians Working Together 
(AWT) (Australian Government, 2003). Before this was introduced, low-income 
partnered women could claim income support in the form of Parenting Payment until 
their children were 16, without reciprocal requirements. AWT introduced a set of 
requirements (see Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2) for those with a child aged over six to 
attend an annual interview similar to the WFIP required of partners in Britain. Parents 
with children aged between 13 and 15 were required to attend an annual interview, 
develop a Participation Agreement and participate in activities for up to 150 hours in 
each consecutive 26 week period. These requirements were extended further by 
Welfare to Work (WTW) (Australian Government, 2005b). This change meant that 
partnered mothers’ entitlement to PP ended when their youngest child reached the age 
of six,184 at which point they were required to claim NSA as a principal carer but also 
as a worker and to search for or take up paid work of at least 15 hours per week, plus 
Mutual Obligation activities (see Section 5.3.2). Sanctions such as loss of benefit are 
applied to those who do not comply with the requirements. This involved a 
                                                 
183 Principal carers are generally the mother or father of a child, however they can also be a foster carer, 
grandparent or other person with legal guardianship. 
184
 PPs recipients must fulfil paid work of work search obligations, but are not moved onto NSA until their 
youngest child is aged eight. 
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redefinition of capacity for work and of mothers’ entitlement to benefit as both 
workers and mothers, with increasingly more emphasis on ‘worker’. Changes to the 
requirements for partnered recipients of PP reflect functional recalibration in that the 
function of social security for this group has been to provide income for the period 
during which their capacity for paid work is reduced due to caring for children. 
Changes in this respect in both Britain and Australia reflect the expectation that 
mothers on income support are increasingly expected to seek work when their 
youngest children reach school age. The requirement to search for part-time work in 
Australia took into account partial incapacity for work resulting from caring roles, 
although how far this was implemented in practice is discussed further in Section 
5.3.2. Although these are all reflections of functional recalibration, they are 
normatively underpinned in relation to the conceptualisation of partnered women as 
workers, rather than as wives/partners or mothers.  
 
5.2.3 Denmark 
 
In Denmark there are two types of unemployment benefit: unemployment benefit for 
insured people (dagpenge)185 is individualised and non-means tested and cash-benefit 
(social assistance) for those without sufficient insurance is means-tested on the basis of 
both income and assets. Unlike unemployment benefit, social assistance is not time-
limited, but the 300 hours rule has effectively limited its duration for a sub-group of 
married recipients. The 300 hours rule must be viewed in the context of other related 
policies relating to immigrants.186 For example, the 2002 law on immigration 
introduced ‘Start Help’ (Starthjælp), a benefit paid at a lower rate187 for immigrants 
                                                 
185
 The maximum level of compensation is 90 per cent of previous income for those with lower earnings, but 
the average replacement rate is 63 per cent. See Kvist, J., Pedersen, L. & Köhler, P. A. (2008) Making all 
persons work: modern Danish labour market policies, in Eichhorst, W., Kaufmann, O. & Konle-Seidl, R. 
(Eds.) Bringing the jobless into work? Experiences with activation schemes in Europe and the US. Berlin, 
Springer, 221-256. Page 235. 
186 On establishing the Venstre-Det Konservative Folkeparti (Liberal-Conservative) coalition in 2001, as well 
as creating the Ministry of Employment, the new government created the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration 
and Integration Affairs, reflecting its focus on the integration of immigrants. 
187
 Around 35 to 50 per cent of usual benefit rate. 
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than for other recipients. From this date, only people who had lived in Denmark for at 
least seven out of the preceding eight years were entitled to cash-benefit. Ostensibly, 
this applies to Danes who have lived outside Denmark, but the principal target of the 
policy was immigrants.188 Danish social security is predicated on the individual, 
deriving from reforms in 1933 which changed the basis of entitlement from discretion 
based on charity to the notion of the individual with rights as a citizen (Greve, 2005: 
36). Although the emphasis is on individual entitlements and citizenship rights for all 
(Millar, 1999: 34), more recent policies emphasising citizenship/residence have 
restricted access to social security for immigrants, highlighting Williams’ claim (1995) 
that ‚access to benefits differs according to gender, race, or migrant status‛ (p.131).  
 
In Britain and Australia there is parity of treatment of both married and cohabiting 
partners, but this is not the case in Denmark - an aspect particularly relevant to the 300 
hours rule. There is arguably a marriage penalty for couples on cash-benefit189 so it is 
not quite true that ‚universalism has neutralised the influence of marriage on social 
rights‛ (Borchorst, 2002: 269). The Social Assistance Law states that: ‚Every man and 
woman has responsibility to look after themselves and their married spouse and their 
children under 18 years and that responsibility only stops when you are separated or 
divorced.‛190 Although the income of cohabiting couples is still assessed on the basis of 
the household, it is specifically married couples who have an enshrined responsibility 
to support each other financially before recourse to the state, as one government 
                                                 
188
 There is also an Introduction Allowance (Introduktionsydelse) for immigrants taking part in an 
Introduction Programme. This programme aims to help to integrate immigrants and their descendants into 
Danish society, for example through the provision of Language Centres for Danish language learning. It is 
only after this three-year programme is completed that they are placed in a match group and are under the 
Law on an Active Social Policy, which legislates for activation interventions. 
189
 The SFI evaluation suggested that a small number (seven per cent in total of those denied cash-benefit and 
not denied) said that they had considered divorce in response to the letter from the local authority about 
potential loss of benefit, which would not have applied had they not been married. See Bach, H. B. & Larsen, 
B. (2008) 300-timers-reglen. Betydningen af 300-timers-reglen for gifte kontanthjælps-modtagere [The 
significance of the 300 hours rule for married social assistance recipients] (translated for the purposes of this 
research by S.S. Nielsen), Copenhagen, Det Nationale Forskningscenter for Velfærd (SFI). 
190
 Translated by government official during interview. 
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official stated: ‚If you are married, then you are obliged to look after and support your 
married partner and that’s a part of Danish legislation.‛ 
 
The dependent spouse supplement (introduced in 2002 and abolished following the 
300 hours rule) has similarities with the main claimant/dependent spouse (derived 
access) model in Britain and Australia before partial individualisation. On this basis, 
married women could claim entitlement to benefit as wives. One Danish academic 
interviewed suggested that the spouse supplement was anomalous to the Danish 
model, although this was presented by the government as a rationale for the 
introduction of the 300 hours rule. It was seen as anomalous to Danish activation as it 
was seen to implicitly accept that the dependent spouse was not available for work, 
which undermined the rationale of ‘all must be active’ (Rosdahl and Weise, 2001) 
under the encompassing activation regime. 
 
The parliamentary proposal which changed the 300 hour requirement to 450 hours 
stated: ‚Couples can decide to let one partner stay at home but it should not be on the 
state’s expenses. With the right to cash benefits follows the duty to be of service to the 
labour market‛ (Ardejdsdirecktoratet, 2009). This expectation was supported by all of 
the interviewees, as one government official commented: ‚We accept if you want to be 
a housewife, it’s your choice, but then you and your family have to pay for it 
yourselves. It’s not our job to pay if you want to be a housewife.‛ Another government 
official stated that: ‚In the UK being a mother entitles you to benefit, but in Denmark 
you can’t do that. You can have it for a certain period of time when the children are 
small, but then you are on the same rules as everyone else.‛ 
 
Motherhood per se does not automatically translate into benefit entitlement in Britain 
or Australia because it is linked with eligibility on the basis of need, although 
motherhood is in particular linked with benefit receipt for lone parents, particularly in 
Britain. However, this quote highlights the point that in Australia and Britain 
 151 
 
motherhood has been linked with incapacity for work. This is not the case in 
Denmark, where everyone who wishes to claim either unemployment benefit or cash-
benefit does so on the bases of entitlement as ‘workers,’ with eligibility being labour 
market status for unemployment benefit and labour market status/need for cash-
benefit. In terms of functional recalibration, the 300 hours rule in effect withdrew 
support in the form of benefits and activation for a sub-group of married women by 
testing their availability for work and thus their eligibility for benefit by requiring 
them to accrue 300 hours of paid work in a one year period; the spouse who did not 
have 300 hours of paid work lost their benefit entitlement. In contrast to Britain and 
Australia, in Denmark caring for a young child does not result in exemption from 
activation and such exemptions are being gradually curtailed in Australia and Britain. 
The case of carers is more complex: in Australia and Britain carers of adults as a group 
of benefit recipients are still exempted from activation, but this is not the case in 
Denmark under encompassing activation. As will be argued in Section 5.5, the 
provision of alternative care (for children and adults) is a crucial aspect of changing 
eligibility for benefits and increasing conditionality for partnered women in all three 
countries. Such provision is an important underpinning of activation in Denmark, is to 
some extent an established foundation in Australia, but is comparatively less 
institutionalised in Britain.  
 
Ferrera et al (2000) suggest that women are key to functional recalibration for two 
reasons. Firstly, in terms of the welfare state revenues generated by high female labour 
market participation. Secondly, population, family, labour market changes, higher 
rates of female employment, modifications to the male breadwinner model and 
traditional gender relations challenge the ‘goodness of fit’ between the welfare state 
and an evolving socio-economic reality (p.72). The male breadwinner foundation of 
the British and Australian welfare states is important to partnered women’s historical 
access to benefits as dependents. Changing the basis of entitlement to benefits for 
partnered women from wives/partners to mothers/workers in Australia was a 
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significant shift in recognising them in the benefits system in their own right, as well 
as on the principle of care. This reflects functional recalibration in representing a shift 
from social security as ‘passive compensation’ to ‘activation’. In Britain the legacy of 
the male breadwinner foundation of benefits has persisted throughout attempts since 
1999 to encourage partnered women into work through activation policies, but the 
Welfare Reform Act 2009 has introduced partial individualisation of benefits for 
partnered women, which has some similarities with the changes introduced by 
Working Nation in Australia. In Denmark the period of the male 
breadwinner/housewife was short-lived and that women are predominantly viewed as 
workers, including in active labour market policies, is a significant difference between 
Denmark and Britain and Australia. However, as will be discussed further in Chapter 
Six, the ‘goodness of fit’ between the welfare state and an evolving socio-economic 
reality relates to how partnered women’s roles are constructed and whether and how 
policies fit with socio-economic changes in their own lives.  
 
5.3  From welfare to workfare: three social contracts 
 
Since the 1990s in each of the three countries there has been an institutional shift from 
welfare to workfare states. Workfare involves ‚the imposition of a range of 
compulsory programmes and mandatory requirements for welfare recipients with a 
view to enforcing work whilst residualising welfare‛ (Peck, 2001: 10, italics in original). In 
this process of re-commodification alternatives to labour market participation are 
restricted, either by tightening eligibility or by cutting benefits (Pierson, 2001a: 422). 
Commonality can be seen across all three countries in limiting the duration of benefit 
claims, increasing conditionality for partnered women and the imposition of penalties 
for non-compliance. Peck argues that the shift to workfare states involves a move from 
welfare states based on need and universality to workfare states based on selectivity 
and market-based compulsion (Peck, 2001: 12). As the previous section has 
demonstrated and subsequent sections intend to further elaborate, the transformation 
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is more complex than this for partnered women. Need in relation to income support is 
articulated according to different constructions of entitlement and eligibility and it is 
important not to overstate the ‘universality’ of the British welfare state in particular in 
relation to benefits for wives and mothers (the issue of selectivity in benefits and 
activation policies is examined further in Section 5.4 in relation to distributive 
recalibration). It will be argued that the changes in entitlement and eligibility for 
benefit in each of the countries examined in the previous section are closely related to 
the recalibration of the function of these welfare states from providers of social 
protection to workfare states. This section examines this shift as articulated through 
the social contracts for welfare in the three countries. As Chapter Two discussed, 
Serrano Pascual (2007) identifies five types of activation regime based on two aspects. 
The first aspect is the modes of managing individuals and within this the two 
extremes of: (i) the moral-therapeutic management of behaviour, and (ii) adaptive 
skills management (these aspects are discussed in Chapter Six). The second aspect is a 
‘new social contract’, which is the focus of this section. Within this contract are the two 
elements of: (i) the quid pro quo191 between unemployed people and the State and the 
duties of the state and the rights and duties of the individual; and (ii) the balance, or 
imbalance between the two (p.294). Here, they are considered in relation to increased 
obligations in return for receipt of benefit. These social contracts have both 
Rousseauian (1998) and Hobbesian (1998) elements. Rousseauian in that they have 
moral aspects and, in emphasising the individual’s responsibility to the rest of society, 
or the ‘general will’ (Rousseau, 1998: I, 6), they recognise the societal dimension crucial 
to Rousseau’s social contract. The notion of quid pro quo also recognises the ‘credits and 
debits’ (Rousseau, 1998: I, 8) which are part of a Rousseauian contract and Serrano 
Pascual highlights the balance or imbalance between these. The Hobbesian aspect is 
visible in the government’s role in enforcing these contracts through legislation and 
monitoring of compliance by frontline policy actors. 
                                                 
191
 Latin meaning ‗something for something‘ but as Goodin argues, there can be asymmetries within this 
supposed reciprocity. See Goodin, R. (2002) Structures of mutual obligation. Journal of Social Policy, 
31(4):579-596. 
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5.3.1  British ‘rights and responsibilities’ 
 
In Britain, ‘rights and responsibilities’ was part of the Blairite policy agenda, ranging 
from welfare reform to justice.192 This was influenced both by the Commission on 
Social Justice Report (1994, see also Bennett and Millar, 2009) produced before Labour 
took office, as well as by the work of Giddens (1998: 65). In the area of welfare reform, 
this began with the first welfare Green Paper in 1998 (Department for Social Security, 
1998): ‚At the heart of the modern welfare state will be a new contract between the 
citizen and the Government, based on responsibilities and rights‛ (p.80). This social 
contract has been presented as a return to the ‘first principles’ of the post-war welfare 
state (Purnell, 2008: 97, Driver and Martell, 2006). However, it also underpinned the 
shift from passive to active labour market policies, begun with the introduction of 
Jobseeker’s Allowance in 1996. Subsequent welfare reforms have drawn on a 
distinction between the requirements for work-readiness attached to Jobseeker’s 
Allowance and the relative absence of requirements for other benefits. However, in the 
case of partners, it has been ideologically problematic that, prior to the Welfare Reform 
Act, many partners were not been claiming benefits in their own right, but at the same 
time were targeted by a policy to increase their labour market participation. Although 
the requirement was comparatively minimal, this conditionality has nevertheless been 
asymmetrical. Although NDP treats non-working partnered women as if they have an 
independent relationship to the labour market, their participation in the programme 
depends upon the employment (or rather, unemployment) status of their partners 
(Lewis, 2001: 162). In this way WFIPs have involved more duties than rights, although 
this has been balanced to an extent by the range of support offered by NDP, despite its 
limitations. However, it is problematic that both members of a couple may be 
sanctioned for the partner’s non-participation and this couple-based sanctioning will 
continue even when partners claim benefit in their own right. 
                                                 
192
 Critical to New Labour‘s focus on rights and responsibilities in the area of welfare was the influence of 
Clinton‘s New Democrats in the US and specifically the work of David Ellwood (adviser to President 
Clinton). See Driver, S. & Martell, L. (2006) New Labour (2nd edition), Cambridge, Polity. 
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5.3.2  Australian ‘Mutual Obligation’ 
 
The ‘active line’ in Australian labour market policies began with the Social Security 
Review of 1986-89 (Cass, 1988), from which followed tougher means testing and a new 
activity test. Working Nation introduced ‘Reciprocal Obligation’ in relation to 
unemployment benefit recipients and in 1996 the Howard government introduced the 
requirement for income support recipients to fulfill their ‘Mutual Obligation’193 to 
society in return for benefits. The McClure report (2000a) which preceded both AWT 
and WTW recommended the extension of Mutual Obligation to parents: ‚The whole of 
the society has an obligation to provide assistance to those most in need. Similarly 
those who receive assistance and opportunities through the social support system 
have a responsibility to themselves and the rest of society to seek to take advantage of 
such opportunities‛ (pp.34, 40). The Australian interviewees had mixed views about 
‘Mutual Obligation’. Some were against any form of compulsion, but others were 
supportive of conditionality, although all non-governmental actors criticised the WTW 
reforms, considering the quantitative requirement for paid work to be too tough, as 
one campaigning organisation suggested: ‚We supported activation but we were 
concerned about the way the previous [Liberal-National Howard] government was 
going about it and we were concerned about the profile of this group.‛ 
 
The number of hours of paid work required under Welfare to Work was more 
demanding than those required by the 300 hours rule: 15 hours per week (or 30 hours 
per fortnight) in Australia, compared with three hours per week, or three months’ full-
time work in Denmark.194 One Australian campaigning organisation commented that: 
‚In Australia participation requirements are very arbitrary‛ and, as with the 300 hours 
                                                 
193 Mutual Obligation activities include job search, training, Work for the Dole or a work experience activity. 
The concept of ‗Mutual Obligation‘ has been critiqued in philosophical terms. For example Goodin has 
suggested alternative models along the three dimensions of conditionality, temporality (time) and currency 
(mode). See Goodin, R. (2002) Structures of mutual obligation. Journal of Social Policy, 31(4):579-596, 
Goodin, R. (2001) False principles of welfare reform. Australian Journal of Social Issues, 36(3):189-205. 
194
 Five hours a week under the 450 hours rule. 
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requirement in Demark, no analytical basis was cited for either of the quantitative 
requirements. WTW was accompanied by the Welfare to Work Contact Model, 
involving regular face-to-face interviews at Centrelink195 offices to reinforce jobseekers’ 
obligations and monitoring.196 Furthermore, fortnightly reporting was a more onerous 
requirement than the six-monthly reporting under AWT. For employment service 
providers, the quantitative focus on a required number of hours could be difficult to 
manage: ‚It’s as frustrating for the providers as it’s terribly frustrating for the 
individuals.‛  
 
In recommending the extension of Mutual Obligation to parents, McClure  (2000a) 
emphasised ‚a broad concept of economic and social participation<*which+ extends 
beyond the traditional focus on financial self-support and labour force status 
(employed, unemployed or not in the labour force) to recognise the value of the many 
other ways people can participate in society‛ (p.4). Further, McClure outlined the 
importance of ‘capacity building,’ explicitly recognising and supporting economic and 
social activities already being undertaken (p.41), arguing that the system would ‚need 
to be sensitive to parents’ concerns about the welfare of their children‛ (p.42). 
However, the WTW requirements appeared to override policy learning from previous 
interventions concerning, firstly, the importance of building on activities already being 
undertaken and, secondly, being sensitive to childcare obligations (see Pearse, 2000: 
105, Alexander et al., 2005, Coventry, 2000: 124). One campaigning organisation 
commented that: ‚The work requirements were imposed without much sensitivity to 
people’s requirements.‛ 
 
                                                 
195
 Centrelink is contracted by the Australian Government to assess claims, pay benefits and enforce 
compliance and is distinct from the employment assistance providers. 
196
 The stipulation that parents with participation requirements attend Centrelink offices in person (rather than 
contact Centrelink by other methods, such as by telephone) on a fortnightly basis was later modified, as a 
number of organisations highlighted that this requirement was incompatible with both the 15-hour work test 
and with caring responsibilities.  
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In contrast to previous interventions for partnered women, WTW was a significant 
shift towards workfare (Blaxland, 2008: 197). For example, only short-term study of 
less than twelve months met participation requirements (Australian Government, 
2007). Although parents could continue with studies already commenced, one 
employment service professional interviewed suggested that in some cases Centrelink 
asked parents to jettison training or education activities in favour of paid work. 
Although under AWT vocationally-oriented voluntary work had been permitted, 
under Welfare to Work voluntary work did not count towards the activity 
requirement, although under the discretion of employment services providers it could 
result in reduced job search requirements (Senate, 2005a: 151).197 However, one 
campaigning organisation emphasised the importance of education and training for 
partners:  
 
‚Most partners of people on income support come from relatively disadvantaged 
backgrounds, probably over half have Year 10 education or less themselves, their 
partners similar<usually unable to break out of low-skill and casual employment into 
better paid, full-time or permanent employment because of their low educational 
level<It just underscores the importance of education and training for this group.‛ 
 
Similarly, they went on to state that in particular couples aged in their 40s and 50s may 
lack labour market experience and have few qualifications:  
 
‚They may have done casual work, but never have really established themselves in the 
labour market<and some actually had capacities to study but just never had the 
opportunity, so that’s the group who would particularly benefit now from return to 
                                                 
197
 Approved activities included under AWT were: job search, a vocational or pre-vocational training course, 
training to help facilitate job search, paid work, measures designed to eliminate or reduce any disadvantage 
the person has in relation to obtaining work, voluntary participation in an approved program of work for 
income support payment, participation in a labour market program, a course of education, and other activities 
including voluntary work. See Commonwealth of Australia (2003) Family and Community Services 
Legislation Amendment (Australians Working Together and other 2001 Budget Measures) Act 2003. 
Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia.  
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study. They come back a decade later and actually do quite well, so if we can identify 
them and assist them in that way that’s really what they need<Others may require 
some paid workforce experience so that they can get references, contacts and all of the 
other benefits of having been employed for a while.‛  
 
The above quote highlights the different paths to work for different partnered women, 
but WTW focused on a single pathway in the form of a work first approach. Parents 
could refuse work if (i) no appropriate care was available for their child/ren; (ii) travel 
time to or from the person’s home to the place of work (via the place of childcare) 
exceeded 60 minutes); (iii) the cost of travel to and from work exceeded 10 per cent of 
the gross wage; or (iv) they were not at least $50 per fortnight better off, compared to 
not working (National Welfare Rights Network, 2007). However, one academic 
suggested that there were some early cases of women being directed towards 
‘inappropriate’ work under the broad concept of ‘any suitable job’ (Senate, 2008: 22). 
The 30 hours per fortnight requirement was too rigidly enforced, and did not allow 
women to take up decent work, but instead pushed them into unpredictable casual 
work which could not guarantee regular hours (Bodsworth, 2010: 50).198 Such casual 
work often provided neither paid holidays nor other forms of leave, resulting in some 
parents working a greater numbers of hours across the year, although perversely 
refusing shifts for a period of time could potentially find them in breach of their 
activity requirements (Bodsworth, 2010: 50).  
 
The focus on paid work overrode any other activities, regardless of whether they were 
part of a longer-term path potentially leading to sustained paid work (Bodsworth, 
2010: 66). This went against evidence from PPIP which suggested that some PPp 
recipients were likely to be entrenched in disadvantage and require a longer-term 
                                                 
198
 Since the 1970s there has been a dramatic increase in part-time and casual work in Australia, particularly 
‗non-standard‘ forms of work. Australia also has the highest proportion of precariously employed workers in 
the world. See Bessant, J., Watts, R., Dalton, T. & Smyth, S. (2006) Talking policy: how social policy is 
made, Crows Nest, NSW, Allen and Unwin.Page 108.  
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perspective to encourage workforce participation (Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 442). One 
former government official suggested that: ‚The Welfare to Work reforms could have 
been less focused on a work first approach and instead built on previous reforms‛. An 
employment service professional commented that: ‚Most people thought that they 
were going to be better off and that going into work would be a good thing, but that 
the system would operate around them, rather than them having to fit the system.‛  
 
This criticism was partly related to the compliance regime199 which was viewed as 
being too punitive.200 Interviews with employment service professionals also 
suggested that Centrelink staff also had a lack of discretion in allowing parents 
conditional exemptions for personal circumstances, such as domestic violence (see 
McInnes and Taylor, 2007). The reforms were viewed as reducing parents’ autonomy 
in making their own decisions about combining work and care and exacerbated 
difficulties they were already experiencing, such as ill health and stress (Blaxland, 
2009, see also McInnes, 2006). The reforms did not sufficiently take account of caring 
responsibilities or non-work activities already being undertaken and overrode parents’ 
own job search efforts (see Blaxland, 2009, McInnes and Taylor, 2007). Under AWT the 
Activity Agreements which participants had to agree with employment service 
providers permitted a wider notion of activity, encompassing social as well as 
economic participation. However, in both functional and normative terms, WTW 
transformed the meaning of these agreements to a narrower focus on paid work.  
 
The introduction of the new Job Services Australia contract from 1 July 2009 included 
the replacement of Activity Agreements with legally-binding Employment Pathway 
                                                 
199
 For recipients of both Parenting Payment and Newstart claimants, three ‗participation failures‘ or a 
‗serious participation failures‘ could result in an eight-week suspension of their payment.  
200
 McInnes highlights a number of shortcomings of this regime, such as misinterpretation by Centrelink and 
providers. See McInnes, E. & Taylor, J. (2007) Single mothers' struggles for survival in the Job Network 
system. 'Our Work, Our Lives' Conference. Adelaide, 20-21 September 2007, McInnes, E. (2006) When 
unpaid care work doesn't count: the commodification of family life in the new Welfare to Work order. Road 
to where: the politics and practice of implementing Welfare to Work. Brisbane, 17-18 July.  
 
 160 
 
Plans (EPP). A number of interviewees highlighted the importance of a ‘pathway’ to 
work, building on the skills and experience partnered women already have; an aspect 
missing from the Australian reforms, but outlined in the British welfare reforms under 
the Labour government (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b, Gregg, 2008). The 
Rudd Labor Government appeared to move away from an overtly workfarist 
approach in emphasising more human capital elements through its rhetoric of creating 
an ‘education revolution’ (Australian Labor Party, 2007) from the early years 
upwards.201 In the area of labour market policy for partners, this shift towards a more 
human capital approach can be seen in the flexibilities introduced for parents to 
undertake part-time study or voluntary work with vocational value within the 
parameters set by Welfare to Work (Department of Education Employment and 
Workplace Relations, 2009).202  
 
Australian activation policies relating to partnered parents are illustrative of 
functional recalibration in responding to a group perceived by policymakers as remote 
from the labour market and who, as Section 5.4 of this chapter and Chapter Six will 
demonstrate, are considered ‘welfare dependent’. Activation for partnered women in 
Australia is closely related to the function of social security. As discussed in Section 
5.2, Working Nation brought such partners into the benefits and employment 
assistance systems and Australians Working Together began to recalibrate the function 
of PP as social security by increasing conditionality for this group. The interviews and 
documentary evidence suggest that the social contract enshrined in this reform built 
on activities partnered women were already undertaking and was predominantly 
focused on a longer-term pathway into work. However, the interviews pointed to 
Welfare to Work as embodying a more workfarist approach, with a focus on recording 
a specific number of hours of paid work or job search, rather than other avenues into 
work. 
                                                 
201
 This has similarities with the Blairite mantra of ‗education, education, education‘. 
202
 Following the report of the Participation Review Taskforce - Australian Government (2008) Participation 
Review Taskforce Report, Barton, ACT. Commonwealth of Australia. 
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5.3.3 The Danish ‘right and duty’ to activation 
 
In contrast to the Australian case, none of the Danish interviewees voiced objection to 
the notion of the ‘right and duty’ to activation. The Danish Constitution (Grundlov) 
was cited in a number of the interviews with policy actors as being of significance to 
activation. The Constitution states that:  
(1) In order to advance the public interest, efforts shall be made to guarantee work 
for every able-bodied citizen on terms that will secure his [sic] existence 
(2) Any person unable to support himself or his dependants shall, where no other 
person is responsible for his or their maintenance, be entitled to receive public 
assistance, provided that he shall comply with the obligations imposed by 
statute in such respect (Danish Constitution Section 75 paragraphs 1 and 2 cited 
in Kvist et al., 2008: 227) 
 
The 1994 activation reforms introduced the concept of the ‘right and duty’ to 
activation. People have the right to work and to expect the state to help them to find 
work, but this is coupled with the obligation to become work-ready and to seek work. 
This was summarised by Danish social workers as follows: ‚It *activation+ is a right 
and we have to explain why that is. That’s the thing about this system. It’s their right 
to learn Danish and it is their right to get support and we have so many things‛203; ‚It’s 
easy to say to people ‘When you get money, you have to work, you have to be in 
activation’. Everybody can see some kind of fairness in that.‛ 
 
The right and duty introduced by the 1994 reforms was balanced by significant 
investment in employment services, brokered by the trade unions in order to gain 
their agreement to activation. This softened the workfarist potential of the 1990s 
                                                 
203
 Unlike in Britain, in Denmark social workers have a role as frontline actors in Jobcenters, discussed further 
in Chapter Seven. 
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reforms and retained the focus on human capital development. The right and duty 
was viewed by the majority of interviewees to be reflective of the universal nature of 
the Danish welfare state based on a ‘social contract’ (quid pro quo), as one academic 
suggested: ‚The first trick is having everyone working and the second trick is having 
everyone benefiting because if everyone benefits everyone wants to contribute so 
we’ve got a high legitimacy of welfare provisions.‛ 
 
In terms of functional recalibration, Danish interviewees linked this with the 
‘ideology’ of the Danish welfare state which, as one academic stated, is ‚about labour 
and work, so you couldn’t have a welfare state like that if all members weren’t 
working‛ (see Kvist and Pedersen, 2007: 100). Further, a social worker suggested that: 
‚When you hear it again and again that people have to work and when they find out 
better ways to do it<I had no problem arguing to citizens who said ‘Why should I do 
something?’ because ‘Everybody else is doing something, so it’s not so strange that 
you are doing something also.’‛ 
 
This highlights the importance of the encompassing nature of Danish activation, as 
well as the inequity of targeting via the 300 hours rule within this context. However, 
the following quote from a social worker illustrates that, although the interviews 
suggested consensus concerning the right and duty, at the time it was introduced this 
new policy was viewed as controversial and was in fact perceived as a different way of 
conceptualising the relationship of unemployed people with the state: ‚Many people 
have changed their opinion and most social workers now think that it’s very fair and 
right that people have to do something to get back to work. It’s accepted now but at 
first I also said ‘Oh, that’s slavery.’‛ 
 
The introduction of Individual Action Plans (IAPs) in Denmark in 1994 was illustrative 
of both the right and duty, with both a focus on the needs of the labour market and the 
individual. However, it was argued by a number of commentators that many activities 
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were not tailored towards work, but focused too much on the social rights of the 
individual, as one academic commented: ‚For the first time ever the unemployed 
person was in power<but we confused that with reality. This was a nice instrument, 
but at the end of the day there were still only a few different pathways out of this 
action plan.‛ Another academic suggested: ‚In the mid-90s we had a huge discussion 
about different priorities between the different PES [public employment service] 
offices because some of them<you could really pick what kind of education you 
would like to have and you could get it, but in other PES offices it was much more 
difficult and there was a lot of press on this.‛  
 
Over time IAPs became less individualised and were replaced by Job Plans following 
the reform More people into work  (Finansministeriet, 2002). With a dual focus on both 
the needs of the labour market and the aspirations of the individual, it could be argued 
that at one point or another, these needs may conflict and one has to take precedence 
over the other. The shift from IAPs to Job Plans may be viewed as reflective of a move 
away from a more human capital focus in Danish labour market policies. Table 5.2 
below shows the population of women in the three countries with at least upper 
secondary education. Denmark exceeds both the OECD and EU averages in all age 
groups, but both Britain and Australia lag behind, particularly for older age groups. 
 
Table 5.2: Females in population with at least upper secondary education, 2007 
 25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
Australia 64 83 67 58 45 
Denmark 74 86 82 68 60 
United Kingdom 66 75 67 62 51 
OECD average 69 80 74 64 52 
EU19 average 70 83 76 66 53 
Source: OECD, 2009a 
 
A trade union interviewee highlighted that: ‚The Danish model is that people have to 
be well educated. The government mantra is the quickest way into employment. We 
think that people should be educated so that they can have jobs and be able to move 
 164 
 
up.‛ That the Venstre government’s focus in labour market policies is on the quickest 
way into work was supported by interviews with government officials:  
 
‚The primary focus is on ‘job’ *sic+. If you can’t get a job then we’ll start looking at 
upgrading, but first and foremost a job. But of course it’s difficult if you don’t have the 
skills, then you shall have the skills first, but<If you focus on upgrading for 
everybody, you park them<if education should be a good idea, it should be very 
targeted into a concrete job.‛ 
 
Similarly, an academic interviewee suggested that: ‚You couldn’t keep sending people 
into education at the same time as there were so many job openings, so this is also part 
of the story.‛ Opportunities to undertake training have been curtailed, with greater 
emphasis being placed on guidance (Larsen and Mailand, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
following quote from a Jobcenter employee suggests that implementation may differ 
in order to achieve sustainable job outcomes: ‚Sometimes you can discuss that perhaps 
you can get a person into work with unskilled work but if you perhaps get them a 
little more education perhaps they have more long-lasting work afterwards.‛ 
 
In Denmark the requirement for benefit (both insured and uninsured) is availability 
for paid work. However, social workers and academics highlighted that the 300 hours 
rule goes beyond the normative foundations of activation in requiring recipients to not 
only be available for work, but to have accrued a certain number of hours of paid work 
in the ordinary labour market, as one social worker suggested: ‚The principle in 
labour market policies has always been that you are not obliged to have a job, but you 
are obliged to be available for a job. Only with this scheme you are not only obliged to 
be available, you are obliged to actually get a job. I think that’s a big difference.‛ 
 
Social workers argued that existing policies were already achieving some success in 
assisting partnered women from ethnic minorities into work, but that change would 
 165 
 
not be instant: ‚The tools we had before, if you used them right, if you had a really 
good offer for this woman that is a special package for her and you say ‘OK, you don’t 
have to be on the labour market full-time’ but she still says no and it is the husband 
who says no, before this law we could say they didn’t get any money. So we had the 
tools.‛ 
 
In terms of policy learning, some actors argued that there was no requirement for 
legislation such as the 300 hours rule, for example one social worker stated: ‚It was a 
problem that too many women from ethnic minorities were not in the labour market 
and that’s a problem that’s been there for a long time, but I think we already worked 
on this and by debating and qualifying this debate by real information about what’s 
working and what’s not, you could have done all this without this law.‛  
 
In this sense, the 300 hours rule is an example of what Daguerre (2007: 83) refers to as 
a ‘negative activation strategy’ in which support is withdrawn and in this way it has 
similarities with the Australian Welfare to Work changes, which most interviewees 
said represented an unnecessary toughening of obligations, compared with the 
progressive approach of Australians Working Together. As implementation of the 300 
hours rule and the local government reorganisation took place at the same time, there 
was also a conflict of priorities. The AKF evaluation (Jensen and Lauritzen, 2008: 2) of 
its implementation suggested that although local authorities were required to warn 
social assistance recipients about possible loss of benefit by 1 October 2006, many local 
authorities only came ‘up to speed’ with implementation of the rule after 1 January 
2007. The capacity for policy actors to alter a policy through delivery may suggest a 
recalibration of policies at the level of implementation, an aspect considered further in 
Chapter Seven. It was highlighted by a number of interviewees that many local 
authorities were concerned to avoid people losing their benefit. To this end, during the 
six months before potential loss of benefit, around half of local authorities surveyed by 
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AKF intensified their efforts to move those at risk of losing their cash-benefit into work 
(Jensen and Lauritzen, 2008: 5-6).204  
 
Danish activation mixes welfare and workfare requirements in a special way; 
‚adjusted to service capitalism’s structural traits, institutional and organisational 
traditions and political norms‛ (Larsen and Mailand, 2007: 111). It is a unique mix of 
both human capital and workfare elements, constituting what a number of authors 
have called ‘workfare light’ (Goul Anderson and Pedersen, 2006: 15, Daguerre, 2007: 
103). Goul Andersen and Pedersen (2007) suggest that Danish ALMPs are ‘a 
battlefield’ between the two extremes of neo-liberal workfare and Social Democratic 
activation, reflective of the paths of the pre- and post-2001 governments and the 
continuity between. Workfare has to some extent been present in Danish ALMPs since 
1990, but it has become more explicit and is now ‚a more integral part of Danish 
labour market and social policy‛ (Rosdahl and Weise, 2001: 160, 175). There was a 
consensus from the interviews that in the 1990s policy actors considered that 
activation should be more work-focused, whilst still retaining the focus on individual 
aspirations. The 1994 reforms were designed to raise the qualification levels of 
unemployed people to match labour market requirements, as well as to test their 
availability for work and motivate them to intensify job search (Kvist and Pedersen, 
2007: 104). However, since 2001 more workfarist elements have been assumed, 
exemplified by the 300 hours rule, as one academic suggested: ‚There has been 
increasing conditionality and you can look at it in isolation from the context, 
suggesting that a social security state has become a workfare state, but the 300 hours 
rule is the only clear-cut workfare element. Otherwise you have to see these changes in 
conjunction with the improved employment situation.‛ 
                                                 
204
 Through (i) job-oriented programmes and (ii) assessment programmes. The former comprised motivational 
interviews concerning working life with a focus on perceived language and cultural barriers to work and the 
latter were aimed at recipients considered to have reduced (but not permanent) capacity for work. A number 
of local authorities contracted with external partners with experience of working with immigrants to provide 
these. See Jensen, K. B. & Lauritzen, H. B. (2008) Local authority implementation of the 300 hour rule, 
Copenhagen, Anvendt Kommunal Forskning. Pages 5-6. 
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In Danish labour market policies since 2001 there has been a functional recalibration of 
the function of social security and labour market policies, in line with Peck’s (2001: 10) 
definition of workfare. This is a reflection of the new social risk of large numbers of 
people receiving out-of-work benefits for lengthy periods, as well as of perceptions of 
welfare dependency articulated by policymakers, examined in Chapter Six. This can 
be seen in the shift in the balance between the rights and duties of the individual and 
the state, with more emphasis on the duties than the rights and duties of the 
individual (Goul Andersen and Pedersen, 2007), highlighted by the shift from IAPs to 
Job Plans and the curtailing of human capital approaches in favour of work first. 
Although the 300 hours rule affects a small group of people (as do progammes relating 
to partners in Britain and Australia), examining such a programme can provide both 
policy analysis with regard to this group, as well as indications of policy change on a 
wider level. One academic posed the question: ‚Are these exceptions to the wonderful 
Danish case or whether it’s actually really a break that has bigger implications for the 
whole system?‛  
 
The previous two sections have illustrated the three cases of welfare recalibration at 
the functional level, as evidenced by changes in access to benefits for partnered 
women and by changes to the social contracts, or quid pro quo. As highlighted in 
Section 5.2, the bases of entitlement to benefit have been recalibrated in each of the 
countries to a focus on ‘worker’. In Denmark this has involved reinforcing the status of 
worker for married (immigrant) couples on social assistance. In Australia and Britain 
access to benefits for partnered women has been recalibrated from eligibility as 
wives/partners to mothers/workers. This functional recalibration of entitlement links 
to the activation policies and to the recalibration of the related social contracts. For 
partnered women in Britain since 1999 there has been increasingly asymmetrical 
conditionality which is being recalibrated through the Welfare Reform Act 2009 in 
requiring partners to claim benefit in their own right. In Australia Working Nation 
introduced a similar requirement for partners in 1994 which recalibrated access to 
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benefits on a functional level. This was followed by Australians Working Together, 
which was a further functional recalibration of policies relating to partnered women 
outside the labour market. Although this reform was generally viewed positively by 
interviewees as a way of the state encouraging partnered women into work in a way 
which fitted with their personal circumstances, Welfare to Work was clearly viewed 
by the majority of policy actors to place more emphasis on the duties of the individual 
than the duties of the state. This latter also seems to be the case for the 300 hours rule, 
which was critiqued as having gone beyond the normative foundations of Danish 
active labour market policy by requiring social assistance recipients to have accrued a 
number of hours of paid work, rather than to be available for work. In this way it was 
also seen to embody workfarist elements, reflective of the post-2001 Danish 
government’s focus on the ‘quickest way into work.’ In all three cases in relation to 
partnered women the social contract has been recalibrated to include more workfarist 
elements.  
 
The elements of functional recalibration described above reflect shifts in the focus of 
policies towards groups viewed as excluded from the labour market but who are a 
seen as potential sources of labour. The following section considers these distributive 
aspects. 
 
5.4 Targeted versus encompassing labour market policies 
 
Distributive recalibration relates to social groups. It concerns the ways in which the 
distribution of benefits (and also activation) by welfare states changes in relation to the 
new social risks articulated in the functional sub-dimension. Distributive recalibration 
relates to distinctions governing access to income support and how these translate into 
the relevant activation programmes. Studies of activation suggest that a key feature is 
the enlargement of target groups by including sick or disabled people, older people, 
highly vulnerable groups and single parents (Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007: 278). The 
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following section 5.4.1 compares categorical social security and labour market policies 
in Australia and Britain with the encompassing social security and labour market 
policies in Denmark. Section 5.4.2 considers the design and implementation of 
individualised employment assistance in both Australia and Denmark and highlights 
the shortcomings of both.  
 
5.4.1 Categorical social security and labour market policies 
 
A distinction is made here between the categorical benefit systems in Britain and 
Australia based on capacity for work (whether jobseekers capable of work, parents, 
disabled people) and the benefit system in Denmark focused on categories of insured 
and uninsured unemployed. In the British and Australian systems benefit recipients 
are divided into categories and subject to targeted policies and programmes, or 
claiming regimes. The Danish system is not based on such categories and there is one 
encompassing system of activation, tailored to moving individuals closer to work, 
based on assessment of work-readiness, with slightly differing requirements for 
insured and uninsured unemployed people. However, within this framework there 
are target groups (see Chapter Four) for intensified activation efforts to meet 
government targets.  
 
Fraser (1989) argues that the needs of those on means-tested benefits are not met on 
their own terms, but are framed within administrative categories developed by the 
welfare state. Britton (2007) defines categorising as the process by which people are 
placed ‚into collectivities or sub-populations based on any given criteria‛ (p.62); this is 
inevitable in the policy process in order to target policies most effectively (p.63). Such 
categories can be based on socio-demographic characteristics, such as class or gender, 
but other forms of categorising are a result of choice, ideology and agency (Britton, 
2007: 62). Targeting may be viewed as a consequence, or indeed a constituent part, of 
welfare states in which means-testing predominates, such as Britain and Australia. 
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One Australian former government official interviewee highlighted a disadvantage of 
categorical systems based on incapacity for work: ‚Categorisation may lead to a 
negative focus on incapacity for, and barriers to, work, as categorisation is linked to 
perceptions of self, identity and roles‛ and this was supported by a Danish local 
authority employee:  
 
‚It’s very important that the people who work in the Jobcenter here, they will not 
make the limitations, they will not be the limits, so to speak. I mean, I debated a lot 
with some of my employees. That, whilst he or she is not ready to go to this job yet 
because he has this issue or this issue, if we are saying ‘You are not able to’, then you 
will not be able to.‛ 
 
One problem with ascribed categorisation is the construction of groups as 
homogeneous, which can be problematic for a group labelled as ‘partners’ who, as we 
saw in Chapter Four, are heterogeneous and may have a number of constraints on 
working, which cross benefit categories and require individually tailored responses 
(Millar and Evans, 2006: 74). In both Australia and Britain assisting parents (mothers) 
into work is an important policy goal, but the focus has predominantly been on lone 
parents, with labour market policies relating to this group also being extended to 
partners. This focus is partly because there are more lone parents than partnered 
parents on income support,205 although this is exacerbated by partners not being able 
to claim benefit in their own right. It also relates to normative or moral aspects, 
particularly seen in British policies under the Conservatives in the 1980s and in 
Australian policies under the Howard government in the 1990s and 2000s which 
suggested that sole parent families were ‘deviant’ compared with the social norm of 
couple families. Distributive recalibration highlights the polarisation of paid work 
                                                 
205
 Although this may be partly related to couple penalties within the tax and benefits systems. See Centre for 
Social Justice (2009) Dynamic benefits: Towards welfare that works. A Policy Report from the Economic 
Dependency Working Group, London, Centre for Social Justice, Adam, S. & Brewer, M. (2010) Couple 
penalties and premiums in the UK tax and benefit system. IFS Briefing Note BN102, London, Institute for 
Fiscal Studies. 
 171 
 
amongst social groups and in particular the increase in the number of workless 
households, lone and couple households, some of whom are of an ethnic minority. 
Partners are included in activation for lone parents to achieve parity of treatment but 
also because of the policy focus in both countries on reducing workless households 
(both lone and partnered), and particularly in Britain there has been the overarching 
goal of reducing child poverty. Blaxland (2008) highlights that in relation to activity 
requirements both AWT and Welfare to Work divided parents into groups according 
to the ages of their children, with WTW distinguishing between parents with pre-
school and school-age children (p.33), a distinction also made by the British Welfare 
Reform Act.  
 
Section 5.2 argued that in Denmark partnered women are considered to be ‘workers’ 
in terms of eligibility for benefits and that this is also becoming the case in Britain and 
Australia. One Australian campaigning organisation suggested that: ‚Once Welfare to 
Work came along there was a big shift away from identifying parents as a target group 
and a shift towards putting everybody onto Newstart, as with many other OECD 
countries.‛ One issue relating to implementation is that the focus and experience of 
Job Network providers has predominantly been on unemployed people, rather than 
being able to take account of the specific needs of parents (McInnes and Taylor, 2007). 
This was highlighted by another Australian campaigning organisation:  
 
‚There has been a shift away from treating parents as a separate target group for 
assistance, which in some ways is probably desirable because there’s quite a bit of 
heterogeneity amongst parents and treating them as a single category was never all 
that sensible, but in other ways I wonder whether we’ve gone a little too far because 
they have a particular set of needs, for example if you’re caring for a child with a 
disability then the services have to be there for you.‛  
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In Australia Gregory and Klug (2003: 13) highlighted that PPp recipients and PPs 
recipients are effectively the same group, as recipients ‘churn’ between single and 
partnered payments due to relationship breakdown, re-partnering and instability of 
earnings.206 One Australian campaigning organisation suggested that: ‚Partners often 
lack secure employment and this has created a lot of marital instability, hence many 
move from PPp to PPs and back again because the relationships don’t last because the 
family lacks stable sources of income and for a host of other reasons as well.‛ Similar 
transitioning is seen in Britain (Arrowsmith, 2004: 15-6). Bradbury and Norris (2005a) 
highlight the ‘fluid’ nature of relationships amongst income support recipients, who 
are more than twice as likely to separate as non-recipients; cohabiting couples are 
more likely to separate than legally married couples (Bradbury and Norris, 2005b).207 
Australia has two tiers of income support payments, distinguishing between pensions 
and allowances208 and one campaigning organisation commented: ‚The distinction 
between pensions and allowances is unjust and discourages workforce participation 
when people transition *between payments+.‛  Similarly, a former government official 
suggested that: ‚Merging PPs and PPp would have the benefit of allowing for changes 
in relationship status‛ and a campaigning organisation that ‚we have to treat the 
person and not the payment category.‛ 
 
This highlights that there is a balance to be struck between moving away from 
categorising recipients in terms of, for example, their parental or partnered status, but 
                                                 
206
 For example, in examining inflows to PPs in 1995, the most common destination after the first period on 
PPs was to PPp (27.8 per cent). This ‗considerable churning‘ is for two reasons: firstly, re-partnering and 
moving back and forth between PPS and PPP; and secondly, the instability of earnings of both the female 
recipient and her partner. See Gregory, R. G. & Klug, E. (2003) A picture book primer: welfare dependency 
and the dynamics of female lone parent spells, Canberra, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian 
National University. See also Coventry, L. (2000) Workforce pilots. Australian Social Policy, 2000(2):123-
131 No recent published data were available. 
207
 Further, individuals may re-partner with the same person a few months later. See Bradbury, B. & Norris, 
K. (2005a) Family dynamics In Australia. Final Report of the Fluid Families Project, Sydney, NSW, Social 
Policy Research Centre. 
208
 Pensions are paid at a higher rate and have more generous income testing than allowances. For historical 
reasons (see Appendix 5), Parenting Payment Partnered is an allowance, whilst Parenting Payment Single is a 
pension. This has been a problem for lone parents transferred from PP to NSA, who have had a lower 
payment and more punitive taper rates. 
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still paying attention to particular needs which arise from this status. Just as Dean and 
Taylor-Gooby’s (1992) analysis shows that the claiming regime may reinforce the 
identity of the ‘benefit claimant,’ categorization which focuses on reasons for labour 
market incapacity may reinforce barriers to work. Categories of payments based on 
relationship status may also be unhelpful in assisting partners into work, particularly 
if their barriers to work cross categories and are intra-household.209 However, the 
constraints of categorisation may be overcome by employment services which can 
move beyond categories to effectively address constraints on working. 
 
In Denmark the right and duty to activation is applicable to both insured and 
uninsured unemployed in terms of the paradigm of ‘all must be active’ (Rosdahl and 
Weise, 2001). Within this regime, partnered women may choose to stay at home and 
not undertake paid work, but they cannot receive benefit. Some Danish interviewees 
suggested that partners were not recognised in the Danish model, for example one 
Jobcenter employee suggested: ‚We don’t talk to them about whether they’re married‛ 
and a government official stated that: ‚We don’t deal with couples, particularly for 
insured.‛ However, this was contested by a local authority employee interviewee, who 
argued that: ‚You could never deal with anybody’s case without at the very moment 
you open it to link it to the case of the husband and wife.‛210 This links to what Greve 
(2005) argues is the ‘whole family principle’ basis of the Danish welfare state in which 
‚it was not enough to look simply at the person and discuss the individual client’s 
problem. It was necessary to look at the whole family’s situation‛ (p.45). Furthermore, 
marriage is significant for the 300 hours rule. Although it was purported to cover all 
couples to avoid claims of ethnic bias, all interviewees stated that immigrant couples 
                                                 
209 Moving away from a system based on categorical benefits was one argument made in Australia in favour 
of having one single-working age benefit in both Australia and Britain. See McClure, P. (2000a) Participation 
support for a more equitable society. Final report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Canberra, 
Department of Family and Community Services, Gregg, P. (2008) Realising potential. A vision for 
personalised conditionality and support, Norwich, The Stationery Office. Sainsbury, R. & Stanley, K. (2007) 
One for all: active welfare and the single working age benefit, London, Institute for Public Policy Research. 
210
 The Personal Identification number (CPR) stores personal information stored in the Civil Registration 
System (Det Centrale Personregister) and allows cases to be tracked in relation to spouses.  
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were the primary focus, for example one social worker argued that: ‚The aim was to 
target this particular group, not to target Danish families.‛ 
  
Drawing on the principle of the right and duty to activation, one of the Danish 
government’s arguments in favour of the 300 hours rule was ‚the principle, that all 
foreigners shall be met with the same expectations and requirements as all other 
citizens in Denmark are met, and that foreigners and their families and descendants 
have the same actual options as everyone else‛ (Folketinget [Danish Parliament], 
2005). Daguerre (2007) argues that the ‘anti-immigration rhetoric’ which informs 
policies relating to immigrants is evidence of ‘welfare chauvinism’ which suggests that 
‚social programmes should benefit Danes rather than foreigners‛ (p.94). Such 
targeting led Danish academics interviewed to describe the 300 hours rule as a 
‘borderline case’, or an ‘anomaly’ in the Danish model. Serrano Pascual (2007: 305) 
rightly argues that although public spending in Denmark remains high, the approach 
depends on the target group (distributive recalibration), with immigrants being 
subject to more disciplinary measures, marking a break with the Danish universalist 
welfare tradition. 
 
In relation to distributive recalibration, British and Australian labour market policies 
have focused on partnered parents as an extension of policies targeted at lone parents. 
In both countries this focus is reflective of benefits and activation based on categories. 
However, in Australia such a shift in the inclusion of lone and partnered parents as 
target groups for employment assistance was also within the context of individualised 
employment services, which to date have been less relevant for partners in Britain. In 
Australia there is a tension evident in relation to, on the one hand, the treatment of 
partners as a discrete group which may reinforce constraints on working. On the other 
hand, treatment of partnered parents in line with other jobseekers within an 
individualised model may not take sufficient account of constraints on working linked 
to caring roles. In comparison, the Danish approach is ‘encompassing’ and based on 
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individualised assistance, although within this there has been distributive 
recalibration in relation to specific groups, such as immigrant married couples in 
receipt of social assistance. The Danish model does not take account of caring roles 
because, as Section 5.5 discusses, alternative care is provided by the state. The next 
section examines individualised employment assistance in practice in both Denmark 
and Australia. 
 
5.4.2 Individualised employment assistance 
 
Van Berkel and Valkenburg (2007) highlight the shift towards individualisation in 
activation services which, as with other personal social services, relates to the ‚need to 
cope with the heterogeneity of the groups at which activation is targeted‛ (p.11). 
Individualised services have the attraction of being efficient and effective in 
preventing people from being enrolled in programmes that they do not require (van 
Berkel and Valkenburg, 2007: 13). Individualisation is an alternative way of 
recalibrating employment policies across social groups according to distance from the 
labour market, rather than across social risk-based categories in relation to incapacity 
for work, such as disability, unemployment or caring status. However, 
‘individualisation’ is an ‘ambiguous concept’, the fundamental issue being ‘who is in 
charge?’ (Valkenburg, 2007: 37). This relates to the notion of social contracts (see 
Section 5.3) and is explored further in this section in terms of individualised 
employment services in Australia and Denmark. In Britain individualised assistance is 
envisaged by the ‘personalised conditionality’ of the Welfare Reform Act.  
 
Both Denmark and Australia define distance from the labour market by means of 
assessment tools. Serrano Pascual (2007) highlights the use of measures of 
employability to separate out employable people and to ‘diagnose’ the correct 
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activation intervention (p.296).211 In both Denmark and Australia the match 
categorisation tools precede the ‘modes of management’ (Serrano Pascual, 2007), so 
that those closer to the labour market receive less intensive services than those 
considered further away. Although a classificatory instrument is not used in Britain, 
other mechanisms are used. For example, as most JSA recipients will leave benefit 
after a relatively short period, during the initial period of unemployment job search is 
predominantly self-managed, with support increasing in line with the unemployment 
spell.212 Personal Advisers make informal assessments of key barriers to work, for 
example lone parents are directed to the New Deal for Lone Parents, even if their main 
constraint on employment is health problems.  
 
In Australia the initial interview with Centrelink involves completion of a computer 
diagnostic tool, the Jobseeker Classification instrument (JSCI), consisting of 30 
questions213 relating to age, education, disability and language skill. It is intended to 
assess the likelihood of long-term unemployment and to direct participants to the 
relevant support stream. Under the Job Services Australia contract there are four 
streams, the first being for those assessed as closest to the labour market and four for 
those furthest away (Table A4.5 in Appendix 4 sets out the interventions available to 
partnered women in the four streams). McInnes and Taylor (2007: 9) have criticised the 
JSCI for being a standardised instrument focused on the needs of unemployed people, 
rather than those of parents.  However, under the JSA contract providers have more 
flexibility than under Job Network to direct resources to individual jobseekers, 
regardless of the stream in which they are placed. JSA providers also have the 
flexibility to contract directly with providers of other support, rather than merely 
                                                 
211 These are features of the personality variant or treatment approach of the mode of managing behaviour, 
seen in Britain and to an extent in Denmark, although this analysis argues that such tools are not used 
explicitly in Britain but are seen in Australia. 
212
 Some income support recipients are classified into categories of disadvantaged groups: disabled people, 
ethnic minorities, lone parents, unemployed people aged 50 and over, the 15 per cent lowest qualified and 
those living in the most deprived local authority wards. 
213
 Reduced from 60 in 2003. The outcome of the JSCI may highlight personal factors or disabilities and 
suggest referral to a Job Capacity Assessor (JCA), or health professional. 
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offering referrals, with the aim of providing a seamless service to individuals. 
Although there is a ‘notional bank’ of funding under the Employment Pathway Fund 
(EPF) according to the stream, as in Denmark providers have the flexibility to spend 
more on an individual, if this will benefit their pathway into work.214 In Denmark 
providing cheaper activation measures for people closer to the labour market means 
that others may receive more expensive measures which may benefit their route into 
work. Both the Danish and Australian models are supported by frequent contact with 
partnered women. In Denmark this is every three months215 and in Australia under 
JSA the minimum contact is once a month, although flexibility is built into this (and 
this increases during the Work Experience Phase - see Table A4.5 in Appendix 4).  
 
In Denmark the employment potential of each individual is determined by placing 
them in different match-categories during job conversations according to their 
estimated distance from the labour market (Caswell et al., 2008: 11). These categories 
range from Match Group 1 (an ‘immediate match’ to the labour market), through 
Match Groups 2 and 3 (can be work-ready, but requires some support or intervention), 
to Match Groups 4 and 5 (‘no match at all’ to the labour market).216 Table 5.3 below 
shows the definition of each match category, along with the types of intervention used 
for both insured and uninsured unemployed. People in Match Group 5 are exempted 
from the 300 hours rule, but those in Match Group 4 are included217; participants may 
move between streams dependent upon the length of their unemployment spell.  
 
                                                 
214
 Under the new employment service delivery model from 2009, there is a notional allocation of funding for 
each activated person of DKK 18,500 (around £2,500). This notional allocation is predominantly for 
budgetary purposes; below this amount 50 per cent is refunded to local authorities by the state. 
215
 A controlled experiment consisting of a substantial intensification of labour market policies (Hurtigt i 
Gang) was carried out in two counties in Denmark in 2005-06. Although the experiment displayed positive 
effects perhaps resulting from the intensification, none of the specific treatments had a positive effect. See 
Danish Economic Council (2007) Dansk Økonomi forår 2007. Diskussionsoplæg, Copenhagen, Danish 
Economic Council. 
216
 From April 2010 there is a new system of 3 match-groups. 
217
 Exemptions relate to the match group status of the individual, not the whole couple so if only one spouse is 
in match group 4 or above, the other may still lose their benefit. The inclusion of people in Match Group 4 
into the rule was one reason for the withdrawal of the Social Democrats and some of the Social Liberals from 
negotiations over the rule, although the Social Democrats had originally supported the proposal. 
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Table 5.3: Types of Danish activation for unemployed people in the five match groups 
Match 
group 
Description Insured 
unemployed 
(per cent) 
Social 
assistance 
Recipients 
(per cent) 
 
1 Immediate match 
Skills and resources are compatible with 
job functions widely existing in the 
ordinary labour market 
Qualifications and skills within bottleneck 
areas of labour market 
72 6 
2 High degree of match 
Immediately matches labour market 
requirements to a significant extent 
Matches job functions widely existing in 
the labour market 
May be a slight lack of match, for example 
specific qualifications 
22 9 
3 Partial match 
Only partially matches existing labour 
market requirements 
Able to perform job functions existing to a 
certain extent in the ordinary labour market  
5 17 
4 Low degree of match 
Significant limitations in skills and 
resources 
Immediately unable to perform job 
functions in the ordinary labour market 
Ability to work is currently so reduced that 
job functions compatible with skills and 
resources will only be found to a limited 
extent in the ordinary labour market 
1 49 
5 No match 
Extensive limitations in skills and resources 
Does not currently have the ability to 
perform job functions in the ordinary 
labour market  
0 19 
Source: AMS  
 
The Law on Active Social Policy aims to deal with any social problems which may 
exist apart from unemployment but which may be a reason for long-term 
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unemployment (Finansministeriet, 2005: 45),  although this has to an extent been 
constrained by the work first approach of the Venstre government. One Danish 
Jobcentre interviewee suggested that: ‚We have the possibility to look at the person’s 
problems and to choose on those projects that is right for that person.‛ Social workers 
suggested: ‚We really try to help people, to make their skills better so they can 
participate in the labour market. We really have a lot of tools and possibilities to help 
them. The law is good in that context‛; ‚You must have various offers you can offer 
people because you can do this so mechanically and I don’t think it’s good.‛ 
 
In this context, social workers are employed in Jobcenters and have a key role in 
identifying and addressing wider and multiple barriers to work aside from 
unemployment, as one local authority employee stated: ‚They [social workers] have a 
social background because the unemployed people in match categories 4 and 5<have 
a number of other problems, that if you don’t take those into consideration, it’s 
difficult to make the whole plan for what do you have to do.‛ This was echoed by a 
Jobcenter employee: 
 
‚There the importance of the social worker is to find out what’s the problem and what 
can be done and if the person wants to change anything and to work within a plan and 
to find some good offers for those people. I think it’s very important that you have 
some skilled person who can differentiate between those who need some support and 
those who don’t need it.‛ 
 
Interviewees also highlighted the importance of the Danish decentralised model of 
policy delivery (see Chapter Seven), stating that local authorities: 
 
‚have the competence and the financial position to carry out tasks in the public 
sector<because they have then the possibility to do other things than just what they 
are asked to do with specific programmes. They could look into let’s say this scheme 
 180 
 
of non-working partnered women and look at ‘What problems do we face?’ In many 
local authorities these problems are concentrated into social housing, so the local 
authority being competent in whatever question concerning the citizen could be 
advised not only to look into the 300 hours concept but look into the broader 
context<the principle basis for doing the right thing is established, so it is really up to 
the particular local authority to conceive intelligent policies.‛  
 
Integration-Jobcenters run by the local authority provide a range of services to help 
immigrants into work, including assistance with housing and outreach workers to 
help them settle into Denmark and their local area. Social workers facilitate Job Clubs 
which partnered women attend and which cover topics such as the Danish labour 
market, paying tax, day-care and job applications.218 This has some similarities with 
the support provided by POEM in Britain.  
 
Australian interviewees did not agree that employment assistance under Job Network 
had been ‘individualised’ in practice as intended by the policy, as one campaigning 
organisation stated:  
 
‚It seems not able to be responsive to the particular circumstances of individuals, nor 
to the context of the labour market in which they find themselves. So, the requirement 
to undertake compulsory unpaid work experience and/or take up training and/or go 
into paid work I think needs to be mediated by the opportunities available in the 
market and also the point in the pathway to work that the person is at.‚ 
 
Another campaigning organisation commented that:  
 
                                                 
218
 The extent of services provided depends on the priorities of the local authority. The Jobcenter-Integration 
visited as part of this research provided an extensive range of services.  
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‚There has been chronic under-investment in the services and support [partners] need, 
not only education and training and other labour market programmes, but housing 
close to where jobs are and the whole suite of services, mental health services that this 
group is likely to need and the services haven’t been joined together very well.‛ 
 
This interviewee also suggested that those who are severely disadvantaged require:  
 
‚someone to really step them through all of the assistance they need, shepherd them 
through various family and other crises that are happening and gradually into the 
labour market and training and the other support they need<the mainstream system I 
don’t think is going to work with that group really at all, even the new one.‛ 
 
In contrast to Job Network, Job Services Australia is intended to be a ‘one-stop shop 
approach’ to employment services: flexible, responsive and designed to provide 
jobseekers with tailored services and support. However, one campaigning 
organisation critiqued this, suggesting: ‚Choice isn’t a big thing in Australian 
employment services. The providers serve the government, not the consumer.‛219 
 
These points are of note because although ‘personalised conditionality’ (Gregg, 2008, 
Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b) is in line with the neo-liberal notion of the 
‘consumer’ of public services, choice is relatively absent from workfarist  policies. This 
can be related to outcome-based funding, as McInnes and Taylor (2007) suggest of 
Australia: ‚Despite the rhetoric of an individualised service, there is high pressure on 
employment consultants to get outcomes, and thus payments, leaving no opportunity 
for genuine individual attention to jobseekers’ individual needs‛ (p.7). It remains to be 
                                                 
219
 Both Job Network and Job Services Australia offer a choice of provider and a customer service guarantee, 
but often clients are referred to a provider by Centrelink and do not realise they have a choice. See Finn, D. 
(2008) The British 'welfare market'. Lessons from contracting out welfare to work programmes in Australia 
and the Netherlands, York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.  
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seen how far the new Job Services Australia model will achieve such individualised 
assistance. Similarly, one Danish academic stated that:  
 
‚One of the arguments for contracting out in Denmark as well as in the UK was that 
when you contract out you have private providers with specialist skills towards 
specific target groups, so services would be more tailor-made or individualised, but 
our general finding was that this market was actually quite standardised<because of 
the tendering model and the price mechanisms and the competition in the market.‛  
 
Whilst it is outside the scope of this study to examine in-depth the contracting of 
employment services, some aspects relating to this are discussed further in Chapter 
Seven. In Britain flexible, individualised assistance has been in the form of 
Employment Zones and Flexible New Deal, however such a flexible approach has so 
far not been attempted with partnered women. 
 
This section has examined policy actors’ views of individualised employment 
assistance in Australia and Denmark as a reflection of distributive recalibration. In 
both countries assessment tools are used to categorise recipients according to their 
distance from the labour market and to determine the level and type of assistance 
deemed necessary to move them into work. In Denmark individualised activation is 
supported by the decentralisation of some levels of policy design as well as delivery to 
local authorities. This is augmented by the capacity and expertise of social workers to 
construct a package of support for partnered women. Australian interviewees 
suggested that the ability to construct such a package to sufficiently take account of 
the needs of partnered parents was absent under Job Network. In both Australia and 
Denmark there are further challenges to the implementation of individualised services 
as a result of increased contracting out and this is discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
The next section returns to functional recalibration in relation to the provision of 
childcare as a function of the welfare state. 
 183 
 
5.5 Childcare220 
 
Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003) suggest that in terms of welfare recalibration ‚Beyond 
important supply-side activation measures, of key importance has been the 
rediscovery of public social services with respect to childcare, maternity and parental 
leave arrangements‛ (p.123). This section considers childcare as an illustration of 
functional recalibration, examining in what ways this is a function of each of the 
welfare states in response to the new ‘social risk’ of the reconciliation of work and 
family. It will be argued that the provision of childcare in Denmark is a key function of 
the welfare state and is a foundation on which activation policies are overlaid. Since 
the 1970s this has also been the case in Australia, although there have been some 
contradictions in relation to ‘maternalist’ policies. In Britain childcare provision is a 
missing core foundation for activation for partnered women, reflective of stalled 
functional and normative recalibration.  Section 5.5.1 sets out a potted history of 
childcare in the three countries and Section 5.5.2 discusses childcare as a foundation 
for activation policies for partnered women. 
 
5.5.1 A brief history of childcare in Australia, Denmark and Britain 
 
Figure 5.4 shows total family spending (child payments and allowances, parental leave 
benefits and childcare support) in the three countries and Figure 5.5 shows spending 
on early childhood education and care. Australia spends the least and Denmark’s 
expenditure is more than twice that of Britain. Denmark differs from both Britain and 
Australia in not offering tax breaks to families as a method of funding their childcare.  
                                                 
220
 ‗Early childhood education and care‘ is the term used in the OECD report Starting Strong and is distinct 
from the concept of ‗childcare‘ which suggests that replacement care is instrumental, rather than pedagogical. 
However, taking into account this critique of the concept of childcare, childcare is used in this thesis to cover 
both early years care as well as school age care. See OECD (2006b) Starting Strong II: early childhood 
education and care, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , Moss, P. (2006) 
Farewell to childcare? National Institute Economic Review, 195:70-83. 
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Figure 5.4: Public expenditure on family (percentage of GDP), 2005 
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Figure 5.5: Public expenditure on childcare and early education (percentage of GDP), 2005  
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As in most countries, the impetus for establishing childcare facilities in Denmark came 
with the industrialisation process and provision began with a two-tiered, class-based 
system, emphasising care for working-class children from working families and 
education for upper-class children (Borchorst, 2002: 270).221 In 1901 state-run People’s 
                                                 
221
 The first such provision for the former was in 1828. 
 185 
 
Kindergartens were established, along with the notion of ‘social pedagogy’.222 
Economic pressures meant there were only a small number of facilities, concentrated 
in major cities and predominantly for working-class children. Universal provision was 
institutionalised in 1949, allowing state funding to be allocated to children from better-
off families too. By the mid-1950s there was a visible shift towards universalist 
provision, which was established by the 1960s.223 The importance of childcare in 
facilitating the integration of women into the labour market was stated in legislation 
(Borchorst, 2002: 274).224 Responsibility for operating costs was equally divided 
between the state, local authorities and parents and from an early stage priority for 
places was given to children of parents working outside the home (Borchorst, 2002: 
274). Part-time day-care facilities never gained ground (Borchorst, 2002: 274).225 By 
contrast, in Britain the trend for part-time nursery education was established as early 
as the 1944 Education Act (Randall, 2002: 221). Nevertheless, a critique of the Danish 
norm of full-time work and day-care is that long working hours do not sufficiently 
allow for time with family (Borchorst, 2002: 281).  
 
In relation to functional recalibration, the Danish day-care model has been 
characterised by continuity, although there have been challenges.226 At a time of high 
unemployment in the 1970s, the rules linking child care to labour market participation 
were tightened, but the child-centred legislation meant that children of unemployed 
                                                 
222
 At this time education and care were also integrated. 
223
 In 1951 local authorities were obliged to support the running of childcare facilities and in 1964 legislation 
was passed which obliged the public sector to provide childcare facilities. At this time programmes previously 
termed ‗preventive child welfare‘ (forebyggende børneforsog) were now referred to as ‗social pedagogical 
measures‘ (socialpædagogiske foranstaltninger). See Borchorst, A. (2002) Danish child care policy: 
continuity rather than radical change, in Michel, S. & Mahon, R. (Eds.) Child care policy at the crossroads. 
Gender and welfare state restructuring. New York, NY, Routledge, 267-285. 
224 This can be contrasted with the marriage bar, which was still operational in both Britain and Australia 
respectively in 1971 and 1966.  
225
 In Denmark part-time day-care is less used than full-time. In 2008 there were 211 part-time children in 
nurseries, 7,422 in kindergartens and 9,739 in age-integrated institutions (E-mail correspondence with 
Statistics Denmark, August 2009) 
226
 In 1973, economists recommended a modular system entitling children to three hours of pedagogy per day 
in which additional modules would depend on parents‘ employment. See Borchorst, A. (2002) Danish child 
care policy: continuity rather than radical change, in Michel, S. & Mahon, R. (Eds.) Child care policy at the 
crossroads. Gender and welfare state restructuring. New York, NY, Routledge, 267-285. 
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people did not lose their places (Borchorst, 2002: 276). In Denmark the state is the main 
provider of day-care and the provision of day-care is a pillar of the Danish welfare 
state model. More recent concerns relating to day-care in Denmark relate to quality of 
provision in the context of increased quantity. 
 
Between 1972 and 1976, and 1983 and 1996 Australia developed ‚a world-class 
childcare system more in keeping with the generous, public provision of social 
democracies such as Denmark, Sweden, and France than with the virtual absence of 
national support exemplified by other liberal regimes such as the United States, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom‛ (Brennan, 2002: 98). In this sense, Australia has 
more in common with the Danish than the British model. As one campaigning 
organisation commented: ‚It’s pretty good compared to the UK, compared to the 
Anglophone countries and it’s because the Whitlam government in the 70s invested in 
funding for childcare services, so the structures were there to be built upon.‛ The 
Whitlam government’s model (National Childcare Program)227 was based on non-
profit community-based services, but in 1990 the Hawke Labor government began 
directing funding towards families using private, for-profit rather than non-profit care. 
The shift to a marketised model intensified under the Howard government (from 
1996)228; although this was intended to reduce financial pressure on government 
expenditure, it did the opposite (Brennan, 2002: 104). Although between 1992 and 2006 
the policies of both Labor and Coalition governments led to large increases in the 
number of government-supported childcare places, unmet demand also grew (Craig et 
al., 2009: 12). There are still accessibility issues, particularly for parents in rural areas. 
In Australia such issues have been exacerbated by the corporatisation of childcare 
                                                 
227
 The Whitlam Labor government built on the 1972 Childcare Act introduced by the previous McMahon 
Liberal-Country Party coalition government. See Brennan, D. (2002) Australia: child care and state-centred 
feminism in a liberal welfare regime, in Michel, S. & Mahon, R. (Eds.) Child care policy at the crossroads. 
London, Routledge, 95-112. 
228
 In the first budget following the election of the Liberal/National Coalition under Howard, the government 
removed non-profit operational subsidies and withdrew funding for over 5,000 planned places in community 
childcare centres. See Craig, L., Mullan, K. & Blaxland, M. (2009) Australian work and family policy: 1992-
2006. SPRC Report 3/09, review prepared for Trends in Time: Work, Family and Social Policy in Australia 
1992-2006. Australian Research Council Linkage Project LP088202424., Sydney, SPRC. 
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(Brennan, 2007a).229 In Britain and Australia the market is the main provider of 
childcare and state provision is ostensibly based on the notion of neo-liberal ‘choice’230 
through subsidies. However, there are signs that the Australian childcare landscape 
may be changing in curtailing the capacity of private providers to become dominant 
and in encouraging non-profit providers (Senate, 2009: 105). 
 
It was not until 1998 that Britain had a national childcare strategy. Although childcare 
provision had expanded dramatically during the Second World War, the war 
nurseries were rapidly wound down under the direction of the Ministry of Labour 
(Randall, 2002: 221). In response to the growing number of women in paid work in the 
1960s, private day nurseries, childminders and play groups expanded rapidly 
(Randall, 2002: 222). Under the Conservatives231 in 1972 plans were set out to expand 
nursery education for three and four year olds by 1982. However, the plans were 
curtailed in 1974 under Labour’s public expenditure cuts. Randall  (2002: 222-3) 
describes public provision in the 1970s as ‚meagre in the extreme‛ although in the 
1980s there were a series of initiatives for under-fives and during this time private 
provision expanded considerably. In 1993 the Major Conservative government 
announced plans for universal provision and following this a nursery education 
voucher scheme and a disregard for low-income families receiving income 
supplements were introduced. Although the voucher scheme was largely viewed as 
unsuccessful, both of these formed the basis for the expansion of provision and 
subsidies under the Labour government following the publication of its Ten Year 
                                                 
229 The listing of childcare providers on the stock exchange began in the 2000s and the extent of 
corporatisation was highlighted by the collapse of ABC Learning Centers (holding 20 per cent of the market) 
in 2008, although the balance may be shifting. See Senate (2009) Provision of childcare. Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations References Committee. November 2009, Canberra, Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
230
 It must be noted that market-based replacement care has implications for other areas of the labour market, 
such as use of migrant labour and use of feminised labour. This is highlighted by a number of authors - see for 
example Lister, R., Williams, F., Anttonen, A., Bussemaker, J., Gerhard, U., Heinen, J., Johansson, S., Leira, 
A., Siim, B., Tobio, C. & Gavanas, A. (2007) Gendering citizenship in Western Europe. New challenges for 
citizenship research in a cross-national context, Bristol, Policy Press. 
231
 The Minister of Education was Margaret Thatcher. See Randall, V. (2002) Child care in Britain, or, how 
do you restructure nothing?, in Michel, S. & Mahon, R. (Eds.) Child care policy at the crossroads: gender 
and welfare state restructuring. New York, NY, Routledge, 219-238. Page 222. 
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Childcare Strategy in 1998 (Department for Education and Employment, 1998), which 
aimed to provide good quality, affordable childcare to all children aged 0-14.232 
 
5.5.2 Childcare as a foundation for activation policies 
 
Day-care was particularly important to the Danish case, but also to the Australian one. 
As a social worker commented: ‚If in Britain you want to really change the society in 
the direction of having more women joining the labour market from low income 
groups and from a history of non-working families then you will have to look at the 
day-care aspect of it.‛ As highlighted in Section 5.2, in Denmark caring for children at 
home does not constitute incapacity for work when receiving benefit and this is a key 
difference between Denmark and the other two countries. Full-time labour market 
participation for partnered women is possible because of the institutional foundation 
of day-care, which provides a basis for labour market policies,  highlighted by a 
Jobcentre employee: ‚If you want to draw unemployment benefit, you have to make 
sure that your child is taken care of<It’s not directly you know<you give me proof, 
but it’s just if you want to have a job, if you want to have unemployment benefit, then 
you must be able to start the job tomorrow morning at 9.‛ 
 
In Denmark local authorities provide the majority of funding for day-care and parents 
pay the remainder (based on household income); those on a low income pay nothing, 
or very little.233 There are reductions for families on a low income, for siblings and for 
families with special needs and there is an additional aided place subsidy for families 
on a low income. Similar subsidies are provided for after-school clubs, according to 
                                                 
232
 The Home Office consultation paper Supporting Families (1998) was the first time any British government 
had published such a paper on the family. See Millar, J. & Ridge, T. (2002) Parents, children, families and 
New Labour: developing family policy?, in Powell, M. (Ed.) Evaluating New Labour's welfare reforms. 
Bristol, Policy Press, 85-106. Page 85. 
233
 The subsidies are paid directly to the day-care provider. The maximum was reduced from 33 per cent to 25 
per cent in 2005, at the same time as Family Allowance was increased for children aged under three, but was 
increased to 30 per cent in autumn 2009 to cover the costs of providing every child in day-care with a 
nutritious meal.  
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family income. All children have the right to childcare regardless of their parents’ 
labour market attachment (Finansministeriet, 2005: 41) and there is a day-care 
guarantee from when a child is 26 weeks (six months) old234 (Finansministeriet, 2007: 
51). However, local authorities may decide their own guidelines for provision at the 
local level, for example prioritisation of certain groups and the combination of full-
time and part-time places.235  
 
In Denmark there are play groups as in Britain, but most are for ages 0-1, as the 
expectation is that all children are in day-care beyond this age. In this sense, as 
discussed further in Chapter Six, for partnered women in Britain and Denmark the 
respective models constrain the capacity to work and care, but in different ways. As 
one government official suggested: ‚Parents do not want to keep their children out of 
day-care because that would mean that their children didn’t have anybody else to play 
with because nobody else is at home.‛ This was echoed by an academic: ‚In most 
public housing estates in Denmark it would be very odd being at home during the 
day, but that may not be the case in Britain.‛ Furthermore, a social worker suggested 
that: ‚In Britain you still have that implicit idea that children staying at home until 
school age is preferable. It’s better. It’s not the only thing to do, but it is something 
which society should treasure<whereas in Denmark that’s your private decision if 
you don’t want to work.‛ Day-care as a social norm in Denmark is also self-reinforcing 
in that parents want their children to benefit from day-care. Day-care also plays a role 
in relation to the integration of immigrants, as a social worker highlighted: ‚We 
actually see the day-care system in terms of integrating not only ethnic minorities but 
                                                 
234
 This has been in place since 1995. Since 2005 all children aged eight months have been guaranteed a day-
care place in a public setting within the local authority and since 2006 this has been extended to children aged 
six months. There are penalties for local authorities who cannot provide day-care to meet the guarantee. 
Parents must generally apply for day-care places three months in advance of requiring the place and if a day-
care place cannot be provided, in some local authorities it is possible to claim an allowance to care for 
children at home. When children are aged around 10-12 months parents start to enrol them in either centre-
based provision - Vuggestuer (crèches), Bornehaver (kindergartens), Aldersintegrerede Institutioner (age-
integrated centres), or Communal DagplejeI (family day-care). Family day-care has similarities with the 
childminder model in Britain.  
235
 These priorities must be made public. 
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also for people who are from a long history of non-working families. We see the day-
care system as something which can help these families change the pattern.‛ 
Nevertheless, one Danish academic did pose the question as to: ‚When is the norm 
supportive and when is it force to presume that you should be on the labour market? 
It’s about whether it’s force or empowerment.‛ 
 
Authors such as Borchost (2002) have critiqued the Danish model for not providing 
sufficient choice: ‚Childcare services have served to commodify women rather than 
the opposite‛(p.269). In the Danish model there is no cash or alternative to day-care 
provision, as in Finland.236 However, none of the Danish interviewees challenged the 
view that women with young children should work, for example on academic 
suggested: ‚Denmark has had record high activity rates for mothers with small 
children...0-2 has been the record for many many years. For many years the culture 
has been ‘Go out to the labour market.’‛ Furthermore, a government official stated: 
‚The debate about whether women should work was over and done with in the 1970s. 
The focus is now on work-life balance.‛  
 
In contrast to Britain, although the day-care offer in Denmark is linked to the policy 
goal of increasing labour market participation (see Millar and Ridge, 2002: 102) the 
pedagogical focus237 comes first, as a government official explained: 
 
‚Part of the purpose of the *Day-care] Act is that actually it does have the labour 
market perspective, but it’s only a smaller part<.Day-care is also very much viewed 
                                                 
236
 In Finland since the mid-1980s child home care allowance (HCA) has been available as an alternative to 
municipal day care. HCA is a means-tested allowance (by family size and income) if one parent stays at home 
to care for a child aged below three. Hakim et al have argued for a Parental Care Allowance for the UK. See 
Hakim, C., Bradley, K., Price, E. & Mitchell, L. (2009) Little Britons: financing childcare choice, London, 
Policy Exchange. 
237
 Pedagogy is a complex concept, but can be summarised as expressing ―the ideals of upbringing and 
development with a view to living a good life as an individual and as part of a community‖ - Juul Jensen, J. 
(2005) Pedagogy as an integrative concept: the Danish model of early education and care, in Daycare Trust 
(Ed.) Learning with other countries: International models of early education and care. London, Daycare 
Trust, 26-29. Page 26. 
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as an instrument in helping all children have the same possibilities in life. And that’s 
why it’s common for parents who are unemployed to also have their children in day-
care. And that’s also partly why it does have a lot of public funding.‛ 
 
They further argued that: 
 
‚A good thing about having the pedagogical focus coming first is that it makes the 
parent feel more comfortable about going to work when their children are still very 
young. If your child had to attend a day-care facility that was mainly just for ‘storage’ 
while the parent is working, it wouldn’t be very attractive.‛ 
 
By contrast, an Australian employment service professional commented that: ‚Women 
may want to work, but have concerns about putting their children into childcare.‛ This 
underscores the importance of not merely the availability of replacement care, but also 
quality, accessibility and acceptability for families who wish to use it. Furthermore, in 
Australia there have been a number of policies which have encouraged partnered 
women to remain at home with their children, such as the Baby Bonus (which 
rewarded women who withdrew from the labour market after the birth of their child) 
and Family Tax Benefit Part B, which provides tax incentives to single-earner families. 
Such maternalist policies, particularly under the Howard government, may be one 
reason why despite having a foundation of childcare and a range of subsidies, 
enrolment in childcare in Australia is lower than in Britain. Figure 5.6 shows 
enrolment in childcare for 0-2 and 3-5 year olds in the three countries.238 Denmark has 
the highest enrolment, but Britain has a similar proportion of 3-5 year olds enrolled, 
primarily as a result of the early Years Entitlement (discussed below).  
                                                 
238 Compulsory school age is seven in Denmark, six in Australia and five in Britain. Figure A2.19 in 
Appendix 2 shows take-up of out-of-school hours care in Australia and Denmark. 
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Figure 5.6: Enrolment rates of children aged below 6 in formal care or early education services, 
2006 
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In Australia there are subsidies for childcare, occasional care, outside school hours 
care and vacation care in the form of two main types of provision: Childcare Benefit 
(CCB)239 and Childcare Rebate (CCR)240 along with the Jobs, Education and Training 
Childcare Fee Assistance (JETCCFA).241 There are two points to be made about these 
subsidies in relation to the British and Danish cases. Firstly, both subsidies are subject 
to a work, study or training test. All eligible families can receive up to 24 hours of CCB 
per child per week, but to receive up to 50 hours both partners need to be working, 
training or studying for at least 15 hours per week (30 hours per fortnight), or have an 
exemption.242 Eligibility for CCR is based on a similar work, study or training test as 
for CCB and covers up to 50 per cent of out-of-pocket childcare expenses, to a 
                                                 
239
 Introduced in 2000 as part of the New Tax System. Childcare Benefit is the foundation subsidy, with the 
level determined by household income and the number of children cared for.  
240 Formerly Childcare Cash Rebate and Childcare Tax Rebate. To be eligible for CCR families have to be 
assessed for CCB, but not necessarily receive it.  
241 See Chapter Four. 
242
 The greatest gains from CCB are for low-income families, but CCR benefits high-income families the 
most. See Brennan, D. (2007a) The ABC of child care politics. Australian Journal of Social Issues, 
42(2):213-225. In its first budget in 2008-09, the Labor Government increased the CCR from 30 per cent to 
50 per cent of out-of-pocket childcare costs, which was viewed by some interviewees as regressive, benefiting 
higher earners. 
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maximum. Secondly, subsidies are paid for both approved and registered care.243 
Approved services include long day-care, family day-care, outside school hours care, 
vacation care and some occasional and in-home care.244 Registered care is work-related 
childcare provided by carers registered with the Family Assistance Office and includes 
grandparents or other relatives, friends or nannies.245 However, one critique of these 
subsidies is that they familise other family members who may not wish to provide care 
on a formal basis. A further issue is the cost of childcare for working parents who do 
not receive the maximum rate. For parents on certain payments (including NSA and 
PP) undertaking activities such as job search, work, study or rehabilitation as part of 
an Employment Pathway Plan, JETCCFA provides extra help with the cost of 
approved childcare by paying most of the ‘gap fee’ not covered by CCB or CCR. 
Nevertheless, some academics interviewed suggested that the gap fee was not 
sufficiently covered. One campaigning organisation stated that ‚The JET CCFA is also 
essential because unless you reduce the childcare cost to practically zero it’s a very big 
stumbling block.‛ 
 
Table 5.7 sets out the subsidies available to partnered women in Britain in respect of 
childcare, according to the proposed conditionality following the Welfare Reform Act 
and divided into universal support available to all, whether in or out of work and 
subsidies for those in work or on NDP.  
 
                                                 
243
 The Childcare Payments Bill 1997 introduced a legislative basis for subsidies for use of approved and 
registered childcare, which included childcare provided by family members. Prior to this, Childcare 
Assistance had only been paid to approved long day-care centres. 
244
 To be approved, the service has to meet the regulations of the state government and the service has to 
participate in a Commonwealth accreditation process. 
245
 It can also include care provided by individuals in private pre-schools and kindergartens as well as some 
outside school hours care and occasional care. Grandparents tend to be the most-used care. 
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Table 5.7: Childcare subsidies available to partnered women in Britain 
Age of 
child 
Conditionality 
for partners post-
Welfare Reform Act 
Universal Partners on 
NDP or in 
work: 
Jobcentre 
Plus subsidy 
Childcare 
Tax Credits 
Child Tax 
Credits 
Employer 
vouchers 
C
h
ild
 B
en
efit 
 E
arly
 y
ears ed
u
catio
n
 
S
u
re S
ta
rt C
h
ild
ren
’s 
C
en
tres 
E
x
ten
d
ed
 sch
o
o
ls 
< 1 Progression to Work: 
no conditionality 
     
1-2 Progression to Work: 
attend periodic WFIPs 
and agree action plan 
 Some 
two 
year 
olds 
   
3-6 Progression to Work: 
full conditionality, of 
WFIs, action plans, 
work-related activity, 
adviser direction 
 Ages 
3 & 4 
To 
school 
age 
From 
age 5 
 
7+246 JSA - full 
conditionality 
     
 
 
Universal support comprises the Early Years Entitlement of 12.5/15 hours of free early 
years education with a 'registered provider' such as a school, nursery or playgroup for 
38 weeks a year.247 Following the publication of the Ten Year Childcare Strategy 
(Department for Education and Employment, 1998) all four year olds have been 
entitled to a free place in early education, from April 2004 extended to all three year 
olds for 33 weeks a year and from April 2006 extended to 38 weeks of the year. Take-
up of the entitlement has increased since its introduction and in January 2009, 92 per 
cent of the three year old population and 98 per cent of the four year old population 
                                                 
246
 This may be reduced to five under the Coalition government plans. 
247 From April 2007 twenty pathfinder local authorities have been delivering an extended entitlement of 15 
hours per week, rolled out nationwide by September 2010.  
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made use of the Early Years Entitlement (Department for Childre, Schools and Familis, 
2009). Although take-up is low for the poorest families (Harker, 2006: 33) this is a 
cultural change in the use of provision outside the family. The Labour government 
extended this entitlement to the most disadvantaged two-year olds.248 Sure Start Local 
Programmes were targeted specifically at disadvantaged families and became 
Children’s Centres providing universal provision in 2003.249 The Full Service Extended 
Schools (FSES)250 includes 8am to 6pm wrap-around, chargeable (for some parents) 
childcare, such as before and after school clubs for 48 weeks of the year, as well as 
access to other services.251 Child Tax Credit is paid regardless of labour market 
participation but, as with some elements of the Australian subsidies, the childcare 
element of Working Tax Credit is linked to participation in paid work, as are Jobcentre 
Plus childcare subsidies (see Appendix 3). The childcare element of WTC is usually 
only paid to those working at least 16 hours a week and covers up to 80 per cent of 
childcare costs, to a maximum weekly limit.252 Francesconi et al (2009) argue that this 
may not encourage low-earning couples into employment because both partners have 
to work 16 hours to claim the credit (p.F68). However, this could be argued to be in 
line with policies which aim to incentivise both partners to move into work, rather 
                                                 
248
 From September 2009 15 per cent of the most disadvantaged two-year-olds have been offered 10 or 15 
hours of free, high-quality childcare a week, equating to 20,000 places by 2011 and providing family support, 
parenting classes and wider support, effective partnership-working and outreach activity to engage families in 
using childcare. HM Government (2009a) Next steps for early learning and childcare. Building on the 10-
Year Strategy, London, The Stationery Office.  
249 Sure Start Local Programmes (SSLP) began in 1998, bringing together early education, childcare, health 
and family support services for parents-to-be, parents and children, adapted to local needs. Following Every 
Child Matters (2004), Sure Start provision moved from Local Programmes to Sure Start Children‘s Centres. 
Jobcentre Plus has also been piloting the approach of placing Advisers in Children‘s Centres to promote its 
services Marangozov, R. & Stevens, H. (2010) Work-focused services in children’s centres pilot. Interim 
report. Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 677, Norwich, Stationery Office. 
250 Compulsory school age is five. 
251 To be established by 2010. Services will be based on the requirements of the local community and 
delivered in partnership. Support includes study support, parenting support, health care, adult learning and 
community activities and builds on provision introduced in 2001. See Cummings, C., Dyson, A., Papps, I., 
Pearson, D., Raffo, C., Tiplady, L. & Todd, L. (2006) Evaluation of the Full Service Extended Schools 
initiative, second year. Thematic papers. Research Report no. 795, Manchester, University of Manchester. 
252
 Childcare Tax Credits may be claimed when only one partner is working if the other partner is receiving 
disability benefits. 
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than providing economic encouragement for one to remain at home.253 Employer-
provided childcare vouchers provide tax relief for those in work (where schemes are in 
operation) and take-up is across a range of occupations and ethnicities, but 
predominantly by middle income earners (although disproportionately by manual 
and unskilled workers) and by lone parents rather than couples (Konings, 2010).  
 
Randall (2000) argues that one of the reasons that childcare policy is not more 
developed in Britain has been the liberal reluctance to intervene in the private sphere, 
together with ‘traditional’ assumptions about mothering. However, she also argues 
that it was not so much that governments promoted such maternalist assumptions, as 
it did not interfere with them (p.185). Bacchi (1999) suggests that ‚governments are 
‘intervening’ all the time, even when they are not ‘acting’ in the traditional sense‛; one 
example of this is not providing publicly funded childcare (p.3). Nevertheless, in 
Britain the extension of the Early Years Entitlement to the most disadvantaged two-
year olds marks an important policy shift in terms of functional (as well as normative) 
recalibration), as previous policy developments (and public funding) have 
concentrated on early years education, rather than early years care.  
 
The previous two sections have considered childcare as a reflection of functional 
distribution, which may also be seen as a function of the welfare state in response to 
changing social risks, such as the reconciliation of work and care. The Danish case is a 
reversal of the situation in Britain where, as Chapter Four demonstrated, it is difficult 
for many partnered women to combine work and care, despite the promotion of 
labour market participation through activation policies for this group. In Denmark 
partnered women are commodified through activation and day-care policies and it is a 
social norm that they work full-time and take up day-care provided by the state. In 
Britain being in work when children are below school age is viewed as an individual 
                                                 
253
 There is also a Childcare Charges Disregard for recipients of Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit and 
Working Tax Credit (WTC) working over 16 hours a week and on a low income. This disregard built on that 
introduced by the Conservatives from 1994 for those in receipt of Family Credit. 
 197 
 
‘choice’, as the state does not provide comprehensive support for children aged below 
three, but instead a variety of piecemeal subsidies for what is viewed as a private 
issue. However, since 1998 there has been a significant shift in the provision of 
universal nursery education for three- and four-year-olds and the high take-up 
suggests that this is becoming a social norm. In Australia subsidies are available for a 
wider range of care than in Britain, such as family-provided care, but there has been a 
tension with more maternalist policies which encourage partnered mothers to care for 
their children themselves. Furthermore, receipt of many subsidies in both Britain and 
Australia is linked with labour market participation and as will be discussed further in 
Chapter Seven, such instrumentality is problematic. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has examined the findings from this study in relation to functional and 
distributive recalibration. Access to benefits has been considered as illustrative of the 
functional recalibration of social security for partnered women, with a focus on their 
status as workers, rather than wives/partners, or mothers. Active labour market 
policies for this group are reflections of a functional shift from welfare to workfare and 
this was demonstrated by the social contracts (quid pro quo) in each of the countries. 
Functional recalibration was also examined in terms of the role of the state in the 
provision of childcare. Distributive recalibration has compared social security and 
labour market policies in the three countries in relation to targeted and encompassing 
approaches to partnered women as a social group and within this context, 
individualised activation has been explored. 
 
Consideration of these two sub-dimensions suggests that the three countries are on 
similar policy reform paths in relation to encouraging the labour market participation 
of partnered women, however each is at a different stage, with Britain lagging behind 
the other two in relation to partial individualisation of benefits, individualised 
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employment assistance and childcare. As a Danish academic commented: ‚All the 
other OECD countries are moving in the same direction, towards a work first 
approach, but it’s not the same to say that we are converging in any way because the 
starting point for this was very different.‛ In all three countries there has been a shift 
towards work first approaches. In Denmark this is exemplified by the 300 hours rule, 
although it is unclear whether this represents a more serious challenge to the Danish 
universal model. In Australia, Australians Working Together signaled a ‘step’ towards 
workfare for some partnered parents, but this became a ‘leap’ under the Welfare to 
Work reforms (Blaxland, 2008: 197), although the Labor government has introduced 
some more human capital-related elements to the overarching workfarist approach. 
The dominant British approach is work first, but partners have to an extent been 
excluded from workfare before the Welfare Reform Act 2009. The cases of Denmark 
and Australia suggest caution with regard to extending a workfarist approach to 
partners, particularly without childcare provision. The other side of encouraging 
partnered women’s labour market participation is the ‘farewell to maternalism’ 
(Orloff, 2006), which requires that care is transferred elsewhere.  
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Chapter Six - Normative representations of the policy ‘problem’ 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The focus of this chapter is normative recalibration, which is concerned with the 
values, norms and discourses which inform the policies relevant to partnered women 
in the three countries. ‚Normative recalibration...denotes symbolic initiatives and new 
discourses addressing the functional and distributive dilemmas of the status quo and 
the future directions of policy‛ (Schmidt, 2000 cited in Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 
92). Page (2007) suggests that ‚if it becomes broadly accepted that welfare reform 
should be determined solely by the weight of ‘scientific’ evidence there is a danger 
that the broader ideological and political rationales for such policies will be 
overlooked‛ (p.155). These rationales are important for consideration of the possibility 
of policy learning. An advantage of lesson-drawing is to enable researchers and 
policymakers to examine a policy problem in a different context, or to make the 
familiar strange (MacClancey 2002, cited in Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007) by examining a 
policy issue in a different context. This chapter builds on Chapter Four’s discussion of 
the policy ‘problem’ evidenced in each of the countries by elaborating further how 
partnered women’s worklessness is problematised, or socially constructed across the 
countries, as suggested by the elite interview data. Bacchi (1999) argues that ‚any 
policy proposal necessarily contains a diagnosis of the problem to be addressed‛ 
(p.199) by the policy community. This informs the policy responses and is an 
important aspect of gaining an in-depth understanding of the contexts of the countries 
as a basis for ‘hard’ policy learning.254  
 
                                                 
254
 For example, Lewis demonstrates how differently the problems associated with lone motherhood are 
conceptualised in different countries - Lewis, J. (1999) The 'problem' of lone motherhood in comparative 
perspective, in Clasen, J. (Ed.) Comparative social policy: concepts, theories and methods. Oxford, 
Blackwell, 181-199. 
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The shift from welfare to workfare states (see Chapter Five) is reflected in normative 
debates that are ‚no longer exclusively concentrated on issues of distributive justice 
and income maintenance, but increasingly...on work-related values and 
aspirations...the division of labour between men and women in and outside the 
family‛ (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 92). It is argued in this thesis that the four sub-
dimensions of recalibration are inter-dependent, but normative recalibration 
underpins the other three. The re-balancing of social security, labour market policies 
and childcare which we saw in the previous chapter as illustrations of functional and 
distributive recalibration is underpinned by conceptualisations of citizenship, social 
exclusion, integration and dependency. These aspects are considered in this chapter 
using Williams’ (1995) framework of ‘work,’ ‘nation’ and ‘family’. 
 
6.2 Work, nation and family  
 
Multi-layered welfare settlements emerged ‚from the state’s relationship to the 
specific and interrelated organisation, conditions, current and historic social relations 
of power, discursive practice, and forms of mobilisation associated with family, nation, 
and work‛ (Williams, 1995: 148). These three interrelated dynamics are a way of 
incorporating and illustrating the gendered and racial/ethnic social relations suggested 
by the interview data into this comparative study of partnered women. As Clarke 
(2004) argues, welfare states embody assumptions about work and care, as well as 
about national membership in relation to ‚who lies outside the nation‛ (p.48). Section 
6.3 concerns ‘Work’ and discusses the normative justifications for the policies 
examined in the three countries, firstly using Serrano Pascual’s (2007) 
conceptualisations of economic rationality and incentives. Secondly, Serrano Pascual’s 
hegemonic regulatory assumptions relating to the meaning of work and citizenship 
are considered as normative underpinnings of the programmes relating to partnered 
women. Section 6.4 discusses ‘Nation and ‘culture,’ including culture as a reflection of 
the normative recalibration of nation states in response to increasing ethnic diversity, 
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particularly in Denmark. It also considers how ‘culture’ is used in a negative way in 
policymaking in relation to ‘welfare dependency’ and argues for its positive usage to 
describe the ‘welfare cultures’ (Pfau-Effinger, 2005) of welfare states. As Williams 
(1995) rightly highlights, each dimension of work, family and nation includes 
processes (and conceptualisations) of inclusion and exclusion (p.149), particularly 
exclusion from the labour market and these are explicitly discussed in Section 6.4 in 
relation to ‘nation’. Section 6.5 considers ‘Family,’ specifically the tensions for 
partnered women in reconciling the demands of paid and unpaid labour (Williams, 
1995: 149), heightened by the promotion of the adult worker model (Lewis, 2003) and 
the universal breadwinner model (Fraser, 1989) in policymaking. Section 6.6 
summarises the chapter. In focusing on normative recalibration it is argued that 
welfare recalibration as a progressive dynamic of renovation and re-casting to achieve a 
better ‘fit’ with prevailing societal challenges (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 121-2) may 
wrongly assume that all families and households have equally recalibrated.  
 
6.3 Work 
 
For Serrano Pascual, two factors distinguish activation regimes: governance structures 
and institutional setting, and hegemonic regulatory assumptions (Serrano Pascual, 
2007).255 Hegemonic regulatory assumptions have four aspects: (i) the meaning of 
work, (ii) the meaning of citizenship, (iii) who or what is considered to be responsible 
for the jobless situation of the individual and (iv) the duties of jobseekers and the 
duties of the state in terms of a social contract (quid pro quo). The three types of social 
contract (quid pro quo) in relation to activation were considered in Chapter Five as a 
reflection of the functional shift from welfare to workfare. However, these social 
contracts are informed by aspects of normative recalibration considered here. Who is 
deemed to be ‘responsible’ for the unemployment of the individual shapes the policy 
                                                 
255
 As stated in Chapter Two, this analysis does not consider governance structures and institutional setting, 
but instead uses politico-institutional recalibration in Chapter Seven in relation to policy learning. 
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responses and this can be seen in the dichotomies of active/passive, as well as other 
policy drivers associated with activation, such as ‘making work pay’. These in turn 
reflect conceptions of dependency versus work as a social norm and to social inclusion 
(and in particular in Britain the reduction of child poverty) in relation to wider 
conceptualisations of citizenship, including the adult worker model. These all ‚act as 
cultural frames that not only influence policy design, but also serve as a regulatory 
justification/foundation for these policies‛ (Serrano Pascual, 2007: 278).  
 
Serrano Pascual’s (2007) five types of activation regimes (discussed in Section 2.4, 
Chapter Two) are based on two aspects: (i) the modes of managing individuals and (ii) 
a new social contract (quid pro quo). Within the modes of managing there are two 
extremes of: (i) the moral-therapeutic management of behaviour and (ii) adaptive 
skills management. The first (moral-therapeutic) aspect has two dimensions. Firstly, an 
understanding of the ‘problem’ of unemployment as a consequence of rational 
calculations based on cost/benefit analyses (homo economicus) and, secondly, an 
understanding of unemployment as a personality failing. These have some similarities 
with the work of Mead (see for example Mead, 1986: 76-88, see also Roche, 1992: 129-
134). The first holds that the individual does not wish to work, or that it is not 
worthwhile to do so (for example, because the gains from working are little compared 
to the stability of being on benefit), whilst the latter assumes that the individual is not 
able to work without assistance. Serrano Pascual argues that the first scenario sees the 
question as a moral issue, whilst the second treats the problem as a therapeutic issue 
(p.296) and these conceptualisations inform the policy responses. The buoyant labour 
markets which have been features of the three countries have seemingly given rise to 
the perception that people are not in work through their own choice, as a result of 
economic rationality or personality failings. 
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6.3.1 Homo economicus 
 
The programmes examined in the three countries all include some aspect of ‘making 
work pay’ as a policy goal. Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003: 102) include wage subsidies 
as a supplement for low-incomes in functional recalibration. This aspect does have 
functional elements, for example in Britain the increasing importance of in-work 
benefits as a policy lever is a recalibration of the function of social security from 
providing wage replacement to supplementing low-paid work (see Millar, 2009: 247, 
Bennett and Millar, 2005). However, in line with Serrano Pascual, this analysis 
considers ‘making work pay’ policies as normatively driven in that they contain a 
diagnosis of the ‘problem’ of unemployment as a consequence of the economic 
rationality of individuals, which produces the policy response of enforcing work or job 
search as a moral obligation. Furthermore, this discourse conceals low-waged labour 
as a structural problem. Albrekt Larsen (2002) suggests that post-1994 activation in 
Denmark placed demands on unemployed people in order to counteract the low 
economic incentives of generous unemployment benefits (p.717). Some Danish 
commentators argue that since 2001 there has been ‘a new orthodoxy of economic 
ideas’ emphasising incentives (Goul Andersen and Pedersen, 2007: 14-5). Although 
there are no in-work benefits in Denmark, some measures have been introduced to 
make work pay, such as the introduction of the transferable tax allowance for couples 
in 2002, so that one spouse could earn more before the social assistance of the other 
spouse was reduced.256 Daguerre (2007: 98-9) argues that underlying the Danish 
government’s emphasis on making work pay is not the idea that people in low-paid 
jobs should earn more money, but that by reducing high benefit levels recipients can 
                                                 
256
 In Britain the Conservative party in the Coalition government plans to introduce a transferable tax 
allowance to incentivise marriage. Prior to the introduction of independent taxation in 1990, the Conservative 
government proposed to allow husbands and wives to transfer their personal tax allowance to their spouse. As 
a result of a number of serious objections instead all persons were taxed as individuals, but an extra tax 
allowance was provided in the form of the married couple‘s allowance (MCA), withdrawn by Labour in 2000 
for all couples except those already aged 65 and over. See House of Commons Library (2009) Tax, marriage 
& transferable allowances. Standard Note: SN/BT/4392, London, House of Commons.  
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be encouraged to take up work. One Danish academic suggested: ‚There are these 
incentives based on ideological understandings of what the issue is.‛ 
 
The threat of removal of benefit as a basis for a programme assumes that individuals 
have no other significant barriers to employment than economic disincentives or lack 
of motivation to work, or at least downplays these supply-side issues, as well as 
demand-side ones such as the availability of (suitable) work. This emphasises the link 
between the framing of the policy problem and the policy response, as interviewees 
highlighted of the 300 hours rule, for example a government official stated:  
 
‚This programme does not only provide for the housewife to get a job, it also gives 
economic encouragement for the husband to find a job<So, now before if they had 
two times social assistance, it was very difficult for that husband to go out and find a 
job that could match the twice social assistance. Now that they only have one social 
assistance, he also has a very good economic encouragement to go out and find a 
job<So, it’s a programme that enhances the availability of the other partner but also 
gives economic encouragement to get closer *to the labour market+‛  
 
Another government official suggested that: 
 
‚When you see that if you don’t want to accept the job the municipality gives you, 
they will take your money from you, so therefore I want to find a job myself. When 
you make these demands you see that many people can find a job themselves‛  
 
This is, to some extent, supported by the SFI evaluation (Bach and Larsen, 2008), 
although the sustainability of jobs is not known. However, social workers countered 
the notion of the success of the rule, arguing that: ‚For those who have the incentive to 
find a job, that’s very positive, but I do believe we would have been able to reach that 
target by other means. And what about those other women who don’t?‛ Furthermore, 
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as another social worker emphasised, there is still a group of partnered women who 
do not respond to such economic incentives, partially because they are not currently 
able to move into the labour market, for example as a result of ill health: ‚Match group 
4 people are people who at the moment are not able to work. So, we’re saying that at 
the moment you’re not able to work, but afterwards we punish them financially for 
not working.‛ This view was supported by the trade unions, for example:  
 
‚We don’t believe in this punishment approach. We don’t believe so much in 
economic incentives. We think instead of punishing people you should help them to 
escape unemployment. If they’re immigrants, you should give them some language 
courses. Maybe they have some other problems, such as health problems. And also tell 
them that when you receive benefit you should not just lie home on your couch and 
watch TV; you need to apply for jobs all the time and keep courses and if you don’t do 
this, we think it’s ok if you lose money in some ways. There are some applications we 
do agree on. But we don’t agree about this punishment because these people cannot 
get a job because of other problems. Maybe employers discriminate. It’s not their own 
fault‛  
 
The pastoral role of Danish social workers was viewed by some policy actors, 
including social workers themselves, as being manifested in a ‘soft’ approach towards 
partnered women not in work. The government argued that the 300 hours rule arose 
out of a desire to activate a group of people who had been allowed to become inactive 
under the previous policy by introducing a more ‘objective’ element in the form of 
number of hours worked, as government officials highlighted: ‚There was some kind 
of feeling that it was still very hard to get these women to be actually really available. I 
think there was a feeling in the municipalities that they didn’t really try, they didn’t 
encourage them to go out and they didn’t ask them to go out and actually take some 
projects‛; ‚Many social workers are not used to focusing on the labour market; they 
are used to dealing with the person: ‘We have to take care of them and don’t demand 
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too many things from people’<It’s better for these people to get a job. It’s no help to 
leave them.‛ However, social workers countered the argument that they have been too 
‘soft’: ‚You’re not seeing the citizens. You have no idea<If you meet someone, you 
can say ‘There’s nothing wrong with him, he can go out’ and you meet him and say ‘I 
wouldn’t send him out’. It’s easy to state these things when you are so far away.‛ The 
interviews with social workers also underscored their support for the right and duty 
to activation, also discussed in Chapter Five:  
 
‚You can see that the consequence during the 80s that people weren’t activated, there 
were people who had received social assistance for 10, 15 years and we started to see 
that when you start activating people early then people don’t get accustomed to being 
a client and they don’t lose their hopes to get back to work. I think it’s important for 
people not to be passive‛  
 
Other interviewees further emphasised that the 300 hours legislation did not allow for 
being ‘soft’, as one academic suggested: ‚When the reform was first implemented, 
some municipalities introduced it in a softer way, but the Ministry emphasised the 
need to implement it according to the law.‛  
 
In Australia increasing incentives to work was a key driver for the Working Nation 
package, as well as changing eligibility for previously dependent partners 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1994), based on analysis suggesting that joint 
entitlement and the joint income test disincentivised second earners (interview with 
former government official). As with the 300 hours rule in Denmark, Welfare to Work 
involved the threat of removal of benefit for parents who did not comply with paid 
work or job search requirements. For lone parents it involved transfer to a lower rate 
of benefit by moving them from a pension (PPs) to an allowance (NSA), but partnered 
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mothers were already receiving an allowance (PPp).257 Working Credits also aim to 
make work more attractive to income support recipients by allowing them to keep 
more of their payment whilst working (see Appendix 4).  
 
There is an irony in the suggestion that the 300 hours rule provided an economic 
incentive to work in order to help people to avoid poverty, given that one outcome 
was that cash-benefit recipients and their families were likely to be in poverty (see 
Bach and Larsen, 2008): ‚It’s so drastic what is happening to these people and that’s 
our main concern. It’s just not possible for a family to live on what’s left without living 
in poverty‛ (social worker).  
 
As the evaluation evidence suggests, the 300 hours rule has resulted in some economic 
and social marginalisation and is likely to continue to do so. The 300 hour rule was 
‚seen as controversial from the start, as it was widely considered to break with 
previous practice in the benefits area‛ (Jensen and Lauritzen, 2008: 1). The rule was 
seen by many Danish interviewees as signifying a recalibration of the Danish welfare 
state, particularly in response to immigration. It was also viewed by many as breaking 
fundamental principles of the universal Danish model, as academics and social 
workers highlighted: ‚It’s making work pay at its most controversial because you are 
actually taking away their social assistance. You kind of de facto accept that people are 
living at below subsistence level. That’s not something we normally do in this welfare 
state‛; ‚In Denmark labour market marginalisation has not been tantamount to social 
marginalisation‛ (academic); ‚This benefit is the last line of defence here. There’s no 
security net catching you afterwards. In that way it broke a fundamental principle in 
Danish labour market policy.‛ Social workers interviewed were amongst the most 
vociferous critics of the rule, for example:  
 
                                                 
257
 Although, as has already been noted, PP recipients have a fluid relationship status and may transition 
between being partnered and sole parents. 
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‚We hate the law. I don’t think you’ll find many social workers who think this is a just 
law. I think it’s discriminating and it makes people very poor and when people are 
poor their health gets worse, they don’t have money to send their children out with 
the other children with whatever the school organises. They are marginalised and you 
make them so different from the rest of society. Especially the children‛  
 
Similarly, in Australia there is evidence to suggest that the Welfare to Work reforms 
have resulted in increased poverty as well as increased stress, which again calls into 
question the policy goal (Martin et al., 2008, McInnes and Taylor, 2007). In Britain, the 
ideas of David Ellwood (Adviser to President Clinton) were influential to New 
Labour, particularly in the area of making work pay (Driver and Martell, 2006: 98).258 
Policy initiatives such as Tax Credits259, the National Minimum Wage,260 the Ten Pence 
Tax Rate261 and In-Work Credit (IWC)262 aimed to increase the economic gains from 
low-paid work compared to being on benefit (the latter was specifically at parents). 
Australia does not have in-work benefits as such, but income support part payments 
(as well as Family Tax Benefit - see section 6.5) provide a similar function to British in-
work benefits, although they are based on income, not on hours worked as in 
Britain.263 It could be argued that tax credits are viewed in policymaking as being more 
                                                 
258
 Additionally, the European employment policy guidelines for 2002 (Council of the EU 2002) echo a 2000 
OECD policy paper which stressed the need to reform tax and benefits systems in order to avoid 
unemployment and poverty traps and ‗to make work pay‘. See Lewis, J. & Giullari, S. (2005) The adult 
worker model family, gender equality and care: the search for new policy principles and the possibilities and 
problems of a capabilities approach. Economy and Society, 34(1):76-104. Page 4. 
259 The first in-work benefits were introduced in 1973 (as Family Income Supplement). New Labour 
transformed Family Credit (introduced in 1986) into Working Families Tax Credit in 1999 (renamed Working 
Tax Credit in 2003) and also introduced Child Tax Credit.  
260 Introduced in November 1997. As of 1 October 2008 the NMW was £5.73 per hour for workers aged 22 
years and older, with a ‗development rate‘ of £4.77 per hour for workers aged 18-21 and £3.53 per hour for all 
workers under the age of 18, who are no longer of compulsory school age. Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003: 105) 
argue that two-thirds of the employees who have benefited the most from the introduction of the National 
Minimum Wage (NMW) are women who work part-time.  
261
 The Ten Pence Tax Rate was introduced in 1990 and designed to benefit low earners. The abolition of this 
rate in 2008 was accompanied by a small increase in the tax-free personal allowance.  
262
 A payment of £40 per week (£60 in London) for couple parents (either the main claimant or partner) 
during their first year in work if they had previously been receiving benefit for at least a year.  
263
 These limitations were introduced by the Conservative government. However, this also needs to recognise 
demand-side issues such as precarious employment. The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Iain 
Duncan Smith) has proposed a Universal Credit to replace existing benefits, which would have a taper rate 
based on earnings, rather than hours worked. 
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respectable given their explicit link to paid work and paying tax, as one Australian 
academic commented: ‚The part payments make the transitions smoother compared 
to the UK system. In the UK it’s about tax allowances being more respectable and 
working being more respectable‛ (see also Millar, 2009: 238, Bennett and Millar, 
2005).264 Although part income support payments with earnings may be viewed 
negatively, in Australia increasing the numbers of recipients of part payments is a 
defined policy goal in reducing the extent of ‘welfare dependency’ (Department for 
Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010). Landt and Pech (2000) argue 
that since the 1980s in Australia ‚increasing numbers of people have come to rely on 
income support to supplement their earnings‛ (p.48). This, they argue, reflects both 
the increased participation in employment of people on income support and a 
reduction in the availability of secure full-time work, particularly for men. This relates 
to a functional recalibration of the role of benefits as a supplement to (rather than a 
replacement for) paid work and undermines the dichotomy of active/passive. Further, 
the binary of ‘working’ and ‘jobless’ (or active/passive) was challenged by evidence, as 
we saw in Chapters Four and Five in relation to AWT and the extent of existing social 
and economic activities (Alexander et al., 2005, Social Research Centre, 2005a, 
Blaxland, 2008). In Australia there is a federal minimum wage, the value of which was 
eroded under the Howard government (Masterman-Smith and Pocock, 2008: 53-4), but 
increased by the Labor government. There are also agreed wage rates for different 
industries, occupations, employers and job types which are set out in awards and 
agreements. In Denmark wages, working conditions and welfare are agreed through 
collective bargaining amongst the social partners (see Chapter Seven).  
 
                                                 
264
 Introduction of a US-style earned Income Tax Credit has been considered in Australia. See Leigh, A. & 
Wilkins, R. (2009) Working Credits: a low-cost alternative to Earned Income Tax Credits? Melbourne 
Institute Working Paper Series. Working Paper No. 7/09. Melbourne, Vic, Melbourne Institute. Kalb 
conducted a micro-simulation of EITC which predicted that sole parents would benefit the most but that 
partnered women would not benefit as second earners. See Kalb, G. (2006) Evaluation of policy options to 
encourage welfare to work. The Australian Economic Review, 39(3):273-92. 
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Goodin and Schmidtz (1998) argue that ‚The language of incentives suggests that the 
poor do not work because they have coldly, calculatedly determined that it is not 
worth their while working‛ (p.179).265 Policymakers may also wrongly over-emphasise 
economic rationality in relation to the labour supply of partnered women. Duncan et 
al (2003) refer to this as a ‘rationality mistake’ (p.310) in which policymaking conflates 
the individualisation model, which describes the preferences and values of 
individuals, with the new household economics, which describes how these are 
operationalised according to a gendered division of labour (p.323). Duncan et al argue 
that this may not reflect the reality of family life although, as Chapter Four illustrates, 
for partnered women in Britain the new household economics does have some 
relevance to their labour supply decisions across the household. Duncan et al suggest 
that Hakim’s preference theory266 (2000) is predicated on the individual and therefore 
ignores the importance of social ties and ‘socially negotiated moral responsibilities,’ 
which includes negotiation with partners (p.325). Further, Hakim’s preference groups 
are static, which also does not reflect the reality of family life for partnered women, 
who may have periods in and out of paid work throughout their lives, as well as 
transition between being lone and partnered parents. As Chapter Four demonstrated, 
partnered women sometimes moved into work as a result of changes in circumstances, 
such as children starting school or adjustment to caring responsibilities. Duncan and 
Edwards’ (Duncan and Edwards, 1999, Duncan et al., 2003) concept of ‘gendered 
moral rationalities’ accounts for the diversity of decision-making in relation to 
employment and caring amongst both lone and partnered mothers;267 such moral 
rationalities may lead mothers to prioritise caring over paid work (Duncan and 
Edwards, 1999). As we saw in Chapter Four, this prioritisation was a result of both 
structural as well as normative constraints.  
                                                 
265 Goodin (drawing on Steiner, 1974-5 and 1994) refers to a ‗throffer‘: a combination of a threat and an offer. 
See Goodin, R. E. & Schmidtz, D. (1998) Social welfare and individual responsibility, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press..  
266 Hakim argued that women in Britain and the US can be divided into three groups according to their 
preferences for work-life patterns: home-centred women, adaptive and work-centred women. 
267
 They use the term ‗moral‘ in the sense of ‗the right thing to do‘. 
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6.3.2 Hegemonic regulatory assumptions 
 
Serrano Pascual’s (2007) concept of hegemonic regulatory assumptions relates to the 
prevailing understanding of unemployment in policies: whether as an individual or 
societal failing (p.294-8). Further, her notion of personality failings as a cause of 
unemployment is closely linked with the rationale of economic incentives discussed in 
the previous section. The former problematises partnered women’s worklessness as a 
result of individual attitudes and a lack of willingness to work. In Britain there has 
been a focus on workless households and on economic inactivity, 268  emphasising the 
worklessness of the individual, with the focus on the person being ‘inactive’ or passive 
rather than unemployed or without work. However, some British studies have 
highlighted that economically inactive groups such as sick or disabled people are 
actually hidden unemployed, or discouraged workers (see for example Beatty et al., 
2010). One Danish trade union officer suggested:  
 
‚There are two things. Firstly, whether you believe in incentives or not and, secondly, 
whether you believe unemployment is an individual or a structural problem. If it’s a 
structural problem of course you can find individual aspects about it too, but the main 
thing is that there is a lack of demand on the labour market. Of course you should 
solve structural challenges with structural solutions, but the individual solution is that 
you punish people‛  
 
There has been a shift in Denmark from viewing unemployment as a structural 
problem to seeing it as an individual failing. Until the late 1980s, unemployment was 
considered to be a product of insufficient demand, with Keynesian policy responses 
adopted (Goul Andersen and Pedersen, 2007: 5). However, from the late 1980s 
                                                 
268
 Economically inactive people are those ―who are out of work, but who do not satisfy all of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) criteria for unemployment because they are either not seeking work 
or are unavailable to start work‖ - National Statistics (2005) What is economic inactivity? 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/data/guides/LabourMarket/concepts/inactivity.asp [Last accessed 30 April 
2008]. 
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onwards policy debates focused on the problem of structural unemployment, with an 
accompanying shift in activation to focus on supply-side policies, such as a mismatch 
between minimum wages and qualifications, insufficient work incentives and 
inflexible labour markets (Goul Andersen and Pedersen, 2007: 5). Albrekt Larsen 
(2002)269 critiques the focus on the ‘problem’ of structural unemployment caused by a 
mismatch of workers to jobs, suggesting that instead it was caused by low labour 
market demand The individualisation of social problems diverts attention from 
structural factors. What can be observed in Australia and to a lesser extent in Denmark 
and Britain in relation to partners are not policy responses based on structural 
problems in the labour market itself, but as Serrano Pascual (2007) argues, supply-side 
responses which seek to ‘blame’ the individual for their workless situation. A Danish 
academic suggested that: ‚Denmark is shifting from a more structural understanding 
of unemployment to unemployment as an individual failing...you punish people 
because they can’t get work. They must be doing something wrong, because they are 
lazy or will not take up the work they are offered<This is affiliated with this 
movement towards a more prominent work first approach, for example how the 
media handle the unemployment problems. It’s very obvious that this has changed.‛  
 
Hegemonic regulatory assumptions also reflect how policy conceptualises individual 
partnered women: as competent and responsible (active), or as dependent and passive 
(Serrano Pascual, 2007: 278). In both Britain and Australia there has been an emphasis 
in political rhetoric on the concept of ‘welfare dependency’. However, welfare 
dependency has not historically been an overt policy driver for Danish labour market 
policy, apart from for young unemployed people (Torfing, 1999: 22). This is contested 
by Daguerre (2007), who argues that the overall rationale of the post-2001 reforms is to 
reduce welfare dependency by increasing the number of people in the labour market. 
                                                 
269
 Albrekt Larsen further critiques the attribution of the Danish employment ‗miracle‘ to this paradigm and to 
activation. Instead, he argues that the Danish miracle is more likely to have been a result of favourable macro-
economic conditions and other public policies. See Albrekt Larsen, C. (2002) Policy paradigms and cross-
national (mis)learning from the Danish employment miracle. Journal of European Social Policy, 9(5):715-
735. 
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Danish activation has the twin aim of both policing moral hazard in a system of 
generous benefits and promoting an inclusive society (Kvist et al., 2008: 223). This 
study suggests that, although the latter has perhaps historically been the overriding 
goal, in more recent years the former has taken on more precedence and this is clear 
from the case of immigrant married women. In Denmark as in Britain such women 
outside the labour market are conceptualised as a ‘problem’ in terms of the risk of 
long-term benefit receipt in relation to increased poverty, as one government official 
highlighted:  
 
‚The Government’s argument<is if you want to help them on a long-term process, it 
makes them more poor staying on social assistance. If you want to get them out of 
poverty, you have to help them get into the labour market. That’s how you and your 
children will on the long-term be better off. So, we need to use some economic 
encouragements to help them get out of poverty because it’s not a long-term solution 
that they stay for years and years on social assistance‛  
 
That benefit dependency as a personality failing is again linked with economic 
incentives to work highlights that Serrano Pascual’s (2007) modes of managing 
individuals are not mutually exclusive, but may be combined. In relation to benefit 
dependency, one Danish government official commented that: ‚We’re talking about 
the weakest group and of course you find Danes there too and many of them don’t 
want to work, particularly if they come from a family where their parents aren’t used 
to working, that’s the kind of lifestyle.‛ However, other interviewees suggested: ‚I 
would say it’s a very few people who really if you asked them deep down, who 
doesn’t want to work‛ (municipality); ‚Of course there are lazy people, but that’s not 
the majority‛ (social worker). In Australia the notion of dependency was an important 
policy driver, as one employment service professional commented about Welfare to 
Work: ‚The policy is based on the idea that people are lying and cheating the system 
and need to be caught out.‛ Further, a campaigning organisation suggested of the 
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government department implementing the reforms (DEWR) that: ‚Their brief was to 
cut down the numbers on income support at a fairly low cost.‛  
 
Borghi and Van Berkel (2007) highlight that within the activation paradigm there has 
been a redefinition of social issues as a lack of (predominantly labour market or 
economic) participation rather than a lack of income, as well as an emphasis on 
individual responsibilities and obligations in preventing or solving social problems 
The notion of paid work as a ‘social norm’ is important in considering policy 
responses to partnered women outside the labour market in all three countries. When 
AWT was introduced in Australia, the Minister stated: ‚The introduction of a part-
time participation requirement will encourage and help parents prepare to return to 
work as children grow older, the usual situation for most parents with school-aged 
children‛ (House of Representatives, 2005: 2310). In Australia and Britain the majority 
of women with children return to work when their children are of school age, whereas 
in Denmark women tend to return to work earlier in their child’s life. A Danish 
academic suggested:  
 
‚I think that it’s very important to understand that going to work is a cultural 
expectation. There might be recessions, so there won’t be jobs, but then you get your 
benefits, but the rule of thumb is that everybody goes to work, everybody all the time 
and choosing to stay at home would be a very logical thing during your child’s first 
year but then you go back to work‛ 
 
Whiteford (2009: 62) suggests that as Australia’s high level of joblessness can be 
attributed to mothers not working until their children are teenagers it is important to 
change expectations about participation in employment. As we saw in Chapter Five, to 
an extent the labour market absence of partnered mothers has historically been 
reinforced by access to Parenting Payment based on the principle of care until children 
were aged 16. Policies are based on cultural foundations concerning what is ‘normal’ 
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in relation to waged work and the labour market (Pfau-Effinger, 2005: 8). The 
functional aspect of the provision of childcare is normatively informed in terms of 
what is provided and who provides it. Furthermore, the length of maternity, paternity 
and parental shared leave270 and the age at which children attend childcare and school 
are underpinned by normative assumptions concerning women’s roles as wives, 
mothers, carers or workers. Such ‘norms’ are articulated in the construction of policies 
by policymaking elites.  
 
Dependency is an ideological term (Fraser, 1997: 123). As Goodin (see Goodin and 
Schmidtz, 1998) argues, the construction of dependency has a moral dimension, 
implicitly or explicitly suggesting that some forms of dependency (such as upon the 
family or the labour market) are preferable to other forms (such as dependency on the 
state). Goodin (2001: 198-9) suggests that ‘moral panic’ (see Cohen, 1980) is responsible 
for the focus in both the US and Australia on ‘welfare dependency’ and ‘dole 
bludgers’.271 Although the interim McClure report in Australia ‚provided striking 
evidence that the problem of welfare dependency did not actually exist<in due course 
the McClure Committee reported back with a set of recommendations designed to 
mitigate the worst effects of welfare dependency‛ (Bessant et al., 2006: 111). The ‘work 
first’ approach of Welfare to Work was partly a result of the rhetoric around the 
‘dependency’ of sole mothers (McInnes and Taylor, 2007), constructing them as a 
group who were ‘deviant and work-shy’ (McInnes, 2006: 2). Chapter Five discussed 
how activation policies aimed at non-working partnered women have been an 
extension of those targeted at lone parents. However, Dean and Taylor-Gooby (1992) 
rightly argue that ‚Dependency, whether it be upon the market, the family or the state, 
                                                 
270 In Denmark maternity leave (barselsorlov) is 18 weeks at 100 per cent of earnings up to a ceiling; 
paternity leave is two weeks at 100 per cent of earnings and parental leave comprises 32 weeks (per family), 
until the child is aged 48 weeks. In Britain paid maternity leave is 52 weeks with Statutory Maternity Pay paid 
for 39 weeks at a flat rate and paternity leave is two weeks, also paid at a flat rate. In Australia Paid Parental 
Leave will be introduced from 2011, offering 18 weeks paid at the Federal Minimum Wage, although the 
introduction of paternity leave has been postponed.  
271
 Goodin also critiques the term ‗self-reliance‘ - Goodin, R. E. & Schmidtz, D. (1998) Social welfare and 
individual responsibility, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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is the universal condition of all social beings‛ (p.150). Women’s unpaid labour in the 
form of care or working in the home facilitates men’s independence as workers 
(Pateman, 1989). Breadwinner-based welfare states such as Britain and Australia were 
founded upon such dependency. However, dependency is presented as problematic 
by policymakers in both of these countries in the context of workless households and 
in Denmark in relation to immigration. Such a focus on dependency in moral terms is 
qualitatively different from arguments which highlight the disadvantages of women 
being outside the labour market, as one Australian campaigning organisation 
commented: ‚We were worried about women being outside the labour force for so 
long that it would be difficult to break back in and the problems of entrenched child 
poverty and long-term reliance on income support.‛  
 
Borchost and Siim (1987) argue that it is crucial to focus on such variations in 
dependency: ‚There is a huge difference between being dependent as a client on social 
welfare, with public assistance as one’s only source of income, and being dependent as 
a consumer of a public service offered as a universal benefit. The latter, of course, 
enhances access to market income and actually reduces one’s dependency as a client.‛ 
In Denmark dependence on the state is more acceptable in terms of use of services, 
particularly childcare, as a social worker highlighted: ‚There is a different relationship 
with the state in Denmark and also a different conception of welfare as being a 
positive thing.‛ This is reflective of Danish universalism, where state, rather than 
family, provision is expected (Millar, 1999: 34). This was supported by other 
interviewees: ‚Day-care is very closely related to the whole concept of the Danish 
welfare state; that it is very normal that for aspects of life that the state provides a lot 
of services‛ (government official); ‚For people from other countries it’s more common 
that they take care of sick persons; in Denmark we go to the community and we ask 
for help because we pay you high taxes. I think that’s an important difference between 
England and Scandinavia‛ (local authority). This is in contrast to the negative 
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connotations of ‘welfare’ in Britain and Australia, where welfare does not tend to refer 
to ‘well-being,’ but emphasises reliance on income support.  
 
The common thread of recalibration in Europe is the normative emphasis on gainful 
employment as the principal channel for achieving effective citizenship (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck, 2003: 123). The implication of this ‘employment-anchored social policy’ 
(O'Connor, 2005) is that participation in activities which are unpaid (such as caring for 
dependents) is of inferior value.272 This was seen in Chapter Five in the recalibration of 
partnered women’s access to benefits as wives/partners and mothers to workers, as 
well as in relation to the curtailment of caring activities as a legitimate reason for 
incapacity for work within social security and activation policies. Implicit in such an 
ideology are value judgements regarding the nature and extent of women’s labour 
market participation. Ideology may be implicit in social assumptions as well as explicit 
ideological conceptions in informing the character of social welfare (Clarke, 2004: 48). 
Furthermore, countries’ policies regarding labour market participation, as well as 
caring, reflect different conceptualisations of citizenship. Marshall (1963) ascribed 
social rights of citizenship to the 20th Century, following on from civil rights in the 18th 
Century and political rights in the 19th. However, this was predominantly in relation to 
men’s rather than women’s rights, given women in Britain, for example, did not 
achieve political rights until the 20th Century (Roche, 2010: 97). Roche (1992) has 
argued for a progressive approach to citizenship which accounts for both economic 
and social dimensions and moves beyond the individual requirements exhibited by 
the social contracts of activation (see Chapter Five). 
 
                                                 
272 The economic value of unwaged care work in Britain adults has been calculated at £87 billion in terms of 
the cost of replacement care, which can be considered to be a saving to the Exchequer. Buckner, L. & 
Yeandle, S. (2007) Valuing carers – calculating the value of unpaid care. London, CarersUK. In Australia the 
cost is estimated at $30.5 billion Carers Australia (2009) Carers and workforce participation, Deakin, ACT, 
Carers Australia.  
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In the Australian context, Saunders et al  (2003: 6) have defined economic and social 
participation as follows: (i) economic participation includes paid work, self-
employment, job search and study or training and (ii) social participation includes 
voluntary work, childcare and adult care (p.6)273 A number of authors (Giullari and 
Lewis, 2005, Land, 2002, Finch and Groves, 1983) have argued that unpaid care has 
both active and passive elements, which further undermines the construction in social 
security and activation of caring responsibilities as ‘passive’ and distinct from ‘active’ 
paid work (see Sinfield, 1997 for a critique of this binary). The tendency in workfarist 
policies to define care work as passive also helps to justify the low value attached to it 
(Giullari and Lewis, 2005: 15). This is not to undermine the importance of economic 
participation for many partnered women, but the two types of participation are 
perhaps better characterised as a spectrum than as a dichotomy. Millar (1994: 89) 
suggests that the dichotomy of dependence/independence also makes little sense 
when paid work does not guarantee adequate income and must be supplemented by 
in-work benefits. 
 
This section on ‘Work’ links closely with Section 6.5 in relation to ‘Family’ as the policy 
‘problem’ of partnered women in all three countries is conceptualised as a lack of 
access to paid work, although partnered women are likely to be working in the home 
and caring for adults, children or both. This section has specifically considered two 
normative underpinnings of policy change relating to partnered women, based on 
Serrano Pascual’s (2007) hegemonic regulatory assumptions of economic incentives 
and personality failings. Economic incentives were explicitly cited as a driver for the 
300 hours rule in Denmark, however ‘making work pay’ as a policy goal was also 
apparent in Australia and Britain. The notion of dependency has been an important 
foundation for activation policies relating to sole parents in Australia and by extension 
                                                 
273
 While parents of young children may participate in toddler groups, Saunders et al make the distinction that 
other forms of caring may not involve interaction outside the home. See Saunders, P., Brown, J. & Eardley, T. 
(2003) Patterns of economic and social participation among FaCS customers, Canberra, Department of 
Family and Community Services.. 
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to partnered women. Although in Britain partners of main benefit claimants could not 
so easily be considered ‘welfare dependent’ if they were not claiming benefit in their 
own right, as we saw in Chapter Five, dependency has been important in relation to 
the functional recalibration of partnered women’s access to benefits from dependants 
to claimants in their own right. Although dependency has not been an overt feature of 
Danish activation policy, it has been used as a justification for the 300 hours rule, 
although a major critique of the programme is that it increases women’s familial 
dependency. This is discussed further in Section 6.5, where the privileging of 
economic participation is also considered in more detail. Serrano Pascual’s (2007: 297) 
notion of personality failings highlights that policies relating to partnered women may 
consider attitudinal factors to be a cause of unemployment. In terms of normative 
recalibration, this can be related to the normative shift from considering caring or 
working in the home as a legitimate constraint on employment, elaborated further in 
consideration of ‘Nation’ and ‘culture’. 
 
6.4 Nation and ‘culture’ 
 
Williams (1995) suggests that a new welfare settlement or order may be characterised 
by ‚particular configurations of power relations and discourses shaped by family, 
nation, and work‛ (p.155). Similarly, Clarke (2004) argues that ‚Nations have to be 
remade in the face of shifting conditions, borders, populations and problems‛ (p.41). 
Welfare state policies are based on specific notions of ‘social integration’: cultural ideas 
about ‘social inclusion’ and ‘social exclusion’ and the nature of citizenship (Pfau-
Effinger, 2005: 8). Kvist and Pedersen (2007: 100) argue that one way of legitimising 
Danish activation is that employment is seen as being the best way to avoid social 
exclusion. This relates to the idea of ‘an inclusive society’ with respect to every person 
being able to realise their potential as active citizens. Daguerre (2007) argues that 
‚social inclusion remains at the heart of activation‛ in Denmark (p.100) and, as 
government officials stated, a defined policy goal of the 300 hours rule was to: ‚help 
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people integrate into Danish society by going out on the workforce‛. However, social 
workers challenged this, arguing: 
 
‚It does the opposite of integration. It sounds like we want to do something for 
integration on the one hand and it’s for everybody this law, but it’s the families that 
are not from Denmark that are affected. It symbolises the understanding of the word 
‘integration’ in Denmark on a political level<Integration is something with culture 
and people getting together but integration on the labour market and if you are not on 
the labour market, you cannot be integrated. That’s the big headline‛  
 
‚When people receive social assistance they are obliged to participate in activation 
projects<Once the 300 hours rule hits you and you no longer receive social assistance 
you are no longer obliged to participate. The local authority can offer you to 
participate but you are not obliged to say yes<So in a funny way if this law was 
meant to put them closer to the labour market or what we feel is better integrated into 
society<it goes the other way‛ 
 
In Britain one of Labour’s policy agendas was social exclusion, including the 
establishment of the Social Exclusion Unit.274 Similarly, in Australia under the Rudd 
Labor government there was a focus on social inclusion, including the establishment 
of a Social Inclusion Board.275 The Rudd Government adopted a new definition for 
jobless families: those with dependent children aged between 0 and 16 and no 
recorded earnings in the past 12 months; individuals in such households are likely to 
be claiming full rather than part benefit payments.276 The Danish case demonstrates 
                                                 
274
 Now the cross-departmental Social Exclusion Taskforce focusing on the combination of aspects such as 
unemployment, discrimination, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime and family breakdown. 
275
 See Hayes, A., Gray, M. & Edwards, B. (2009) Social inclusion: origins, concepts and key themes, Barton, 
ACT, Commonwealth of Australia. 
276
 In 2000 the McClure Report acknowledged the link between low participation rates and relative 
deprivation and social exclusion. See McClure, P. (2000b) Participation support for a more equitable society. 
Interim report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform, Canberra, Department of Family and Community 
Services. 
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that there is also an ethnic element to a political agenda of social inclusion or social 
exclusion, which in the British case is not as overt. Clarke (2004) argues that New 
Labour’s multiculturalism can be said to be based around ‘tolerance’ and ‚attempts by 
the centre left to reinvent ‘solidarity’ around national/ethnic homogeneity‛ (p.68). 
Rather than a policy such as the 300 hours rule, in Britain there have been a number of 
activation programmes specifically targeted at ethnic minority groups and in 
particular in relation to partners (POEM). In Australia a distinction can be made in 
labour market policies between those referred to as culturally and linguistically 
different (CALD) groups and indigenous groups (including Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples). The CALD group in particular did not overtly feature in the 
interviews with policy actors and that this was the case is of interest. Indigenous 
Peoples have featured more explicitly in government policies, including income 
support and employment policies. In Australia the Community Development 
Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme (operational since 1977) has been viewed as ‚the 
most significant labour market program targeted at Indigenous Australians‛ (Altman 
and Gray, 2005: 4). Interviewees were reluctant to engage in discussion of issues 
relating to the employment of Indigenous Peoples, apart from to highlight the 2007 
Northern Territory National Emergency Response (known as the NT intervention) 
which introduced a clear racial element to income support payments. Amongst a 
number of measures was income management (quarantining) of payments to ensure 
children’s needs were met.277 The low employment rates for Indigenous Peoples have 
historically been, and continue to be, a politically sensitive area. However, aspects 
relating to Indigenous Peoples are beyond the scope of this study (see Section 4.2.3).278  
 
                                                 
277 See 
http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/indigenous/progserv/ntresponse/about_response/overview/Pages/about_nter.asp
x [Accessed 6 October 2009] 
278
 Interviewees voiced concern that such issues be considered in an in-depth and discrete way and this was 
not possible within the scope of the research. Documents relating to Indigenous employment were sourced but 
these did not discuss women, or partnered women. 
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Examining the 300 hours rule in Denmark and POEM in Britain demonstrates the 
different approaches to the engagement of partnered women from ethnic minorities 
within active labour market policies. Clarke (2004) argues that ‚What the ‘cultural 
turn’ makes visible is the way in which welfare is about the nation and the people as 
much as it is about ‘work’‛ (p.47). Nation is articulated with race, ethnicity and culture 
(Williams, 1995: 146). From the Danish case the notion of ‘culture’ or ‘social norms’ 
was important to the representation of the ‘problem’ of partnered women outside the 
labour market. Although this was also the case in Britain, this was to a lesser extent. A 
number of Danish interviewees referred to a distinction between the dominant Danish 
cultural model of the dual breadwinner, supported by day-care, from which some 
immigrant families were seen to diverge, as an academic highlighted:  
 
‚We do have both a financial support system and the day-care institutions so that it’s 
actually possible for a mother to work practically full-time and this has been so for 
quite a long time. So, if you choose not to do it, it’s alternative to the culture, to the 
general opinion and idea of how family life should be led‛ 
 
It was suggested in the parliamentary proposal for the 300 hours legislation, as well as 
by some of the interviewees, that women in immigrant and ethnic minority couples 
often do not work outside the home and are also less likely to use formal day-care 
outside the family, as one academic suggested: ‚There are cultures in which having a 
spouse at home is much more natural or expected than it is in the majority Danish or 
Scandinavian culture.‛ The Danish interviews support Daguerre’s (2007: 9) suggestion 
that the policymaking elites framed the policy problem of partnered women outside 
the labour market in cultural terms: ‚Some of the municipalities say that their feeling 
is that a lot of these women were not allowed to go out and take a job, even though 
they might have wanted to. There was a cultural thing and now they have a good 
excuse because now they have to if they want to keep the social assistance. Or go out 
and find a job and help providing for the family‛ (government official); ‚The culture 
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says also for a number of these people that it’s not acceptable for her to provide‛ 
(Jobcenter).  
 
The notion of cultural barriers was based on the premise that some immigrant women 
were outside the labour market because of their husbands’ negative views about them 
working, rather than through their own choice (Jensen and Lauritzen, 2008: 5). In this 
way, the 300 hours rule was viewed positively as ‚an argument that they could bring 
to bear on their husbands‛ (Jensen and Lauritzen, 2008: 5, see also 
Ardejdsdirecktoratet, 2009). This was contrasted with the high female labour market 
participation in Denmark, equated with gender equality, suggested by a Jobcenter 
employee: ‚In Denmark it’s important for women to get out and get their own money 
and not be dependent on their husbands‛. A conflict has been constructed between 
minority cultural traditions and ‚Danish‛ equality norms (Langvasbråten, 2008). 
However, some interviews countered this, for example an academic argued: ‚There 
have been a number of studies which on a rather weak basis of a low employment rate 
concluded that this implied that there was probably a ‘housewife mentality.’‛  
 
Evaluation evidence from POEM and NDP (Aston et al., 2009a, Bewley et al., 2005: 2) 
in Britain suggested that there are cultural barriers to work for women from ethnic 
minorities (particularly Muslim women), in which men were reluctant for their wives 
to work. In Australia some interviewees working with partnered women receiving 
income support suggested that some husbands do not want their wives to work and 
that in some cases (for both migrants and non-migrants) this is related to oppression 
or even risk of domestic violence at home (interview with employment service 
professional). Some policy actors working directly with partnered women expressed 
concern that the increased work testing under Welfare to Work risked harm occurring 
to women with violent partners, along with their children (interview with 
employment service professional). However, such circumstances and attitudes do not 
necessarily affect all ethnic minority (or immigrant) groups, as some Danish 
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interviewees highlighted: ‚The research shows that not all immigrant women<have 
this housewife mentality. Many of these women also want to work‛ (researcher); ‚It’s 
important to emphasise that there are a lot of immigrants who work‛ (Jobcenter). 
Further, one researcher stressed: ‚Immigrant women are so heterogeneous‛ and this is 
underlined by Sainsbury (2006: 230), who highlights that immigrants may be labour or 
economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers or political immigrants, family members, 
ethnic ‘citizens’ or undocumented migrants.  
 
A further distinction was drawn by some Danish interviewees between the dominant 
Danish model of day-care and the reluctance of some immigrant families to use formal 
care: ‚One problem is that some immigrant women don’t know what *day-care] could 
do for their children‛ (researcher). It had even been suggested by a Social Democrat 
that immigrants should be required to place their children in day-care. However, as 
we saw in Chapter Five in relation to Integration-Jobcenters in Denmark and the 
POEM pilot in Britain, this was viewed as an opportunity to increase awareness of 
provision: ‚We actually want these *immigrant+ families to put their children into day-
care. If they speak the language they know at home they’ll never learn Danish and that 
would forever stop them in this society‛ (social worker); ‚Sometimes families are not 
quite sure what day-care is, so information is definitely a critical issue in heightening 
participation‛ (government official). These comments are supported by the OECD 
(2006b), which has suggested that early years provision has a role in supporting the 
integration of immigrant and ethnic minority families, particularly where parents or 
children lack language proficiency. However, there may also be cultural issues 
regarding take-up, which is seen amongst some ethnic minority partnered women in 
Britain (Aston et al., 2009a), although Koning (2010: 21) suggests that employer 
childcare vouchers are taken up by a large number of ethnic minority groups. 
 
In Denmark the notion of ‘difference’ between immigrants and ‘ethnic Danes’ was 
emphasised in relation to the 300 hours rule. Some Danish interviewees referred to the 
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diversity of family models in Britain, compared with the dominance of the dual-earner 
model in Denmark,279 particularly when considering different ethnic groups, as an 
academic highlighted: ‚Danish society is more homogeneous than British society so 
immigrants are seen as being different.‛ Such diversity of models in Britain is also 
highlighted by Daly and Rake (2003). Another aspect was the comparatively recent 
immigration to a homogeneous country such as Denmark, compared with Britain: 
‚One of the things you have to understand about Denmark is that we’re about 50 
years behind other countries in terms of immigration. Immigrants came to Denmark in 
the 70s‛ (social worker). In the interviews, references were made to a ‘clash’ of cultures 
and, for example, ‚the dilemma and capability of integrating different cultures to 
Danish culture‛ (local authority). However, this was critiqued by academics as 
viewing women from ethnic minorities as homogeneous: ‚Immigrant women come 
from very many different countries and many are highly educated. This is the problem 
with saying ‘culture’: you don’t differentiate<it’s a problem using culture.‛ Similarly, 
a researcher suggested: 
 
‚It’s very problematic that we as a society believe that ‘They have a problem other 
than us and we cut their benefits’<We have to be critical about whether their culture 
really is the problem. If the main reason why they don’t work is because they don’t 
have qualifications and they don’t know anything about Danish labour market, why 
should we then take their money? Is this the right way to help them?‛  
 
A survey of nine different ethnic minority groups by Goul Andersen (2008: 23, 33) 
highlights that attitudes to work amongst ethnic minorities (as well as attitudes to 
receiving benefits) are similar to those of ethnic Danes. Low employment may be a 
response to barriers of discrimination (Armstrong et al., 2009: 266) and social workers 
concurred with this: ‚Some *immigrants+ are afraid to get into the labour market. They 
                                                 
279 However, in Denmark the anti-immigration policies (of which the 300 hours rule is one) are also linked 
with Danish identity, which is outside the scope of this research.  
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are afraid of the Danish people and of being misused‛; ‚It’s so difficult to explain the 
fairness in this law<Nobody wanted to hire you and now we take your money.‛ A 
Danish researcher contrasted the Danish approach to the labour market participation 
of immigrants with that of other Nordic countries: ‚We have to understand the 
driving forces behind these beliefs, compared to other countries like Sweden and 
Norway, who don’t cut benefit. They discuss discrimination and in Denmark we 
discuss culture.‛  
 
The creation of a group as being ‘other’ than can be related to the creation of specific 
groups as recipients of policies, particularly in the context of targeted policies which 
by definition are directed at, or involved in the creation of, social groups (discussed in 
terms of distributive recalibration in Chapter Five). However, Armstrong et al (2009) 
urge caution against ‚accepting different standards for different groups‛ as in this 
way ‚existing inequalities are explained away by reference to<’cultural difference’ or 
‘diversity’‛ (p.267). Clarke (1999) suggests that culture is a ‚field or domain of social 
life in which meanings are produced and reproduced<*and+ in the process, some sets 
of meaning may<*become+ the ‘way of life’ of a social group‛ (p.77). This differs from 
a ‘quasi-anthropological concept of culture’ which suggests that ‚sets of traditions, 
values, beliefs and habits that characterise (or are believed to characterise) a distinctive 
social group‛ (p.73). Important to Clarke’s definition of culture is the role of agency in 
the production and reproduction of meaning. Pfau-Effinger (2008) suggests that 
culture consists of ‚constructions of sense to which people orient their behaviour‛, 
which includes values, models and stocks of knowledge (p.21). This conceptualisation 
relates to both culture at the individual and family level, as well as to the cultural and 
ideological beliefs which inform policymaking, constructed through the agency of 
policy actors. The argument that welfare dependency is a ‘way of life’ for a significant 
number of people has been used to justify the existence of a ‘dependency culture’ and 
Murray’s (1984) concept of the ‘underclass’ is culturally constructed. Such concepts 
have been challenged by empirical evidence (Dean and Taylor-Gooby, 1992, Beatty et 
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al., 2010). Pfau-Effinger (2005) defines a ‘welfare culture’ as a country’s dominant 
model of welfare: ‚the relevant ideas in a given society surrounding the welfare state 
and the way it is embedded in a society‛ (p.4). In both Britain and Australia welfare 
reform documents refer to an intended shift from a ‘welfare culture’ to a ‘work 
culture’ (Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2008, 
Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b: 10), again drawing on the one hand on 
notions of dependency and on the other on work as a norm. 
 
Just as the welfare states of Britain and Australia were predominantly based on a 
white male breadwinner model, the Danish welfare state was also constructed on the 
basis of a less ethnically diverse population. Examination of the 300 hours rule 
suggests that Denmark is attempting to combine universalism with difference, which 
Williams (1995: 129) argues constitutes ‘a new politics of welfare.’ In terms of 
hegemonic regulatory assumptions Serrano Pascual (2007: 278-9) suggests that a 
political understanding of unemployment links unemployment to national identity 
and the viability of the welfare state, which may lead to activation focusing on 
national citizenship. Anti-immigration rhetoric in the Danish media and Danish 
government reports suggest that immigrants are deliberately arriving in Denmark as 
‘welfare tourists’ (Daguerre, 2007: 95) to take advantage of the welfare system 
(notably, a claim also made by some of the right-wing British media about immigrants 
to Britain). In this way, the 300 hours rule in Denmark is an example of symbolic 
policymaking, as stated by the following Danish interviewees: ‚The 300 hours rule is a 
very limited arrangement in some senses<*but+ This is one very clear and symbolic 
example of some of the policy developments taking place in Denmark‛ (academic); 
‚We didn’t have that point of view that we had to have more women into the labour 
market because in Denmark there’s quite a lot of women who work‛ (government 
official); ‚It’s not a rational argument that we’re spending a lot of money there or we 
would save a lot of money there‛ (academic). Daguerre (2007) suggests that in 
Denmark stronger work requirements and sanction regimes have been ‚more 
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symbolic than real‛ (p.103). Both this study and evidence such as Bach and Larsen 
(2008) contest this view, highlighting the reality of the 300 hours rule in relation to loss 
of benefit and increased poverty. 
 
The 300 hours rule was viewed by policy actors as being reflective of the influence of 
the Danske Folkeparti (DFP - Danish People’s Party280), a Radical Right-Wing Populist 
Party, combining ethno-pluralist xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, anti-establishment 
populism and EU-scepticism (Rydgren, 2004: 488). The DFP has ‚constructed 
immigrants as a threat to the homogeneity and cultural way of life in a small nation 
like Denmark‛ (Daguerre, 2007: 93).281 Although on taking office in 2001, Venstre 
(Liberals) had originally stated that the DFP would not have undue influence on their 
policies (Daguerre, 2007: 82), in fact they occupy a pivotal position and a de facto role 
as an unofficial coalition partner (Rydgren, 2004: 487).282 Similarly, an Australian 
campaigning organisation suggested that the Welfare to Work reforms were a 
reflection of political power: ‚The government had obtained control of the upper 
house of Parliament, it didn’t have to negotiate with anybody, it wanted to save 
money on social security payments, so it forged a policy without really consulting 
with anybody.‛283 Early in the implementation of AWT there were signs of resulting 
‘positive improvement’ (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Employment Workplace Relations and Workforce Participation, 2005: 149), but just 
                                                 
280 Founded in 1995, the Danish People‘s party was a breakaway faction of the Danish Progress Party, which 
emerged in 1972 and was a populist anti-tax protest party. See Rydgren, J. (2004) Explaining the emergence 
of Radical Right-Wing populist Parties: the case of Denmark. West European Politics, 27(3):474-502. 
281
 Active labour market policies aimed at immigrants can also be viewed in the wider context of race 
relations in Denmark, for example the Danish ‗cartoons crisis‘ of 2005 and the publication of the Danish 
‗canon‘. See Mohring Reestorff, C. (2007) Kulturpolitiske kanonkugler. Kulturkanonen og kulturens 
nationalstatslige foranfring (The Cultural Canon and the national anchoring of culture). Kulture & Klasse, 
35(2):86-109. 
282
 This was also stated in a number of the interviews with policy actors as important context to the 300 hours 
rule. 
283 Blaxland emphasises the speed at which the two bills progressed through Parliament and states that its 
passage was hastened by the fact that the Howard Government‘s Liberal/National Coalition had achieved a 
majority in both Houses of Parliament in the 2004 election. See Blaxland, M. (2008) Everyday negotiations 
for care and autonomy in the world of welfare-to-work: the policy experience of Australian mothers, 2003-
2006 (PhD thesis). Sydney, University of Sydney.  
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two months later Welfare to Work, in contrast to AWT, passed into legislation after 
little parliamentary debate (Blaxland, 2008: 32), suggesting that its principal political 
driver was ideology. 
 
Although in the case of partnered women in Britain and Australia the ‘nation’ element 
is less evident than in Denmark284 there are similarities between the countries in the 
notion that those not in work (and, importantly, claiming income support) are ‘other’ 
(Lister, 2004) than the majority of the population. The 300 hours rule can be viewed as 
a negative policy tool which risks further marginalising an already disadvantaged 
group by removing their safety net. The agenda driving the 300 hours does not seem 
to be numbers of couples claiming social assistance or potential savings to be made. To 
an extent it reflects the Danish policy agenda of increasing labour supply, but is 
illustrative of normative recalibration in relation to the construction of a sub-section of 
immigrants as not wishing to work and who do not share the dominant values. The 
Danish case is of interest to Britain in terms of ethnic minority partnered women: the 
300 hours rule appears to undermine more supportive policies for immigrants in 
Denmark, such as the services provided by Jobcenter-Integration and by 
encompassing activation. The Danish case also highlights the construction of ‘culture’ 
in labour market policy. Policies cannot be said to be merely evidence-based, but are 
ideologically-driven. It was notable from the interviews that the views of Danish 
government officials concerning the policy ‘problem’ diverged from those of other 
policy actors, particularly those working directly with partnered women affected by 
the policies. This highlights the importance of policy elites in the construction and 
representation of policy ‘problems’. 
                                                 
284
 Apart from for Indigenous people in Australia, who have been associated with ‗welfare dependency‘. 
 230 
 
6.5 Family 
 
The following two sections consider aspects relating to ‘Family’ as reflections of 
normative recalibration, although these overlap with the first section of this chapter 
concerning ‘Work’. The first section discusses the shift towards the adult worker 
model family (Lewis, 2001) reflected in policies relating to partnered women and 
highlights the basis, continuing legacy and tensions apparent in recalibrations to the 
male breadwinner-based welfare states of Australia and Britain. This is contrasted 
with the relative absence of such a foundation in Denmark, in which partnered women 
are viewed less as carers and mothers, than as workers. Fraser’s (1997) typology of 
family models is considered and it is argued that all three countries are moving 
towards achievement of the universal breadwinner model, but only Denmark has 
virtually attained it. The second section focuses on de-familialisation (McLaughlin and 
Glendinning, 1994, Lister, 1994) and considers different conceptualisations of gender 
equity (Armstrong et al., 2009). It argues that all three countries promote the 
‘sameness’ model but with differing bases of care provision. It further argues that the 
commodification of partnered women in Denmark as an expression of gender equity 
may itself be a constraint on women’s own wish to fulfill caring roles. 
 
6.5.1 From the male breadwinner to the adult worker model family 
 
In the 1990s most Western European governments shifted towards the assumption of 
the adult worker model (AWM) family, during a period of ‘welfare state 
retrenchment’ (Lewis, 2003: 176). The central tenet of the AWM (Lewis, 2006, Lewis 
and Giullari, 2005, Lewis, 2001) is the notion that all adults are capable of paid work. 
The concept has similarities with that of the ‘citizen worker’ (Rake, 2001), which 
relates to the social contracts discussed in terms of functional recalibration in Chapter 
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Five.285 The adult and citizen worker models build on societal changes such as 
increased female labour market participation, increased educational attainment, and 
changes in the structure of both families and the labour market. However, as Esping-
Andersen (2009) highlights, such societal changes have not been evenly distributed. 
This section also highlights that some partnered women in all three countries may 
consider responsibilities other than fulfilling the requirements of the activation 
contract to be more important (Griggs and Bennett, 2009: 61).  
 
The concept of the adult worker model family assumes that the male breadwinner 
model no longer exists, or at least is less pervasive than it was. In 1998, the New 
Labour Government declared the welfare state based around the male breadwinner as 
being ‚increasingly out of date‛ (Department for Social Security, 1998: 13), although as 
Chapter Five highlighted, the British benefit system still demonstrates the legacy of 
this model. In recommending the introduction of policies aimed at encouraging non-
working partners into work in 1998, Taylor (1998) highlighted that policies required 
only one member of a couple to actively seek work when claiming JSA and this 
partner was not necessarily the one with the most ‘marketable skills’ (p.26). The 
changes introduced by Working Nation in Australia ‚sought to improve the financial 
returns obtained from increased work. They were aimed at encouraging people to take 
up part-time work, mainly by encouraging both members of a couple to work‛ 
(Warburton et al., 1999: i). This can be contrasted with both NDP and the 300 hours 
rule, where the aim was to target the member of the couple most likely to move into 
work. However, whereas in both Britain and Australia part-time work is seen as a 
strategy for encouraging people (particularly women) into work (for example 
Warburton et al., 1999: iv),286 this is not a strategy in Denmark, where full-time work is 
more prevalent (see Table A2.2 in Appendix 2). 
                                                 
285
 Further, in terms of the ‗social investment state‘ the concept of the citizen worker also holds that children 
are the citizen-workers of the future. See Lister, R. (2006) Children (but not women) first: New Labour, child 
welfare and gender Critical Social Policy, 26(2):315-335. 
286
 See also Millar, J., Ridge, T. & Bennett, F. (2006) Part-time work and social security: increasing the 
options. Research report No. 351, Leeds, Corporate Document Services. 
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The adult or citizen worker models can be seen in the British Labour Government’s 
policy goals of an 80 per cent employment rate, of reducing worklessness and 
economic inactivity and of reducing child poverty (see Gardiner and Millar, 2006).287 
However, the AWM is gendered as it is undermined, firstly, by both women’s low pay 
and, secondly, by the problem of unpaid and unequal work within the household 
(Lewis, 2003: 180). In both Britain and Australia in the 1980s there was an acceptance 
that many women would not be in the labour market and an overriding concern about 
the numbers of men out of work as a result of industrial decline. However as Orloff 
(2006) argues, countries are moving away from a ‘maternalist’ policy model under 
which mothers are expected to stay at home to care in favour of ‘employment for all’ 
in which women are expected to enter the labour market. 
 
Rhetoric about women’s engagement in paid work has a differing normative basis for 
different groups of women. As discussed in Chapter Five and in Section 6.3.2 above, 
targeted policies in Australia and Britain have predominantly focused on lone parents, 
but have been extended to partnered parents. Furthermore, the normative basis for 
some of the Australian Howard government’s (1996-2007) policies can be viewed as 
contradictory in relation to different groups of women. On the one hand, welfare 
reforms such as Australians Working Together and Welfare to Work increased activity 
testing for lone and partnered mothers, emphasising the disadvantages of remaining 
at home if they were receiving benefit. On the other hand, tax reforms encouraged 
some mothers to stay at home. Family Tax Benefit288 is designed to assist families with 
the costs of raising children and is split into two parts: A and B.289 Family Tax Benefit 
Part A is similar to Child Tax Credit in Britain (Millar, 2009: 238) and is means-tested 
                                                 
287
 The basis given for the 80 per cent objective is to address the dependency ratio, usually defined as the ratio 
of those of working age to those of retirement age, or the ratio of workers to non-workers. This requires 
another 2.5 million people to be in work, comprising 300,000 lone parents, 1 million Incapacity Benefit 
claimants and 1 million older workers - Department for Work and Pensions (2005) Five Year Strategy: 
Opportunity and security for all, London, TSO. 
288
 FTB is paid to around 2.2 million families with 4.2 million children under 16 (around 80 per cent of 
Australian families). 
289
 Both Parts A and B were introduced in 2000 as part of the New Tax System. Family Tax Part A was 
formerly Family Allowance. 
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on parental income.290 Family Tax Benefit Part B is paid to sole parent families and to 
couple families with one main earner earning below a specified income (all sole 
parents and couple households on income support are eligible for the maximum rate). 
Apps (2006) demonstrates that Family Tax Benefit Part B financially penalises families 
with dual full-time incomes, thus creating disincentives for mothers to take up paid 
work as a result of high effective marginal tax rates; it also effectively rewards full-
time care of children at home. Brennan has argued: ‚The structure of family tax 
benefits made it much more economically advantageous for a family to rely on a single 
income, than to share paid work and family care between the parents‛ (pp.38, 45) and 
has created strong work disincentives for women in low and middle-income families 
(see also Cass and Brennan, 2003: 55).291  
 
One critique made by an Australian academic was that partial individualisation in 
Australia was ‚in name only and essentially family-based.‛ Furthermore, Cass (1995, 
cited in Wilson et al., 1999: 31) has suggested that the liberalisation and partial 
disaggregation of the couple income tests did not change the male breadwinner model 
(see also Brennan, 2002: 95). Hill (2007: 226) argues that embedded within the 
Australian policy framework is a traditional ideology of gender relations which 
delivers more financial support to mothers who stay at home to care for their children. 
There is also a contradiction between the assertion of the work ethic and familism 
(Roche, 1992: 151), which relates to differing perceptions of dependency. One 
Australian researcher stated that being in work has been framed in terms of ‘good 
motherhood’: ‚to be a good mother, you should be a working mother; it’s the right 
thing to do by your children to bring in enough income to secure your family’s long-
term future.‛ However, an Australian academic suggested: ‚For low skilled women 
                                                 
290 FTB Part A is considered to be responsible for high EMTRs, particularly for couple families. See Harding, 
A., Vu, Q. N., Tanton, R. & Vidyattama, Y. (2008) Improving work incentives for mothers: the national and 
geographic impact of liberalising the Family Tax Benefit income test. 37th Australian Conference of 
Economists. Gold Coast, QLD. 
291
 In Australia the short-lived First Child Tax Refund (FCTR refunded to new mothers tax paid in the year 
prior to the birth of their child, on the proviso that the parent remained outside the labour market. 
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the choice may be between a low-level service sector job for not much pay, compared 
to being at home with your kids.‛ This reflects Duncan and Edwards’ (1999) ‘gendered 
moral rationalities’, which may be a product of gendered societal constraints; Land 
and Rose’s (1985) notion of ‘compulsory altruism’ acknowledges that unequal power 
relations may exist within caring relationships between spouses or partners.  
 
In the activation regime (and, more specifically, the workfare state) women’s role as 
homemakers, carers and mothers is now linked with passivity if they are receiving 
benefit and this has been increasingly conceptualised as being less acceptable and 
linked with dependency. This process of re-commodification involves reducing 
‚alternatives to participation in the labour market, either by tightening eligibility or 
cutting benefits‛ (Pierson, 2001a: 422) and ‚enforcing work while residualising welfare‛ 
(Peck, 2001: 10). The normative goal of post-war welfare states was to protect the 
vulnerable (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 92), however in Britain and Australia 
protection was via the male breadwinner. Programmes relating to partners in both 
Australia and Britain have made visible women who were formerly less so in the 
benefits system and in labour market policies.  
 
Women have previously been underrepresented in public training schemes 
(Sainsbury, 1996: 184). In Britain, women in couples claiming benefit were not offered 
employment assistance because of their ‘assumed dependency’ (Department for Social 
Security, 1998: 27). Similarly, in Australia partnered women were not offered labour 
market assistance under the pre-Working Nation model of dependency-based 
payments (Douglas et al., 1993). For many years in the Australian welfare state, it has 
been seen as acceptable for mothers to be outside the labour market and instead be at 
home caring for children and, importantly, to receive income support for this. As we 
saw in Chapter Five, this has historically been the case for partnered mothers, but in 
terms of both functional and normative recalibration this is changing. One Australian 
campaigning organisation suggested: ‚The same as the UK, we were laggards in 
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activation of parents. The part-time work requirement was fairly lax by international 
standards.‛ However, Pech and Innes (1998) highlight that, on the one hand, although 
Parenting Payment provides ‚some tangible recognition of the social value of child-
rearing‛ (pp.25-6) or what Sainsbury (1996) refers to as the ‘principle of care,’ on the 
other hand: 
 
‚women who do exercise their choice to stay on payment may come 
disproportionately from groups that are already disadvantaged in the labour 
market, including those whose partners are similarly disadvantaged. If this is 
so, then the social security system might, under the guise of allowing women 
choice, be helping to entrench some in poverty and disadvantage‛ (pp.22-3) 
 
There is thus a balance to be struck between empowerment and further oppression 
from the state. Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003) suggest that in relation to normative 
recalibration ‚Despite women’s new life histories<social policy programmes in many 
European welfare states remain encapsulated in the breadwinner model‛ (p.92). As 
suggested in Section 6.4, the British and Australian welfare states began as white, male 
breadwinner states in which ‚Women’s role in the family became tied to the 
development of race and nation,‛ as well as work (Williams, 1995: 151). Castles and 
Mitchell (Castles, 1992, Castles and Mitchell, 1993)  argue that Australia is a ‘wage-
earners’ welfare state’ (Castles, 1985, Castles, 1992)292 and (as with the British welfare 
state) this was specifically a white, male, married breadwinner welfare state (Bessant 
et al., 2006: 89, Bryson, 2001: 65). The concept of the Australian ‘wage earner’s welfare 
state’ has some similarities with the concept of the ‘family wage’ in Britain as a basis 
for the post-war welfare state on the model of the (married) male worker, supported 
by the trade unions. However, Land (1999: 129, see also Lewis, 2001: 153) argues that 
                                                 
292
 The concept of the ‗wage earners‘ welfare state‘ is based on the Harvester/‘Basic wage‘ ruling of the first 
Arbitration Court by Justice H.B. Higgins in 1907. Judge Higgins ruled that the state, the industrial relations 
and arbitration systems should deliver a basic wage sufficient for a male worker and his family; this was 
viewed as a way of preserving male full employment. 
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although the male breadwinner model was accepted as an ideal over 100 years ago by 
the Trade Union Movement, it was never a model to which the majority of working 
class families conformed. Brennan (2002) suggests that ‚The assumption of women’s 
dependence was built into the very foundations of the Australian welfare state. Most 
pensions and benefits assumed the presence of a male breadwinner and female 
caregiver‛ (p.96). This was also the case with the British welfare state, as we saw in 
Chapter Five in relation to benefits.  
 
In Denmark the male breadwinner model was short-lived and ‚a historical 
parenthesis‛ (Borchorst, 2002: 273). Although by the late 1950s ‚the male 
breadwinner/female homemaker family model spread to the working class, 
and<three-fourths of married women were housewives‛ (Borchorst, 2002: 273), this 
‘golden age’ lasted only 15 years, ‚as traditional family policy promoting a male 
breadwinner family model<never gained ground‛ (Borchost, 2006: 5-7). From an 
early stage, the Danish welfare state was based on universal and equal access by 
citizens and based on institutional systems of care. These institutional aspects 
supported increased female employment in the early 1960s, resulting from 
opportunities accompanying the economic boom which were reinforced by women’s 
rights organisations (Borchost, 2006: 5). The ‘women friendliness’ (Hernes, 1987b, 
Hernes, 1987a) of the Danish welfare state was both a product of mobilisation from 
below and institutional response from above. Borchost (2009: 100) argues that the 
universal breadwinner model is dominant in Denmark. This model is based on 
Fraser’s (1997) typology of three models, based on a normative theory of justice 
distinguishing between recognition of caring and redistribution of resources. The 
‘caregiver parity model’ aims to achieve gender equity by supporting informal care 
work: women are caregivers and men breadwinners, but parity is achieved by paying 
women to care and granting them social rights on account of their caring role. This has 
similarities with Sainsbury’s (1996) basis of entitlement to benefit on the principle of 
care and, as we have seen, in Britain and Australia the social rights to care have been 
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curtailed by activation policies. Knijn and Kremer (1997) take further the 
conceptualisation of the social rights of citizenship in relation to how differently 
welfare states conceptualise social rights to give or to receive care. Such a right must 
be related to both men and women in couple households if men are to realistically 
share caring responsibilities. Similarly, Fraser’s ‘universal caregiver model’ achieves 
equity by allowing both men and women to be care-givers. Borchost (2009: 9) suggests 
that Fraser was biased towards economic redistribution to achieve social justice, but 
that such a theory of redistribution is based on class and gender, rather than ethnic 
differences. Such differences are important, as we saw in the Section 6.4 in relation to 
‘nation’ and ‘culture’ whereby immigrant women have recently been made more 
visible as a target group for activation.  
 
Fraser’s third model, the ‘universal breadwinner model’, aims to achieve gender 
equity by promoting female employment and making both men and women 
breadwinners. Most Danish interviewees cited the universal breadwinner model as the 
dominant model, although some evidence suggests that it is not the reality for all 
women. Using Danish an event history data set293 developed by AMS, Laužadytė 
(2008) found that children of all age groups increase fathers’ employment 
probabilities, however this is not the case for women.294 Nevertheless, the difference in 
employment rates between women and men is smaller in Denmark than the other two 
countries (see Chapter Four). In Britain the dual earner model applies to over half the 
population: 60.2 per cent in 2006, compared with 27.9 per cent of single earners and 
11.9 per cent of workless households (Beatty et al., 2010). In Australia in 2001 dual 
                                                 
293
 Event history analysis is concerned not merely with if something occurs, but when it occurs. See Box-
Steffensmeier, J. M. & Jones, B. S. (2004) Event history modelling. A guide for social scientists, New York, 
NY, Cambridge University Press. 
294
 Laužadytė shows that children in the household make women much less inclined to move to a job and 
much more prone to leave the labour force. Married men are more likely to re-enter employment and the 
likelihood of becoming inactive is reduced, however, married women face a higher risk of remaining 
unemployed. Whilst 70 per cent of men return to the labour force, 63 per cent of women do so and 
unemployment duration is one and a half to two times longer for women than for men. See Laužadytė, A. 
(2008) Active labour market policies and labour market transitions in Denmark: an analysis of event history 
data (PhD thesis), Aarhus, University of Aarhus. 
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earner couples accounted for 50 per cent of all couples (Drago et al., 2004: 1). However, 
although women are commodified in Denmark, this does not negate the effects of 
either gender segregation in the workplace, or that women still do the majority of 
housework, as one academic commented: ‚We don’t have a completely even 
distribution of housework between men and women but we do have both a financial 
support system and the day-care institutions so that’s it’s actually possible for a 
mother to work practically full-time and this has been so for quite a long time.‛ 
Nevertheless the dominant cultural model for families (Pfau-Effinger, 2005: 9) in 
Denmark is important to policy problem representations and to the policy responses in 
relation to partnered women outside the labour market as being ‘other’ than the 
majority population. Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003: 123) suggest that the Scandinavian 
countries offer mothers the widest array of choices in relation to care, although as a 
Danish academic highlighted, the Danish model ‚is so much founded on the idea of 
the universal breadwinner‛ which equates to limited choice with regard to caring.  
 
Combining work and caring is not a new social risk, but is one which has become 
more explicitly ‘visible’ in policy terms for partnered women. Furthermore, partnered 
women outside the labour market are not necessarily a new social risk, but this is now 
conceptualised in a more visible way as a policy ‘problem’ in each of the countries. 
The targeting of partnered women by activation is linked to the changing 
conceptualisation of women’s roles in societal institutions such as the labour market 
and the family and this can be seen at both functional and normative levels in relation 
to recalibration. This is a more explicit change in Australia and Britain than in 
Denmark, with the former having the legacy of male breadwinner model-based 
welfare states. The shifting conceptualisation of women’s roles is viewed in terms of 
the functional recalibration of social security, labour market and childcare policies in 
the wider context of women’s increased labour force participation. However, this is 
underpinned by a recalibration of normative expectations of partnered women as 
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social groups outside the labour market and often caring for children, when they could 
legitimately be expected to take up paid work.  
 
6.5.2 De-familialisation 
 
De-commodification is defined as the degree to which individuals, or families, can 
uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of labour market 
participation (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Similarly, de-familialisation describes the 
degree to which individuals can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living 
independently of family relationships (Lister, 1994: 37, see also McLaughlin and 
Glendinning, 1994). Orloff (1993) argues that de-commodification should be 
accompanied by two additional dimensions: access to paid work and the capacity to 
form and maintain autonomous households or ‘autonomy’. Millar (2003) highlights 
the dynamic and interrelated nature of transitions between autonomy and 
dependency. From the interviews and documentary evidence analysed in this study, 
Denmark appears to be a de-familialising and commodifying welfare state, as both 
labour market and day-care policies encourage female labour market participation 
(dual breadwinner model). The day-care guarantee from when a child is aged six 
months encourages women to return to the labour market before children reach school 
age and both labour market participation and day-care are on a full-time basis. By 
contrast, Australia and Britain have been less commodifying and de-familialising. 
Recent welfare reforms in both countries aim to commodify women, but without 
adequately de-familialising them by ensuring alternative care, although Australia has 
moved further in this direction than Britain. In both Australia and Britain it has been 
possible for mothers to receive benefit for looking after children at home, even if in 
Britain this has been as dependent partners. This possibility has now been reduced in 
both countries, depending on the age of the youngest child. In Denmark it has not 
been possible (with the minor exception of the relatively short-lived spouse 
supplement) to receive benefit for caring for children, or working in the home.  
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It could be argued that prior to the introduction of the spouse supplement and the 300 
hours rule non-working partnered women were to an extent de-commodified. The 300 
hours rule may thus be viewed as being in accord with the wider Danish welfare 
model in aiming to de-familise married women by commodifying their labour supply. 
This reduction in the de-commodifying potential of labour market policies arguably 
aligned policies relating to married couples/immigrants with other active labour 
market policies. However, as was argued in Chapter Five, this reform went further 
than other ALMPs in demanding a quantity of paid work and by removing benefit. 
This policy then compelled women affected to become either commodified in the 
labour market or to become dependent on their spouse and therefore further 
familialised.  
 
In neither Britain nor Australia are carers of adults a key focus of active labour market 
policies. By contrast, in Denmark, those caring for adults are not exempt from 
activation, except for short periods of caring for terminally ill relatives; one Danish 
Jobcentre employee commented that it ‚doesn’t come into the picture at all here.‛ As 
with day-care, care for adults (elderly or disabled people) in Denmark is provided 
through municipalities and can be viewed as an institutional foundation for activation 
policies and a key function of the welfare state. Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003) suggest 
that: 
 
‚The viability of European welfare states also relies on women’s willingness to 
reproduce the next generation... which requires policies and incentives that lead to a 
reallocation of caring work within families (i.e. between men and women) and 
between families and the public sector‛ (p.90) 
 
Bacchi (1999: 204) argues that the construction of the policy problem of women’s 
inequality as ‘lack of access to paid labour’ leaves unaddressed the issue of the 
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responsibilities of caring. Within activation relating to female partners, there is an 
implicit assumption that caring responsibilities will be transferred elsewhere. Both the 
British and Australian programmes directed at partnered women assumed that 
couples have the capacity to swap child-caring and earning roles. The alternative is 
care by immediate family, by extended family or friendship networks, or by formal 
provision. The propensity to take up formal care may be influenced by individual or 
family preferences, as well as the availability of such care. Although policies can 
influence welfare states’ de-commodifying and de-familialising potential, what may be 
described as cultural and social norms are also important. Whether and how welfare 
states facilitate the provision of care (whether for adults or disabled or non-disabled 
children) can either support or challenge the dominant breadwinner model in each of 
the countries. This relates to the constitution of welfare agents, whether by the state, 
the market or the private sphere (Clarke, 2004).  
 
Ferrera and Hemerijck (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003) point to ‚the greater salience of 
economic independence, and the spreading conviction that labour market 
participation is a demonstration of gender equality‛ (p.92). However, Bacchi (1999: 67) 
challenges the underlying presumption in policies that women only become equal to 
men when they have equal access to the labour market. Furthermore, Armstrong et al 
(2009: 265) highlight that there are different conceptualisations of gender equality. 
Firstly, the ‘sameness’ model, where women are expected to behave like men in terms 
of the male pattern of full-time continuous employment, but without provision to 
replace care. Secondly, the ‘difference’ model, where there is equality of difference of 
preferences or choices, with care work being afforded equal recognition, the potential 
of which Armstrong et al argue has yet to be realised (p.265). Thirdly, the ‘universal 
caregiver’ or ‘dual-carer/dual-earner’ model, in which women’s paid work would 
increase and their unpaid care work would decrease; correspondingly, men’s paid 
work would decrease and their unpaid care work would increase. Armstrong et al 
suggest that this perhaps offers the greatest potential for gender equality as it involves 
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greater symmetry of care and paid work between men and women (p.265). In 
Denmark the sameness model is dominant, but alternative care is provided. Australia 
and Britain are moving towards promotion of the sameness model in activation, but 
the promotion, and incidence of, part-time work is both an advantage and 
disadvantage in this respect for partnered women. Similarly, Misra et al’s (2007) 
conceptualisation of work-family policies in Europe and North America is in the form 
of four strategies: (i) the carer strategy (where women are treated primarily as carers 
and secondarily as earners), (ii) the earner strategy (where women are treated 
primarily as earners and secondarily as carers), (iii) the choice strategy (where women 
are treated as being able to choose between being primarily earners or care-givers) and 
(iv) the earner-carer strategy (where women and men are treated as being equally 
involved in both earning and caring). Denmark reflects the earner strategy and Britain 
and Australia previously represented the carer strategy, but have more recently 
moved towards the earner strategy. In Australia and Britain there is arguably more 
choice as to whether to work or to care than in Denmark, although this is constrained 
by the limited alternative care provision, particularly in Britain.  
 
In Britain women’s labour market participation is not explicitly presented by 
policymakers in gender equalising terms. The Labour Government’s goal to encourage 
non-working partnered women into work was not stated as being one of gender 
equality or gender equity and this is a result of the tendency in British policy-making 
to treat the family as a private sphere (Lewis and Campbell, 2007a). This study 
suggests that this is also the case in Australia. In Denmark commodification has been 
linked with gender equality and has to a large extent addressed caring responsibilities 
by transferring them to the state, rather than through equality within the household. 
The universal breadwinner model in Denmark can be seen as being based on economic 
citizenship, or commodification. In Denmark commodification is a key objective of 
Danish social policies as a means of social integration, as well as for economic reasons. 
However, that some immigrant women are not in the labour market and also have less 
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propensity to use day-care may be a challenge to the notion of dominant social norms. 
There may be cultural factors which lead to this challenge, or not adhering to social 
norms may be viewed as resistance (Clarke, 2004: 158-9, see also Finch, 1989). It is here 
that human agency is important, in terms of resistance to policies and as an alternative 
to institutionalist views of policymaking. Does culture change policy, or vice versa, or 
is there an element of both in action? It has not been possible to fully answer this 
question in this analysis, but the evidence from the case studies suggests that both are 
important factors and they may be self-reinforcing.295 An important, and sensitive 
issue, is whether partnered women’s caring responsibilities represent a form of 
oppression, from which paid labour may be empowering, or how far this goes against 
the preferences and identities of individual women. Some women may derive status 
from their caring role and may wish to fulfil it, although this may also be informed by 
the perception or reality of suitable jobs. Pfau-Effinger (2005) summarises this 
difficulty: 
 
‚The social action of individuals is not a simple outcome and not determined 
by state policies, although this is often assumed when statistics on behaviour 
(such as labour force participation rates, unemployment rates and birth rates) 
are used as indicators for welfare state policies. Such assumptions do not reflect 
the fact that the social behaviour of individuals is a process which takes place in 
a very complex field of influences, where cultural ideals and values also play 
an important role‛ (p.12) 
 
Cultural values are held by policymakers as well as by recipients of policies. The state 
may only intervene to an extent in the social relations and economic decision-making 
within a household; other factors, such as power relations and entrenched attitudes to 
men and women’s work and caring roles may be more powerful, as may moral 
                                                 
295
 The complexity of the effects of policies on individual or household behaviour in relation to culture is 
summarised by Pfau-Effinger, B. (2005) Culture and welfare state policies: reflections on a complex 
interrelation. Journal of Social Policy, 34(1):3-20. 
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obligations and rationalities in relation to caring for both children and adults. A 
survey of time use in Australian households with children between 1992 and 2006 
under both Labor and Liberal/Coalition governments (Craig et al., 2009) found that 
there was a discernable trend towards gender convergence in both paid and unpaid 
work under Labor, but that this reversed under the Coalition. Labor demonstrated a 
commitment to gender equity in terms of family-friendly employment arrangements 
and childcare. By contrast, as discussed earlier, the Coalition had a more conservative 
view of women, with tax policies favouring a single breadwinner model. Such data 
suggest that government policies can have an impact on gendered roles and such roles 
may be reinforced by structures of access to benefit and the availability of alternative 
care. Pech and Innes (1998) have argued that: 
 
‚choices do not exist in a societal vacuum. Society places its own constraints on 
the exercise of choice - in the social security system these constraints are 
reflected in the activity requirements that some recipients must satisfy to 
receive payment. Thus the very provision of income support both defines the 
range of options open to individuals and conditions the choices they make‛ 
(p.25) 
 
As Esping-Andersen (1999: 45) suggests, the choice to work or care is not either-or, but 
is a matter of degree. How policies influence people ‚will depend on the extent to 
which these changes are consistent with people’s beliefs about family responsibilities‛ 
(Land, 1999: 127).296 Steiber and Haas  (2009: 657-8) have shown that mothers’ 
generalised attitudes towards work and care were less strongly related to their own 
employment behaviour than their own beliefs about the impact of their work on their 
                                                 
296
 For example, the qualitative evaluation of the In-Work Credit (offering £40 a week for 52 weeks to lone 
and partnered parents moving into work of 16 hours or more per week suggested that those who took up the 
IWC were already work-ready or work-committed and that those who were more closely aligned to a non-
working, caring role were much less likely to take up the credit. See Brewer, M., Browne, J., Crawford, C. & 
Knight, G. (2007) The lone parent pilots after 12 to 24 months: an impact assessment of In-Work Credit, 
Work Search Premium, Extended Schools Childcare, Quarterly Work Focused Interviews and New Deal Plus 
for Lone Parents, Norwich, Stationery Office. 
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own children. Mothers’ own care attitudes had the strongest effect on their labour 
market participation in Britain, followed by New Zealand and then Australia and it 
was only in English-speaking countries that Steiber and Haas found a correlation 
between women’s care attitudes and their choice of part-time or full-time work (p.655-
6). One Australian employment service professional commented that: ‚The Welfare to 
Work requirements challenge some mothers’ concept of themselves; they may see 
themselves as mothers and perceive their role to be to look after their child.‛ 
Furthermore, there may be problems in attempting to impose autonomy on families 
where there are cultural barriers which suggest that it is not acceptable for wives to be 
independent (Aston et al., 2009a: 22). Kangas and Rostgaard (2007) argue that attitudes 
are important with regard to work and care (and in particular the attitudes of male 
partners), but that these are shaped by institutional factors. So, one significant 
question is: Should the state force women into work when they want to stay at home 
and care? This study suggests that the answer partly depends on the availability of 
alternative care provision. However, despite the many benefits of paid work, if forcing 
women into work results in families being in poverty, or a work/benefits cycle, work 
in itself may not necessarily be the ‘good thing’ it is purported to be.  
 
6.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has highlighted the normative recalibration of activation policies for 
partnered women in Australia and Denmark, with reference to Britain, using 
Williams’ concepts of ‘work’, ‘nation’ and ‘family’. It echoes other studies of activation 
in affirming that policy actors emphasised individual reasons (Lødemel and Trickey, 
2001, van Berkel and Valkenburg, 2007) for partnered women being outside the labour 
market, rather than structural issues such as insufficient work which is flexible enough 
to accommodate caring responsibilities, or labour market discrimination. In Denmark 
and Australia, as well as Britain, there is a focus on increasing incentives to ‘make 
work pay’. The view of labour market participation as gender equalising in Denmark 
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is a useful lens through which to view the continuing promotion of the adult worker 
model in British and Australian employment policy. Equally, the normative 
recalibration of the Danish model in response to challenges posed by immigrant 
families with different cultural family models can be helpful in highlighting partnered 
women’s gendered moral rationalities. However, focusing on culture as a barrier to 
work can be problematic if it does not take demand-side issues into account, or 
acknowledge other barriers to work such as ill health. 
 
Serrano Pascual’s (2007: 278) concept of hegemonic regulatory assumptions relates to 
the prevailing understanding of the individual: as either competent and responsible or 
as dependent and passive. She argues that community values relating to work and 
worklessness influence the social representation of policies. One issue is how such 
community views are articulated, for example in Britain this is through the British 
Social Attitudes Survey (see for example Park et al., 2010). Serrano Pascual suggests 
that a moralistic understanding of unemployment favours activation to discourage 
dependency and promote responsibility; a political understanding emphasises 
national identity and citizenship; and an economic conceptualisation may lead to a 
focus on adaptation to new economic challenges through investment in human capital 
or through more coercive strategies to ensure a reserve army of workers (pp.278-9). As 
has been demonstrated in this chapter, hegemonic regulatory assumptions as 
constituent of normative recalibration have been important in the representation of the 
‘problem’ of partnered women outside the labour market. In Denmark national 
identity was important to its conceptualisation and a moralistic understanding in 
relation to dependency and the promotion of responsibility informed both the British 
and Australian (particularly Welfare to Work) reforms, but this was also seen in the 
Danish policies in relation to immigrant married women.  
 
From the analysis which has spanned this and the previous chapters, three main 
aspects of policy learning can be recommended from Australia and Denmark to 
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Britain. These issues are examined in the following chapter, which begins with 
consideration of the possibility of transfer, before examining what may be transferred. 
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Chapter Seven - What can Britain learn from the Australian and 
Danish policy responses? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers what Britain may learn about assisting partnered women into 
work from the case studies of Australia and Denmark. The following Section 7.2 
returns to the theory explored in Chapter Two concerning policy transfer and policy 
translation in light of the findings from this study. The fourth sub-dimension of 
recalibration (politico-institutional) is utilised in Section 7.3 to highlight the 
implications for the translatability of specific polices to Britain: partial 
individualisation of benefits, the extension of childcare as a prerequisite for activation 
policy, and individually responsive employment assistance. These policy 
recommendations are considered in detail in the sub-sections of Section 7.3, drawing 
on the similarities and differences between the three countries explored in the 
preceding chapters. Section 7.4 discusses the negative lessons which may be learnt 
from the Australian and Danish case studies and Section 7.5 summarises the chapter. 
 
The chapter commences by reviewing the similarities and differences evidenced by 
this analysis of the policy responses to partnered women outside the labour market in 
the three countries. Table 7.1 summarises these aspects as reflections of the three sub-
dimensions of recalibration examined so far.  
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Table 7.1: Policy similarities and differences between the three countries in relation to 
partnered women outside the labour market 
Sub-
dimensions of 
recalibration  
Britain Australia 
 
Denmark 
Access to 
benefits  
 
Functional 
 
Normative 
 
Distributive 
Pre-Welfare Reform 
Act 2009: 
wives/partners, 
mothers/carers, 
disabled 
 
Post-Welfare 
Reform Act: 
workers or disabled 
 
Pre-Working 
Nation:  
wives/partners 
 
Pre-Welfare to 
Work: mothers, 
carers, disabled 
 
Post-Welfare to 
Work: 
mothers/workers, 
carers, disabled 
Insured and 
uninsured 
unemployed: 
worker 
 
Spouse supplement: 
wife 
 
Post-300 hours rule: 
worker 
Social contract 
 
Functional  
 
Normative 
 
Distributive 
‘Rights and 
responsibilities’ 
 
Increased 
conditionality for 
partners, 
particularly post-
Welfare Reform Act  
 
Eventually only 
exemptions for 
parents with 
youngest child 
aged under one and 
for carers  
 
Number of hours of 
activity not 
specified, but policy 
goal of at least 16 
hours of paid work 
per week 
‘Mutual obligation’ 
 
 
Increased 
conditionality for 
partnered parents 
 
 
 
Exemptions for 
carers and parents 
with youngest 
children below six 
 
15 hours paid work 
or job search each 
week, plus 150 
hours of Mutual 
Obligation activity 
within a 26-week 
period 
‘Right and duty’ to 
activation 
 
‘All must be active’ 
in return for benefit  
 
 
 
 
Exemptions for 
parents of children 
under one and 
permanently sick 
 
 
300 hours within 
two-year period 
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Sub-
dimensions of 
recalibration  
Britain Australia 
 
Denmark 
Childcare 
 
Functional 
 
Normative 
 
 
Predominantly 
marketised 
provision 
 
Universal Child 
Benefit,  
15 hours of free 
early years 
education for 38 
weeks per year 
from age 3, targeted 
provision for 2 year 
olds 
 
Income-tested 
Child Tax Credit, 
income- and work-
related childcare 
element of Working 
Tax Credit.  
Jobcentre Plus 
Childcare 
Assist/Childcare 
Subsidy, employer-
supported childcare 
vouchers 
Predominantly 
marketised 
provision 
 
Income-related 
Childcare Benefit: 
24 hours of 
childcare per week 
regardless of work 
status, up to 50 
hours dependent 
on activity status 
 
Childcare Rebate 
refunds up to 50% 
of costs to a limit 
(no income test), 
dependent on 
activity status 
 
Income-tested 
Family Tax Benefit 
Part A,  
Family Tax Benefit 
Part B income 
tested for families 
with one earner  
Predominantly 
state-provided day-
care 
 
Universal from 6 
months of age, at 
low cost to parents, 
graduated 
according to income 
 
Family benefits per 
child  
 
Extra subsidies for 
low income families 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Access to benefits (Chapter Five) illustrates the recalibration of the function of the 
three welfare states in providing social security for partnered women and this can be 
linked with the changing social contracts for activation (Chapter Five) in each of the 
countries. These recalibrations are, in turn, reflective of distributive recalibration 
(Chapter Five) in governing conditionality and activation for particular social groups. 
Childcare reflects the functional recalibration of the provision of alternative care by 
welfare states (Chapter Five). Each of these aspects are interlinked and are 
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underpinned by normative recalibration (Chapter Six), reflecting how the roles of 
partnered women in families and the labour market have been enshrined in the 
policies, illustrative of the nexus of work, nation and family. There are also 
institutional aspects to each of the policy features described here (access to benefits, 
social contracts for activation, childcare) and these are discussed in this chapter in 
relation to politico-institutional recalibration and in considering policy learning for 
Britain from Australia and Denmark. Before considering these aspects, we will return 
to the hypotheses posited at the start of the research. 
 
The first hypothesis was that the higher labour market participation of partnered 
women in Denmark, compared with Britain, is a result of the ‘encompassing’ nature of 
its welfare state, rather than policies specifically targeted at this group of women. This 
was supported, as the Danish policy actors attributed the high number of partnered 
women in employment to the attainment of the universal breadwinner model through 
flexicurity and activation, supported by the institutional and normative foundation of 
care, particularly day-care. The interviews linked the smaller number of immigrant 
women moving into employment with health problems, cultural issues and 
discriminatory labour market practices. For predominantly political and symbolic 
reasons this policy ‘problem’ has been addressed by a targeted policy in the form of 
the 300 hours rule and its precursor (the spouse supplement), which are to some extent 
anomalies within the encompassing Danish model. In terms of numbers of married 
women into work and off benefits the 300 hours rule appeared to have had some 
success, but with increased poverty for many. 
 
The second hypothesis was that there would be policies in Australia which, as in 
Britain, were specifically targeted at non-working partnered women but which had a 
differential impact on their labour market participation. This was also supported. The 
Australian policy response to partnered women outside the labour market is based on 
a policy genealogy of reforms to Parenting Payment. The first of these (Working 
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Nation) increased the labour market participation of partnered women without 
children. Compared with British partners, there appeared to be less health problems 
amongst this group and less incidence of caring for adults. Welfare to Work appears to 
have led to a decrease in claims for both PPs and PPp for a small sub-set of the 
population, but results were mixed. The Australian case study also highlighted the 
different conceptualisations of economic and social participation in the genealogy of 
welfare reforms, as well as highlighting that the binary of active/passive is not as clear-
cut in reality as it is purported to be in policymaking. Australia has a more established 
foundation of childcare than Britain, although its female labour market participation 
and take-up of childcare is lower than Britain, suggesting that the male breadwinner is 
persistent. This may be viewed in the context of maternalist policies which support, 
but also reinforce, the principle of care. 
 
In terms of whether targeted or encompassing approaches are more effective, this 
analysis argues for an approach which moves away from categorical assistance based 
on benefits claimed. It suggests that policy responses to partnered women outside the 
labour market should be encompassing in terms of complementarity across policy 
areas (such as activation and childcare), but that employment assistance should be 
responsive to individual requirements. 
 
7.2 The possibility of policy translation 
 
This section begins by returning to the policy learning literature reviewed in Chapter 
Two to examine the likelihood of translation of policies from Australia and Denmark 
to Britain. In particular, this section discusses constraints on policy transfer set out by 
Dolowitz et al (2000): past relations, institutions, ideology and economic aspects. These 
aspects are then examined in more detail in subsequent sections relating to the specific 
policy recommendations.  
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This study has involved voluntaristic lesson-drawing (Rose, 1993). By focusing on 
content (the problems, goals, instruments and implementation of policies and 
programmes) it has been concerned with ‘policy learning’ (May, 1992: 340). However, 
it has also been concerned with ‘social learning,’ in examining the construction of 
policy problems, goals and solutions (May, 1992: 340 my italics). Specifically, the focus 
has been on ‘hard’ social learning (Dolowitz, 2009). In soft learning ‚nothing new is 
incorporated into the existing knowledge structure,‛ whilst harder forms require ‚a 
deeper understanding of how and why the object under consideration operates in the 
observed system‛ (Dolowitz, 2009: 323). Searching for policies within existing 
paradigms, or looking for ‘soft’ policy learning does not challenge the normative 
foundation of policy ‘problem representation’ (Bacchi, 1999). Examination of such 
foundations is important in considering policy translation which takes account of 
context in both the policy lending countries (Australia and Denmark), as well as the 
policy borrowing country (Britain). Ferrera et al (2000) suggest that normative 
recalibration is not merely ‚about challenging the status quo from a value 
perspective...[but] also about widening the agenda by shifting emphasis within the 
value premises themselves‛ (p.75). By recognising that activation is part of a global 
‘policy market’ (Peck, 2001: 6), this cross-national analysis does not challenge the 
activation paradigm per se, nor redefine the goal of encouraging partnered women 
into work. However, it raises questions about how it is executed in relation to 
partnered women.  
 
Two hypotheses regarding policy translation were posited at the start of this research. 
Firstly, based on welfare regime differences, it was suggested that Danish policies are 
the most difficult to translate to Britain because of the different institutional, historical, 
political, social and economic contexts and cultural specificities. There appears to be 
reluctance amongst British policymakers to look to the Nordic countries for policy 
learning and the day-care aspect seems to be viewed as a particular barrier. However, 
the Nordic countries (particularly Denmark) and Australia had some influence on the 
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British welfare reforms (Purnell, 2008). Stone (1999: 57) highlights the ease of looking 
to other English-speaking countries, which has been a practical consideration for this 
research (see Chapter Three). Nevertheless, despite the differences between Britain 
and Denmark, there are also important points of policy learning. It is not possible to 
focus on the perceived success of Danish activation without acknowledging the 
institutional and normative foundation of day-care upon which activation policies are 
overlaid, as well as the role of the state within this. Policy translation must also take 
into account the Danish flexicurity model, the social partners in the policy process and 
the decentralised policy delivery model. The second hypothesis regarding policy 
translation was that, in relation to welfare regimes, Australia’s policies may be easier 
to translate to Britain, given the similarities between their welfare states. Section 7.3 
highlights the differences between the Australian and British cases, such as the fully 
privatised employment services and the absence of contributory benefits in the former. 
By extracting policy recommendations from the two case studies, this analysis argues 
for both hybridisation and synthesis in the sense of generally ‘mixing’ different 
policies or programmes (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, Dolowitz et al., 2000), but, 
crucially, that attention must paid to the contexts of both the lending and borrowing 
countries. 
 
Hall (1993) suggests that the policymaking process usually involves three central 
variables: the overarching goals that guide policy, the techniques or policy 
instruments used to attain the goals, and the precise settings (constitution) of these 
instruments. Three policy recommendations are made in relation to policy instruments 
and settings for the goal of assisting partnered women into work: partial 
individualisation of benefits, the extension of childcare as a prerequisite for activation 
policy and individually responsive employment assistance. In terms of what 
specifically may be transferred, Dolowitz (2000: 10) suggests: (i) policy instruments, 
content and goals, (ii) programmes, (ii) institutions, (iii) ideologies, (iv) attitudes or 
cultural values, and (v) negative lessons. This study recommends that the ‘objects of 
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transfer’ (Evans and Davies, 1999) should be instruments, content, goals, programmes 
and ideologies. It is not necessary in this context to transfer institutions - these are 
defined as welfare state agencies and delivery systems (Hudson and Lowe, 2004: 148) 
and Section 7.3 describes the relevant institutions in each of the countries and the 
similarities and differences between. Institutions are not easily transferred, as they are 
cultural products linked to a country’s history (Freeman, 1999). It is also difficult to 
translate attitudes or cultural values and these are considered as constraints on policy 
translation, particularly in relation to childcare (Section 7.3.2). Negative lessons can be 
extracted from the case studies examined, in relation to negative (and unintentional) 
policy outcomes, such as increased poverty (see Section 7.4).  
 
Ideologies behind programmes may be translated as a constituent part of other objects 
of transfer, such as policy instruments. They may also be transferred as objects in their 
own right, with the instruments employed in the borrowing context being different to 
those of the lending country. As discussed in Chapter Six, the ideology of the 
commodification of women as adult workers is evident in all three countries. 
However, the translation of partial individualisation to Britain involves reform of the 
male breadwinner/derived access model of social security at both functional and 
normative levels to engage directly with partnered women outside the labour market. 
The ideology of providing alternative care as a prerequisite to activation for partnered 
women may be translated, but the means by which this could be achieved in Britain is 
not necessarily to implement a Nordic-style day-care model. Furthermore, if the 
promotion of adult (or citizen) workers and re-commodification are policy goals in 
relation to partnered women outside the labour market, it may equate to policy 
translation failure if the provision of care in Denmark and Australia is not taken into 
account. In Britain individually responsive employment assistance involves an 
ideological move away from work first approaches for partnered women furthest from 
the labour market.  
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In relation to the ‘degree of transfer’ (Evans and Davies, 1999), this analysis has gone 
beyond inspiration (Rose, 1991: 22) in engaging in hard policy learning (Dolowitz, 
2009) and examining how the programmes have operated within the wider contexts. 
Direct copying of programmes is problematic, even paying attention to the contexts of 
the lending and borrowing countries, due to institutional and ideological constraints. 
Instead, elements of programmes may be translated in terms of content, but the 
ideologies behind them and the wider context of institutions and instruments must 
also be taken into account, otherwise there is a risk of policy translation failure. 
Lendvai and Stubbs’ (2007) concept of ‘policy as translation’ rather than ‘policy as 
transfer’ rightly recognises that policies or programmes are de-territorialised and then 
re-territorialised in the act of translation and that translating policies from one country 
to another requires reconstitution, or re-siting. Thus, this study has not merely 
examined programmes in isolation, but by using the recalibration framework, has also 
looked at the context within which they are sited. 
 
Dolowitz et al (2000: 10) suggest that constraints (or what Evans and Davies (1999) 
refer to as ‘prerequisites’) on policy transfer are: policy complexity, past policies (path 
dependency), structural or institutional aspects, feasibility (in terms of ideology, 
cultural proximity, technology and economic and bureaucratic aspects), language and 
past relations. There are a number of aspects of the country case studies which suggest 
policy convergence and which may constitute a shared basis for policy translation. As 
Chapter Five demonstrated, each of the countries has moved from welfare to workfare 
and has introduced more ‘work first’ programmes, although the degree is qualitatively 
different in each case. There is ‘divergent convergence’ (Leibfried and Obinger, 2001) 
or ‘contingent convergence’ (Hemerijck, 2006). Rose (1993) argues that ‘psychological 
proximity’ is important for policy learning. Chapter Five highlighted the similarities 
between the ideologies informing the social contract297, or quid pro quo (Serrano 
Pascual, 2007):  ‘rights and responsibilities’ in Britain, ‘Mutual Obligation’ in Australia 
                                                 
297 Both Denmark and Australia have codified constitutions, but Britain does not. 
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and the ‘right and duty’ to activation in Denmark. Despite other differences, these 
similarities can be construed as a shared basis for translation, although importantly, 
the balance between quid and quo differs between the countries. In Denmark in 
particular the significance of the social contract was linked to the universal welfare 
state model. So, the provision of services to support the universal breadwinner model 
was in turn supported by high labour market participation and this was accompanied 
by the expectation that all must be in paid work, or in activation to move them 
towards this. 
 
In terms of past relations, both Australia and Britain have a shared history and still 
share a Head of State298, although the Commonwealth is arguably becoming less 
relevant given Australia’s trading relationships with Pacific Rim countries. All three 
countries are OECD members and at a trans-national level the OECD may indirectly 
coerce its member countries into transferring policy, such as activation, through the 
method of publication of indicators (OECD, 2006a). Common membership of the EU 
has an impact on legislation in Britain and Denmark within the framework of the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and is also a driver for coercive policy transfer. 
 
In relation to goals all three countries have a focus on increasing labour supply by 
encouraging partnered women into the labour market. However, this has been to 
different degrees and this broad policy goal may be overshadowed by other elements. 
For example in Denmark this relates to targets to increase the number of immigrants in 
the labour market, but also to decreasing numbers of benefit recipients from this 
particular social group. In Australia there has been a focus on encouraging more 
parents, particularly lone parents, into paid work but, as in Britain, this has been 
underpinned by a focus on decreasing numbers of benefit recipients. In all three 
countries there has been discussion of reducing dependency and increasing self-
                                                 
298
 Australia was a British colony and still has the British Monarch as its Head of State, despite being a 
Federation since 1901, when Australia‘s six colonies joined together and became state governments, Australia 
has six states and three territories, which are part of the Federation but are self-governing.  
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reliance in relation to the programmes for partnered women, although the 
‘dependency’ rhetoric has been less obvious in Denmark, except in relation to 
immigrants. In Britain and Australia policies have articulated a concern with the 
number of workless households (which is far less in Denmark), and in Britain in 
particular the reduction of child poverty (which again is far less in Denmark - see 
Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in Appendix 2) has been a key policy driver. 
 
Britain and Australia have a shared basis for translation in terms of the prevalence of 
gendered role models within couple households and the persistence of the male 
breadwinner model in both countries. However, Australia appears to have a more 
persistent male breadwinner model than Britain and, as was illustrated by Chapter 
Five, maternalism (2006) in the form of the ‘principle of care’ has not been an overt 
feature of the British welfare state in relation to partnered women. By contrast, the 
male breadwinner was relatively short-lived in Denmark and the universal 
breadwinner model dominates. This is particularly important to policymaking relating 
to the 300 hours rule, which assumes that groups which do not conform to this model 
are in conflict with the Danish model.  The new social risks to the welfare state posed 
by immigration are particularly evident in Denmark, but not isolated to it. 
 
All three countries have in common flexible labour markets, although key to the 
Danish approach is the flexicurity model as an institutional set-up, characterised by 
flexible labour markets and activation but, importantly, balanced by generous 
employment protection. In economic terms, Denmark stands out from the other two 
countries in having had a labour shortage, for which the policy response was to 
encourage as many people as possible into the labour market. However, this is not an 
explicit goal for the 300 hours rule (see Chapter Six). A common factor shared by all 
three countries is a period of sustained economic growth in which reforms have 
occurred. Peck (2001) argues that such periods have hastened the progress of the 
‘workfare juggernaut’. As discussed in Chapter Six, a favourable economic 
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environment bolsters arguments based on hegemonic regulatory assumptions 
(Serrano Pascual, 2007) that those not in the labour market are workless through their 
own choice. The economic climate to some extent sets the parameters of political 
debates and what is seen as acceptable at a time of economic prosperity is not 
necessarily seen as being so in a downturn. A further barrier to policy translation from 
Denmark is the notion that it is a high-tax/high-spend country on the one hand, with a 
small population on the other. However, some Danish interviewees highlighted that 
they felt the conceptualisation of Denmark as high tax/high spend overplayed 
differences: ‚Normally people are saying that in Denmark we pay a lot of tax, but it’s a 
very simple tax system compared to the British one because you are paying your water 
tax and your this and that and in the end of the day the taxation is approximately the 
same<We pay one lot of tax<divided up into several‛ (Jobcenter).  
 
Although Dolowitz does not highlight population as a constraint on policy transfer, 
this could be viewed as a constraint on policy translation from Denmark, with its 
population of 5.4 million, compared with Britain’s population of around 61 million. 
However, in the past this has not prevented policy learning from New Zealand 
(population around 4 million) (Dolowitz et al., 1999), or Australia (population around 
21 million). Furthermore, policies in lending countries may themselves be products of 
policy borrowing, suggesting policy hybridisation (Hemerijck, 2007). Larsen and 
Mailand (2007: 111) have described Danish labour market initiatives from the 1990s as 
consisting of equal parts innovation and imitation. In particular, Denmark has 
imitated Dutch labour market policies in their introduction of ‘one-stop-shops’ and 
Australians Working Together was based on US welfare reforms (McInnes, 2002, Gray 
and Stanton, 2002). 
 
Some accounts of transatlantic policy transfer (for example Dolowitz et al., 2000) 
suggest that failures are due to some degree of incomplete transfer. This analysis has 
aimed to gain sufficient contextual information about both the Australian and Danish 
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systems to avoid ‘unknowledgeable transfer’ (Dolowitz et al., 2000: 33-4) in relation to 
policies relating to partnered women by utilising evaluation and other documentary 
evidence as well as data from interviews with policy actors. This method, together 
with a critique of the definitions of policy ‘success,’ has intended to contribute towards 
avoiding ‘incomplete transfer’. To avoid ‘inappropriate transfer’ the four sub-
dimensions of recalibration and in particular the politico-institutional and normative 
sub-dimensions have considered the differences in social, political and ideological 
contexts in both the originating and transferring systems. Methodological issues 
arising from this research (Chapter Three) highlight the importance of the openness 
and willingness of policy actors in the originating countries to share information with 
borrowing countries: such openness is crucial in facilitating policy translation success. 
This suggests that, rather than looking to the US or Australia based on the assumption 
of institutional similarities, there is the potential for British policy actors to look to 
alternative policy lenders such as Denmark. 
 
 
The goal of encouraging partnered women into work has not been revised by this 
study, but the assumptions underpinning activation for this group have been 
qualified. Firstly, by highlighting that the extension of activation to partnered women 
in Britain has been a challenge to the assumed welfare dependency of this group, as 
well as to the function of social security; and, secondly, that the extension of activation 
in pursuit of the adult worker model has implications for the transfer of care. There are 
a number of aspects in the three countries which constitute a shared basis for 
translation, such as policy goals, the social contracts and past relations. However, there 
are other aspects which may act as constraints, such as the different breadwinner 
models enshrined in the welfare states. This analysis argues that the instruments, 
content, goals, programmes and ideologies of policies observed in Australia and 
Denmark may be translated, but that they should be hybridised or synthesised by re-
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siting them within the British context. The following sections consider the policy 
recommendations and their translatability in more detail.  
 
7.3 Policy learning for Britain from Australia and Denmark  
 
The following sections discuss the three main recommendations for British social 
policy in relation to partnered women, including consideration of the possibility of 
policy translation, drawing on aspects of politico-institutional recalibration. Section 
7.3.1 considers partial individualisation of benefits, Section 7.3.2 examines the 
provision of alternative care as a prerequisite for activation policies for partnered 
parents and Section 7.3.3 sets out the aspects of individually responsive employment 
assistance. These three sections are followed in Section 7.4 by consideration of negative 
lesson learning and in Section 7.5 by a brief conclusion before a more detailed 
concluding discussion in Chapter Eight.  
 
7.3.1 Partial individualisation of benefits 
 
A key finding from Australia was that the policy genealogy could be traced back to the 
restructuring of payments following Working Nation which, as with the British policy 
story in relation to partnered women, underscores that policy change has been path 
dependent and incremental. The process of partial individualisation of benefits for 
partnered women in Britain was begun in 2001 by the introduction of Joint Claims for 
JSA for couples without children, which constituted a significant shift in requiring 
partners of some benefit recipients to claim benefit in their own right. The Welfare 
Reform Act (2009) extends Joint Claims to partnered women with children aged over 
seven and aims to simplify the benefits system by having two principal working age 
benefits (JSA and ESA). 
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In Australia, individual activity testing accompanied individual entitlement to benefit, 
whereas in Britain for most partners individual activity testing came first under 
enhanced NDP (from 2004), and it is only under the changes brought about by the 
Welfare Reform Act that individual benefit entitlement is linked with increased 
conditionality. The introduction of partial individualisation for partnered women in 
Britain is based on the notion that partners of benefit claimants received financial 
support but were ‚free of obligations‛ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009a: 24). 
This was to an extent true compared to other groups of income support recipients, 
however if women are not claiming (and receiving) income support in their own right, 
the social contract or quid pro quo should not operate on the basis of asymmetrical 
conditionality (see Bennett, 2002). As one Australian former government official 
highlighted, partnered women claiming benefit in their own right is an important 
precursor to assisting them into work: ‚If you want to engage with this group directly, 
they need to be recipients of income support.‛ 
 
Millar (2004: 68-71) suggests that a fully individualised means-tested social security 
system would have four main aspects and that these were broadly met by Working 
Nation in Australia, but Joint Claims in the UK meets only the first criterion. Firstly, 
each person would have an individual right to claim financial support and no one 
would be able to claim support simply as an adult dependent of another claimant. 
Secondly, assessments of financial need would be on an individual basis and not 
include the needs and resources of other adults in the household. Thirdly, the award 
of benefit would cover only the needs of the individual and not adult dependents. 
Finally, payments would be made to individuals only. This analysis echoes Millar’s 
(2004: 72) suggestion that the UK has made some steps towards individualisation of 
eligibility and it also suggests that this should be continued. However, it is not yet 
clear whether partial individualisation in Britain will meet all four of Millar’s criteria, 
particularly not the second (none of the countries currently meets this in relation to 
social assistance). Millar suggests that it is possible to introduce some element of 
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individualisation into both the means test and the payment (p.71). However, it seems 
that in practice claims within a couple will still be linked and sanctions for 
participation failures will be applied to both adults. As Griggs and Bennett (2009: 54) 
highlight, cross-couple sanctioning is particularly problematic and complex in the 
context of individualised activation. This analysis recommends that, as in Australia 
and Denmark, sanctions are also individualised. Although barriers to work for 
partners may be household-related, the quid pro quo is between the individual and 
state/society and neither member of a couple should be sanctioned for the behaviour 
of the other, for which they are not responsible 
 
The Labour government in Britain estimated that up to 94,000 couples would be 
subject to full JSA Joint Claims conditionality following partial individualisation; of 
these, up to 22,000 individuals could be helped off benefits and into work after three 
years (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009a: 27). However, the assumptions 
underpinning this are uncertain due to a lack of evidence concerning how partners 
respond to increased conditionality (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009a: 27). 
One risk of increasing conditionality is that it ‚pushes people outside of the benefit 
system entirely, leading to their disconnection from both work and welfare‛ (Gregg, 
2008: 6). Griggs and Bennett (2009: 34) highlight that WFIPs had a deterrent effect and 
in both Britain and Australia evaluation evidence concerning compulsory and 
voluntary programmes for partnered parents is mixed (see Chapter Four and 
Appendix 4). One Australian campaigning organisation suggested: ‚I favour 
compulsion because those who need the assistance will not by and large volunteer‛; 
similarly one Danish government official stated that frequent contact ‚has to be 
mandatory, otherwise they wouldn’t come.‛ One Personal Adviser interviewed in 
Britain suggested that only increased conditionality would compel partners into work, 
as evidenced by the case of lone parents. However, the Australian example in 
particular highlights the balance to be struck between motivating partnered women 
who require it, but not undermining the efforts of those who are already motivated 
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and who require support and assistance to move into work. This is illustrated by the 
following quotes from two Australian interviewees: ‚A strong message is required, 
but with allowance for flexibility in the administration of such a message (former 
government official); ‚There needs to be assessment at the individualised level. For 
some we need to have those mutual obligation principles to give them the necessary 
push forward. But for another person, we think we should take you out of that 
framework, but there’s no capacity to do that in the system‛ (employment service 
provider). As Millar and Evans (2006: 74) argue, changes in definition or the 
introduction of more mandation are unlikely to assist hard to reach groups. 
 
The Social Security Advisory Committee has warned of the potential of the Welfare 
Reform Act to create tensions within couples, ending in family breakdown and has 
recommended that it be imposed in a culturally sensitive manner (Social Security 
Advisory Committee, 2008: 3, see also Department for Work and Pensions, 2008: 172, 
Bewley et al., 2005). This was highlighted by frontline workers in Australia (see 
Chapter Six) and may be an argument in favour of joint interviews, although evidence 
from both Britain and Australia is mixed concerning the efficacy of such interventions. 
Furthermore, other facets of welfare reform, such as moving recipients of Incapacity 
Benefit onto Employment and Support Allowance or Jobseeker’s Allowance, may 
result in further familisation rather than individualisation299 because partners will 
claim means tested benefits based on joint income assessment (see Bennett and Millar, 
2009: 22). This suggests that attention should be paid to the interaction of different 
policy reforms. Carers of adults are so far exempted from ongoing reforms; the 
previous Labour government stated that it would not move this group from Income 
Support or increase their conditionality ‚until it has a clear and detailed plan setting 
                                                 
 
299
 I am grateful to Dr David Byrne for highlighting this. 
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out how it will reform the benefit system over the longer term‛ (Department for Work 
and Pensions, 2009a: 43).300 
 
Sainsbury (1996: 173) sets out five different types of gender equality reforms: gender 
neutral, gender reinforcement, gender recognition, gender reconstruction and 
individualisation. She argues that individualisation reforms have tended to be more 
successful in equalising access to benefits than gender neutral measures. However, she 
cautions that individualisation is easier to pursue when the breadwinner model is 
based on the family, but harder where there is a derived access model (Sainsbury, 
1996: 197). She draws on the case of the Netherlands to suggest that there are 
drawbacks to individualisation if ‚not combined with provision of adequate childcare 
facilities and labour market measures‛ (p.197). In the case of partners in Britain to this 
can be added the provision of care for disabled or elderly adults. Sainsbury draws on 
the Swedish case to suggest three prerequisites which would aid the implementation 
of individualisation in order to benefit women: (i) adequate social benefits with 
citizenship as the basis of entitlement, (ii) policies to aid women in achieving financial 
independence through their own earnings, and (iii) marginalisation of means tested 
programmes with the family as the unit of benefit (p.197). An academic interviewed in 
Denmark commented that: ‚With individual rights *to benefit+ you don’t even have to 
study incentives because they are not there‛ (see also Adam and Brewer, 2010: 3). This 
individual model is exemplified by the citizen’s income model (Fitzpatrick, 1999, van 
Parijs, 1992, Roche, 1992: 178-189), although none of the countries examined achieve 
this. 
 
The Australian case demonstrates that it is possible to restructure income tests to 
partially individualise benefit entitlement, even if assessment is still at least partially 
household-based. The primary goal of partial individualisation in Australia was to 
                                                 
300
  In June 2008 the government published a National Carers Strategy (Department of Health, 2008) signed 
by seven Government departments and allocating £255 million of funding over three years. The strategy 
included a commitment to try to ensure that all carers who want to work are able to do so. 
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increase incentives to work by requiring previously dependent partners to claim 
benefits in their own right and by making changes to the income tests and taper rates. 
A number of policy actors interviewed in Australia suggested that attention should be 
paid to EMTRs arising from the interaction of the tax and benefits systems.301 
Whiteford (2009) argues that in Australia average EMTRs on the movement from 
joblessness into work are amongst the lowest in the OECD and that they insufficiently 
explain Australia’s high level of family joblessness compared to other countries (p.53-
55, 60) but Apps (2006) argues that high EMTRs particularly disincentivise second 
earners. Nevertheless, attention should be paid to EMTRs in designing policies for 
partnered women in Britain (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010, see also Centre 
for Social Justice, 2009).  
 
There have been concerns within DWP302 that full individualisation of benefits would 
bring a large number of new claimants into the benefits system (see also Millar, 2004: 
73); which groups would be impacted should be further examined. A by-product of 
partial individualisation in Australia was that two new groups of partners became 
eligible for payments: partners of minimum wage earners and partners of self-
employed people (interview with former government official). However, this was 
deemed necessary in relation to the goals of transforming a dependency-based system 
and encouraging more women into the labour market. Furthermore, it was 
acknowledged by the government at the time that a consequence of tightening the 
eligibility for dependency-based payments would be an increase in those claiming 
unemployment benefit, but that this would be offset by tax receipts from recipients 
undertaking more work, as well as the increased likelihood of leaving payment for a 
year (Warburton et al., 1999: iii). In the Regulatory Impact Assessment for the British 
                                                 
301
 Harding et al argue that ―means-testing necessarily creates high EMTRs — particularly when the means-
tests for two or more programs overlap and/or there is also a liability for income tax‖ - Harding, A., Vu, Q. 
N., Tanton, R. & Vidyattama, Y. (2008) Improving work incentives for mothers: the national and geographic 
impact of liberalising the Family Tax Benefit income test. 37th Australian Conference of Economists. Gold 
Coast, QLD. 
302
 Conversation with DWP official. 
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Welfare Reform Act, additional costs were anticipated from payment of health-related 
benefits to 28,000 new claimant partners (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009a: 
29). However, savings to the Exchequer are estimated to be £3,000 per year for each 
individual helped off benefits (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009a: 29).303 The 
Australian system involved the creation of interim payments304 as a step on the way to 
further restructuring, but this may not be necessary in Britain.  
 
Dolowitz et al (2000: 10) suggest that one constraint on policy translation is policy 
complexity, which is important in relation to partial individualisation. The Danish 
social security system appears simpler than those of either Britain and Australia. 
Given that British social security and labour market policies are already complex, 
increased complexity is not to be aspired to, as it has been linked with perceived 
disincentives to work (Beatty et al., 2010, Hasluck and Green, 2005, Centre for Social 
Justice, 2009, Millar, 2005). The British social security system is inherently complex, 
reform difficult and the goal of simplification elusive; the direction of reform has been 
of incremental progress towards simplification (Millar, 2005, Bennett and Millar, 2009: 
20). However, Millar (2005: 14-15) highlights that there are three different perspectives 
that may be considered in relation to increasing simplification in the social security 
system: those of DWP, those of recipients and those of the public: these are not 
necessarily compatible.  
 
In relation to negative lessons, partial individualisation and changes to the income test 
following Working Nation in Australia predominantly benefited older women 
without dependent children (Burke and Redmond, 2002), who constitute a significant 
group of British partners. Individualisation may also produce disincentives to work, as 
evidenced by partners on Incapacity Benefit in Britain (Beatty et al., 2010: 64). The 
Coalition Government’s Green Paper (Department for Work and Pensions, 2010) on 
                                                 
303
 Amounting to savings of between £15-30m in 2012/13, £22.5-45m in 2013/14 and £32.5-65m in 2014/15. 
304
 In 1994 Home Childcare Allowance was introduced as an alternative to the Dependent Spouse Rebate for 
couples with children and was subsumed into Parenting Allowance in 1998. See Appendix 4. 
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welfare reform is concerned with increasing incentives to work by altering the levels 
of earnings disregards and taper rates and some of the proposals have similarities with 
the Australian reforms. However, it is of concern that in relation to the proposed 
Universal Work Credit the right to claim financial support and payment of such 
support will be to one member of a household (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2010: 19, 33), which is potentially a regressive step in the individualisation process and 
seemingly in contradiction to the provisions set out in the Welfare Reform Act. Partial 
individualisation alone may not result in increased numbers of partnered women in 
work, although it is a significant step in engaging directly with them and overcoming 
existing asymmetrical conditionality. If a simplified and partially individualised form 
of benefit regime is coupled with more individually responsive assistance, as well as 
alternative care provision, this may help to assist partnered women into work. 
 
7.3.1.1 Politico-institutional recalibration in relation to partial individualisation 
 
Politico-institutional recalibration concerns the levels and actors involved in 
governance (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 93). In particular, Grubb (2009) has 
suggested that it significant who pays benefits.305 This was supported by one 
Australian campaigning organisation, who argued that in Australia ‚state 
governments are less concerned about employment services because they don’t pay 
income support.‛ The Australian social security system has similarities with Britain’s 
in being based on categorical benefits, however Australia funds benefits from general 
taxation, whereas both Britain and Denmark have, respectively, contribution- and 
insurance-based benefits, although Denmark finances its welfare state to a greater 
extent from taxes rather than social security contributions (Kvist and Pedersen, 2007: 
101). Serrano Pascual (2007) highlights the merging of benefits administration and 
                                                 
305
 Although FaHCSIA had responsibility for Australians Working Together, DEWR was responsible for the 
contracts in Job Network under the Active Participation Model and providers were required under the terms 
of their contract to be more work focused; this overrode other requirements. This perhaps helps to explain the 
reasons for the overriding work first approach which some policy actors criticised in Chapter Five and 
highlights that the location of responsibility for policies and programmes is important. 
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employment services as a ‘significant institutional trend’ (p.284), seen in all three 
countries. The implications of such machinery of government changes are two-fold. 
Firstly, in each of the countries social assistance payments have become the 
responsibility of government departments focused on ‘work,’ highlighting politico-
institutional as well as functional and normative recalibration. Secondly, there has 
been convergence in the creation of ‘one stop shops’306 in all three countries, which 
broadly constitutes a shared basis for policy translation.  
 
In Australia in 2004, responsibility for working age income support payments 
(including PP and NSA) was transferred from the Department of Family and 
Community Services to the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, 
which in 2007 became the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations.307 This highlighted a normative shift to a focus on work for parents in 
receipt of benefit. The Working Nation changes pre-dated the creation of both 
Centrelink (in 1997) and Job Network (in 1998). Centrelink was created as a delivery 
agency of government by restructuring the Department of Social Security, the 
Department of Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs, Student 
Assistance Centres and the Commonwealth Employment Service. Centrelink became a 
one-stop shop for government payments, although the employment service function 
was contracted out to Job Network, comprised of voluntary, public and private 
employment service providers. Policy actors suggested that Centrelink predominantly 
                                                 
306
 Britain and Australia share similarities in the physical aspects of customer-facing offices. Prior to the 
introduction of AWT, Centrelink offices were redesigned in a more open-plan style; the new Jobcentre Plus 
offices introduced in Britain in 2002 were also open-plan. Denmark no longer has open-plan Jobcenters and 
social workers interviewed suggested that side offices encouraged people to disclose more information about 
their circumstances.  
307 In January 2006 the Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS) merged with the Office of 
Indigenous Policy Coordination (OIPC) to form the Department of Families, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (FaCSIA). In December 2007 FaCSIA assumed responsibility for housing and became the 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). At the same time 
as DEWR assumed responsibility for education from the former Department of Education, Science and 
Training (DEST) and became the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
(DEEWR).  
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has a compliance function in relation to partnered women and that this was 
compounded by a lack of discretion.  
 
In Denmark the Ministry of Employment has overall responsibility for legislation 
relating to benefits for both insured and uninsured unemployed people. Responsibility 
for policy relating to cash-benefits was transferred from the Ministry of Social Affairs 
to the new Ministry of Employment in 2001, which also assumed responsibility for 
active labour market policy (Daguerre, 2007: 98). Since January 2007 services for 
insured and uninsured unemployed have been brought together in joint Jobcenters 
(‘one-stop shops’) and from August 2009 local authorities have responsibility for both 
groups of unemployed people, although AKs still retain responsibility for paying 
unemployment insurance to their members.308 In Britain in 2002 offices of the Benefits 
Agency and the Employment Service were brought together under a single ‘one-stop 
shop’ as Jobcentre Plus, which became an agency of the newly-formed Department for 
Work and Pensions, created by merging the employment responsibilities of the former 
Department for Education and Employment with the responsibilities for pensions and 
working age benefits of the former Department of Social Security. This institutional 
change reflected a normative shift from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ benefit regimes, building 
on the origins of Jobseeker’s Allowance in 1996. 
 
The merging of benefits administration and employment services, and the creation of 
‘one stop shops’ both constitute a shared basis for policy translation. However, 
institutions may change slowly and incrementally and it may be the case that 
ideological constraints have been a barrier to individualisation in Britain. Such 
ideological constraints may relate to differing conceptions of dependency and in 
                                                 
308 Concern was voiced by some Danish interviewees about this responsibility in future being transferred to 
the local authorities. It is also important to note that payment of benefits was separated by legislation from 
employment measures, which was the responsibility of Jobcenters; this separation was problematic for 
implementation of the 300 hours rule, which required close collaboration between benefit offices and 
Jobcenters. See Jensen, K. B. & Lauritzen, H. B. (2008) Local authority implementation of the 300 hour rule, 
Copenhagen, Anvendt Kommunal Forskning. 
 271 
 
particular that dependence on the state is viewed as less preferable to dependence on 
the family or market. In Australia the shift to partial individualisation involved 
recognition that ‚marital status is no longer a significant limiting factor in women’s 
labour force participation. Rather, it is the presence and more particularly the age of 
dependent children‛ (Douglas et al., 1993: i). Whether women should return to work 
after childbirth and, if so, how old their children are when they do this, are important 
normative questions for the recalibration of policies relating to partnered women and 
this links with both social norms and the availability of alternative care. 
 
7.3.2 Childcare  
 
The availability of alternative care is key to facilitating the labour market participation 
of partnered women. Although the prerequisite of care provision applies to care for 
both adults and children, space only allows for in-depth consideration of the policy 
translation of childcare. Griggs and Bennett (2009: 46) highlight that in Britain the 
foundation of universal care has not preceded increased conditionality for partners. In 
Denmark it is an institutional foundation on which labour market policies are 
overlaid. As a social worker suggested: ‚You can’t just transfer our *activation+ 
policies. Then you have to transfer our day-care system where you are guaranteed 
day-care.‛ Similarly, an academic argued that:  
 
‚It goes to prove the success of the Danish model of women being in the labour 
market. The condition is that you have these good childcare facilities. It goes together. 
Everybody loves it and they are proud of it and they want to export it everywhere 
because they think it’s so good<It goes together: labour market and childcare 
institutions‛ 
 
There are two main constraints on the translation of expanded childcare as a 
prerequisite to activation policies. Firstly, feasibility in terms of ideological and 
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cultural constraints, manifested both by policy actors, as well as families and by 
partnered women themselves; secondly, institutional (or structural) constraints. We 
will consider these in turn before addressing what may be translated. 
 
Whiteford (2009) argues that activation for parents with below school-age children is 
the solution to joblessness, as ‚even allowing low income parents to stay out of the 
labour market until their youngest child is seven years of age309 is likely to have 
significant adverse employment effects‛ (p.62). He rightly highlights that in the 
Nordic countries (particularly Denmark) women are expected to be in employment 
when their children are aged around three, but importantly ‚childcare support is 
available to encourage this‛ (p.62). As this analysis has argued, the success of the 
Danish model of moving partnered women into work is a result of encompassing 
activation policies in the context of the flexicurity model and the universal 
breadwinner model, as well as the provision of care, including childcare. However, as 
this analysis has highlighted, there are also challenges to the success of this model 
with increasing diversity in the Danish population.  
 
One Danish government official suggested that during a visit to Denmark, James 
Purnell310 expressed surprise that in Denmark there is little debate about whether 
women should work. Whiteford (2009: 62) recommends that it is desirable to have 
considerable public debate about the appropriate age at which parents are expected to 
seek work. In Denmark, debates concerning female labour market participation took 
place in the 1960s and 1970s and current debates centre on work-life balance and the 
quality and content of day-care. In Britain New Labour introduced a raft of flexible 
working legislation, however the debate about whether women with children should 
be in the labour market is still ongoing, as it is in Australia, in relation to different 
groups of women (see Chapters Five and Six); more specifically, the debate centres on 
                                                 
309
 School age 
310
 At the time Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and responsible for the Welfare Reform Bill. 
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the age of children. As highlighted earlier in this analysis, these aspects reflect 
ideology, which can be implicit or explicit in policies and may reflect or may drive 
culture or attitudes within society. Cultural or ideational aspects may be difficult to 
translate between countries, although policy may contribute to cultural change. 
Sometimes, however, policies may run counter to cultural changes in the population. 
The British Social Attitudes Survey311 suggests that 38 per cent of Britons disapprove of 
mothers working full time when their children are aged below 12 (Harrison and 
Fitzgerald, 2010). However, Steiber and Haas (2009) argue that mothers’ own attitudes 
to work and care are more important than generalized attitudes, although the latter 
may affect the former. As we saw in Chapters Five and Six, Danish policy actors 
highlighted that the Danish model does not offer sufficient choice for families who do 
not wish to use day-care, although the pedagogical aspect is important in encouraging 
its usage. Furthermore, in contrast to Denmark, both Britain (and Australia) appears to 
have a diversity of family models, which constrains the translation of Danish day-care 
policy to Britain.  
 
Australia and Denmark established childcare institutions much earlier than Britain 
(see Chapter Five) and in relation to path dependency as a constraint on translation, it 
is necessary to build on past policies and the existing institutional structures in Britain. 
The brief history of childcare in Britain in Chapter Five (Section 5.5.2) highlights that, 
as with the welfare reforms examined in this research, reforms in the area of childcare 
policy in Britain have also taken considerable time. For example, the plans for nursery 
education for three- and four-year olds set out by the Conservative government in 
1972 were not realised until the New Labour government’s childcare strategy of 1998. 
Borchost’s analysis (2002) suggests that the Danish day-care model may be viewed as a 
product of economic, structural and normative factors. One Danish academic stated: 
‚One of the big differences is that here it [day-care+ was not a women’s issue. It was a 
reform movement. It was also supported by political parties and the men and not only 
                                                 
311
 The British Social Attitudes Survey is an important barometer of public opinion for DWP Ministers. 
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by women.‛ Another academic suggested that the reason day-care has not progressed 
in Britain to the same extent as other countries, especially Denmark, is: ‚*a+ Path 
dependent explanation. One point would be the political actors were much stronger in 
Denmark and they gained influence within the state apparatus. In Britain it’s not the 
same and you had John Bowlby312 being quite influential.‛  
 
Randall (2000: 228) suggests three main reasons why childcare policy has not 
progressed further in Britain. Firstly, the unitary, politically centralised basis of British 
statism has been an impediment to childcare advocates. Secondly, childcare advocacy 
and feminist groups have been weak actors and, further, the power of trade unions 
(who were influential to the development of childcare in Australia and Denmark) and 
local authorities were weakened under the Thatcher legislation of the 1980s. Thirdly, 
the liberal state tradition of the British welfare state, in particular the historical legacy 
of non-intervention in the ‘private’ sphere, although this is not necessarily consistent. 
Bacchi (1999: 3) suggests that governments ‘intervene’ in the private sphere in both 
explicit and implicit ways, including by not providing childcare. Although New 
Labour appeared more willing to intervene in the private sphere than previous 
governments, it still appeared to consider decision-making around care to be a private 
family matter, rather than a public good (see Lewis and Campbell, 2007a). However, 
such intervention is not consistent for partnered women. Firstly, because access to 
benefits based on relationship status and benefit assessment predicated on the 
household intervene in the private sphere of the family. Secondly, activation policies 
for partnered women are an intervention in the private sphere, as increasing 
conditionality has implications for the transfer of caring responsibilities elsewhere. For 
example, Griggs and Bennett (2009: 46) suggest that activation for partners may result 
                                                 
312
 Child psychologist John Bowlby‘s ‗attachment theory‘ in the 1950s highlighted that maternal deprivation 
caused harm to children. Initially his theory was based on research with children who were hospitalised, or in 
institutional care, but was used to legitimate policymaking around childcare. Randall, V. (2000) The politics 
of child daycare in Britain. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Pages 51-53.  
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in potentially problematic, conflicting divisions of labour within families, particularly 
in circumstances where both partners are subject to conditionality. 
 
Establishing a high quality childcare system in Britain such as that of Denmark 
potentially requires radical institutional and normative change. The OECD (2007a: 22-
3) suggests that the Nordic model is not directly transferable to countries which are 
still in the process of building up childcare capacity and quality and here good quality 
local public services and considerable local government taxation powers are 
important, both of which are features of Denmark. The stated policy goal of 
‘progressive universalism’ in Britain is ‘predominantly demand-led,’ to be achieved by 
‘incremental support of piecemeal development’ (HC, 2001: Q84). Significant 
investment has been made in early years provision since 1998 in comparison to 
preceding years and incremental, piecemeal development may eventually lead to 
expanded provision, if the path dependent trajectory is followed. However, current 
provision is too piecemeal and, although a significant shift, the 15 hours (over three 
days) Early Years entitlement offer provides a low baseline compared to other 
countries. Furthermore, it conflicts with the reality of working life, as well as with the 
tax and benefits systems, which only recognise employment of 16 hours or more. Cost 
is one political constraint on increasing childcare provision, including political 
reluctance to increase taxes to fund it, or lack of political will to redistribute resources 
to this area. Pricewaterhouse Coopers have costed a number of options for pre- and 
post-school age care for both government and Daycare Trust (see 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003, Daycare Trust, 2004). To increase supply-side funding 
for running costs (Daycare Trust, 2004: 29) the estimated total cost to government and 
parents is around 2.6 per cent of GDP (around £30 billion at 2004/5 GDP values), 
around 1.8 per cent more than existing spending levels. However, with regard to 
human capital, the rate of return per dollar of investment in early childhood education 
and care is higher than the rate of return for the same investment later in the life-cycle, 
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including at school and with decreasing returns for post-school job training (see for 
example Cunha et al., 2005: 19).313  
 
Based on the cases of Australia and Denmark, there are different instruments and 
settings by which expanded childcare may be achieved. Expansion of childcare would 
be unlikely to apply solely to partnered parents, but also to lone parents, or to a subset 
of low-income parents. However, targeting childcare provision towards a sub-set of 
parents may be viewed as stigmatising or paternalistic. The existing subsidies for 
childcare in Britain are complex (see Chapter Five) and, similarly to the social security 
system, it would be advantageous to streamline these for the purposes of reducing 
both policy complexity and potential disincentives to work for partnered women. The 
complex range of subsidies, combined with inadequate provision of sufficient quality 
results in use of a patchwork of different services which may not be suited to families’ 
needs. Denmark offers one principal subsidy for pre- and post-school age children, 
graduated according to income, and Australia offers two subsidies for pre- and post-
school age children. In Britain Hakim et al (2009) have suggested abolishing the 
childcare element of Working Tax Credit, the employer vouchers and the Sure Start 
Maternity Grant and instead providing a universal untaxed and untapered Parental 
Care Allowance (PCA) to parents with children aged 0-3. This has similarities with the 
Finnish model and would offer choice not available to Danish parents. Although this 
would be in line with the liberal notion of choice, one potential drawback is that it may 
discourage the use of childcare outside the home, further familialising women and 
with potentially negative impacts on educational attainment for children. Danish 
provision is based on the importance of pedagogy and universality in improving the 
life chances of all children, which is an important aspect of reducing child poverty, as 
a Danish government official suggested: ‚The research shows that if you make an 
effort to heighten the learning among all the children, the children that benefit the 
                                                 
313
 This claim may be challenged if applied to low quality provision, although this ‗child-to-invest-in 
paradigm‘ has been influential for early years provision. See Prentice, S. (2009) High stakes: The 'investable' 
child and the economic reframing of childcare Signs, 34(3):687-710. 
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most are the vulnerable children.‛ The British universal Early Years Entitlement is 
important in relation to improving attainment and take-up is high, although it could 
be improved for poorer households.  
 
An alternative option is the Australian model, which may be more translatable to 
Britain and where subsidies are provided for family-based care. NDP evidence 
suggests that partners, particularly those from an ethnic minority, are reluctant to use 
formal childcare (Aston et al., 2009a, Coleman and Seeds, 2007), however, the childcare 
element of Working Tax Credit is not paid for informal care. Nevertheless, families 
themselves may not wish to provide care on such a regular basis314 and this may 
adversely impact on, for example, grandparents’ own risk of poverty (Grandparents 
Plus, 2010)315, as well as with their own wishes to continue in paid work in line with 
the proposed abolition of the statutory retirement age. A further constraint on 
increasing childcare provision is technical feasibility in terms of the creation of places 
and in relation to problems with current funding mechanisms, whereby providers do 
not receive full reimbursement for free places (NurseryWorld, 2010). There needs to be 
a focus on capacity-building in Britain and one possibility which is in line with the 
British model is the increased involvement of employers in the provision of care, 
rather than merely through the voucher scheme. Some large employers in the public 
and private sectors already provide childcare facilities (see Millar and Ridge, 2002: 96). 
The link between the policy goal of increasing employment rates and increased 
demand for childcare places should be recognised in relation to building capacity and 
the self-reinforcing effect on women’s employment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
314
 Further, it may important to consider how the early years framework is achieved by informal care. 
315
 The Welfare Reform Act legislated for National Insurance credits for grandparents providing care. 
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5.3.2.1 Politico-institutional recalibration in relation to childcare 
 
In terms of Danish politico-institutional recalibration, day-care is the policy 
responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior and Social Welfare316 although within this 
legislative framework, local authorities are responsible for ensuring that supply meets 
demand. It is in line with a broader international trend for childcare policy to be under 
the auspices of education ministries (Moss, 2006) and this is the case in Britain and 
Australia (the Department for Education in the former and DEEWR in the latter), 
although subsidies are the responsibility of different government institutions. In 
Denmark local authorities provide the majority of day-care, although around a third is 
provided by not-for-profit organisations integrated into the public system; there is 
only a minor role for private providers (OECD, 2006b: 46). The Australian childcare 
system has in common with Britain a reliance on the market, although Australia’s 
National Childcare program was originally dominated by the community sector (see 
Chapter Five). Using the varieties of capitalism thesis, Morgan (2005) argues that the 
availability of cheap labour in liberal market economies (such as Britain and Australia) 
promotes dependence on the market for childcare. She also argues that the more 
regulated labour markets of the coordinated market economies (such as Denmark) 
make such private services more difficult to sustain and force the issue of childcare 
onto the political stage (p.259).317  
 
Gender equality underpinned the overall objectives of childcare policy in Denmark, 
due in part to the political influence of women’s organisations and movements 
                                                 
316
 Indenrigs- og Socialministeriet (Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs) from 2007 and from 2010 the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. 
317
 The Danish model has not been immune to the neo-liberal ideas promoting choice through the market, 
although it has proved resistant to such challenges so far. For example, private solutions have been 
encouraged through pool arrangements and the role of mothers has been extended by the childcare leave act 
of 1992-3. There have also been moves to encourage for-profit care providers, for example the legislation Lov 
om Social Service allowed for contracting out of provision to a limited degree and the free-choice scheme 
promoted choice of providers, although it was optional for local authorities. Borchorst, A. (2002) Danish child 
care policy: continuity rather than radical change, in Michel, S. & Mahon, R. (Eds.) Child care policy at the 
crossroads. Gender and welfare state restructuring. New York, NY, Routledge, 267-285. Page 278. 
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(Borchorst, 2002: 268-9). Such actors have not been as influential in British childcare 
policy (Randall, 2000). However, in Denmark it was not only women’s organisations 
who argued for childcare; there was political consensus. In Australia, the main driver 
for childcare was not the feminist movement, but employers’ demands for labour in 
the 1970s and trade union lobbying in the 1980s (Brennan, 2002: 98). Funding for 
additional childcare places accompanied both Australians Working Together and 
Welfare to Work (see Chapter Four) so an explicit link was made between childcare 
and labour market participation. Bacchi (1999) argues that the market-led model 
frames childcare services ‚as primarily a means to facilitate women’s workforce 
participation‛ (p.204). Childcare should not be purely instrumental to labour market 
participation, although this does not preclude linkages being made between the two. 
As we saw in Chapter Five, in Denmark the ‘instrumental’ aspect is secondary to 
pedagogy, as all children can attend day-care regardless of their parents’ labour force 
status. Although in Britain for partnered women the Early Years Entitlement is not 
tied to labour market participation, the childcare element of WTC, employer-provided 
vouchers and Jobcentre Plus subsidies are. In Australia Childcare Benefit to fund up to 
24 hours of care per week is available regardless of labour market participation, but to 
receive 50 hours per week, funded by Childcare Benefit or Childcare Rebate, requires 
participation in work, job search, training or study. There are two principal problems 
in tying care provision to labour market participation. 
 
Firstly, it is essential that good alternative care is available at the time of job search, so 
that childcare is not viewed as another ‘obstacle’ to be overcome when parents take up 
suitable work. Secondly, the availability of alternative care as a foundation for ALMPs 
would not only help to facilitate the transition into work, but as Ridge’s (2009: 511) 
study of children of lone mothers highlights, reduce any detrimental effects on the 
welfare of children arising from transitions in and out of unsustained work. Positing 
childcare as instrumental to labour market participation may in fact be exacerbated 
through the involvement of employers in the extension of childcare provision 
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suggested above. It is significant that in Denmark childcare policy is child-centred 
(Borchorst, 2002: 268) and the child development purpose distinguishes it from other 
countries which still regard formal childcare as ‚a service for which working parents 
and employers should largely pay themselves‛ (OECD, 2007a: 23). Danish day-care 
provision has integrated education and care elements since the 1960s, as has Australia 
since the establishment of its childcare system in the 1970s. Britain has comparatively 
recently moved from a ‘childcare discourse’ focusing on childcare as ‘instrumental’ to 
paid work to a ‘pedagogical discourse’ following Every Child Matters in 2003 (Moss, 
2006). 
 
In each of the countries there is concern over quality of provision and in Australia and 
Britain in relation to cost to users. As we saw in Chapter Four, the cost of childcare is 
still a potential barrier to many partnered women in Britain, particularly those who 
would probably be limited (at least initially) to relatively low paid work because of 
their skills and experience (Aston et al., 2007: 63). Attention needs to be paid to the 
reasons for low take-up of Jobcentre Plus childcare subsidies (Coleman and Seeds, 
2007: 2, Harker, 2006: 31). The ‘selling’ of the offer to an extent relies on the skills of 
Jobcentre Plus Personal Advisers and parents need to be reassured of the quality and 
appropriateness of alternative care for their children. One way of overcoming this 
would be if more comprehensive childcare was provided so that it became a ‘social 
norm’ and take-up of the Early Years Entitlement (Department for Children Schools 
and Families, 2009) suggests that this is becoming the case for three- and four-year 
olds. 
 
In Australia increased investment in childcare accompanied the increased 
participation requirements of Welfare to Work and one of DEWR’s responsibilities 
was to monitor the number of places to ensure sufficient availability (Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations, 2006: 177). This aspect constitutes critical 
policy learning in relation to partnered women in Britain. In Britain, a key problem for 
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partnered women’s engagement in the labour market is that, although many vital 
components are in place, there appears to be a lack of coherence overall, unlike 
Denmark, where there is a ‘life course’ approach based on parental leave, day-care and 
activation policies. The decentralised policy model may also be a key reason for the 
success of the approach and in Britain there may therefore be advantages to local 
authorities assuming responsibility for early years provision (from 2010) in ensuring 
supply meets local demand, including the provision of culturally-sensitive provision 
(see Aston et al., 2007: 65). It will be important that central government and local 
authorities ensure capacity in tandem with welfare reforms for partnered women and 
attention should be paid to potential tensions which may arise between the local and 
national dimensions of policy delivery, particularly in relation to the differing 
responsibilities for policy areas.  
 
7.3.3 Individually responsive employment assistance  
 
Based on evaluation evidence, Hasluck and Green (2005: 93) recommend that workless 
couples might be more effectively treated by explicit inclusion in existing initiatives, 
such as early entry to other New Deal programmes, rather than developing new 
programmes exclusively for this group. They are partially right, as both WFIPs and 
NDP are ineffective in their current forms. Harker (2006: 8) suggests offering a ‘New 
Deal for Parents’ to both lone and couple parents, which has similarities with the 
Progression to Work model set out by DWP and Gregg (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2009b).318 As Chapter Four showed, partnered women are a heterogeneous 
group and churning between PPs and PPp in Australia highlights the unstatic or fluid 
nature of the relationship status of partnered women, also seen in Britain. There are 
potential advantages in considering partners and lone parents together, as both groups 
may experience similar constraints on paid work (Millar, 1996: 113), despite partnered 
mothers in theory being able to share care responsibilities. The latter has been 
                                                 
318
 It is not yet known whether this will be implemented by the Coalition Government. 
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assumed in both British and Australian activation policies aimed at partnered women, 
although as Chapter Four showed, in some cases partners may be unwilling to share 
care, or may have a disability which limits their capacity to do so. Furthermore, in 
relation to constraints on working, some partnered women may have more in common 
with IB recipients (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 22).  
 
In both Australia and Britain unemployment benefits319 will become the principal 
working age payments, as in Denmark. The Welfare Reform Act in Britain intends that 
employment support be provided on the basis of need rather than benefit label 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b: 7). The Coalition Government intends to 
replace all welfare to work programmes with one single programme, the Work 
Programme. This has the potential to positively move away from support based on 
categories which may be ineffective in addressing the range of constraints on working 
for partnered women. The McClure Report (2000a) in Australia suggested that a 
system based on income payment categories as the basis for access to assistance 
‚constrains the capacity of service providers to be flexible and responsive. It is also 
fragmented, which can be confusing and confronting for clients‛ (p.9). However, the 
case of Australia illustrates that caution should be exercised in treating partnered 
parents in the same way as other jobseekers. In Australia neither the policy design nor 
implementation sufficiently took account of caring responsibilities. Danish activation 
does not specifically take account of the needs of parents, but this is principally 
because alternative care is provided (and assumed) in the context of the universal 
breadwinner model. British policies should incorporate policy learning from both 
Australia and Denmark in relation to the importance of childcare provision, but also in 
taking into account caring responsibilities both as a constraint on the kinds of work 
which may be taken up, as well as by positively building on skills acquired through 
such activities. In addition to supply-side issues, the availability of flexible work is 
                                                 
319
 Newstart Allowance in Australia and Jobseeker‘s Allowance in Britain. 
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important and Jobcentre Plus can play a role in this at both strategic and local levels 
(see Harker, 2006: 35). 
 
Frontline actors need to have a range of skills to assess the needs of partnered women, 
as well to motivate and support them in their path to work. This depends on staff: 
client ratios, time available, as well as their capacity for flexibility in the 
implementation of policies. One key implementation problem for NDP was that many 
Jobcentre Plus advisers did not have sufficient partnered women on their caseloads to 
build up expertise to address specific couple-related issues (Thomas and Griffiths, 
2005: 69) or the heterogeneous needs of this group. Advisers have a range of valuable 
skills and the expertise built up from the New Deal for Lone Parents (which has a 
much higher caseload than NDP) may mean that they are more familiar with the 
needs of parents than perhaps frontline actors were in Australia. As noted in Chapter 
Four, for partnered women without children, Advisers with experience of assisting 
IB/ESA recipients may be better placed to provide support.  
 
If all income support recipients are to receive employment assistance from one 
programme, there needs to be an effective method of assessing distance from the 
labour market. Chapter Five described the assessment tools used in Australia and 
Denmark: in Australia Centrelink uses a computerised tool to place partnered women 
into streams and in Denmark job counsellors place partnered women into match 
groups during job conversations. These tools have the potential advantage of targeting 
resources accordingly, however they may also reinforce claimant identities (see 
Caswell et al., 2008) in the same way as categorical benefit systems; in Australia they 
were also too standardised to effectively assess the needs of parents (McInnes and 
Taylor, 2007). There needs to be flexibility to move partnered women between streams 
of support, as there is in both Australia and Denmark. 
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If tougher, personalised conditionality (Gregg, 2008) is to be implemented for 
partnered women in Britain it needs to be supported by effectively tailored activation 
with an emphasis on earlier intervention and individualised assistance (see for 
example Daguerre and Etherington, 2009: 16-7). The advantage of the Danish 
encompassing approach was the ability of frontline actors to construct a package of 
support to overcome constraints on working, based on the provision of repeated 
activation offers every six months. NDP evaluation evidence suggests that ‚no one 
model would suit all‛ (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 34) and this cross-national analysis 
supports the evaluation of the POEM pilot in emphasising the importance of one-to-
one responsive support. That such assistance was ‚intensive, flexible, and tailored to 
client need‛ (Aston et al., 2009a: 58) was viewed by both providers and clients as 
POEM’s key strength.320 An Australian campaigning organisation suggested that 
policy learning for partnered women could be gleaned from Pathways to Work in 
Britain and suggested a model of compulsory ‘engagements’ in the form of 
information sessions, with the option of undertaking a range of voluntary activities: 
 
‚There is a massive productivity loss in not aligning the services that you offer 
better with what people’s aspirations might be<You could get better 
productivity out of the unutilised potential workforce by doing more work up-
front on engagement and positive messages, which means to me choice, 
options and respect. So, a lot of it is about messaging. I actually think you will 
achieve the same result ultimately, but the means by which you do it is so 
much better if it’s framed respectfully with an emphasis on choice and self-
direction. Now, that may be a bit bleeding heart, but I haven’t seen it attempted 
sufficiently in this country to say ‘It’s too well-intentioned and it won’t work’‛  
                                                 
320
 Furthermore, outreach activities have been important to both the POEM pilot and the Work-Focused 
Services in Children‘s Centres pilots in Britain. See Aston, J., Bellis, A., Munro, M., Pillai, R. & Willison, R. 
(2009a) Evaluation of Partners Outreach for Ethnic Minorities (POEM): Final report. Department for Work 
and Pensions Research Report No. 598, Norwich, The Stationery Office, Marangozov, R. & Stevens, H. 
(2010) Work-focused services in children’s centres pilot. Interim report. Department for Work and Pensions 
Research Report No 677, Norwich, Stationery Office. 
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Here the focus on what the state can do for the citizens has similarities with the 
sessions provided for immigrants in Denmark, which social workers interviewed felt 
constituted positive interventions. An Australian former government official 
suggested that: ‚If people find work which fits in with their preferences, long-term 
outcomes are more likely to be sustainable.‛ (see also Millar and Ridge, 2009: 119). 
Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 set out suggested interventions for partnered women at 
differing distances from the labour market, based on the evidence from Britain, 
Australia and Denmark. These interventions should be supported by action plans 
agreed between partnered women and their advisers, based on their existing skills and 
experience and taking into account the needs of the labour market, as well as their 
individual aspirations. The action plans should be updated regularly and be flexible. 
This overall framework for assistance can be complemented by a nominal allocation of 
funding per partnered woman, but with the flexibility to purchase training or 
equipment to facilitate job entry on an individual basis, as in both Australia and 
Denmark. Some form of post-employment support is also necessary for approximately 
six months following entry into work. An Australian campaigning organisation 
emphasised the importance of a ‘progress narrative’and a government official that 
‚There needs to be more focus on retention and progression.‛ 321 
 
                                                 
321
 The importance of retention is recognised by DWP in its Employment Retention and Advancement Pilots 
(ERA). 
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Table 7.2: Suggested interventions for partnered women closest to the labour market 
Distance from the labour 
market322 
Barriers to work Suggested interventions 
Closest to the labour 
market 
(work-ready) 
Few barriers - some recent 
work experience, but 
lacking confidence 
 
No language or literacy 
requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Child or adult care 
requirements 
Job search for flexible work 
(if required, for example if 
a carer of adult or child) 
 
Assistance with 
completing application 
forms 
 
Assistance with regard to  
non-UK qualifications 
 
Other vocational or non-
vocational study or 
training to facilitate 
sustained job entry 
 
Support/advice concerning 
self-employment 
 
Childcare, respite or other 
care (perhaps culturally 
sensitive) 
 
                                                 
322
 This categorisation is informed by the POEM pilot evaluation. Aston, J., Bellis, A., Munro, M., Pillai, R. 
& Willison, R. (2009a) Evaluation of Partners Outreach for Ethnic Minorities (POEM): Final report. 
Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No. 598, Norwich, The Stationery Office. 
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Table 7.3: Suggested interventions for partnered women at an intermediate distance from the 
labour market 
Distance from the labour 
market 
Barriers to work Suggested interventions 
Intermediate distance 
(work-ready with some 
support) 
Some language or literacy 
problems 
 
No recent work experience 
 
Lack of qualifications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health problems or 
disabilities 
 
Problems other than 
unemployment 
 
Child or adult care 
requirements 
Skills for Life including 
ESOL 
 
Support to build 
confidence on group or 
one-to-one basis 
 
Guidance about work 
culture/local labour market 
 
Short-term skills 
upgrading 
 
Other vocational or non-
vocational study or 
training to facilitate 
sustained job entry 
 
Wage subsidised jobs or 
private or public job 
training for at least six 
months 
 
Voluntary work 
 
Help to identify and apply 
for work (perhaps flexible 
or culturally sensitive) 
 
Referral to other support 
 
 
Signposting/referral to 
other support 
 
Childcare, respite or other 
care (perhaps culturally 
sensitive) 
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Table 7.4: Suggested interventions for partnered women furthest from the labour market 
Distance from the labour 
market 
Barriers to work Suggested interventions 
Furthest away 
(needs considerable 
support to be work-ready) 
Never worked or not for 
more than 5 years 
 
Some language or literacy 
problems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health problems or 
disabilities 
 
Severe problems other than 
unemployment 
 
Child or adult care 
requirements 
Support to build 
confidence on group or 
one-to-one basis 
 
Skills for Life including 
ESOL 
 
Work placements/work 
trials 
 
Wage subsidised jobs or 
private or public job 
training for at least six 
months 
 
Voluntary work 
 
Referral to other support 
 
 
Referral to other support 
 
 
Childcare, respite or other 
care (perhaps culturally 
sensitive) 
 
 
Drawing on Job Services Australia, a guideline could be specified regarding the 
minimum number of meetings, with adviser flexibility to increase or decrease 
frequency according to individual circumstances (see Gregg, 2008: 109). Evaluations of 
the New Deal Plus for Lone Parents suggest that there should be flexibility and 
discretion around frequency of contact with advisers (Hosain and Breen, 2007), but 
that this risks ‚overcrowding advisers’ time and reducing effective case load practice, 
which already appears to struggle with lone parents furthest from the labour market‛ 
(Thomas, 2007: 72). Flexibility depends on resources available to the frontline. 
 289 
 
Evaluation evidence suggests that for the majority of partners, the current feasibility of 
undertaking paid work is a constraint and if not considered feasible at the present 
time, is often perceived as an option for the future when circumstances change, such 
as when their own or their partner’s health improves, or when their children reach 
school age (Thomas and Griffiths, 2005: 19). One-off WFIPs are not effective in being 
able to capitalise on any changes to household circumstances (Coleman and Seeds, 
2007: 69). McInnes argues for ‚structured and supported pathways for mothers, and 
other unpaid carers, to re-skill during or after providing unpaid care‛ (McInnes, 2006: 
3). One potential advantage of the Progression to Work approach is that it allows for 
consideration of work participation requirements at a future date, with a 
‚personalised conditionality regime which is responsive to the individual’s 
circumstances, and so that preparation for work becomes a natural progression rather 
than a sudden step up‛ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009a: 15-6). The notion 
of a ‘path’ to work (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b, Gregg, 2008) rightly 
emphasises the longer-term aspect which is key to assisting partnered women into 
work and which may be undermined by a work first approach. Work first 
approaches323 are not necessarily discounted here, but they are most effective for 
partnered women closest to the labour market and may be counter-productive for 
those furthest away.  
 
DWP (2009b) has set out a range of activities which partnered women in the 
Progression to Work group may undertake. Although the list is predominantly work-
focused, Gregg (2008) rightly emphasises that ‚the Government should define work-
related activity in a very broad way‛ (p.109), as there is the risk that the system ‚fails 
to recognise the wider contributions that claimants are making, principally as carers‛ 
(Gregg, 2008: 6). This is a key policy lesson to be learned from the Australian case. 
Focusing solely on paid work undermines opportunities for voluntary work, which 
                                                 
323
 Britain‘s predominantly work first activation approach is characterised by supply-side measures such as 
job brokering/matching, job placement, job search and short-term training, rather than demand-side solutions 
such as more substantial training, wage subsidies or job creation. 
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can be an effective method of acquiring skills and gaining confidence, particularly for 
partnered women without recent labour market experience. In their evaluation of 
Australians Working Together Alexander et al (2005) demonstrated that undertaking 
voluntary work in their children’s schools benefited both mothers and their children. 
There is also a balance to be struck between the provision of training and study 
options to produce more sustained job outcomes and in not exacerbating the lock-in 
effects of education for partnered women who do not need it, as evidenced by the 
Danish case. For some partnered women undertaking education and training is 
viewed as a step towards paid work and a way of testing spending time away from 
home responsibilities (Hasluck and Green, 2007: 93, Thomas and Griffiths, 2005: 79, 
Coleman et al., 2006: 25), but it should be available on a flexible basis to accommodate 
caring responsibilities (see Thomas and Griffiths, 2005, Coleman and Seeds, 2007)..  
 
Hirsch and Millar (2004: 7) suggest that a key issue is the extent to which activation 
can become a flexible and dynamic process, avoiding the pitfalls of, on the one hand, 
being too rigid in the requirements on individuals whilst, on the other, failing to give 
sufficient direction and continuity. Importantly for policy implementation in Britain, 
both the Australian and Danish experiences illustrate that there are limits to the ideal 
of individualised assistance in practice. The Danish example shows that the quid pro 
quo can become out of balance in favour of the state or the individual (Chapter Five). 
As an Australian campaigning organisation suggested:  
 
‚In principle we would love to be able to create an employment system where 
everybody’s aspirations and interests were able to be accommodated, but that 
process needs to cut back the other way too. So, the information you provide 
also informs people about where the work is and what you can make in terms 
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of hourly rates, or what skills are required in areas. So, you have to massage 
and direct aspirations too‛324 
 
This suggests investment of Advisers’ time, possibly over a long-term period. Cost is a 
constraint on the translation of individualised assistance. Figure 7.5 shows 
expenditure on both active and passive labour market measures for all three countries 
in 1998, 2006 and 2007. All have decreased their expenditure on passive labour market 
measures. Britain and Australia spend the same amount of GDP on active measures, 
whilst Denmark spends four times this amount, although this has reduced since 1998. 
On this basis, it could be argued that Australian ALMPs may be easier to translate 
than the Danish. However, a Danish trade union official argued that: ‚The money that 
you pay for active labour market policies is not an expenditure, it’s an investment.‛ 
Rose (2001) suggests that ‚the current economic climate favours drawing ‘cheap’ 
lessons depending primarily on the law for their effect‛ (p.14); work first strategies are 
cheaper than personalised assistance (Daguerre and Etherington, 2009: 3). Policies 
which may bring longer-term benefits are often compromised by the need for early 
and visible ‘results’ and here both the political system and the media may act as 
constraints, as well as the contracts for employment services. These are both technical 
and political constraints (Rose, 1991: 24) on policy translation, reflecting functional as 
well as normative aspects. 
 
                                                 
324 This suggestion is reflective of approaches such as Sen‘s capabilities approach. See Giullari, S. & Lewis, J. 
(2005) The adult worker model family, gender equality and care, Geneva, United Nations Research Institute 
for Social Development. Also see Sennett‘s respect approach Sennett, R. (2003) Respect. The formation of 
character in an age of inequality, London, Penguin. 
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Figure 7.5: Spending on active and passive labour market policies (percentage of GDP), 2007  
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Individualised assistance has been linked with the contracting out of employment 
services, however McInnes and Taylor (2007: 7) argue that the work first approach of 
Welfare to Work in Australia was a by-product of contracted-out employment 
assistance focused on ‘quick wins’ in terms of job outcomes, rather than on the existing 
experience and skill needs of women, as well as on individual circumstances and 
constraints relating to their parental status. They refer to ‘outcome buying,’ where 
clients are placed in jobs for 13 weeks and repeatedly churned through the system to 
achieve outcomes which enable providers to retain their contracts (p.7).325 Further, 
Mabbett (2009: 145) argues that private providers are important contributors to the 
casualisation of employment and the spread of temporary work in Australia. Finn 
(2008: 40) refers to problems of ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ of clients. In the former case, 
providers concentrate their efforts on those closest to the labour market; in the latter 
case, harder-to-place participants receive less attention or services.326 In Britain job 
                                                 
325
 Providers receive payments for sustained job outcomes at 13 and 26 weeks. There is weekly post-
placement support from providers but support for the client is gradually withdrawn after 26 weeks. 
326
 For a review of such issues relating to contracting out in Britain, see House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Committee (2010) Management and administration of contracted employment programmes. Fourth 
Report of Session 2009–10, London, The Stationery Office. 
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outcome target structures within Jobcentre Plus also need to be sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate the requirements of individualised assistance.  
 
7.3.3.1    Politico-institutional recalibration in relation to individually responsive 
employment assistance 
 
The marketisation of employment services across all three countries is a shared basis 
for policy translation, although Australia has gone further than Britain and Denmark 
in fully privatising its employment services in 1998, when the first incarnation of Job 
Network (JN) was created, replacing the former Commonwealth Employment 
Service327 with a national network of contracted private and community sector 
organisations. Within a decade it made the transition from radical experiment to 
established institution and has been a source of policy learning (Finn, 2008: 12). 
Following a review of employment services undertaken by the Labor Government in 
July 2009, Job Services Australia replaced JN. Australian interviewees highlighted that 
a ‘profound weakness’ (campaigning organisation) of this model of competing 
providers is that employers only have access to clients from one provider.328 Although 
in Denmark private providers have been contracted to provide employment services 
since the 1980s, More people into work (2002) required local authorities to allow private 
providers to compete for employment projects.329 Legislation in 2009 set out that the 
government would refund 50 per cent of all the running costs of contracting, as well as 
for active measures.330 As in Australia, providers receive bonuses if partnered women 
are still in work after 13 weeks, however Danish interviewees (academics and trade 
                                                 
327
 With Job Network also came a sophisticated computer system to manage clients. This has similarities with 
the Labour Market System used by Jobcentre Plus in Britain, first introduced alongside Jobseeker‘s 
Allowance in 1996. In terms of technology as a constraint on or enabler to policy translation (see Dolowitz et 
al, 2000) there is a shared basis for transfer in the use of computer systems for recording of contacts between 
advisers and clients in each country. 
328 However, projects such as the Yarra Centre for Work and Learning (YCWL) (funded by DEEWR and the 
Brotherhood of Saint Lawrence) are designed to help providers to jointly approach employers. 
329
 This included private providers, educational institutions, trade unions, AKs and voluntary organisations in 
the first round, but more recently contracts are predominantly with private providers. 
330
 Previously reimbursements were only for active measures. 
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unions) cautioned that economic incentives to contract out may result in cheap and 
ineffective active measures.  
 
Similarly to Australia, the involvement of both the private and third sectors in the 
delivery of employment programmes has increased in Britain,331 encouraged by the 
Freud report (2007), which has been influential to both the Labour and Conservative 
parties. Flexible New Deal (introduced in 2009) created a ‘welfare market’ (Finn, 2008: 
98); although FND has been scrapped by the Coalition Government, there is continuity 
in terms of marketisation under the Coalition’s proposals for the Work Programme. It 
is worth highlighting here the outcome-based funding model of the ‘Invest to Save’ 
(I2S) pilots (also known as AME-DEL transfer332) recommended by Freud, along with 
the adoption of ‘black box’ approaches (with little prescription from DWP) by 
providers to assist people into work, for which providers would be paid uncapped 
contract payments for sustained job entries. This appears to be the direction of travel 
for the Coalition Government. 
 
The involvement of contracted providers in all three countries alters the number of 
actors involved, increasing the difficulty of disentangling the effects of different actors 
within the policy process. In relation to politico-institutional recalibration (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck, 2003: 93), the three countries share similarities of structures and actors 
involved in the governance of employment service provision and these are set out in 
Table 5.6 below. The table reflects Serrano Pascual’s (2007: 278) suggestion that the 
activation paradigm has been accompanied by administrative and management 
reforms, such as privatisation, marketisation, competition and decentralization. 
 
                                                 
331
 The third sector is not a key provider of services in Denmark. 
332
 This model involves a change to the existing limitations of DEL (Designated Expenditure Limits) relating 
to budgets for employment services and AME (Annually Managed Expenditure) relating to budgets for 
benefit payments.  
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Table 7.6: Comparison of politico-institutional aspects of the three countries 
Feature UK Denmark Australia 
Contractualism Action Plan Individual Action 
Plans -> Job Plan 
Participation 
Agreement -> 
Activity Agreement  
-> Employment 
Pathway Plan 
Administrative 
structures  
DWP administers 
benefits and 
employment 
services through 
Jobcentre Plus 
(one-stop shops for 
access to benefits 
and assistance) 
 
Childcare is policy 
responsibility of 
Department for 
Education, 
transfers delivered 
through DWP, Her 
Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs 
(HMRC), local 
authorities, 
employers and 
private providers 
BM has policy 
responsibility for 
benefits, delivered 
through local 
authority-run 
Jobcenters (one-
stop shops)  
 
 
Childcare is policy 
responsibility of 
Department for 
Education, 
Employment and 
Workplace 
Relations 
(DEEWR), 
payments delivered 
through Family 
Assistance Office 
DEEWR has policy 
responsibility for 
benefits, delivered 
through Centrelink 
(one-stop shops) 
 
 
 
Childcare is policy 
responsibility of 
Ministry of Social 
Affairs, delivered 
through local 
authorities 
 
Policy delivery 
actors 
Personal Advisers Job counsellors 
Social workers for 
cash-benefit 
recipients 
Personal Advisers 
JET Advisers 
Some Centrelink 
social workers 
Privatisation Increasing 
contracting out of 
employment 
services to private 
and third sector 
providers 
Increasing 
contracting out of 
employment 
services to private 
providers 
Fully privatised 
employment 
service, 
contracts with 
private and 
voluntary sectors 
 
 
The roles of frontline workers are important in relation to agency in the 
implementation of policies, including translating them differently than intended by 
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policymakers (Lipsky, 1980). In this way frontline actors are important ‘agents of 
policy transfer’ (Stone, 1999: 55). Danish Jobcenters have job consultants for insured 
unemployed and social workers for uninsured unemployed. The role of social workers 
is important to the delivery of individualised assistance: ‚One of the reasons we have 
social workers in the Jobcenters is that we have people who are actually very far from 
the labour market, but we insist that everyone goes to the Jobcenter‛ (social worker). 
However, the capacity to carry out their professional role is subject to challenge 
through reduced flexibility by policies such as the 300 hours rule. Social workers are 
employed by Centrelink333 in Australia but they have not played a role in British 
employment services.334 Supervision and surveillance are a feature of all three 
countries, often resulting in a change in the role of frontline workers; the degree of 
discretion also impacts on the capacity of policies to be punitive, as evidenced by the 
following quote from a Danish social worker:  
 
‚The 300 hours rule highlights the real dilemma of social work. Many people 
working at the Jobcenter see the social worker’s job as to help people gain 
focus, to inspire them to try to make the change happen within them. They 
want these people in jobs; they don’t want them to be unemployed. But then 
suddenly their role is ‘I’m also going to remove your benefit’ and I know that 
this is going to put your children in a horrible dilemma‛ (see also Millar and 
Austin, 2006: 6, Goul Andersen and Pedersen, 2007: 22) 
 
As already highlighted, flexibility at the frontline needs to accompany individualised 
support. The Australian Welfare to Work reforms were complex both for frontline 
actors and partnered women themselves and appeared to be more constraining than 
facilitative. However, institutional constraints potentially limit the capacity of 
Jobcentre Plus in Britain to provide individualised assistance; as a centralised state 
                                                 
333
 Social workers also worked in the previous Commonwealth Employment Service.  
334
 As in Britain, there are call centres with specialised teams dealing with particular groups of income support 
recipients, such as people with disabilities and family payments. 
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function it has less flexibility than some contracted providers. Even in Denmark, the 
challenge is to provide a flexible system which is not more bureaucratic, given an 
increased tendency for control at a central level (Kvist et al., 2008: 253). In relation to 
Danish politico-institutional recalibration, two aspects are particularly relevant for 
policy translation: the institutionalised role of the social partners335 in the flexicurity 
model, and decentralisation (Etherington and Jones, 2004b).  
 
LO, the Danish trade union confederation (2008) argues that the Danish flexicurity 
system is not a low-cost system and it has strong historical roots, based on collective 
agreements between strong organisations on both sides, which does not make it easily 
exportable. LO also highlights that the flexicurity model is complemented by services, 
such as free or inexpensive childcare and care for the elderly and disabled. One Danish 
academic suggested that: ‚On a more structural level it’s hard to transfer the Danish or 
Nordic flexicurity model<But when you come to instruments on a more individual 
level<giving people specific offers at a certain point of time when they are 
unemployed, I think you can transfer these kinds of experience from one country to 
another.‛ This suggests that elements of a programme or policy may be translated, 
however to do so requires some synthesis of these elements within the borrowing 
country. 
 
Another Danish academic commented: ‚Policy transfer is very difficult when you 
come from a country with a social partnership tradition.‛ Trade unions in both Britain 
and Australia do not have such a significant role as in Denmark. In 2007 around 69.1 
per cent of workers in Denmark were union members, compared with 18.5 per cent in 
Australia and 28 per cent in Britain (OECD, 2009b).336 Serrano Pascual (2007) suggests 
                                                 
335
 There are three main trade union confederations: LO - the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, the 
largest trade union confederation, including both private and public sector workers; FTF - the Confederation 
of Salaried Employees and Civil Servants; and AC - the Danish Confederation of Professional Associations, 
predominantly higher educated workers. 
336
 In Australia, the WorkChoices amendment to the Workplace Relations Act 2005 was a significant shift in 
employment regulation in Australia. Although it was effectively repealed by the Rudd Labor government, 
WorkChoices restricted unfair dismissal protection and unions‘ right of entry to workplaces. To an extent it 
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that in countries where trade union involvement is institutionalised there persists ‚a 
degree of balance between institutional pressure to encourage people to work and the 
protection of social rights<trade unions have defended the social contract between 
the State and its citizens‛ (p.279). That the welfare and industrial relations systems are 
highly interlinked (Etherington, 1998: 150) helps to explain the significance of the 
social contract in Denmark. Since the end of the 1970s the social partners’ influence has 
principally been through their relationship with the political parties (Kvist et al., 2008: 
244), although ‚the opportunities to influence the process are slowly being 
diminished‛ (academic). This is partly a result of the post-2001 government’s 
marginalisation of trade unions in decision-making, but is also due to decreasing 
numbers of trade union members (particularly young people) linked to the buoyant 
labour market. The assumption of local authority responsibility for both insured and 
uninsured unemployed may in time lead to further decline in the influence of the 
social partners. However, to what extent these changes constitute a full-scale 
dismantling, or a mere change of role remains to be seen (Larsen and Mailand, 2007: 
116, 123). 
 
In Denmark policy implementation is devolved to local authorities, which also have 
significant tax-raising powers, unlike British local authorities (apart from Council Tax). 
The importance of this policy delivery model was highlighted by many Danish 
interviewees: ‚It is also very important that the organisation of our system is based on 
local self-government‛ (government official); ‚In Denmark the relevant authority *for 
citizens+ to turn to is the local authority, from birth to grave‛ (local authority). Local 
authorities are responsible for a wide range of services, including health, social 
services, education and labour market policies and have considerable autonomy to 
                                                                                                                                                    
compounded the effects of Welfare to Work for women with family responsibilities, making them more 
dependent on their male partners and on the benefits system and contributed to the precarious employment 
already in existence in Australia. See Elton, J., Bailey, J., Baird, M., Charlesworth, S., Cooper, R., Ellem, B., 
Jefferson, T., Macdonald, F., Oliver, D., Pocock, B., Preston, A. & Whitehouse, G. (2007) Women and 
WorkChoices. Impacts on the low pay sector, Magill, SA, Centre for Work + Life, Hawke Research Institute 
for Sustainable Societies. 
 299 
 
deliver services to meet the needs of the local population. Decentralisation of social 
policies began in the early 1970s and was further consolidated in 1987. In 1994 labour 
market policy was decentralised, with central government setting the economic 
framework,337 but regional labour market councils held responsibility for devising 
policies relevant to the local labour market context.338 Following structural reforms in 
2007 regional labour market councils act as advisers, rather than decision makers to 
Jobcenters (Kvist et al., 2008: 244). The Danish model has the flexibility to examine 
both demand and supply issues at the local level. Australian employment providers 
are also able to do this, although their efficacy was questioned by some interviewees, 
particularly in the previous JN contract.  
 
Local authorities in Denmark play a further role in activation by providing subsidised 
employment. Public employment is extensive and the strong emphasis on social 
services provides employment for highly-trained people, as well as decently paid 
work for those who are modestly trained (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 97). Although 
there is recalibration in terms of diverting the focus on public sector employment in 
favour of generating greater demand for private employment (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 
2003: 97-8), it is part of the story of the Danish ‘miracle’ that the universal welfare state 
is self-reinforcing in creating employment for women. In Australia there are three 
levels of government: federal, state and local. The Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) initiates, develops and implements national policy between the three levels of 
government and comprises the Prime Minister, State Premiers, Chief Ministers of the 
territories and the President of the Australian Local Government Association. The 
Australian federal model is the most centralised federal system in the world (Bessant 
et al., 2006: 212) and thus has some similarities with the British model.  
 
                                                 
337
 At the national level, the trade unions and the local government association 
(Kommunerneslandsforegningen - KL) are influential in this process. 
338
 The 1994 reforms delegated management of ALMP for insured unemployed to local authorities and 14 
regional labour market councils comprising the social partners (two-thirds of the seats), employers and 
employees, local authorities and doctors. 
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In Britain there is national jurisdiction for social security and labour market policies 
but this is complicated by local authority responsibility for Housing Benefit and other 
benefits for low-income households such as free school meals, as well as early years 
provision. In Britain, the local level of service delivery is important, for example the 
City Strategy and Local Employment Partnerships (LEP),339 but the importance of 
decentralisation to the Danish model is a potential constraint on translating policies to 
Britain. A number of studies have highlighted the importance of local labour markets 
to British activation, including increasing labour demand as well as supply (Beatty et 
al., 2010, Etherington and Jones, 2004b), but there are significant coordination 
problems seemingly inherent in the sub-national architecture in Britain (Etherington 
and Ingold, forthcoming). 
 
 
The previous three sections have examined the main policy recommendations for 
Britain in relation to partnered women outside the labour market: partial 
individualisation of benefits, the extension of childcare as a prerequisite for activation 
policy and individually responsive employment assistance. Consideration has also 
been given to how far these policies may be translated from Australia and Denmark, 
drawing on aspects of politico-institutional recalibration. The following section 
examines negative policy learning for Britain, before concluding the chapter as a 
whole. 
 
7.4   Negative lessons 
 
As Dolowitz et al (2000: 10) suggest, policy learning can also be negative in 
highlighting what should not be transferred. There are four points of negative policy 
                                                 
339
 Launched in 2008, the City Strategy aimed to tackle worklessness in the most disadvantaged communities 
across Britain which were furthest from the Labour government‘s target 80 per cent employment rate. Local 
Employment Partnerships were launched in March 2007, involving major employers in both the public and 
private sectors to provide guaranteed job interviews for benefit recipients. From April 2009 LEPs have been 
open to new as well as long-term jobseekers and were important to the success of the POEM pilots.  
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learning from this analysis. Firstly, the 300 hours rule in Denmark has been a 
stigmatising programme targeted at an already disadvantaged group. By contrast, the 
Partners Outreach for Ethnic Minorities (POEM) pilots in Britain offered a more 
supportive approach. As one Danish trade union official suggested: ‚The 300 hours 
rule is a good example of what you should not do if you want to increase the labour 
market participation of women.‛  
 
Secondly, the British welfare to work reforms set out by the previous Labour 
government envisaged a role for sanctions340 and this looks set to be continued, and 
possibly extended, under the Coalition. Conditionality brings with it the threat of 
punishment for non-compliance341 and the Social Security Advisory Committee has 
expressed concerns about the impact of sanctions, particularly in relation to child 
poverty (Social Security Advisory Committee, 2008). In particular the Ethnic Minority 
Advisory Group in Britain has warned that increasing conditionality for partners may 
have the unintended consequence of increasing child poverty for 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi families who are already disproportionately disadvantaged 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2008: 172). Lessons may be learned from the 
punitive sanction regime under Welfare to Work in Australia, which has been softened 
by the Labor government. When AWT was introduced the Australian Council of 
Social Service342 (2001) suggested that the most appropriate key role for Advisers was 
to improve assessment, advice and referral and to monitor progress with employment 
assistance providers in a general way but that a focus on monitoring compliance 
‚would undermine the process of supporting and encouraging participation‛ (p.6).343 
                                                 
340
 The claim disentitlement process (whereby claims were closed down as sanctions and often restarted by a 
new claim) will be replaced with a fixed one week sanction for failure to attend a mandatory interview 
(increased to two weeks for a second failure) Department for Work and Pensions (2009a) Impact assessment 
of Welfare Reform Bill. 14 January 2009, London, Department for Work and Pensions. Page 96. 
341
 This has been critiqued by Goodin. See Goodin, R. (2002) Structures of mutual obligation. Journal of 
Social Policy, 31(4):579-596. 
342
 The peak council of the community services and welfare sector. 
343
 Data published for April to June 2006 (before the introduction of Welfare to Work) show that there were 
very few breaches for PP beneficiaries - Australian Government and Centrelink (2006) Top 5 breach reasons 
by payment type for the period April 2006 to June 2006, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. 
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In Britain there is a risk of focusing on compliance rather than on providing a 
personalised pathway into work, particularly at a time of reduced investment in 
employment services. It is important that Jobcentre Plus does not become 
marginalised in the new British ‘welfare market’ model, predominantly fulfilling a 
policing function as Centrelink has done in Australia. In particular this would 
undermine the valuable skills and experience Personal Advisers have344 which 
evaluation evidence suggests is crucial for partners (Hasluck and Green, 2007). 
 
Thirdly, both the Danish and Australian cases demonstrate that there appears to be 
little to be gained by implementing an approach which specifies an arbitrary number 
of hours of activity. The Australian experience in particular highlights the difficulty of 
meeting strictly prescribed requirements in a labour market which has precarious or 
irregular employment, as in Britain. Instead, policies should reflect the state of the 
labour market and make allowances for such employment. Blaxland (2008) argues that 
many mothers were already working close to the required number of hours prior to 
the introduction of AWT and many wished, but could not find, additional hours: 
‚merely mandating that mothers spend longer each week in paid employment does 
not necessarily ensure that they will be able to find more hours‛ (p.206). This also 
highlights the importance of demand-side strategies.  
 
Finally, as the cases of both Australia (Whiteford, 2009) and Denmark (Bach and 
Larsen, 2008) show, reducing the amount of benefit, or removing it, does not 
necessarily need to accompany increased conditionality for partnered women, even in 
the guise of economic incentives and particularly if this results in increased poverty 
for households. Furthermore, the basis for economic incentives, as evidenced by both 
the Australian and Danish examples, is that partnered women make a rational 
decision not to work. In the Australian case it was clear that although many income 
                                                 
344
 See McNeil, C. (2009) Now It’s Personal: Personal advisers and the new public service workforce, 
London, Institute for Public Policy Research. See also Ingold, J. (2001) Adviser skills. Employment Service 
internal working paper, Sheffield, Employment Service. 
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support recipients were not in work, they were also not purely ‘inactive’ as many were 
undertaking voluntary work, training or education, as well as caring responsibilities. 
In the Danish case evidence suggests that many married women affected by the 300 
hours rule have significant health problems. Although some may be pushed into work 
by the economic incentive of loss of benefit, most are not able to obtain work without 
assistance. 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
Partial individualisation is seen in relation to partnered women in both Australia and 
Denmark but policy learning is taken from Australia in relation to the principle of 
extending conditionality to this group by partially individualising benefits for a group 
who have previously had derived access. Partial individualisation is also in line with 
other British social security policies in relation to means testing on the household; 
although this is not sufficiently gender-equalising, translation of policies must 
recognise the path dependency of existing policies. Current politico-institutional 
aspects in all three countries provide a shared basis for policy transfer in relation to 
partial individualisation, such as the machinery of government changes and the 
creation of one-stop shops. Although partial individualisation in Britain is to be 
welcomed in relation to gender equality and re-balancing the asymmetrical 
conditionality of previous policies for partnered women, there are a number of 
persistent concerns. Firstly, that sanctions will still be imposed upon both members of 
a couple for the behaviour of one partner. Secondly, that partial individualisation 
combined with increased conditionality may result in partnered women exiting the 
benefits system but not entering paid work, which is of concern, especially in relation 
to child poverty. However, this may be addressed by the provision of individually 
responsive employment assistance.  
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In relation to childcare, this analysis suggests that a Nordic model of care, particularly 
childcare, may not be possible in the current British context. This is based on the 
diversity of family models in Britain, as well as the notion of (neo-) liberalism, which is 
constrained in the Danish model, although Denmark has had ‚a stronger touch of 
liberalism‛ than the other Nordic countries (Borchorst, 2002: 270). The Danish model is 
reflective of universalism, decentralisation and the role of the state, but in Britain pre-
school provision, particularly in the form of care, is still contested as an intervention in 
the private sphere. However, the ideology of the centrality of alternative care as an 
institutional and normative foundation on which activation policies are overlaid is 
translatable, but there are economic, institutional and ideological constraints on its 
translation, both in relation to policy actors as well as partnered women and their 
families. The existing Early Years Entitlement and related changes to pre- and post-
school provision during the New Labour years represent significant steps for further 
welfare recalibrations. Both Australia and Denmark provide a simpler system of 
subsidies graduated according to income which should be explored. There is also a 
requirement for further improvements to current funding mechanisms as well as 
capacity-building on a structural level, which may usefully involve employers, 
although caution is advised regarding the instrumentality of childcare provision by 
linking it to paid work.  
 
The model of individually responsive employment assistance suggested here is based 
on policy learning from both Australia and Denmark in terms of providing a package 
of support to partnered women, taking into account their existing skills, needs and 
aspirations (including intra-household constraints on working), but balanced with the 
needs of the labour market. This is a difficult balance to maintain and the case studies 
highlight the challenges in relation to implementation at the frontline, as well as those 
arising from the contracting-out of employment services. The model of individualised 
assistance recommended is supported by increased flexibility at the frontline, 
including with regard to regularity of contact with partnered women. However, this 
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requires sufficient staff: client ratios, as well as effective resourcing and how far this is 
possible within the current, predominantly centralised Jobcentre Plus framework 
should be explored. The Coalition Government’s plan to move away from 
employment programmes based on categories of benefit recipients is to be welcomed. 
However, the Australian case highlights that within this model of a single working age 
programme, attention must be paid to the needs of partnered women with caring 
responsibilities, particularly in the absence of sufficient alternative care.  
 
As well as path dependency Randall (2000: 187) highlights the importance of timing in 
relation to the development of childcare policy. Timing is an important aspect of the 
translation of all three policy recommendations from this study. Specific policy 
responses are shaped by path-dependent legacies, by institutional structures of 
decision-making, but crucially by policy makers’ capacity for innovation (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck, 2003: 122). The beginning of the process of successful translation relies 
upon agents of policy transfer (such as individuals, networks345 and organisations) 
(Stone, 1999: 55) to move issues onto the policy agenda and to seek out ‘policy spaces’ 
(Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007: 185) and opportunities (such as changes in government), in 
which new ideas may be discussed. However, this analysis has also highlighted the 
role of path dependency as a constraint on policy translation, both in institutional and 
ideational terms. 
 
                                                 
345
 Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggest ‗policy communities‘, Adler and Haas (1992) focus on ‗epistemic 
communities‘ and Evans and Davies highlight the role of ‗policy transfer networks‘. See Evans, M. & Davies, 
J. (1999) Understanding policy transfer: a multi-level, multi-disciplinary perspective. Public Administration, 
77(2):361-385. 
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Chapter Eight - Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter draws the thesis to a close. Section 8.2 returns to the research questions 
posed at the beginning of the study, Section 8.3 sets out the contribution of the thesis 
to the theoretical literature, Section 8.4 considers the strengths and weaknesses of the 
methodological approach and Section 8.5 sets out suggestions for further research. 
Section 8.6 provides some closing thoughts. 
 
8.2 What this research tells us about assisting partnered women into work in Britain 
 
This research was commissioned by policymakers to produce a conceptual and 
comparative analysis of policy responses to partnered women outside the labour 
market, with a view to policy learning for Britain. The first stage of the research was an 
evidence review of OECD countries, from which Australia and Denmark were selected 
as comparators for in-depth case study research. The case study method comprised 
documentary analysis and 52 elite interviews with policy actors in Australia and 
Denmark, both face-to-face and by telephone.  
 
The first research question posed at the start of this research concerned the 
identification of the most relevant benefit (and service) policies and labour market 
interventions within a range of OECD countries relating to partnered women in non-
working households of working age. In Britain the research has predominantly 
considered the New Deal for Partners (NDP) and the Partners Outreach for Ethnic 
Minorities (POEM) pilots. In Australia, the policy genealogy examined began with the 
Working Nation reforms in 1994 and subsequent reforms relating to Parenting 
Payment: Australians Working Together (2003) and Welfare to Work (2006). The Danish 
case study considered the 300 hours rule (300 timers reglen) aimed at married couples 
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(predominantly immigrants) which commenced in 2006, in the context of Danish 
activation since 1994.  
 
Policy responses in Denmark were encompassing in that activation requires ‘all to be 
active,’ even parents and carers. However, the 300 hours rule is an anomalous, 
targeted response within this overall encompassing approach. The active labour 
market policies examined in Britain were targeted at partners and in Australia were 
targeted towards parents, both lone and partnered. Partnered women outside the 
labour market in both Britain and Australia have been explicitly viewed in 
policymaking as supplementary to the policy goal of assisting lone parents into work. 
The Equalities Review Fairness and Freedom (Cabinet Office, 2007) stated that: ‚We 
strongly believe that it is time to devote at least as much attention to finding new ways 
of reintegrating more partnered women into working life [as has been given to lone 
parents+‛ (p.68). However, this analysis has shown that assisting partnered women 
into work should not merely focus on activation policies, but dovetail with other 
policy areas. Calmfors (1994) argues that ‚The proper perspective appears to be to 
view active labour market policy as only one ingredient of many in a general 
programme against unemployment. Active labour market policy can be a complement 
but not a substitute to other measures‛ (p.38). Likewise, Dingeldey (2007) views 
enabling (rather than workfarist) policies to be inclusive of both activation and 
childcare. It is debatable as to whether even a focus on a longer-term pathway into 
work through individually responsive provision will by itself result in more partnered 
women in paid work without access to alternative care, as well as sufficient, suitable 
work. Whilst in the longer term many partnered mothers in Britain may return to the 
labour market when circumstances and their preferences in relation to caring allow, 
the risk is of atrophying skills and difficulty securing work in a changing labour 
market.  
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The second research question concerned how and for which groups of partnered 
women the policies examined have been effective in facilitating labour market 
participation, and to what extent elements of these policies are likely to be transferable 
to Britain. On the face of it, compulsion and work first approaches have been 
successful in both Australia and Denmark in moving partnered women into work, 
however one Danish social worker stated:  
 
‚A Minister can read the statistics and say ‘It’s working. We now have eight per cent 
less women on welfare’ and if you read the statistics another way, you can say it’s 
because they don’t get any money now, or maybe because the spouse is making 
money they don’t have the right *to cash-benefit+, but it’s not the same as saying 
they’re integrated or they’re in the labour market. It’s only about who’s getting money 
and who’s not getting money‛  
 
For policymakers, the policy solution for assisting partnered women into the labour 
market depends on broader ideologies about the kind of welfare state they wish to 
promote. If governmental policy actors wish to reduce the number of benefit 
recipients, the programmes examined in this study may be effective in meeting short 
term targets. However, as the evidence suggests, they are likely to result in poverty 
and other social problems (and costs elsewhere), despite the welfare rolls ostensibly 
being reduced. In legitimating the activation paradigm, policymakers need to consider 
the impact of activation policies on individuals and families in terms of ‘illfare’ 
(Titmuss, 1974: 27) for partnered women who may not secure stable paid work and 
whose families are worse off as a result, as well as the notion of ‘welfare’ constructed 
as an espousement of participation in paid work as a poverty reduction and inclusion 
measure. This highlights Titmuss’ (1974: 16) ideas about ‘means’ and ‘ends’ of social 
policy, where ends are ‘what we think we want’ and means are ‘how we get there’. 
Activation policies are not merely about increasing employment or increasing 
employability, but they reflect wider normative views concerning the role of the state 
 309 
 
and the kind of societies the state in conjunction with other welfare agents constructs 
and maintains. 
 
This analysis has argued for three changes to the British approach to encouraging 
partnered women outside the labour market into work. Firstly, the partial 
individualisation of social assistance benefits - full individualisation has not been 
recommended because this was not a feature of social assistance for partnered women 
in either of the countries studied. Secondly, more comprehensive, accessible and high 
quality alternative care for children of both pre- and post-school age as a foundation 
for labour market policies. Thirdly, employment assistance should be flexible and 
responsive to the needs of the individual partnered woman. It is suggested that all of 
these policy changes will be incremental and thus recalibrations of the existing British 
model. 
 
This analysis supports the findings from the Comparative Social Inclusion Policies 
project (European Commission, 2000) concerning activation programmes, which 
argued that activation policies should fulfil the following criteria: 
 
 They should recognise any useful activity as work, not merely paid 
employment 
 They should be located in a broader programme of anti-poverty policies, rather 
than being isolated measures 
 The resources available should be adequate for personal tailoring of 
programmes to fit clients’ needs, rather than only supporting standardised 
services 
 They should operate on the basis of respect for clients 
 They should offer positive incentives for clients to participate on a voluntary 
basis (p.83) 
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The third research question related to the driving factors and social and economic 
contexts behind the introduction of the policies examined and to the lessons regarding 
transferability to Britain. Within the activation paradigm is the assumption of the adult 
worker model. In Britain and Australia this can be seen in the shift for partnered 
women from access to benefits (Sainsbury, 1996) as wives, mothers, carers or disabled 
to access as workers. In all three countries some partnered mothers prefer to care for 
their children at home, but in Denmark benefits cannot be claimed if partnered women 
are not actively seeking work, or taking part in activation projects. This was in contrast 
to British and Australian social security and labour market policies, where historically 
the principle of care (Sainsbury, 1996) has been recognised, although within the British 
social security system this has been more explicit in the case of lone parents rather 
than partners. Denmark is the only one of the three countries where activation applies 
to carers of adults as well as children. The adult worker model of activation needs to 
take into account how caring responsibilities may be transferred elsewhere, 
particularly in the British context where alternative provision is comparatively more 
limited than in Denmark and to a lesser extent in Australia. The highlighting of 
childcare as a shortcoming of labour market policies in Britain is not unique to this 
research. However, this analysis has furthered the debate in considering whether and 
how this may be achieved in the context of the existing British model. This is 
important in the case of all three of the policy recommendations in order to provide a 
persuasive case to policymakers. In the activation state unpaid care work is effectively 
devalued. Until the lack of sufficient childcare support is sufficiently addressed it is 
likely that only partners with better skills and more chance of moving into better paid, 
less precarious work will successfully move into long-term work, or return to more 
stable and well-paid employment. This is also argued by Esping-Andersen (2009), who 
suggests that until this is adequately addressed the revolution of women’s labour 
market participation will remain ‘incomplete,’ leaving low-skilled women behind. 
Activation policies for partnered women should recognise care work as an activity 
which may be built upon in labour market interventions and include the provision of 
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appropriate employment support for such women, tailored to their distance from the 
labour market. Increasing skills and qualifications is also important in providing 
women who leave the labour market to care with a foundation of human capital; they 
may subsequently require less intensive support prior to their return. It is to be hoped 
that existing education and lifelong policies will have a positive impact on the labour 
market participation of partners in Britain in the future. Already many partnered 
women are better qualified than previous generations, although there is still a 
significant skills gap in Britain, particularly in the area of basic skills.346 There is also 
evidence to suggest that attitudes to gendered roles are related to level of qualification, 
as well as age (Steiber and Haas, 2009).  
 
One major difficulty of extending conditionality to partnered mothers is their own 
preference to care for their children and to not engage in paid work. In the case of both 
white and ethnic minority partnered women outside the labour market in Britain, 
there is evidence of traditional male breadwinner cultures. For older partnered women 
these can be viewed as products of the historical male breadwinner model, which has 
been reinforced by derived, rather than individual, access to benefits. Based on 
Serrano Pascual’s (2007) hegemonic regulatory assumptions, in Denmark the 300 
hours rule was intended to be an ‘economic encouragement’ to seek work. However, 
this was contradicted to some extent by the perception of the policy ‘problem’ as one 
of ‘culture’, as well as evidence of considerable health problems for the target group. 
‘Culture’ was an important aspect of the Danish approach to assisting immigrant 
women into work, although this was critiqued by some policy actors. Culture may be 
related in a positive way to different cultural understandings and to differing social 
norms and preferences (albeit constrained) of individual partnered women and their 
families. However, a focus on such cultural aspects should also take into account 
demand-side constraints such as labour market discrimination (Harker, 2006: 28). It 
                                                 
346 More than 5 million adults lack functional literacy and over 7 million adults lack functional numeracy 
skills. HM Treasury (2006) The Leitch Review of Skills: prosperity for all in the global economy - world class 
skills. Final report., Norwich, The Stationery Office. Page 61. 
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can be concluded that, although policies can influence welfare states’ de-
/commodifying and de-/familising potential, what may be described as cultural and 
social norms are also important.  
 
Institutional norms, such as the lack of provision of childcare and the age at which 
children begin school, may drive women’s behaviour and attitudes. ‚Country-specific 
trajectories<are not really guided by some grand design or carefully thought-out 
master plan‛ (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 124) and we have seen some of the 
contradictions in this study. One question is whether contradictory policies such as 
those in Britain may allow for more capacity for diversity, or choice. A shortcoming of 
the Danish model is that it commodifies partnered women and does not allow 
sufficient choice for those who wish to care for their children rather than be in paid 
work. A key issue relating to this study is the extent to which partnered women who 
undertake unpaid caring roles should be coerced into paid employment, or into using 
childcare when they (and their families) have a strong preference not to do so (see 
Millar and Ridge, 2009). Instead, increasing pre- and post-school age care may 
incrementally and in the longer-term produce cultural change in line with partnered 
women’s own preferred pathways to work, resulting in their increased labour market 
participation. Policies and employment need to offer a genuine choice as to whether to 
work, care or to combine the two: what Misra et al (2007) refer to as the ‘choice 
strategy’. 
 
However, Lewis and Campbell emphasise New Labour’s policy focus on the 
behaviour of mothers, without taking into account ‚the extent to which men’s choices 
affect those taken by women‛ (Lewis and Campbell, 2007b: 22-3); this is pertinent in 
relation to persistent male breadwinner models within some non-working couple 
households. Consideration of caring responsibilities should not merely focus on 
women, if one of the major issues implicit in the double bind is the degree to which 
men participate in caring and domestic activities in the home. It is equally important 
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to combine policies that allow families to provide care within the home as well as 
outside, which highlights the importance of limiting work hours and also encouraging 
men’s role in caregiving (Misra et al., 2007: 822). This may be affected by a number of 
factors, such as the flexibility of work to accommodate caring responsibilities (for both 
adults and children), as well as perceptions in the workplace about men providing 
care. The former can be driven by policies, but the latter arguably depends both on 
implementation of such policies and the changing of social norms. The Australian 
Welfare to Work evaluation suggested that an important aspect of increasing 
conditionality for parents was employers’ ability and willingness to accommodate 
flexible working (Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 
2010: 104).  
 
Mandating partnered women to seek work is also problematic if there is not sufficient 
work available, a point made by Blaxland (2008: 206) in relation to Welfare to Work in 
Australia. A key question for the British context is whether there is sufficient work for 
couple families to be dual earners/universal breadwinners, as in Denmark. One 
method of facilitating both a more equal division of care as well as sharing 
opportunities for work might be to facilitate part-time work for both men and women, 
however this would require a fundamental shift not seen in either Denmark or 
Australia. The Danish day-care system is effective in discouraging women from 
leaving the labour market for long periods and a day-care place is guaranteed even 
before parental leave ends. The absence of such joined-up policymaking in Britain may 
be one reason why many women do not enter, or re-enter, the labour market until 
their child goes to school. For 29 per cent of partners on NDP, having a baby led to 
their labour market exit in the first place (Coleman and Seeds, 2007: 17). McInnes 
(2002) suggests that a life cycle approach should be taken in policy, which enables 
women to ‚be able to move in and out of the workforce as family needs allow without 
being subjected to lifelong dependency on a partner or the government‛ (p.6). It is a 
matter of concern what the long-term impact will be of extension to parental leave in 
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Britain, if it continues to be disproportionately taken by mothers. Longer maternity 
and parental leave can help to ensure women in particular do not lose out in terms of 
job progression and lifetime incomes (Bennett and Millar, 2005). However, whilst the 
promotion of parental leave to fathers has a role in equalising both labour market 
absence and time for both parents to spend with their children, long maternity leave 
can lead to further labour market detachment (Whiteford, 2009: 62). In Britain 
maternity leave is long and low-paid and paternity leave is short and low-paid 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2009: 22).347 The Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (2009) in Britain has stated that ‚New parental rights introduced 
over the past decade are well intentioned but entrench the unequal division of labour 
and caring between the sexes and work against gender equality‛ (p.29). Furthermore, 
although the right to request flexible working offers greater flexibility than other 
countries, it ‚has so far had little impact on the traditional division of labour‛ (p.58), 
although the Coalition Government has set out plans to introduce further flexibilities 
into parental leave (HM Government, 2010). 
 
8.3 Contribution of the thesis to the theoretical literature 
 
This thesis has contributed to the theoretical and policy debates surrounding effective 
ways of assisting partnered women into work in Britain. The research findings were 
analysed using the framework of recalibration (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003), with its 
four sub-dimensions: functional, distributive, normative and politico-institutional. By 
using recalibration this analysis argues that incremental policy change helps to explain 
the policy approaches examined in relation to partnered women in the three countries.  
 
                                                 
347
 Since 1997, paid maternity leave has risen from three to nine months and 12 months. Statutory Maternity 
Pay is paid for 39 weeks at a flat rate. Paternity leave pay is paid at a flat rate of £117.18 per week (the same 
as statutory maternity pay). See Equality and Human Rights Commission (2009) Working better, London, 
Equality and Human Rights Commission. 
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The recalibration framework has been complemented in the functional sub-dimension 
by Sainsbury’s (1996) bases of entitlement to benefits and by Serrano Pascual’s (2007) 
notion of the social contract (quid pro quo). The normative sub-dimension was 
complemented by Serrano Pascual’s (2007) hegemonic regulatory assumptions and 
Williams’ (1995, see also Williams, 1989) concept of ‘work, family and nation’ as a way 
of conceptualising the perceived problem representations (Bacchi, 1999), which 
informed the policy responses. Finally, both Dolowitz’s (2009) concept of  ‘hard’ policy 
learning and Lendvai and Stubbs’ (2007) concept of ‘policy as translation’ have driven 
the consideration of policy learning from Australia and Denmark to Britain, 
complementing the work of Dolowitz (Dolowitz et al., 2000, Dolowitz and Marsh, 
1996) in assessing the criteria for successful policy transfer. The policy learning aspect 
also completed the analysis using the final sub-dimension of recalibration: the politico-
institutional. 
 
8.3.1 Contribution of the thesis to the comparative social policy literature 
 
The research is situated within the comparative social policy literature and has used 
welfare recalibration as a framework to analyse the findings from the two case studies 
in a number of innovative ways. Firstly, by focusing on policies relating to a specific 
sub-group of women (partners) this study offers an alternative to existing activation 
studies, particularly those at the macro-level which do not always provide adequate 
information about helpful interventions for specific groups. Secondly, the framework 
has been used for both descriptive and prescriptive purposes, as Ferrera and 
Hemerijck (2003) did in their analysis of the four ‘Social Europes’, but this study has 
expanded the framework outside Europe to produce a contextual analysis of policies 
in both Australia and Denmark, as well as to consider the possibility of policy 
translation to Britain.  
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Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003: 106) suggest that New Labour radically redefined the 
goals and functions of the welfare state by elevating labour market participation as the 
‘basic sphere of social integration’. Recalibrations to labour market policies for 
partnered women are symptomatic of these wider shifts, but in themselves they are 
incremental recalibrations. There is independence between the additions and 
subtractions in the social policy menu (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 90), but there is 
also interdependence amongst the four sub-dimensions, where changes in one impact 
on the others. For example, the shift to an activation state for partnered women can be 
seen in the change in the function of the welfare state from a social security state 
(although historically on the basis of derived access for partners in Britain and 
Australia); in machinery of government changes and in changes in the role of frontline 
policy actors in the politico-institutional sub-dimension; in a focus on gender and 
ethnicity in the distributive sub-dimension; in a change in the re-conceptualisation of 
the role of partnered women in families and the labour market in the normative sub-
dimension; and again in the functional sub-dimension in relation to implications for 
alternative care. This analysis argues that it is not possible to adequately examine 
activation policies relating to partnered women without taking into account 
ideological and normative considerations in the construction of such policies, 
particularly in consideration of policy translation. 
 
Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003: 89) suggest that women are key to functional 
recalibration. They also suggest that normative recalibration is perhaps the crucial 
front, or pre-condition for further policy adaptations in Nordic countries (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck, 2003: 100). This analysis accords with this argument for all three countries 
examined and, further, has emphasised that normative recalibration pervades all of 
the sub-dimensions and underpins policy change for all of the countries in this 
research. In Britain and Australia in particular activation for partnered women 
involves changes in the conceptualisation of their roles in the labour market and the 
family. Drawing on Sainsbury (1996), this principally relates to their access to the 
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benefits system: as wives, mothers, carers, workers, or as women with disabilities. In 
Denmark partnered women have been considered as ‘workers’ in relation to access to 
benefits, aside from the anomalous spouse supplement which preceded the 300 hours 
rule. The linkages between employment policy and social security seen in functional 
recalibration (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 123) are also visible in the other sub-
dimensions.  
 
One of the difficulties with activation policies in respect of partnered women is that 
they are interventions in the gender relations within families and between partners. In 
Britain and Australia this is an area of contestation, perhaps because of the ‘liberal’ 
tradition of non-intervention in the family and the separation between the private and 
public spheres. Although the term ‘liberal’ is problematic because it may be 
understood in a range of different ways, at either end of the political spectrum, 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) categorisation of Britain and Australia as liberal welfare 
regimes (although contested) has some salience to this analysis, however regime 
theory is only a part of story. Activation policies are also representations of 
individuals’ and families’ relationships with the state, as reflected by the social 
contracts (quid pro quo) in each country.  
 
Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003) suggest that Nordic countries are well ‘calibrated’ for 
responding to new risks and needs, so the metaphor of recalibration ‚finds a relatively 
smaller scope of application than in other contexts‛ (p.98). In the case of Denmark, this 
is supported by this analysis, but it is argued that the 300 hours rule constitutes a 
recalibration of the Danish welfare state in relation to the constitution of citizenship 
and nation, as a response to increasing diversity in the population resulting from 
immigration. It is not possible to state from this analysis whether this represents a 
more significant challenge to the Danish universal model, but the research thus 
provides a case study example to illustrate the importance of Williams’ (1995) ‘new 
politics of the welfare state’ comprising work, family and nation in terms of 
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citizenship, paid work and family. In all three countries there has been a shift to 
workfare and also to more ‘work first’ approaches in relation to ‘acceptable’ activities 
within the activation contracts. It argues that, particularly in the context of insufficient 
childcare provision in the UK, social security and activation policies need to support 
activities other than paid work (such as caring work, volunteering, education and 
training) which may be a way into the labour market (compare Hirsch and Millar, 
2004). By using Williams’ concepts the analysis adds to the recalibration framework by 
examining recalibration in response to migration and considers the importance of 
‘culture’ to the policy debates. 
 
Achieving gender equality requires a reallocation of caring work within families 
(Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 90) and although activation policies for partners in 
Britain and Australia assume that this will take place, gendered relations still persist in 
some couple families. The welfare state has agency (Daly and Rake, 2003) in shaping 
gender relations within the family, through for example derived access or partially 
individualised models of benefits. However, partnered women also have agency in 
their responses to such policies, although this may be constrained by increased 
compulsion and decreased choice within labour market policies and the labour market 
itself. ‘Culture’ was an important aspect for this study in two ways. Firstly, as Clarke 
(1999) suggests, culture is a ‚field or domain of social life in which meanings are 
produced and reproduced<*and+ in the process, some sets of meaning 
may<*become+ the ‘way of life’ of a social group‛ (p.77). Secondly, the notion of a 
‘welfare culture,’ defined by Pfau-Effinger (2005) as a country’s dominant model of 
welfare: ‚the relevant ideas in a given society surrounding the welfare state and the 
way it is embedded in a society‛ (p.4). Culture in both of these contexts is distinct from 
the policy goals of transforming a ‘dependency culture’ to a ‘work culture’ stated in 
policies in Britain and Australia. In Clarke’s conceptualisation, culture can also be 
understood in terms of ‘gendered moral rationalities’ (Duncan and Edwards, 1999). As 
Duncan et al (2003) suggest, partnered women may feel an obligation to care, but they 
 319 
 
may also wish to do so. However, the question is which comes first, or is more 
important: the propensity to care, or the lack of availability of flexible, suitable paid 
work which offers real gains compared with being on benefit. In Pfau-Effinger’s 
conceptualisation, a welfare culture is important in relation to policy translation. She 
suggests that different cultural family models are the basic ideas in a society in relation 
to the family and childcare, incorporating the relationship of the family with the 
employment system, the adequate societal sphere for childcare, the gender division of 
labour and dependency or autonomy in gender relations (Pfau-Effinger, 2008). Such 
gender relations are constructed by the state as well as by families themselves. These 
are all challenges to be considered in relation to the promotion of the adult/citizen 
worker model family in policies relating to partnered women. 
 
Across the life course women may be wives/partners, mothers, carers, disabled and 
workers and policies need to provide capacity to fulfill all of these at different times, 
rather than merely focusing on ‘re-commodification’ (Pierson, 2001a: 422) in restricting 
alternatives to labour market participation. Titmuss (1963) suggested that ‚The family 
seeks a new equilibrium. Somehow or other it has to conform to the contrary pulls of a 
changing society‛ (p.32). However, correspondingly there needs to be ‘flexibility’ in 
the structure of the welfare state (as well as the labour market), which needs to be 
understood as a ‘dynamic process’ (p.29). Although welfare recalibration is a 
progressive dynamic of renovation and re-casting in order to achieve a better ‘fit’ with 
prevailing societal challenges, new value orientations and progressive economic 
constraints, this assumes that all families and households have also recalibrated and as 
we have seen this is not the case for all partnered women in terms of their skills, or 
gender relations within the family. 
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8.3.2 Contribution of the thesis to the policy learning literature 
 
The approach of this study has been innovative in expanding the policy transfer 
literature in two ways. Firstly, it has used the recalibration framework because the 
focus of recalibration - policy change - is a product of policy learning. Secondly, it has 
investigated the future possibility of policy learning, rather than examined whether 
policy transfer has occurred. Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 180) underline the differences 
between the vocabularies used in the policy transfer literature, compared with policy 
as translation. In the former, the focus is on policy change/stability, whereas in the 
latter the focus is on transformation, hybridity and reflexivity. To this can be added 
‘recalibration’. Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003) suggest that the Anglo-Saxon welfare 
states ‚should make the best of their backward position by simply emulating 
Scandinavian ‘best practices’‛ (p.123) and this thesis has developed this further, 
considering whether and how this may be done, particularly in relation to childcare.  
 
This analysis has put forward aspects of both policy and social learning in terms of 
content (problems, goals, instruments and implementation of policies and 
programmes) as well as their construction (see May, 1992: 340). It has argued that 
learning from Australia and Denmark in the form of the three principal policy 
recommendations should be hybridised or synthesised within the British borrowing 
context. This is in line with Lendvai and Stubbs’ concept of policy as ‘translation’ 
rather than transfer, which brings together the policy learning and research processes. 
Policy as translation recognises that policy learning is constructed both in the art of 
looking and in what is translated and that it is constrained by institutional and 
ideological path dependency within the borrowing context. This research has also 
argued that to engage in ‘hard’ learning (Dolowitz, 2009) requires an in-depth 
understanding of the originating context and that this can be achieved through 
information from a range of sources, using mixed methods.  
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Higgott (1996) suggests that regimes are ‚principled and shared understandings of 
desirable and acceptable forms of state behaviour‛ (p.21). Such shared understandings 
are linked to institutions, which are ‘cultural products’ (Freeman, 1999: 91), which both 
constitute cultures and are constituted by them, and which are given agency by people 
and in particular by policy actors. This study has highlighted that ideology is one of 
the most important, if not the most important, constraint on policy learning for Britain. 
Institutional and cost constraints are also important for translation and all of these are 
particular obstacles to the translation of encompassing activation and day-care from 
Denmark to Britain. In institutional path dependence adherence to a policy path is 
facilitated by increasing returns; decreasing returns are a barrier to policy change and 
policy learning. Path dependency relates to institutional ‘stickiness,’ however there is 
also ‘ideological stickiness’ on the part of policy actors, as well as individual partnered 
women and their families. The basic character of welfare recalibration is as a form of 
institutionally-bounded policy innovation (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003: 121), but such 
institutions are also ideologically-bounded.  
 
The three aspects which Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003: 89-90) use to describe the 
essence of recalibration are directly related to policy learning. Firstly, there are 
constraints on policy choices and development, whether domestic or external, whether 
ideological, political or institutional. Secondly, as this analysis has demonstrated, there 
is interdependence between additions and subtractions in the social policy ‘menu’ 
across the four sub-dimensions and these are underpinned by normative recalibration. 
Finally, shifts of weight and emphasis in both policy instruments and goals are the 
result of ‚complex dynamics of social and institutional learning‛ (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck, 2003: 89-90 my italics). This analysis thus argues for the incorporation of 
recalibration as a framework for assessment of the possibility of policy learning, as 
well as in considering whether policy translation has taken place. 
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8.4 Strengths and weaknesses of the research methodology 
 
This study constructed in-depth case studies comprising elite interviews with policy 
actors, as well as documentary analysis in order to tell the policy ‘stories’ for each of 
the countries in relation to partnered women outside the labour market. This involved 
interviews with both governmental actors, as well as non-governmental actors who 
provided critical accounts of policies. The approach enabled in-depth examination of 
the policies and programmes, as well as the context, which was crucial for hard 
learning (Dolowitz, 2009) and for the assessment of the possibility of policy translation 
(Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007). The use of the recalibration framework to analyse the 
findings has permitted a truly comparative study, rather than a chapter-by-chapter 
comparison for each country, illustrating both the elements of convergence and 
divergence, which informed consideration of policy translation.  
 
The methodology of elite interviews with policy actors is under-utilised in social 
policy research. Taylor-Gooby (2002: 619) argues that quantitative studies tend to 
predominate in the comparative social policy literature because of the availability of 
statistical data, as well as the technical difficulties of conducting cross-nationally 
comparative case studies. This study highlights both the strengths of conducting such 
case studies, particularly in relation to policy learning, as well as perhaps the reasons 
why such research methods are not more commonly used, particularly interviewing of 
policy actors. Chapter Three set out the problems with identification and anonymity of 
respondents, which was an interesting aspect, suggesting that activation policies are a 
sensitive policy area in Australia. This was in contrast to a similarly sensitive area of 
policymaking in relation to immigrants in Denmark, about which policy actors were 
relatively open. However, the problems with access to data at such a late stage in the 
fieldwork planning were neither a result of the methodology nor its application.  
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For both countries access to statistical data was restricted in many cases to people with 
links with institutions within those countries. As suggested in Chapter Three, it would 
have been helpful to have been aware of such problems in advance of the country 
visits and to have had contingencies in place. Time could also have been built into the 
Australian fieldwork to learn about and gain access to HILDA data. In retrospect it 
would have been useful to have gained more signposting from actors in both countries 
towards studies concerning the reasons for partnered women moving into work in 
Australia and Denmark, rather than a ‘deficit model’348 based on barriers to work. 
However, the reasons for the focus on barriers were that this was the starting point 
constructed from NDP data, that it demonstrated comparison of like with like and also 
permitted investigation of policy problem representations, responses and goals, which 
were important for policy translation. It also facilitated analysis as to how far the 
policy responses were in line with these representations. 
 
The elite interviews were a key source of data in the absence of quantitative data 
relating specifically to partnered women in both Australia and Denmark. In Australia 
many of the interviews involved signposting to documents, perhaps because it was 
assumed that I had more knowledge of the context and the shared language meant 
access to more documents. By contrast, in Denmark the interview data were rich, 
perhaps because interviewees assumed the opposite. Aside from the difficulty of 
recording interviews with Australian governmental actors, there was perhaps a lack of 
understanding, particularly amongst the Australian respondents, that the elite 
interviews were the primary data collection method. This was clearly stated in the 
correspondence which preceded the interviews and was emphasised by the fact that 
respondents were asked to sign consent forms. One problem may have been 
respondents’ lack of time, as they were busy professionals, although notably the 
Danish interviews were fairly long in length. The other way of addressing the possible 
                                                 
348
 I am grateful to Professor Fiona Williams for highlighting this. 
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lack of understanding of the importance of the interviews as primary data would have 
been to have had more structured topic guides for the Australian interviews. 
 
It would have been of benefit for both case studies had it been possible to spend longer 
in each of the countries, particularly to have more opportunity for reflection time 
between interviews. The research attempted to collect a great deal of information 
concerning the country contexts: the benefits systems, labour market policies, 
childcare, as well as the institutions and actors involved in the delivery of policies. 
There was also a tension between the contextual focus necessary for policy learning 
and retaining the focus on the research questions. However, the study has succeeded 
in answering the research questions posed at the beginning and provided a 
contribution to the debate about policy responses to partnered women outside the 
labour market in Australia and Denmark, as well the potential lessons for British social 
policy. It has also added to the academic literature on policy transfer and translation 
and has applied the recalibration framework to a new area of study. 
 
When policies are framed purely by the quantitative effects they produce, the 
important human element risks being forgotten, for society is made up of individuals, 
families and households, as well as institutions, which are in themselves given agency 
by people. As Wright (2009) has argued, ‚the particular redefinition of citizenship 
rights and responsibilities that has occurred through the development of welfare-to-
work policies allows the consequences of the individual and collective actions of 
powerful social actors, such as policy makers and employers, to go unnoticed‛ (p.207). 
It is thus important to understand policies from the perspective of policy actors and to 
acknowledge that they are not value-free and objective, no matter how much they rely 
on positivist indicators to construct policy problems, responses and effects. Notably, 
representations of the policy ‘problem’ in each of the countries differed between the 
policymaking elites and frontline actors, academics and campaigning organisations. 
Policy actors help to construct and maintain paradigms within which policies and 
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programmes are framed, which may or may not be true assessments of the policy 
problem representations. ‚Problem definition is the active manipulation of images of 
conditions by competing political actors. Conditions come to be defined as problems 
through the strategic portrayal of causal stories‛ (Stone, 1989: 299). However, whilst 
these paradigms are powerful, they are also ‘unstable settlements’ (Clarke, 2004) and 
therefore open to challenge. 
 
8.5 Further research 
 
Firstly, in relation to further research arising from this study one Danish social worker 
commented that: ‚If you are looking for policy learning, Britain can learn from the 
Danish approach to people on sickness and disability benefits, for example early 
intervention.‛ More policy lessons could be learned from the Danish approach to 
moving people with long-term health problems and disabilities into work, as this 
constitutes a barrier to work for some partners in Britain who care for a sick or 
disabled adult, or who are ill themselves. The Danish case could also be further 
examined in relation to the provision of alternative care for adults.  
 
Secondly, further research could investigate on a longitudinal basis the relationship 
between attitudes to work and care and the labour market participation of both sole 
and partnered mothers in Australia, using HILDA data. This could also include the 
attitudes of the partners of such mothers, exploring gendering of roles within couples 
and its specific effects on partnered women. This would build on McRae’s (2003) 
examination of the influence of both institutional and normative constraints on the 
labour market participation of both single and partnered first-time mothers in Britain 
and on Steiber and Haas’ work (2009) relating to generalised and individual attitudes 
towards work and care. The transitions between lone parent and partnered statuses 
highlighted in this analysis suggest that, despite some differences between lone 
parents and partners, it is beneficial to study lone parents and partnered parents as a 
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combined group. In this context, longitudinal analysis of partnered women’s 
transitions in and out of work and between relationship statuses would be of value. 
 
Thirdly, in Britain research could examine which interventions partnered women who 
have moved into paid work felt were helpful in assisting (and sustaining) this 
transition. For partnered women not in work the research could examine the 
interventions they perceive would be helpful in assisting them into work. The 
advantage of micro-level studies is the opportunity to examine the effects of policies at 
an individual and familial level. It is important to remember this aspect when there is 
so much focus on outcome targets at the bureaucratic level. Such research could also 
utilise case studies of particular localities in Britain compared with other comparator 
countries to capture the local labour market aspects.  
 
Finally, Millar and Ridge’s (see Millar, 2007) research with children of lone parents 
highlighted the lack of comparable data concerning the role and experiences of 
children in couple families where working age adults were making the transition into 
work. Assisting partnered women into work is a ‘family-work project’ (Millar and 
Ridge, 2008) and this aspect should be explored to further inform social security, 
activation and childcare policies. 
 
8.6 Final thoughts 
 
Relatively high female labour market participation in Britain may suggest that 
participation can occur in the absence of government policies to facilitate it (Pascall, 
2008: 220, Pascall and Lewis, 2004: 220). It is against this backdrop of work as a social 
norm that governmental policy goals relating to the labour market participation of 
partnered women are constructed in Britain. However, this context also draws 
attention to the capacity for people’s agency and resistance to policies (Clarke, 2004: 
158-9) and may also help to explain why in Britain despite all odds many partnered 
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women predominantly remain in work for the majority of their lives, even if not full-
time as in the Danish model. However, others do not. The decision may relate to 
gendered moral rationalities but also to constraints. Women with qualifications, work 
experience and relatively well paid work may choose to work and pay expensive 
childcare costs, although their preferences to combine work and family may still be 
constrained. Other women with low or no qualifications, little or no work experience 
and with the potential of unstable and low-paid work may in such circumstances wish 
to prioritise care over paid work, at least for certain periods of their lives.  
 
One Danish academic suggested that: ‚Instruments that work well in the context of 
prosperity might be a social disaster in the context of recession.‛ In the light of 
proposed public spending reductions in Britain, the extension of childcare provision 
beyond what is already provided, as well as investment in individually responsive 
employment assistance, may seem unlikely. It is also a matter of concern that 
reductions in public sector spending are likely to disproportionately impact on women 
(Fawcett Society, 2010), as this sector provides flexible and relatively stable 
employment for women with caring responsibilities. Despite these challenges relating 
to the economic and political context, the recommendations from this research offer 
some suggestions regarding possible future approaches to engaging partnered women 
in the labour market and it is hoped that they will provide a contribution to ongoing 
debates. 
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Appendix 1 - Research instruments 
 
1.1 Supplementary research questions 
 
Stage 1 - Evidence Review Assessment Framework 
 
 Which policies and programmes in OECD countries encourage the labour market 
participation of partnered women in non-working households?  
 
For each country, this involves an exploration of the following:  
 
Table A1.1- Identification of policies in overall welfare state structure  
(i) Type of welfare state/classification according 
to regime theory 
(a) Claiming principle 
(b) Benefit structure 
(c) Financing 
(d) Actors349 
 
(ii) Political/ policy structure (e.g. national, federal)  
(iii) What is the scale of the problem of non-
working partnered women? 
 
(iv) How is the problem of partnered women’s 
workless status conceptualised in this country? 
 
(v) What are the reasons for the lack of labour 
market participation of non-working partnered 
women? 
 
(vi) Are there policies or programmes specifically 
targeted at non-working partnered women? 
 
(vii) Is the labour market participation of non-
working partnered women increased by means of 
wider policies, such as the operation of the welfare 
system as a whole, work-life balance policies and 
childcare provision? 
 
(viii) Are there any policies currently under 
consideration by policy actors which intend to 
address the issue of the engagement of non-
working partnered women in the labour market? 
What is the current stage of development of such 
policies or programmes? 
 
 
                                                 
349
 After Palier, B. & Bonoli, G. (1998) Changing the politics of social programmes: innovative change in 
British and French welfare reforms. Journal of European Social Policy, 8, 317-330. 
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Table A1.2 – Examination of individual programmes 
Programme (i) What are 
the policy or 
programme 
intentions?  
 
(ii) What is 
actually 
produced by 
the policy or 
programme? 
 
(iii) What is the 
take-up of the 
programme or 
intervention? 
 
(iv) Does the 
programme 
have any 
unintended 
effects? 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
Stage 2 - Case studies 
 
 What factors explain different approaches to the labour market participation of 
non-working partnered women in countries 1 and 2? 
 
In the case of countries with identified successful policies the following will be 
explored: 
 
1. Why have these programmes and policies been effective? 
2. How far is it possible to state that the programmes themselves are successful? 
 
 Success criteria 
 Job entries - this quantitative measure will need be qualified where possible by 
more qualitative aspects, such as type of job entered, level of pay, sustainability 
of jobs (including how this is defined in each country), opportunities within the 
job secured for combining work and caring activities, level of pay and the 
potential for progression. These factors are particularly relevant for non-
working partnered women in Britain, as they risk becoming caught in a cycle of 
low-paid, low-skill jobs, followed by re-entry to the benefits system.  
 Interventions may not result in job entries, but there may be measures of 
progress towards work, such as increases in job readiness, as demonstrated by 
increases in confidence before and after joining a programme.350  
 
3. Although the primary focus of the research is on labour market and social 
protection programmes and policies, what other factors impact on increasing the 
labour market participation of non-working partnered women?  
                                                 
350 Such indicators are more difficult (and less quantitative) to measure and evaluations are likely to employ a 
range of methods, which may make comparability between countries difficult. 
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4. Analysis of policies with respect to non-working partnered women’s barriers to 
labour market participation in Britain: 
 
Table A1.3 – Framework for analysis of barriers to labour market participation 
 supply-side demand-side disincentives 
to work 
(i) barriers - actual and perceived 
(e.g. caring, ill health, financial) 
   
 
(ii) constraints on labour market 
participation 
(e.g. caring, poverty traps) 
   
(iii) cultural reasons 
(e.g. no history of labour market 
engagement, travel, childcare, 
lack of skills and qualifications) 
   
 
5. Do wider social policies have an impact on non-working partnered women’s 
labour market participation? For example, is this group affected by wider policies 
aimed at broader groups such as ‘families with children’, ‘carers’ and ‘work-
life/work-family balance policies’? 
6. Are there particular programmes which are effective for specific sub-groups of 
non-working partnered women? This may be explored in terms of four sub-groups 
of partners, identified by evaluations of NDP – there may be some possible overlap 
between them (Department for Work and Pensions, 2007: 1): 
   
i. Unemployed partners 
ii. Parent partners351 
iii. Partners with caring responsibilities for people other than dependent children 
(such as partners caring for sick/disabled partners)  
iv. Partners with health problems and/or disabilities (this can be linked with group 
2 above, as some partners may be sick/disabled as a consequence of their caring 
responsibilities)352 
 
7. What specific characteristics of identified benefits or services influence the 
effectiveness of policies for non-working partnered women? 
                                                 
351
 DWP defines people as parents if they have at least one child under the age of 16 (or 19, if in full-time 
education) living within their household, whether biological or step-children Department for Work and 
Pensions (2007) Focus on Partners research brief series: parent partners. Sheffield, DWP Lone Parents and 
Partners Evaluation Team. 
352
 Fifth and sixth sub-groups of older partners (those aged between 50 years and state retirement age  - 
currently 6o years for women and 65 years for men) and ethnic minority partners can also be identified, but 
these group will not form a specific focus for this research, as they are likely to experience particular barriers 
to work and would each constitute a separate research project. 
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8. What have been the driving factors behind the introduction of such policies? 
For example, social, economic, historic context? 
9. Are these policies/programmes consistent with the historical policy trajectories 
of each country or do they signify policy change/regime shifting? 
10. How important are institutions/institutional factors in this policy area? 
11. Which actors are involved? 
12. How important are ideational processes or cultural factors? 
 
Stage 3 – Consideration of policy transferability 
 
 How do cross-national variations in approaches to the labour market 
participation of non-working partnered women in countries 1 and 2 impact on 
the possibilities for transfer of these policies to Britain? 
 
This stage will consider the following: 
 
1. To what extent are these policies/programmes likely to be transferable to Britain? 
2. What are the similarities between this country and Britain (institutions, actors, 
culture)? 
3. What are the differences between this country and Britain (institutions, actors, 
culture)? 
4. Which elements are capable of being transferred? 
5. What are the obstacles to successful transfer of these policies and programmes?  
6. What factors will facilitate successful transfer? 
7. What were the key factors that ensured the success of policies/programmes in the 
lending country and do these factors exist in Britain as a borrowing country? 
8. Where are the points for potential policy transfer failure? 
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1.2 Topic guides for Australia and Denmark fieldwork 
 
Key research question 
What policies/programmes in Australia/Denmark are relevant to encouraging non-
working partnered women into work?  Which are successful?  
 
Key areas of focus 
 
1. The broad basis for social protection system and partnered women’s access to 
benefits  
2. Financing of benefits 
3. Management and implementation of benefits system and employment services353  
4. Active labour market policies/welfare-to-work programmes 
5. Anti-poverty measures 
6. Work-life/work-family balance policies 
7. Wage subsidies/in-work benefits 
8. Employer incentives to encourage employment/retention of 
unemployed/inactive people 
9. Other initiatives such as training/skills improvement programmes and job search 
assistance 
10. Cultural context 
 
Agenda-setting, Objective-setting, Choosing policy instruments and Implementation 
 
1. What were the policy drivers? 
 
2. How did partners’ joblessness become defined as a policy issue/how did it lead 
to ideas for policy change being discussed? How did the issue get onto the 
policy or political agenda? Was there a particular driver for this? 
 
3. What other options were considered? What were these? 
 
4. What analysis or appraisal was carried out beforehand? Who by? 
 
5. Why was this option chosen above others? Who decided? 
 
6. What were the policy/programme intentions? Were they explicitly identified, 
expressed and agreed? By whom? 
 
7. Were specific target or client groups identified? Sub-groups? 
 
                                                 
353
 The first four are based on Bonoli, G. & Palier, B. (1998) Changing the politics of social programmes: 
innovative change in British and French welfare reforms. Journal of European Social Policy, 8(4):317-30. 
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8. What consultation took place with target or client groups or other 
stakeholders? (media, political parties, individuals, interest/pressure groups, 
employers’ organisations, TUs, international organisations, research, networks) 
 
9. Who supported it? Did anyone not support it? 
 
10. How far did was this choice of programme relate to the existing policies 
currently in operation? Did the introduction of this policy involve changes in 
existing arrangements? If so, what? 
 
11. Were objectives/outcomes/targets established? Targets for job entries (and 
movement closer to the labour market), numbers off benefit and sustained job 
outcomes (at 13 and 26 weeks) for this group? How were these identified and 
agreed? Where are they set down? How do these reflect political ideologies? 
 
12. Did the programme involve a shift in existing arrangements? Did it involve an 
ideological shift? 
 
13. How much does it cost? What financial resources were required/committed? 
Spending Review cycle? 
 
14. How was the policy/programme implemented? Was it piloted? 
 
15. What does the programme do? Activities? Group activities? How is this 
translated on the ground (frontline)? 
 
16. When was the programme introduced? 
 
17. Which individuals/organisations are involved in its delivery? 
 
18. Were there any key differences between policy design and implementation? 
 
19. Have there been any modifications to the programme? When? What were 
these? 
 
20. How does the policy/programme interact with other programmes (existing or 
planned)? 
 
21. How do the different departments/organisations involved work together? 
 
22. How does this policy/programme fit with current government commitments? 
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23. Are there any policies currently under consideration which intend to address 
partnered women’s worklessness? What is the current stage of development of 
such policies? 
 
Evaluation and policy transfer 
 
1. What evaluations of the programme have been carried out? 
 
2. What evidence is available about:  
 
a. take-up of the programme/impact 
b. extent to which the policy/programme has achieved intended outcomes 
c. job outcomes – at 13 weeks and 26 weeks; types of work 
d. is there any role for subsidised work? 
e. characteristics of group or sub-groups (similar to lone parents or to 
disabled?) 
f. recipient views 
g. any adverse effects 
h. unforeseen consequences, e.g. interaction with other policies, effects on 
unintended recipients 
i. cost/benefit analyses  
 
3. Is the policy successful? How is success defined? In Britain success of a welfare-
to-work policy is reflected in moving into work, movement off benefits (or onto 
an active rather than inactive benefit) and also staying in work and off benefit 
(there are also child poverty reduction targets too). In Denmark success is going 
into work, with movement off benefits a consequence. Instrumentalism or 
ideology? 
 
4. Has there been movement onto other benefits and not movement off benefits in 
full? Increase in part payments and decrease in full payments? 
 
5. What factors explain the success of the approach? What key factors ensured the 
success of policies/programmes?  (Are these factors present in Britain?) 
 
6. Have there been any unintended consequences (good or bad)? Has there been a 
deterrent effect? 
 
7. What data is available? Evaluation data, statistics? 
  
8. Do you have data about barriers for partners? Sub-groups of partners (caring, 
speakers of other languages, literacy/numeracy, health, work 
experience/qualifications)? Similar to other beneficiaries?  
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9. Is the policy successful for certain sub-groups? 
 
10. Are particularly activities more successful than others (e.g. training and self-
employment for partners in Britain)? 
 
11. What lessons can we learn from the experience of this country? Which elements 
are capable of being transferred?  
 
 
For reflection: 
 
1. What are the obstacles to successful transfer of these policies and programmes?  
 
2. To what extent are these policies/programmes likely to be transferable to 
Britain? 
 
3. What are the similarities between Australia/Denmark and Britain (institutions, 
actors, culture)? 
 
4. What are the differences between Australia/Denmark and Britain (institutions, 
actors, culture)? 
 
5. How far are the policies/programmes themselves successful? Is success related 
to wider factors? 
 
 
Table A1.4: Interviewees in Australia by type  
Type of organisation Number of interviews 
Government officials354 10 
Employment service professionals 
(Centrelink, providers) 
4 
Campaigning organisations 3 
Academics/researchers 14 
Total 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
354
 These were round table meetings with a number of officials. 
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Table A1.5: Interviews in Denmark by type 
Type of organisation Number of interviews 
Government officials 4 
Employment service professionals 
(Jobcenter staff, local authority staff, 
social workers)355 
4 
Trade unions 3 
Academics/researchers356 10 
Total 21 
 
                                                 
355
 Some of these interviews were round table meetings with a number of interviewees. 
356
 Some of these interviews were round table meetings with a number of interviewees. 
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1.3 Example information sheet and consent form  
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
PhD Research: Encouraging the labour market participation of non-working 
partnered women in the UK 
 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) in the UK currently implements a New 
Deal for Partners, which aims to encourage non-working partners of non-working main 
benefit claimants into work. These partners (mostly women) do not usually claim benefit 
themselves, but their partner receives a top-up to their benefit on behalf of their 
dependent partner. The DWP is seeking to learn policy lessons from other OECD 
countries which are more successful in moving specifically the female partners in these 
workless couple households into work. This research aims to identify why such policies 
are effective and also to identify which aspects of these policies may be transferred to the 
UK.  
 
Fieldwork for this research consists of first-hand information gained from elite interviews 
with policymakers and other stakeholders. Participants such as yourself are crucial in 
helping me to understand the policies and policy context in Australia, as well as to 
consider the possibility of transferring policies to the UK. 
 
This research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), in 
collaboration with the DWP. It is being carried out in line with ESRC requirements and 
has been approved via the University of Sheffield Ethics Review Committee. All data will 
be treated as personal under the 1998 UK Data Protection Act and will be stored securely. 
Data collected may be processed both manually and with the aid of computer software.  
The ESRC ask that all primary data produced by their funded research is archived with 
the UK Data Archives (UKDA) for the benefit of the wider research community. Founded 
in 1967, the UKDA is curator of the largest collection of digital data in the social sciences 
and humanities in the UK. It is funded by the ESRC, the Joint Information Systems 
Committee of the Higher Education Funding Councils and the University of Essex. 
If you have any queries about this research at any time, please do not hesitate to contact 
myself, or my supervisor Professor Bob Deacon (e-mail: b.deacon@sheffield.ac.uk; 
telephone: +44 (0)114 222 6407). 
 
Thank you very much for your help. 
 
Best regards 
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Jo Ingold BSc (Hons), MA 
j.ingold@sheffield.ac.uk 
+44(0)7703 484 311 
PhD Research Student in Comparative Social Policy 
Department of Sociological Studies 
University of Sheffield 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
Encouraging the labour market participation of non-working partnered women in 
the UK 
 
This research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), in 
collaboration with the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and has been 
approved via the University of Sheffield Ethics Review Process. All data will be 
treated as personal under the 1998 Data Protection Act and will be stored securely. 
Data collected may be processed both manually and with the aid of computer 
software. Where data is not in English, I will employ a translator who will sign a 
confidentiality agreement. 
 
Please answer each statement regarding the collection and use of your research data. 
 
Please answer each statement regarding the collection and use of data you provide for 
this research. 
 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions about the study.   
 
2. I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw from the study at any time.   
 
3. I agree to the interview being audiotaped and to its content being used for research 
purposes.   
 
4. Anonymity – please choose one of the following 3 options: 
 
a) I/my employer (delete as applicable) may be identified and quoted in the final 
thesis and in any related reports.   
 
b) I/my employer do not agree to being identified in the final thesis and any 
related reports - my words may be quoted, provided that they are anonymised.  
 
 
c) I/my employer do not agree to being identified in the final thesis and any 
related reports – the information I give may be used, but my words may not be 
quoted.   
 
5. I agree to the transcript for my interview being archived with the UK Data Archive 
(in line with the conditions outlined above).   
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6. I agree to the recording of my interview being archived with the UK Data Archive 
(in line with the conditions outlined above).   
 
7. I agree to take part in the above named research project.   
 
Name of participant (please print)  __________________________________ 
 
Signature  _________________    Date  _____________________ 
 
The participant should receive a copy of this form and the information sheet. Originals of this form 
will be placed in the project’s main record and kept in a secure location. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation 
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Appendix 2 - Data tables relating to partnered women in Britain, 
Australia and Denmark 
 
2.1 Britain 
 
Table A2.1: Couples in Britain by benefit type and number of dependents, February 2008 
Number of 
Dependents by 
Benefit Type 
Benefit Type 
IS % 
IS and 
IB 
% JSA % Total 
D
ep
en
d
en
ts
 
no dependents 69,200 39 44,400 51 n/a n/a 113,600 
1 dependent 36,500 20 17,000 19 23,400 34 76,900 
2 dependents 33,200 19 13,900 16 21,900 32 69,100 
3 dependents 21,900 12 7,400 8 13,400 19 42,600 
4 dependents 11,000 6 3,100 4 6,200 9 20,300 
5+ dependents 6,900 4 1,600 2 3,800 6 12,300 
Total 179,000 100 87,000 100% 69,000 100% 335,000 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions 
 
Table A2.2: Couples in Britain by benefit type and age of dependents, February 2008 
 
Benefit Type 
IS % 
IS and 
IB 
% JSA % Total 
A
g
e 
o
f 
D
ep
en
d
en
ts
 
no 
dependents 
69,200 39 44,400 51 n/a n/a 113,600 
dependent/s 
less than 7 
yrs 
54,700 31 17,500 20 48,600 71 120,800 
dependent/s 
between 7 
and 16 yrs 
44,700 25 20,200 23 17,000 25 81,900 
dependent/s 
over 16 yrs 
10,100 6 5,400 6 3,100 4 18,500 
Total 179,000 100 87,000 100 69,000 100 335,000 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions  
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Table A2.3: Partnered women participating in the New Deal for Partners in Britain by 
ethnicity April 2004 - August 2009 (thousands)357 
Ethnicity  Individuals starting 
caseload 
(cumulative) 
Participants as at 
August 2009 
White 7.42 2.65 
Black-Caribbean 0.04 0.02 
Black-African 0.11 0.04 
Black-Other 0.02 0.01 
Indian 0.13 0.06 
Pakistani 0.26 0.13 
Bangladeshi 0.08 0.04 
Chinese 0.02 0.01 
Mixed/Other 0.31 0.15 
Total 9.12 3.43 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions Tabulation Tool 
 
 
Table A2.4: Partnered women participating in the New Deal for Partners in Britain by age, 
April 2004-2009 (thousands) 
Age group Individuals starting 
caseload 
(cumulative) 
Participants as at 
August 2009 
18-24 1.40 0.41 
25-29 1.29 0.45 
30-34 1.28 0.48 
35-39 1.22 0.50 
40-44 1.05 0.42 
45-49 0.65 0.29 
50-54 0.37 0.17 
55-59 0.12 0.05 
60 and over - - 
Unknown 1.72 0.65 
Total 9.12 3.43 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions 
 
                                                 
357
 In the following tables figures are rounded to the nearest ten.  
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 Table A2.5: Destination of partnered women leaving the New Deal for Partners in Britain by 
ethnicity, May 2004 - August 2009 (thousands) 
Ethnicity Work Work and 
benefits 
JSA Other 
benefits 
Off benefits/ 
Unknown 
White 0.82 0.53 0.13 0.60 0.01 
Black-
Caribbean 
- - - - 0.01 
Black-
African 
0.01 0.01 - - - 
Black-Other - - - - - 
Indian 0.01  - - 0.05 
Pakistani 0.01 - - 0.01 0.08 
Bangladeshi - - - 0.01 0.03 
Chinese - - - - 0.01 
Mixed/ 
Other 
0.02 0.01 - 0.02 0.10 
Total 0.99 0.60 0.15 0.68 2.91 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions 
 
Table A2.6: Destination of partnered women leaving the New Deal for Partners in Britain by 
age, May 2004 - August 2009 (thousands) 
Age group Work Work and 
benefits 
JSA Other 
benefits 
Off benefits/ 
Unknown 
18-24 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.19 0.49 
25-29 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.42 
30-34 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.38 
35-39 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.39 
40-44 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.32 
45-49 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.18 
50-54 0.04 0.02 - 0.01 0.12 
55-59 0.07 0.01 0.01 - - 
60 and over - - - - - 
Total 0.99 0.60 0.15 0.68 2.91 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions 
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2.2 Australia 
 
Table A2.7: Parenting Payment Partnered recipients in Australia by gender, June 2001 - June 
2005 
As at June Male Female Total 
Number % Number % Number 
2001 20,263 9.9 184,313 90.1 204,576 
2002 19,576 10.2 172,000 89.8 191,576 
2003 19,196 10.6 162,209 89.4 181,405 
2004 18,917 10.7 158,240 89.3 177,157 
2005 17,255 10.3 150,017 89.7 167,272 
Source: Department of Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2009: 
61 
 
Table A2.8: Parenting Payment Partnered recipients in Australia by age, June 2005 
 Male Female Total 
 Number % Number % Number % 
<20 32 0.2 2,789 1.9 2,821 1.7 
20-29 1,845 10.7 36,400 24.3 38,245 22.9 
30-39 6,542 37.9 65,287 43.5 71,829 42.9 
40-49 6,622 38.4 39,546 26.4 46,168 4.6 
50-59 1,978 11.5 5,785 3.9 7,763 4.6 
60+ 236 1.4 210 0.1 446 0.3 
Total 17,255 10.3 150,017 89.7 167,272 100.0 
Source: Department of Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2009: 6 
 
Table A2.9: Number of Parenting Payment Partnered recipients in Australia by payment 
category of partner, June 2001 - June 2005 
As at June Youth 
Allowance 
Low 
income 
Newstart 
Allowance 
Pension Total 
2001 193 86,329 95,182 22,242 204,576 
2002 204 81,078 85,424 24,870 191,576 
2003 195 81,792 74,268 25,150 181,405 
2004 144 87,945 63,571 25,497 177,157 
2005 164 86,184 56,087 24,837 167,272 
Source: Department of Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2009: 
62 
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Table A2.10: Parenting Payment Partnered recipients in Australia by duration of payment, 
June 2005 
 Male Female Total 
 No. % No. % No. % 
<6 months 
 
4,716 27.3 31,094 20.7 35,810 21.4 
6 months to 
<1 year 
3,001 17.4 19,565 13.0 22,566 13.5 
1 to <2 
years 
3,700 21.4 26,857 17.9 30,557 18.3 
2 to <3 
years 
2,180 12.6 17,420 11.6 19,600 11.7 
3+ years 3,658 21.2 55,081 36.7 58,739 35.1 
Source: Department of Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2009: 
63 
 
Table A2.11: Parenting Payment Partnered recipients in Australia by country of birth, June 
2005 
 Male Female Total 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Australia 11,356 65.8 92,020 61.3 103,376 61.8 
Other 3,481 20.2 34,899 23.3 38,380 22.9 
UK/Ireland
/Eire 
930 5.4 4,145 2.8 5,075 3.0 
Vietnam 670 3.9 7,649 5.1 8,319 5.0 
China 532 3.1 5,489 3.7 6,021 3.6 
Lebanon 286 1.7 5,815 3.9 6,101 3.6 
Source: Department of Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2009: 
63 
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Table A2.12: Principal carer parents in Australia by sub-target group, 2006-07 
 Participation 
requirement 
Number Target 
group 
% 
Receiving PP before 1 July 2006 (grandfathered) 
PP single - youngest child < 6 none 163,112 23 
PP partnered - youngest child < 6  none 82,306 12 
PP single - youngest child 6-15  none 249,990 35 
PP partnered - youngest child 6-15  none 64,713 9 
Total grandfathered  560,121 79 
Recipients after 1 July 2006 
PP single - youngest child < 6  none 58,353 8 
PP partnered - youngest child 6-15  none 56,863 8 
Total new claimants with no 
participation requirements 
 115,216 16 
PP single - youngest child < 6  part-time 8,230 1 
NSA single - youngest child 8-15  part-time 13,902 2 
NSA partnered - youngest child 6-
15  
part-time 11,398 2 
Total new claimants with 
participation requirements 
 33,530 5 
Total  708,867 100 
% of total working age population   23 
Source: Department for Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010 
 
Table A2.13: Number of job placements for Parenting Payment recipients (Single and 
Partnered) in Australia358 
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
Job placements 46,106 53,014 67,100 
13-week jobs 16,760                 20, 685 29,200 
Source: DEWR and DEEWR Annual Reports 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08 
 
Table A2.14: Percentage of Parenting Payment Partnered recipients with earnings in Australia  
1999-
2000 
2000-
01 
 
2001-
02 
 
2002-
03 
 
2003-
04 
 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
 
2006-
07 
 
2007-
08 
5.8 7.7 7.4 10.4 11.3 12 13 14 15.5 
Source: DEEWR and FaCS Annual Reports  
 
                                                 
358
 It was not possible to obtain data regarding 26-week outcomes. 
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2.3 Denmark 
 
Table A2.15: Married couples claiming social assistance in Denmark 
 2007 2008 
Married couples with 
children 
39252 35831 
Married couples without 
children 
12 453 12 633 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark StatBank 
 
 
Table A2.16: Economic activity and employment rates for Danish and immigrant women 
 2006 2007 2008 
Economy activity rate    
Persons of Danish origin 77.4 78.2 78.3 
Immigrants from western 
countries 
61.9 62.7 62.9 
Immigrants from non-western 
countries 
49.1 52.6 54.4 
Employment rate    
Persons of Danish origin 74.4 75.9 76.7 
Immigrants from western 
countries 
58.9 60.2 61.1 
Immigrants from non-western 
countries 
42.1 46.2 49.5 
Source: Statistics Denmark, 2009 
 
Table A2.17: Self-estimated health of social assistance recipients affected by the 300 hour rule 
in Denmark 
 Recipients who lost their 
benefit 
Recipients who retained 
their benefit 
Very good 16 13 
Good 26 17 
OK 20 18 
Poor 23 23 
Very poor 15 29 
Source: Bach and Larsen, 2008 Table 3.9 
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Table A2.18: Reduced work ability of social assistance recipients affected by the 300 hour rule 
in Denmark 
 Recipients who lost their 
benefit 
Recipients who retained 
their benefit 
Yes 24 38 
Yes – some 24 23 
No, not really 15 11 
Not at all 37 28 
Ill 40 59 
Source: Bach and Larsen, 2008 Table 3.9 
 
 
2.4    Supplementary data tables 
 
Figure A2.19: Take-up of out-of school hours care (per cent)359 
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Source: OECD Family Database 
 
 
Table A2.20: Poverty rates for couple households with children, 2005 (per cent) 
 Households with children and two or more 
adults 
 No worker 1 worker 2 workers 
Australia 50.8 7.9 1.0 
UK 35.8 9.0 1.0 
Denmark 21.1 5.3 0.4 
Source: Whiteford, 2009: 29 using OECD Income Distribution Survey 
 
                                                 
359
 Data is for 2005 for Denmark and 2006 for Australia using OECD Family Database and OECD (2007b) 
Benefits and Wages Paris, OECD. No comparable data available for Britain. 
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Table A2.21: Composition of child poverty for couple households, 2005 (per cent) 
 All jobless 
households 
2 adults with 
children, 1 
earner 
All 
households 
with 1 earner 
2 earners with 
children 
Australia 69.9 21.6 24.9 5.2 
UK 63.0 25.2 30.9 6.1 
Denmark 42.3 36.6 43.5 14.2 
Source: Whiteford, 2009: 32 using OECD Income Distribution Survey 
 
 
Figure A2.22: Incidence of part-time employment in the three countries in 2007-8 
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Source: OECD Family Database 
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Appendix 3 – The British welfare state in relation to women from 
workless couples 
 
3.1 The British welfare state 
 
The origins of the British welfare state are in the (Old) Elizabethan Poor Law Act of 
1601.360 Its replacement the (New) Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 was key in 
establishing three main planks for the new system: the principle of ‘less eligibility’ 
with its distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor; the workhouse test; 
and administrative centralisation (Fraser, 1984: 43). In 1911 the Liberal government 
under Lloyd George introduced a National Insurance Act which was contributory, 
compulsory and state organised, but not comprehensive (Timmins, 2001: 14). The next 
key Act with regard to unemployment was the 1934 Unemployment Act, covering 
both employment insurance and social assistance, with contributions based on an 
equal thirds principle.361  
 
The Beveridgean welfare state became operational on 5 July 1948.362 Beveridge’s 
National Insurance scheme aimed to provide a minimum subsistence income with 
room for economic incentives, based on flat-rate contributions at a level that the 
lowest-paid worker could afford, rather than a Bismarckian social insurance scheme 
providing earnings-related benefits, although the latter have become more important 
to the British model (Bennett, 2005). There was a safety net in the form of 
Supplementary Allowances on a means-tested basis through the (later National) 
Assistance Board. The National Insurance scheme allowed married women to opt out 
of paying full contributions and instead rely on their husband’s contributions, 
forfeiting the claim to benefits in their own right (Sainsbury, 1996: 55). This option was 
widely used (Land, 1985: 56-7) until its abolition following the Social Security Pensions 
Act 1975.363 Until 1983 only husbands could apply for means-tested assistance.  
                                                 
360
 This identified three main groups: the impotent poor (aged, chronic sick, blind, lunatic); able-bodied; and 
able-bodied who refused to work Fraser, D. (1984) The evolution of the British welfare state (Second Edition), 
Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
361 The Act effectively repealed the 1834 Poor Law.  
362
 The Beveridge Report focused on the five giants of: want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness. Key 
components of the 1948 reforms were the National Insurance, Industrial Injuries, National Assistance and 
National Health Service Acts (family allowances and higher pensions had been paid since 1946) Fraser, D. 
(1984) The evolution of the British welfare state (Second Edition), Basingstoke, Macmillan.. 
363
 Although women already using the option could continue to do so. 
 351 
 
3.2 British labour market policies relevant to partnered women since 1996 
 
1996 Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) introduced, replacing Unemployment Benefit 
(UB) and Income Support (IS) as the benefit for unemployed people 
 
1997 New Labour wins the General Election 
  
1999 New Deal for Partners of the Unemployed (NDPU) introduced, targeted at 
partners of JSA recipients 
 
2001 NDPU renamed New Deal for Partners (NDP) and eligibility extended to 
partners of non-JSA recipients claiming Income Support (IS), Incapacity 
Benefit (IB), Invalid Care Allowance (ICA), Severe Disablement Allowance 
(SDA) 
 
 Joint Claims for JSA introduced, requiring couples without dependent 
children (where both were aged 18 or over, and at least one partner was 
born on or after 18 March 1976) to make a joint claim. 
 
2002 Eligibility for Joint Claims extended to couples where one or both partners 
was born on or before 28 October 1957 
 
2004   Re-launch of Enhanced NDP providing partners with access to the same 
range of Jobcentre Plus services as other customer groups and introduction 
of Work-Focused Interviews for Partners (WFIPs) as a gateway to NDP 
 
2008 From April, partners of JSA recipients with responsibility for a young 
person or child in their household are required to attend a WFIP every six 
months until their partner no longer claims JSA. From October, new 
claimants of IB and IS paid on grounds of incapacity or disability required 
to claim Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) and participate in a 
Work Capability Assessment (WCA),364 gradually extended to all current 
recipients of IB 
                                                 
364
 The WCA takes place within 13 weeks of a new claim. It marks a shift in focus from the previous Personal 
Capability Assessment (PCA – known as the ‗All Work Test‘), which focused on demonstration of incapacity, 
to a focus on capability to undertake work.  
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2009 Welfare Reform Act legislated for extension of Joint Claims principle to all 
partners of benefit recipients capable of paid work and with a youngest 
child aged over seven, along with Progression to Work pilots for parents 
with a youngest child aged below seven 
 
Table A3.1: Assistance provided by the New Deal for Partners in Britain, October 2008365 
Provision Details 
Help with job 
search 
Assistance from Personal Adviser in identifying and 
applying for suitable jobs 
Better Off 
Calculation (BOC) 
Advice about benefit and tax credit entitlement and aims to 
demonstrate the financial gains from being in work versus 
being on benefit  
Travel costs Assistance with travel and training expenses where these 
costs are not met elsewhere 
Childcare costs 
 
 
 
Childcare Subsidy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Childcare Assist 
 
Covers costs of childcare when attending WFIPs, NDP 
interviews, job interviews, training or further education 
courses 
 
Covers the cost of registered childcare whilst in work, up to 
a maximum of £87.50 per week for one child or £150 per 
week for two or more children for 1 year if the job complies 
with employment legislation, is up to 16 hours per week, 
waged, expected to last for at least 5 weeks and is 
undertaken on the recommendation of the Adviser, as part 
of an agreed action plan  
 
Assistance with the cost of registered childcare in the week 
before starting work of at least 8 hours per week  
Adviser Discretion 
Fund (ADF) 
Advisers may use this at their discretion to help NDP 
participants move into work, e.g. to pay for clothing for 
interviews, up to a maximum of £300 per customer in a 
consecutive 12-month period 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
365 NDP participants are able to access most of the same range of provision as New Deal Plus for Lone 
Parents participants.  
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Provision Details 
Work Trial Partners must have been unemployed for 26 weeks or more 
and receive a qualifying benefit. Consists of up to 15 days366 
in an actual job, at no cost to the employer. Benefit 
entitlement is not affected and partners receive travel 
expenses and a meal allowance. 
Education and 
training 
opportunities  
Where training is identified as the appropriate way for the 
partner to move towards employment, they have access to 
contracted training provision  
Training premium A training premium of £15 per week participants who 
undertake an approved activity, usually paid for a 
maximum of 52 weeks367  
Access to 
programme 
centres 
A range of modules including advice on job search 
techniques, alternative jobs, training, increasing motivation 
and confidence in returning to work  
Basic skills 
screening and 
assessment 
Basic Skills screening at first Adviser interview and referral 
for assessment if appropriate 
Referrals to Short Intensive Basic Skills or Basic 
Employability Training 
An extra £12 per week incentive payment for undertaking 
basic skills training and a £100 bonus for achieving certain 
qualifications 
Goals programme Confidence and motivational training (2.5 days) 
Mentoring Mentoring for parents available since July 2003, designed to 
address barriers to work, as an alternative to discussion 
with a Jobcentre Plus Personal Adviser  
One-to-one mentoring, group mentoring, peer mentoring 
(or a combination) for a minimum of two sessions, followed 
by as many as required  
Access to debt 
advice 
Where local free advice on debt is unavailable, Jobcentre 
Plus can refer partners to specialist help if debt problems 
are identified as a barrier to work 
Job Grant A one-off tax-free payment when a recipient or their 
partner starts work expected to last for at least five weeks 
and stops receiving certain benefits. The amount depends 
on household circumstances: for couples without children 
Job Grant is £100 and for couples with children £250. Does 
not affect entitlement to other benefits. 
                                                 
366
 From 17 July 2008, Work Trials were extended from 15 to 30 days. 
367
 However, when undertaking training in NVQ/ SNVQ 3 pilot areas the training premium will exceptionally 
be paid for up to 104 weeks. 
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Provision Details 
Self-employment During the test trading period of up to 26 weeks, the 
partner is advised and mentored by a specialist provider 
and any earnings from the business are placed in an 
account, which can only be accessed for specific purposes 
Being liable to pay self employed National Insurance 
Contributions may remove entitlement to some Jobcentre 
Plus benefits. 
Housing Benefit 
and Council Tax 
Housing Benefit to cover rent for couples in rented 
accommodation or mortgage interest run-on paid for 
couples in private housing for four weeks if the partner 
takes up work of at least 24 hours per week, or the main 
recipient starts work of at least 16 hours per week.  
Council Tax is also paid for four weeks in the same 
circumstances 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of evaluation evidence for programmes in Britain 
Authors Methods/sample 
New Deal for Partners 
Coleman et al (2006) 
Quantitative survey 
 
 
Coleman and Seeds (2007)  
 
Thomas and Griffiths 
(2005) 
Qualitative Phase One  
 
 
 
Thomas and Griffiths 
(2006)  
Qualitative Phase Two 
 
3,786 face-to-face interviews with partners and where 
possible main benefit claimants, representative 
sample 
 
Synthesis of existing NDP and WFIP evaluation data 
 
120 in-depth face-to-face interviews with WFIP and 
NDP participants and main claimants partners (60 
interviews with 30 couples for each of the WFIP and 
NDP elements), 76 interviews with Jobcentre Plus 
staff and managers in 5 Jobcentre Plus districts 
 
Interviews with Personal Advisers, Business 
Managers, Adviser Managers and couples in same 
districts as phase one (paired in-depth interviews 
with couples, simultaneous separate couple 
interviews) 
Partners Outreach for Ethnic Minorities Pilot 
Aston et al (2009a) 
 
Aston et al (2009b) 
 
Initial interviews with DWP staff, three-wave case 
studies comprising interviews with providers and 
other stakeholders in 10 areas and 101 face-to-face 
interviews with clients (50 in Year 1 and 51 in Year 2), 
analysis of administrative data  
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Appendix 4 - The Australian welfare state in relation to women from 
workless couples 
 
4.1 The Australian welfare state 
 
Unlike Denmark or Britain, the Australian welfare state did not have a Poor Law, but 
in the Nineteenth Century poor relief was distributed by charities based on the 
principle of ‘less eligibility’. Australia’s modern welfare state was established between 
1941 and 1947 by the Curtin-Chifley Labor governments. However, prior to this the 
Federation368 of Australia was a pioneer of invalidity pensions (1908) and was the first 
country in the world to introduce maternity benefit (1912) (Castles, 1993: 94). Australia 
does not have contributory benefits apart from superannuation and this is the 
principal reason for the predominance of means-testing.369 Since 1910 the Australian 
welfare state has been funded from general taxation and can be conceptualised as 
having a distinctive ‘targeted safety net approach’ (Bessant et al., 2006: 89), or a 
‘targeted’ approach (Korpi and Palme, 1998).  
 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Social Security set up in 1941 produced a 
number of reports, the fifth of which echoed Beveridge’s five giants. Significant 
benefits which were introduced in the Curtin-Chifley period were the child 
endowment (1941), widows’ pensions (1942), unemployment, sickness and invalid 
benefits (1943) and pharmaceutical benefits (1946) (Bessant et al., 2006: 91). These were 
provided in line with a categorical, means-tested system funded from general taxation, 
creating a ‘welfare society’ rather than a ‘welfare state’ (Bessant et al., 2006: 93).  
                                                 
368
 Australia became a Federation in 1901. Federation is the process by which the six separate British self-
governing colonies became unified under a federal government as the Commonwealth of Australia, with the 
British monarch as its Head of State.  
369
 Australia‘s welfare state was not based on the universal social insurance principles that were a feature of 
either the British and Danish welfare states. Attempts to introduce such systems in the 1920s and 1930s failed, 
predominantly as a result of trade union opposition. 
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4.2 Social security and labour market policies relevant to partnered women  
Table A4.1: Chronology of payments to partners and parents in Australia 1943 - present 
Date 
introduced 
Name Purpose Ended 
8 July 1943 Additional 
allowance for 
dependent 
spouse 
Payable to certain 
pensioners with a 
dependent spouse or 
children 
Precursor of Wife 
Pension, Carer Payment 
& additional Family 
Allowance 
1 July 1945 Unemploy- 
ment and 
Sickness 
Benefits Act 
1944 
Additional amounts 
for dependent spouse 
or children of those 
claiming e.g. 
unemployment/ 
sickness benefits  
Precursors of Partner 
Allowance and Parenting 
Payment (Partnered) 
5 Oct 1972 Wife Pension Replaced pensioner’s 
allowance for a 
dependent spouse 
Closed to new  
entrants (1995) 
1 Dec 1983 
 
Spouse Carer 
Pension 
Payable to husband of 
severely handicapped 
Age or Invalid 
Pensioner 
Became Carer Pension 
with broader eligibility 
(1985) then Carer 
Payment (1997) 
3 July 1973 Supporting 
Mother’s 
Benefit 
Payable to unmarried 
mothers 
 
Subsumed into 
Supporting Parents’ 
Benefit (1977) then into 
Sole Parent Pension 
(1989), became Parenting 
Payment (Single) (1998) 
20 Sept 
1994 
Partner 
Allowance 
Replaced additional 
benefits paid to 
dependent spouses 
Restricted to people born 
before 1 July 1955 without 
dependent children and 
little recent labour force 
experience (1995) 
Closed to new entrants 
(2003)  
1995 Parenting 
Allowance 
Subsumed Home 
Childcare Allowance 
Renamed Parenting 
Payment (1998) 
20 March 
1998 
Parenting 
Payment 
(Partnered) 
Provided for partners 
with children not 
eligible for Partner 
Allowance 
 
Source: FaCS (2001) and Whiteford et al (2001) 
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Table A4.2: Working age benefits in Australia 
Payment Qualifying conditions 
Newstart Allowance For unemployed people aged between 21 and Age Pension 
age who satisfy activity test requirements (or who are 
exempt from activity testing). Reduced requirements apply 
to people with a disability, with partial work capacity and 
principal carers of older children (aged 6-15 if partnered) 
Parenting Payment 
Partnered (PPP) 
Claimants must have a qualifying child aged under 6  
Partner Allowance Member of couple, where partner is on a qualifying 
pension, allowance 
Born on or before 1 July 1955 and with no recent workforce 
experience, no dependent children 
Closed to new entrants from 20 September 2003 as part of 
AWT  
Disability Support 
Pension 
A pension for people aged 16 and over with a serious 
physical, intellectual or psychiatric impairment which 
prevents them working or being re-skilled for work of at 
least 15 hours a week at or above minimum wage for at 
least the next two years 
Youth Allowance 
(Other) 
For people aged 16 to 20 not in full-time study who are 
seeking or preparing for work or who are temporarily 
unable to work 
Lower rates are paid to partnered young people without 
children or living away from home 
Youth Allowance 
(Student) 
For full-time students in secondary or tertiary education or 
training or full-time Australian apprentices aged 16-24 
undertaking an approved course  
Carer Payment For people providing constant care for a person with a 
physical, intellectual or psychiatric disability and generally 
receiving income support 
Income and assets limits tested 
Carer Allowance Income supplement paid in recognition of caring role 
Not income or assets tested 
Family Tax Benefit 
(FTB) Part A 
To assist families with the direct costs of raising children 
and based on an estimate of total family adjusted taxable 
income  
Family Tax Benefit 
(FTB) Part B 
A per family payment paid to single parents and couples 
with one main income earner and a dependent child aged 
under 16 or a qualifying full-time student aged 16-18, based 
on an estimate of total family adjusted taxable income.  
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Payment Qualifying conditions 
Childcare Benefit 
(CCB) 
For families using childcare provided by an approved service 
or registered carer, such as long day care, family day care, 
outside school hours care, vacation care and some occasional 
and in-home care 
Registered carers include nannies, relatives or friends 
registered as carers. 
Eligible families may receive up to 24 hours of CCB per child 
per week regardless of their work status, families where both 
parents are working, studying, training or looking for work 
for at least 15 hours a week are eligible for up to 50 hours of 
CCB  
Childcare Rebate 
(CCR) 
Meets 50 per cent of out-of-pocket childcare expenses for 
approved care up to a limit of $7,500 per child per annum. 
Claimants must be assessed as eligible for CCB and be 
working, studying, training or looking for work 
Source: Centrelink 
 
 
Table A4.3: Changes to the income test for Parenting Payment Partnered recipients before and 
after the Welfare to Work changes in Australia 
Until 30 June 2006 From 1 July 2006 
Income test free area = $62 per fortnight Income test free area = $62 per fortnight 
Income between $62 and $245 = 50 cents 
in the $ taper rate per fortnight 
Income between $62 and $250 = 50 cents 
in the $ taper rate per fortnight 
Income over $245 = 70 cents in the $ 
taper rate per fortnight 
Income over $250 = 60 cents in the $ 
taper rate per fortnight 
Partner’s income over free area ($775) = 
70 cents in the $ taper rate 
Partner’s income over free area ($775)  = 
60 cents in the $ taper rate 
Source: Commonwealth of Australia, 2005 Para.  7.2 
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Table A4.4: Services for partnered parents under the former Job Network in Australia 
Provision Details 
Job Search Support Assistance to lodge a vocational profile into Australian 
JobSearch to receive daily auto-matching  
Access to touch-screen kiosks  
Access an interpreter (where required)  
Assistance to develop an Activity Agreement outlining job 
search requirements 
Intensive Support 
after three months 
 
Intensive Support 
job search training 
 
 
Intensive Support 
customised 
assistance 
 
Individually tailored assistance to improve job search skills, 
motivate jobseekers and expand their job search networks 
 
Job seekers who have not undertaken formal job search 
training activities in the previous year generally receive 100 
hours of job search training activities 
 
Six months of tailored, intensive support, normally available 
after 12 months of unemployment 
 
Jobseekers identified as Highly Disadvantaged due to their 
barriers to employment can get immediate access to Intensive 
Support customised assistance 
Work for the Dole Administered by Community Work Coordinators to develop 
jobseekers’ ability to work as part of a team 
Job Seeker Account 
(JSKA) 
 
 
A quarantined pool of funds to be used flexibly by Job 
Network providers to purchase appropriate services and 
products to help jobseekers move into work 
Employment 
Preparation370 
 
Enabled JN providers to purchase specific assistance 
immediately for parents without recent workforce experience 
and for parents with more recent workforce experience 
received following three months of unemployment 
Includes updating of skills and/or qualifications, assistance 
with self esteem or self confidence issues and improvement 
of job search skills 
For parents in particular, encouragement and facilitation of 
engagement in the job market, including support to access 
suitable childcare 
Training Credits Covers the cost of accredited training 
 
                                                 
370
 Funding allocated for Employment Preparation was $47.7 million over three years from 1 July 2006 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2005a) Annual Report 2004-05, Canberra, Department 
of Employment and Workplace Relations. 
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Provision Details 
Working Credit371 Aims to incentivise work by allowing recipients to keep more 
of their income support when they begin work 
Beneficiaries with an income of less than $48 a fortnight can 
collect up to 1000 credits, earning one extra dollar for every 
credit accrued (450 credits mean an extra $450 can be earned 
before income support is affected) 
May also allow those entering work to keep their concession 
card and other benefits for up to 12 weeks 
Literacy and 
Numeracy Training 
Supplement 
For those undertaking literacy and numeracy training 
Employment Entry 
Payment 
Eligibility criteria broadened to include principal carer 
parents receiving NSA, PPs or PPp for at least 12 months and 
who took up paid work of at least 15 hours per week 
 
 
Table A4.5a: Job Services Australia contract provider responsibilities - Stream 1 
Intervention  Provider responsibilities 
Initial face-to-face 
interview  
 
 
Skills Assessment 
before end of 4th 
month  
 
 
Intensive Activity (30 
hours per fortnight 
for principal carers) 
by end 4th month 
 
Contact requirements 
 
Prepare resumé, explain job search facilities, provide list 
of appropriate job vacancies and advice about looking for 
work, agree Employment Pathway Plan 
 
Determine jobseekers’ current education, skills and 
experience in relation to the local labour market (also 
informs Intensive Activity). Skills training, training to 
address vocational or non-vocational barriers. 
 
Work Experience Activities, including Work for the Dole 
or Green Corps, work in a social or community 
enterprise, Language, Literacy and Numeracy Program,  
Adult Migrant English Program, job search training 
 
First three months - Centrelink 
Four months onwards - face-to-face contact with provider 
on at least monthly basis, but timing and duration to be 
agreed between jobseeker and provider 
 
                                                 
371 Using reporting of earnings, Leigh and Wilkins found that Working Credit boosted the exit rates of both 
men on unemployment benefit and women on unemployment benefit, PPs, and PPp. See Leigh, A. & Wilkins, 
R. (2009) Working Credits: a low-cost alternative to Earned Income Tax Credits? Melbourne Institute 
Working Paper Series. Working Paper No. 7/09. Melbourne, Vic, Melbourne Institute. 
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Table A4.5b: Job Services Australia contract provider responsibilities - Streams 2, 3 and 4 
Interventions -  
Streams 2 and 3 
Provider responsibilities 
Initial face-to-face 
interview  
 
Provider judgment 
regarding timing of: 
 
 
 
Individually tailored 
assistance which may 
include 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact 
Prepare Employment Pathway Plan 
 
 
Assistance with resumé 
Provide list of appropriate job vacancies 
Provide advice about looking for work, including 
Productivity Places Program 
 
Skills Assessment 
Identifying employment or study goals 
Skills development training 
Referral to education training, PPP 
Job search training and supported job search assistance 
Vocational and non-vocational assistance (using 
Employment Pathway Fund) 
 
Provider face-to-face contact on at least monthly basis, 
but timing and duration to be agreed between jobseeker 
and provider 
Interventions -  
Stream 4 
Provider responsibilities 
Initial face-to-face 
interview  
 
 
 
Interventions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact 
Complete initial EPP to address most urgent barriers and 
specify crisis interventions required 
More detailed EPP may not be possible - provider needs 
to build rapport  and trust with jobseeker over time 
 
Vocational and non-vocational interventions 
Skills Assessment before 12 months 
Provide information about PPP, job search 
Pre-employment and employment assistance including 
assessments, counselling or professional support, referral, 
advocacy  
 
Provider face-to-face contact on at least monthly basis, 
but timing and duration to be agreed - higher intensity of 
contact required for Stream 4 participants 
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Table A4.5c: Job Services Australia contract provider responsibilities - All streams 
Interventions - all streams  Provider responsibilities 
Work Experience Phase after 
approx. 12 months following 
Stream Services Review, but 
jobseekers can participate at any 
time 
 
Lasting 26 weeks but can be reduced by other 
activities such as study or paid work, hours 
per fortnight can be flexible 
 
Further Work Experience Activities voluntary 
Bi-monthly contact with providers 
 
4.3 Supplementary evaluation evidence  
 
4.3.1 Working Nation 
 
Burke and Redmond (2002: 9) highlight that not all women gained equally from the 
changes to the income test and to financial support for families. Young women gained 
little and older women gained the most in terms of income; partnered women both 
with and without children were better off in 1996-7 than in 1982 (Burke and Redmond, 
2002: 9). The number of partnered women without dependent children in employment 
increased from 63 to 75 per cent (Burke and Redmond, 2002: 21). In relation to 
women’s access to an independent income, Bradbury (2004) examined consumption 
and within-household income distribution372 following the Working Nation changes, 
comparing results with a similar experiment carried out by Lundberg et al (1997) 
following changes to the payment of Child Benefit in Britain. Whereas Lundberg et al 
found a substantial change in consumption patterns in Britain, Bradbury found no 
major changes in within-household expenditure patterns. Bradbury argues that: ‚the 
Australian experience of income support payment reform should remind us that, even 
though much household economic behaviour may be a result of bargaining processes 
within the household, it may not be easy for exogenous policy changes to influence the 
outcome of this bargaining‛ (p.533). 
 
 
                                                 
372
 In particular the changes to supplementary family payments (Additional Family Payment) in 1993 and the 
introduction of Partner Allowance in 1994. 
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4.3.2 The Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot 
 
PPIP was a quasi-experimental373 research project involving a sample of around 5,000 
Parenting Payment (PP) recipients, both single and partnered in 11 sites, conducted 
between 1999 and 2000. The intervention involved an interview with a Jobs, Education 
and Training (JET) Adviser374, beginning as a 45 minute review of circumstances, 
followed by an optional discussion of future plans and a follow-up telephone 
conversation two to three months later. PPIP involved more structured, holistic 
interviews not solely focused on employment outcomes (Pearse, 2000: 91). One aim of 
the pilot was to collect data concerning two aspects about which little was known: 
firstly, the types and levels of existing economic and social participation and, 
secondly, the barriers to increased participation (Coventry, 2000: 124). The evaluation 
also aimed to compare the effectiveness of voluntary and compulsory interventions for 
four target groups: (i) long-term Parenting Payment Single (PPs) customers on 
payment for more than five years, (ii) new entrants to PP in the preceding four 
months, (iii) Parenting Payment Partnered (PPp) and PPs customers with a youngest 
child aged 12-15 years old and (iv) customers receiving PPp for more than one year 
with a partner receiving Newstart Allowance for more than six months. The latter 
group were selected to test the capacity for swapping of earner/carer roles within 
households (Pearse, 2000: 89).  
 
In total, around 10 per cent of participants were looking for work, more than 20 per 
cent were doing voluntary work, 10 per cent were in training and about 12 per cent 
were caring for someone, usually a relative (Pearse, 2000: 104). Although participants 
were selected for PPIP because they had no recent recorded earnings, by the time of 
                                                 
373
 However, the voluntary and non-take-up categories cannot be considered to be random - there was the 
potential for bias in the collection of data, as well as selection effects. See Pearse, V. (2000) Parenting, 
participation and planning: the Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot. Australian Social Policy 2000(2):87-
106.  
374
 Recipients could already voluntarily access the JET program which began in 1989 following the Cass 
Social Security Review. JET advisers provided information and referrals to education, vocational training and 
employment as well as childcare. 
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the initial interview 16 per cent had undertaken some paid work in the preceding four 
weeks, mostly part-time and for two-thirds this was of a casual nature (Pearse, 2000: 
104). Employment outcomes were highest for new entrants to income support (25 per 
cent). In total, 26 per cent of those interviewed were assessed by JET advisers as job-
ready, 52 per cent were assessed as needing additional training and 22 per cent as 
never likely to work (Pearse, 2000: 100). Table A5.1 sets out the types of referrals from 
PPIP (although these were not necessarily taken up).  
 
Table A4.6: Types of referrals from the Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot in Australia 
Referral per cent 
short term pre-vocational courses 20 
other training 15 
education 15 
Job Network 14 
career counseling 5 
English as a second language 3 
Source: Pearse, 2000: 104 
 
 
In the next one to two years, over 50 per cent of participants said they expected to be 
in paid work, evenly split between full- and part-time, 25 per cent planned to 
undertake training (mainly part-time) and 25 per cent expected to undertake voluntary 
work (Pearse, 2000: 104). When asked what they thought they would be doing when 
their child turned 16, 48 per cent said they hoped to be in paid work, although the 
group with a youngest child aged 12 to 15 was most likely to expect to remain on 
income support (41 per cent) (Pearse, 2000: 104). Almost one-third (32 per cent) of all 
participants said that they had not thought about what they would do when their 
youngest child turned 16 (Pearse, 2000: 104). There was little significant difference 
between compulsory and voluntary participants in relation to plans for the future 
(Barrett and Cobb-Clark, 2000: 204). 
 
Although 59 per cent of the treatment groups said they were interested in the JET 
program (compared with 35 per cent of the control), at the follow-up only 39 per cent 
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had commenced or completed a referral to JET (Pearse, 2000: 96). The main reason 
given was the ‘time was not yet right’ (42 per cent), although only 14 per cent said that 
they had changed their minds (Pearse, 2000: 96). Pearse (2000: 105) highlights that 
many parents were constrained in their ability to act on their intentions, which may 
have been linked to the timing of the follow-up interview, to a loss of interest or to a 
change in circumstances. Amongst those voluntarily participating, partners of NSA 
recipients were more likely to change their plans than other groups (Barrett and Cobb-
Clark, 2000: 201).  
 
Barrett and Cobb-Clark (2000: 193) found that length on payment was positively 
related to take-up of compulsory interviews, but negatively related to take-up of 
voluntary interviews. The rate of voluntary take-up was higher amongst women (17.8 
per cent) than men (12.3 per cent) and new entrants to payment and those with an 
NSA partner were more likely to respond to compulsion (Barrett and Cobb-Clark, 
2000: 197-9). In terms of exits from income support both the compulsory and voluntary 
workless couple groups achieved worse outcomes than the control group, although 
workless couples in both compulsory and voluntary groups displayed ‘superior 
results’ with respect to changes in the proportion reporting any earned income 
(Dockery and Stromback, 2002: section 7). Although some exited income support, they 
were likely to be on a low income (Dockery and Stromback, 2002: section 6).  
 
Barrett and Cobb-Clark (2000) suggest that ‚It may be worthwhile to require certain 
groups of individuals to participate in specific programmes because they are relatively 
less likely to volunteer to do so, but when compelled they appear to respond 
positively and obtain benefits they had not anticipated‛ (p.204). However, Dockery 
and Stromback (2002) conclude that the net impact of the treatment was not positive 
and they did not recommend roll-out,375 arguing that stronger compliance measures 
                                                 
375 Dockery and Stromback also advise caution in expecting the effects of a pilot to be achieved when an 
intervention is extended, as there could be associated crowding-out effects Dockery, A. M. & Stromback, T. 
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may be relatively less effective for less entrenched welfare recipients: ‚when faced 
with the requirement of attending an interview, customers in this group have an 
awareness of whether they are likely to be remaining in benefits and those with higher 
expectations of ongoing reliance<are more likely to comply‛ (section 9). 
 
4.3.3 The Workless Families Pilot  
 
The Workless Families Pilot (WFP) was conducted between 2000 and 2001 and was 
one of three random assignment trials targeted at disadvantaged groups across 32 
sites.376 It involved two customer groups, comprising a total of around 4,300 
participants: (i) couples with school-aged children receiving income support and (ii) 
workless Parenting Payment customers with school-aged children and with repeated 
transitions between single and partnered status. In both cases, the partner was 
receiving Newstart Allowance (NSA). The first interview involved a benefit check and 
completion of a questionnaire to assist JET Advisers in making referrals to assistance, 
which were recorded in a Participation Plan and formed the basis of a follow-up 
interview two months later. The pilot contrasted with the existing situation in which 
beneficiaries of PPp had limited contact with Centrelink. For the intervention group, 
participation in the initial interview was mandatory and subject to sanctions,377 but 
further participation was voluntary (Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 431).  
 
One problem with the sample used in Cobb-Clark et al’s evaluation (2006) was the 
substantial attrition rate, particularly for people from non-English speaking 
backgrounds. However, they highlight the lengthy nature of the interview process and 
the possibility that low-income couples with children may have faced high costs for 
participation(Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 433). The study found that overall the 
                                                                                                                                                    
(2002) Evaluation of the Parenting Payment Intervention PIlot, Canberra, ACT, Department of Family and 
Community Services. 
376
 The two other trials were the Mature Age Pilot (MAP) and the Tailored Assistance for the Very Long term 
Unemployed Pilot (VLTU). 
377
 In practice no sanctions were applied.  
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intervention produced significant increases in economic activity for participants in 
both the treatment and control groups: the key difference was that the economic 
activity of the treatment group was less employment-focused. Whilst those in the 
treatment group increased their amount of work-related study and training, the 
control group increased their participation in paid work (Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 
440).378 The intervention was linked with an increase of seven per cent in the 
proportion of individuals engaged in some form of economic activity, but did not 
appear to effect the number of hours (Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 435). The impact of the 
intervention was similar for the partners receiving NSA: those in the intervention 
group worked less either in paid work or as a volunteer, but their job search activity 
increased compared to the control group (Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 439). One possible 
reason for the negative impact on the hours of activity may be that those who are 
already planning to return to work may be less likely to attend interviews and Cobb-
Clark et al attempted to address this possibility by examining outcomes two months 
after the intervention. Of those who began the trial, 85 per cent were still on PPp at the 
end of the two months and 3.9 per cent had left payments. Of the 11 per cent 
remaining on payments, half had moved to family assistance and the other half to 
NSA or disability payment (Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 438).  
 
There was no evidence to suggest that joint interviews were more effective than 
individual interviews in terms of increased economic activity (Cobb-Clark et al., 2006: 
435). However, ‚interviews centring on future planning can lead to modest increases 
in<economic activity‛ (p.435). Cobb-Clark (2006: 438) conclude that the overall 
impact of the intervention was small, but concede that significant take-up of education 
and training may in the longer-term result in better outcomes, although in the shorter 
term the likelihood of remaining on payment is higher. They emphasise the 
importance of a longer-term perspective towards encouraging the workforce 
                                                 
378
 Those in the treatment group spent less hours in paid work (around one hour and 45 minutes compared 
with the control, although the treatment group increased their participation in both work-related study or 
training (by one and a half hours per week) and in job search activity (one hour per week). 
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participation of this group, who are likely to be entrenched in disadvantage and 
require significant resources p.442). 
 
4.3.4 Australians Working Together 
 
Table A4.7: Participation status of Parenting Payment Partnered recipients in Australia at 
time of Personal Adviser interview 
Participation status per cent 
Economic participant - paid work, looking for work, voluntary work 
or study for vocational reasons 
46 
Social participant - voluntary work, study/training for non-vocational 
reason 
20 
Carer - caring responsibilities for a family member or friend 6 
Non- participant - not involved in paid work, job search, study, 
training or voluntary work and no caring responsibilities 
27 
Source: Social Research Centre, 2005a: 8 
 
Table A4.8: Summary of evaluation evidence for programmes in Australia 
Authors Methods/sample 
Working Nation 
Warburton et al (1999) Departmental administrative data 
Parenting Payment Intervention Pilot 
Barrett and Cobb-
Clark (2000) 
 
Dockery and 
Stromback (2002) 
Randomised trial comprising 1,137 interviews in two 
waves (face-to-face then telephone) 
 
Analysis of longer-term impacts using Departmental 
administrative longitudinal data 
Workless Families Pilot (WFP) 
Cobb-Clark et al 
(2006) 
 
Three-wave (face-to-face and by telephone) survey 
using propensity scoring & quota sampling at 32 
intervention and 24 control sites, administrative data  
Australians Working Together 
Social Research 
Centre (2005a) 
 
Social Research 
Centre (2005b) 
 
Social Research 
Centre (2005c) 
Telephone survey of 600 Personal and JET Advisers 
 
 
2-wave longitudinal survey of 3,000 Personal Adviser 
customers + 40 face-to-face interviews 
 
583 interviews with Personal and JET Advisers 
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Authors Methods/sample 
Alexander et al (2005) Literature review and two waves of semi-structured 
telephone interviews with 60 PP recipients and their 
youngest child 
Welfare to Work 
DEEWR (2010) 
 
Departmental administrative data  and surveys, focus 
groups with jobseekers 
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Annex 5 – The Danish welfare state in relation to women from 
workless couples 
 
5.1  The Danish welfare state 
 
As with Britain, there were Poor Relief Acts in Denmark in 1798, 1802 and 1803 (Greve, 
2005: 29). Pre-First World War reforms established a path towards the modern welfare 
state and the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1907 enshrined the involvement of the 
trade unions in the administration of benefits.379 The next stage of reforms took place 
in 1933 at a time of high unemployment,380 changing the basis of entitlement from 
discretion based on charity to the notion of the individual with rights as a citizen 
(Greve, 2005: 36). Of key importance to the Danish welfare state are the principles 
established in the 1970s concerning the ‘income loss principle’ and the ‘whole family 
principle’ (Greve, 2005: 45). The former describes how benefits are paid at a higher rate 
for short periods, with a principle of discretion. With regard to the latter, ‚it was not 
enough to look simply at the person and discuss the individual client’s problem. It was 
necessary to look at the whole family’s situation‛ (Greve, 2005: 45).  
 
The Danish welfare model is reflective of the Nordic model, characterised by: 
comprehensiveness, universalism, individualism, the goals of both high employment 
and equality, high quality services, generosity of benefits and decentralisation to 
municipalities (Kvist and Pedersen, 2007: 101), but it has distinctive elements, such as 
its flexicurity model, comprising comprehensive social protection, a flexible labour 
market and activation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
379
 This built on the 1899 Constitution of the Danish Labour Market, an agreement between employers and 
employees. 
380
 The Public Assistance Act, the National Insurance Act, the Employment Exchange and Unemployment 
Insurance Act and the Accident Insurance Act Greve, B. (2005) Denmark - a universal welfare state, 
Roskilde: Roskilde University. 
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5.2 Danish labour market reforms 
Table A5.1: Labour market reforms in Denmark  
Reform Insured unemployed Social assistance 
recipients 
1978 Work Offer Voluntary early exit benefits 
scheme (efterløn) introduced in 
1979  
 
The Work Offer Scheme 
(arbejdstilbud, ATB) introduced in 
1979 provided right to a work 
offer in the form of job training 
with a salary, lasting for 9 months 
in the private sector and 7 in the 
public sector, qualifying the 
participant to a further period of 
unemployment insurance (UI) 
 
1980 Education 
Offer for long-
term unemployed 
(uddannelsestilbud) 
For long-term unemployed who 
had completed one work offer 
 
Paid benefits equal to UI 
 
1988 Activation became an earlier 
intervention in the duration of 
unemployment 
 
1993 Labour 
market reform I 
(implemented 
1994) 
Abolition of re-entitlement to UI 
via participation in activation – 
only ordinary, unsubsidised work 
qualified claimants for re-
entitlement  
Maximum UI duration reduced to 
9 years 
Stricter work availability – offer of 
suitable work after 12 months 
Introduction of Individual Action 
Plans 
 
1994 Service 
check of labour 
market reform 
(Budget 1995) 
Maximum UI duration reduced to 
7 years 
Stricter work availability criteria 
Adjustment of leave schemes 
Right and obligation to full-time 
activation after 4 years of 
unemployment 
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Reform Insured unemployed Social assistance 
recipients 
1995 Labour 
market  
reform II 
(implemented 
1996) 
Gradual reduction of maximum UI 
duration to 5 years 
Eligibility for UI increased from 26 
to 52 weeks of work within 3 years 
Right and obligation to full-time 
activation after 2 years  of 
unemployment 
 
1998 Labour 
market  
reform III 
(implemented 
1999) 
Maximum UI duration reduced to 4 
years, after which social assistance 
may be claimed 
Stricter work availability – offer of 
suitable work after 3 months 
Earlier right and obligation to 
activation – after 1 year of 
unemployment 
 
1998 Law on 
Active Social 
Policy replaces 
Law on Social 
Assistance 
 Activation extended to 
social assistance recipients 
2002 Labour 
market reform 
(More people 
into work) 
Abolition of demand for 75 per cent 
activation in the active period 
Minimum demand for activation 
every 6 months and introduction of 
intensive contract schemes at a 
minimum every 3 months 
Lower social assistance 
after 6 months for married 
couples 
 
Introduction of spouse 
supplement for member of 
married couple not 
available for work 
2005 Social 
Assistance 
reform (A new 
chance for all) 
 Introduction of 300 hours 
rule 
2006 Welfare 
Reform 
Agreement 
Earlier right and obligation to 
activation - after 9 months of 
unemployment 
Job counselling and availability 
tests every 3 months 
 
Source: Goul Andersen and Pedersen 2007, Kvist and Pedersen 2007 and Kvist et al 2008 
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Table A5.2: Summary of evaluation evidence for programmes in Denmark 
Authors Methods/sample 
300 hours rule 
Bach and Larsen (2008) 
 
 
Jensen and Lauritzen (2008) 
 
Interviews with 640 social assistance recipients 
affected by the 300 hours rule 
 
Questionnaires to Danish local authorities, 
supplemented by interviews with 10 authorities, 
combined with departmental administrative data  
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